Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal for failure to state a claim of an action filed by the Council, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on the ground that California's Proposition 12 violates the dormant Commerce Clause in banning the sale of whole pork meat (no matter where produced) from animals confined in a manner inconsistent with California standards.The panel concluded that, under its precedent, a state law violates the dormant Commerce Clause only in narrow circumstances. The panel explained that the complaint does not plausibly allege that such narrow circumstances apply to Proposition 12, and thus the district court did not err in dismissing the Council's complaint for failure to state a claim. In this case, even though the Council has plausibly alleged that Proposition 12 will have dramatic upstream effects and require pervasive changes to the pork production industry nationwide, the panel concluded hat it has not stated a violation of the dormant Commerce Clause under existing precedent. The panel stated that alleged cost increases to market participants and customers did not qualify as a substantial burden to interstate commerce for purposes of the dormant Commerce Clause. View "National Pork Producers Council v. Ross" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit concluded that the Commission did not act arbitrarily or capriciously, or abused its discretion, in denying the Association's motion to intervene in post-licensing deadline extension proceedings pertaining to the Eagle Mountain Pumped Storage Hydroelectric Project in California. The panel concluded that the Commission's interpretation of its Rule 214 deserves deference, and thus it may properly limit intervention in post-licensing proceedings. The panel further concluded that the Commission did not abuse its discretion in denying the Association's motion to intervene, where the only change sought by the licensee was an extension of time to commence construction.The panel also concluded that the Commission did not violate the Federal Power Act (FPA) in failing to provide public notice. In this case, based on longstanding interpretative precedent, the Commission determined that Eagle Crest's request was not a significant alteration of the License because the requested extensions were not inconsistent with the Project's plan of development or terms of the License. The panel concluded that the Commission's interpretation of Section 6 of the FPA is sufficiently persuasive as applied to deadline extension requests. Accordingly, the panel denied the petition for review. View "National Parks Conservation Ass'n v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint challenging USCIS's denial of her application for naturalization because the complaint did not plausibly plead that plaintiff had not been convicted of an offense that involves fraud or deceit in which "the loss to the victim or victims exceeds $10,000," 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(M)(i), and therefore had the requisite good moral character.The panel concluded that under the "circumstance-specific" approach to the monetary threshold in section 1101(a)(43)(M)(i), the district court is not limited to reviewing the record in the applicant's criminal case in determining the "loss to the victim." Nevertheless, the panel concluded that the complaint here cannot survive a motion to dismiss, because it does not plausibly allege that the loss to the victim of the applicant's criminal offense did not exceed $10,000. In this case, plaintiff failed to state a plausible claim that the total loss to the victim of her violation of section 550(b)(3) of California Penal Code did not exceed $10,000 and thus she failed to plausibly allege that she was not convicted of an aggravated felony under section 1101(a)(43)(M)(i) and USCIS did not err in ruling that she failed to meet the good moral character requirement for naturalization. View "Estella Orellana v. Mayorkas" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, of plaintiff’s diversity suit against the Public Group and Derek MacFarland, in his capacity as successor-in-interest to Michael MacFarland, plaintiff's late husband.The panel affirmed the district court's holding that plaintiff's claims, which seek modification of her divorce decree, fall within the domestic relations exception to federal diversity jurisdiction. In this case, plaintiff's requested remedy puts this case at the core of the domestic relations exception, and the eight claims she made against the Public Group also fall within the exception. The panel stated that a plaintiff may not evade the domestic relations exception simply by filing her diversity case against a corporate entity associated with her ex-spouse. View "Bailey v. MacFarland" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence. Defendant challenges his convictions for interstate domestic violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2261(a)(1), and use of a firearm in relation to a violent crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(c), arguing that the predicate offenses underlying these convictions no longer qualify as categorical "crimes of violence" in light of Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018). Dimaya held that the residual-clause definition of "crime of violence" in 18 U.S.C. 16(b) is unconstitutionally vague.The panel agreed with the government that defendant has not demonstrated that he was convicted and sentenced in violation of Dimaya and therefore fails to satisfy the gatekeeping provision set forth in 28 U.S.C. 2255(h)(2). The panel explained that the record and relevant background legal environment confirm that the district court's determination that Idaho assault and battery qualify as crimes of violence did not rest on section 16(b). Because defendant's section 2261 and section 924(c) convictions did not rely on section 16(b), the panel concluded that defendant's challenges to those convictions do not "rely on" Dimaya. Therefore, defendant's second section 2255 motion does not meet the gatekeeping requirements for a second or successive motion. View "United States v. Dade" on Justia Law

The Beef Promotion and Research Act of 1985 imposes a $1 assessment, or “checkoff,” on each head of cattle sold in the U.S. to fund beef consumption promotional activities. The Secretary of Agriculture oversees the program. The Montana Beef Council and other qualified state beef councils (QSBCs), receive a portion of the checkoff assessments to fund promotional activities and may direct a portion of these funds to third parties for the production of advertisements and other promotional materials. R-CALF's members include cattle producers who object to their QSBCs’ advertising campaigns. In 2016, the Secretary entered into memoranda of understanding (MOUs) with QSBCs which granted the Secretary preapproval authority over promotions and allowed the Secretary to decertify noncompliant QSBCs, terminating their access to checkoff funds. The Secretary must preapprove all contracts to third parties and any resulting plans. QSBCs can make noncontractual transfers of checkoff funds to third parties for promotional materials which do not need to be pre-approved. Plaintiffs contend that the distribution of funds under these arrangements is an unconstitutional compelled subsidy of private speech.The Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the federal defendants after holding that R-CALF had associational standing and direct standing to sue QSBCs. The