Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in an action brought by plaintiffs, alleging that the Secretary violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) by failing to consider the environmental impacts of various immigration programs and immigration-related policies. Plaintiffs, organizations and individuals, seek to reduce immigration into the United States because it causes population growth, which in turn, they claim, has a detrimental effect on the environment.In regard to Count I, which challenged DHS's 2015 Instruction Manual, the panel concluded that the Manual does not constitute final agency action subject to the court's review under section 704 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Therefore, the district court properly dismissed this count.In regard to Count II, which asserted that DHS implemented eight programs that failed to comply with NEPA, the panel concluded that Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990), squarely foreclosed plaintiffs' request for judicial review of seven non-Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) programs. Therefore, the panel agreed with the district court that none of these programs are reviewable because they are not discrete agency actions.In regard to Counts II, where plaintiffs challenged DACA, as well as Counts III-V, which facially challenged categorical exclusions (CATEXs), the panel concluded that plaintiffs lack Article III standing. In this case, the panel rejected plaintiffs' enticement theory and "more settled population" theory; plaintiffs made no attempt to tie CATEX A3 to any particular action by DHS; plaintiffs offered no evidence showing that population growth was a predictable effect of the DSO and STEM Rules, as well as the AC21 Rule; plaintiffs failed to show injury-in-fact or causation concerning their challenge to the International Entrepreneur Rule; any cumulative effect analysis required by NEPA did not bear on whether plaintiffs had standing to challenge the rules; plaintiffs lacked Article III standing to challenge the sufficiency of the environmental assessments and findings of no significant impact issued in relation to President Obama's Response to the Influx of Unaccompanied Alien Children Across the Southwest border. View "Whitewater Draw Natural Resource Conservation District v. Mayorkas" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed defendant's new, longer sentence imposed after his successful 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion to set aside one of several counts on which he had been convicted. Defendant was convicted for multiple counts of conspiracy, harboring illegal aliens, and hostage taking, as well as one count of possession of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(c). The district court granted defendant's motion to vacate the section 924(c) conviction because hostage taking no longer qualified as a crime of violence in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015).The panel concluded that no presumption of vindictiveness applied because: first, the only reason a new sentencing occurred is that the district court itself granted defendant's motion under section 2255 to set aside his first sentence; and second, defendant's new sentence was imposed by a different judge than the judge who imposed his first sentence. The panel also concluded that the district court permissibly exercised its discretion and committed neither procedural nor substantive error in determining defendant's sentence. Finally, defendant did not otherwise demonstrate vindictiveness. View "United States v. Valdez-Lopez" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order granting the County and law enforcement officers summary judgment, holding that plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1983 action alleging a claim for excessive force was barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Plaintiff argues that her conviction after jury trial for violations of California Penal Code 148(a)(1) and her section 1983 claim are not necessarily based on the same transaction.The panel held that the relevant inquiry is whether the record contains factual circumstances that support the underlying conviction under section 148(a)(1), not whether the conviction was obtained by a jury verdict or a guilty plea. The panel concluded that Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689 (9th Cir. 2005 (en banc), and Beets v. City of Los Angeles, 669 F. 3d 1038 (9th Cir. 2012), controlled application of the Heck bar as found by the district court. In this case, viewed in light of binding circuit precedent, the record compels finding the jury determined that the arresting deputy acted within the scope of his duties without the use of excessive force, and that plaintiff seeks to show that the same conduct constituted excessive force. Therefore, the district court appropriately considered summary disposition of remaining legal issues under Heck and its progeny. View "Lemos v. County of Sonoma" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit vacated defendant's sentence imposed upon revocation of supervised release after he committed another crime. Under the advisory Sentencing Guidelines, the appropriate penalty upon the revocation of supervised release is greater if the new crime is "punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year." U.S.S.G. 7B1.1(a)(2).The panel concluded that the Washington offense of theft from a vulnerable adult in the second degree is not "punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year" when the statutory maximum sentence exceeds one year but the maximum sentence allowed under the State's mandatory sentencing guidelines does not. Therefore, the district court erred in determining that defendant committed a Grade B supervised release violation. The panel also concluded that the district court plainly erred in ordering defendant's sentence to be served consecutively to any other term of imprisonment. The panel explained that a district court may order a sentence to run consecutively to an anticipated state sentence, but not consecutively to another federal sentence that has yet to be imposed. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Agendia in an action alleging that the HHS wrongfully denied its claims for reimbursement for diagnostic tests under the Medicare health insurance program. Agendia contends that the denial was improper because the local coverage determination was issued without notice and opportunity for comment in violation of a provision of the Medicare Act—specifically, 42 U.S.C. 1395hh.The panel held that section 1395hh's notice-and-comment requirement does not apply to local coverage determinations, and that the district court erred in interpreting the statute otherwise. The panel rejected Agendia's alternative argument that the Medicare Act and its implementing regulations have unconstitutionally delegated regulatory authority to Medicare contractors by permitting them to issue local coverage determinations. The panel held that, because those contractors act subordinately to the HHS officials implementing Medicare, there is no unconstitutional delegation. View "Agendia, Inc. v. Becerra" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) dismissal of a putative consumer class action alleging that Trader Joe's misleadingly labeled its store brand honey as "100% New Zealand Manuka Honey." The district court agreed with Trader Joe's that its product is 100% honey whose chief floral source is Manuka, and that no reasonable consumer would believe that it was marketing a product that is impossible to create.The panel concluded that the district court did not err in determining that Trader Joe's Manuka Honey labeling would not mislead a reasonable consumer as a matter of law. In this case, the district court based much of its decision on the FDA's Honey Guidelines, which set the standards for the proper labeling of honey and honey products. The panel stated that Trader Joe's meets this standard. The panel also concluded that the district court properly held that Trader Joe's representation of "Manuka Honey" as the sole ingredient on its ingredient statement was not misleading as a matter of law. Therefore, plaintiffs have not alleged, and cannot allege, facts to state a plausible claim that Trader Joe's Manuka Honey is false, deceptive, or misleading. View "Moore v. Trader Joe's Co." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint alleging that defendant, a superior court judge, violated plaintiff's due process rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Plaintiff, an heir to the Disney fortune, alleged that defendant violated his rights by appointing a guardian without notice or a hearing, and violated the Americans with Disabilities Act by commenting (apparently with questionable factual basis) that plaintiff had Down syndrome.The panel concluded that most of plaintiff's claims are now moot after defendant removed the guardian ad litem and relinquished this case to another judge. The panel also concluded that, while defendant's statement may have been inaccurate and inappropriate, any claim challenging it is barred by judicial immunity. Finally, the district court did not err in denying leave to amend where all of plaintiff's proposed amendments were futile. View "Lund v. Cowan" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for municipal entities and officials in an action brought by a commercial charter business alleging that defendants violated the Rivers and Harbors Act (RHA), 33 U.S.C. 5(b)(2). The business alleged that the municipal entities and officials violated the RHA by imposing landing fees on commercial charters operating out of South Beach Harbor Marina in San Francisco Bay. The district court concluded that Congress did not intend the RHA to restrict the type of fees defendants imposed.The panel affirmed on alternative grounds, finding no indication that Congress intended to create a private right of action under section 5(b)(2). In this case, the panel applied Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), concluding that nothing in the statute's language, structure, context, and legislative history implied a private right of action. To the extent that plaintiff argues it cannot vindicate its rights if section 5(b)(2) does not include a private right of action, plaintiff overlooks that the reasonableness of the Landing Agreement is subject to challenge pursuant to the Tonnage Clause. Furthermore, even if there were no alternative mechanism for private enforcement, this alone would not require the panel to infer a private right of action. View "Lil' Man in the Boat, Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

An adult citizen lacks a constitutionally protected liberty interest, protected by the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, in the Government's decision whether to admit the citizen's unadmitted nonresident alien parent into the United States.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal, based on failure to state a claim, of a civil action brought by plaintiff, a Russian citizen, and his adult son, a U.S. citizen, challenging the government's decision to deny plaintiff an immigration visa.The panel held that, because plaintiff is an unadmitted and nonresident alien, he has no cause of action to challenge the visa denial, and his claims were properly dismissed. Where the son claims that his Fifth Amendment right to due process was violated by the denial of his father's visa because a consular officer allegedly denied that visa in bad faith, the panel agreed that the son's complaint pleads sufficient facts with particularity to raise a plausible inference that plaintiff's visa was denied in bad faith. Nevertheless, the panel concluded that the district court properly dismissed the son's claims because he does not have a liberty interest, protected by due process, in living in the United States with his unadmitted and nonresident alien father. View "Khachatryan v. Blinken" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's preliminary injunction ordering E.E.'s current educational placement as his "stay put" placement during the pendency of judicial proceedings in a suit brought under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).The panel concluded that the ALJ acted without legal authority in determining that E.E.'s potential future placement in the 2020 individualized education plan (IEP) constituted his current placement for purposes of E.E.'s stay put placement. Therefore, because the ALJ acted ultra vires, her stay put determination was void. Consequently, the parents' stay put motion did not seek to modify an existing stay put order, so the district court correctly entered an automatic preliminary injunction pursuant to Joshua A. v. Rocklin Unified Sch. Dist., 559 F.3d 1036, 1037 (9th Cir. 2009). Furthermore, the school district's proposed exception to the stay put provision is not supported by either the text of the IDEA or any other legal authority, and the panel declined to adopt it. View "E.E. v. Norris School District" on Justia Law