speech generated by the third parties for promotional materials was government speech, exempt from First Amendment scrutiny. Given the breadth of the Secretary's authority, third-party speech not subject to pre-approval was effectively controlled by the government. View "Ranchers-Cattlemen Action Legal Fund United Stockgrowers of America v. Vilsack" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a motion brought by plaintiffs, four affiliated Chinese companies, seeking to dismiss an indictment charging violations of the criminal provisions of the Economic Espionage Act. The Pangang Companies moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that they are "instrumentalities" of the government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and are therefore entitled to sovereign immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA).After determining that it had appellate jurisdiction, the panel concluded that, in moving to dismiss the indictment, the Pangang Companies failed to carry their burden to make a prima facie showing that they are instrumentalities of a foreign sovereign within the meaning of the FSIA. In this case, the allegations of the indictment, standing alone, are insufficient to establish that the Pangang Companies were instrumentalities of the PRC on the date they were indicted. The panel explained that, because the Pangang Companies relied solely upon the indictment’s allegations, and presented no evidence to support their motion to dismiss, they necessarily failed to establish a prima facie case that they were foreign states entitled to immunity under section 1604 of the FSIA. Therefore, the motion to dismiss was properly denied. View "United States v. Pangang Group Co." on Justia Law

After Mathew Gordon died within 30 hours of being admitted as a pretrial detainee, his mother filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action alleging claims of inadequate medical care under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In a previous appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that inadequate medical care claims brought by pretrial detainees require a showing of objective, not subjective, deliberate indifference (Gordon I). The district court, on remand, granted summary judgment for the individual defendants based on qualified immunity and for the entity defendant on the ground that plaintiff could not establish a custom or practice sufficient under Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).The Ninth Circuit affirmed as to plaintiff's Monell claim and individual defendants Deputy Robert Denney, Nurse Brianna Garcia, and Sergeant Brian Tunque. However, the panel reversed and remanded as to individual defendant Nurse Debbie Finley. In regard to Finley and Denney, the panel concluded that the district court committed legal error by using a subjective standard in analyzing the clearly established prong of the qualified immunity test. Furthermore, in regard to Finely, the panel concluded that summary judgment was not proper because the available law at the time of the incident clearly established Gordon's constitutional rights to proper medical screening to ensure the medically appropriate protocol was initiated. However, in regards to Denney, the panel concluded that although it now holds that Gordon had a constitutional right to direct-view safety checks, that right was not clearly established at the time of the incident. View "Gordon v. County of Orange" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision denying cancellation of removal to petitioner.The panel incorporated by reference the factual and procedural background of Marinelarena I that conspiracy under California Penal Code 182(a)(1) is overbroad but divisible as to the target crime, and that sale and transport of a controlled substance under California Health and Safety Code 11352, is overbroad and divisible as to controlled substance. The panel concluded that Pereida v. Wilkinson, 141 S. Ct. 754 (2021), is consistent with Marinelarena I, and that Petitioner failed to establish that her conviction did not involve a federally controlled substance. In regard to divisibility, the panel noted that no developments in the California Supreme Court since Marinelarena I undermined the panel's earlier divisibility analysis, and that the jury instructions relating to the conspiracy offense, as well as petitioner's underlying statute of conviction, support divisibility. In regard to the burden of proof, the panel explained that Marinelarena I is consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Pereida and that petitioner failed to establish that her conviction did not involve a federally controlled substance. The panel declined petitioner's invitation to remand to present additional evidence. Finally, the panel reaffirmed its conclusion that a conviction expunged under CPC 1203.4 remains a "conviction" for federal immigration purposes. View "Marinelarena v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part in an action brought by parents and a student challenging the State of California's extended prohibition on in-person schooling during the Covid-19 pandemic. The panel concluded that, despite recent changes to the State's Covid-related regulations, this case is not moot.On the merits, the panel held that the district court properly rejected the substantive due process claims of those plaintiffs who challenge California's decision to temporarily provide public education in an almost exclusively online format. The panel explained that both it and the Supreme Court have repeatedly declined to recognize a federal constitutional right to have the State affirmatively provide an education in any particular manner, and plaintiffs have not made a sufficient showing that the panel can or should recognize such a right in this case.However, in regard to the State's interference in the in-person provision of private education to the children of five of the plaintiffs in this case, the panel concluded that the State's forced closure of their private schools implicates a right that has long been considered fundamental under the applicable caselaw—the right of parents to control their children's education and to choose their children's educational forum. The panel explained that California's ban on in-person schooling abridges a fundamental liberty of these five plaintiffs that is protected by the Due Process Clause, and thus that prohibition can be upheld only if it withstands strict scrutiny. Given the State's closure order's lack of narrow tailoring, the panel cannot say that, as a matter of law, it survives such scrutiny. Therefore, the panel reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment as to these five plaintiffs and remanded for further proceedings.In regard to plaintiffs' claims under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the panel concluded that the public-school plaintiffs have failed to make a sufficient showing of a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The panel explained that the challenged distinctions that the State has drawn between public schools and other facilities are subject only to rational-basis scrutiny, and these distinctions readily survive that lenient review. In regard to the private-school plaintiffs, the panel vacated the district court's judgment rejecting their Equal Protection claims and remanded for further consideration in light of the conclusion that the State's actions implicate a fundamental right of those plaintiffs. View "Brach v. Newsom" on Justia Law