Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In a prior opinion, the Ninth CIrcuit held that SS Mumbai could not equitably estop SS Bangalore from avoiding arbitration. Mumbai, a non-signatory to a partnership deed that contained an arbitration provision, argued that, based on the arbitration provision, Indian law applied to the question of whether it could compel Bangalore to arbitrate.The Supreme Court vacated and remanded based on its holding that the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards does not conflict with the enforcement of arbitration agreements by non-signatories under domestic law equitable estoppel doctrines.On remand, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order denying Mumbai’s motion to compel arbitration. While a nonsignatory can compel arbitration in a Convention case, the allegations, in this case, do not implicate the arbitration clause—a prerequisite for compelling arbitration under the equitable estoppel framework. The court declined to apply Indian law because whether Mumbai could enforce the partnership deed as a non-signatory was a threshold issue for which it did not look to the agreement itself. The deed’s arbitration provision applied to disputes “arising between the partners” and not also to third parties such as Mumbai. View "Setty v.. Shrinivas Sugandhallayah, LLP" on Justia Law

Lopez, a member of the U.S. Army, Guam, worked at Andersen Air Force Base but lived off-base in territory subject to both federal law and the laws of Guam. Lopez was convicted of attempting to entice a minor to engage in prohibited sexual activity, 18 U.S.C. 2422(b)) and attempting to transfer obscenity to a minor under 16 years of age, 18 U.S.C. 1470.The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The district court erred in admitting into evidence edited video clips of Lopez’s post-arrest interrogation while categorically excluding the entire remaining interrogation footage as inadmissible hearsay despite the risk that the government’s selective editing would mislead the jury; the error was harmless in light of the strength of the government’s case. Section 2422(b) did not require the government to charge a predicate offense and to prove Guam would have had jurisdiction to prosecute Lopez for said predicate offense; the government presented sufficient evidence that Lopez attempted to entice a minor to engage in sexual conduct that is criminal in Guam. Although the district court should have instructed the jury on the applicable “laws of Guam,” Lopez cannot establish that the error affected his substantial rights. View "United States v. Lopez" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied Regency Air's petition for review challenging the FAA's decision affirming an ALJ's finding that Regency Air violated regulations requiring air carriers to test each employee for drug and alcohol misuse if performing a safety-sensitive function like plane maintenance.The panel concluded that Regency Air had adequate notice of the dispositive allegations against it, and thus it should have enrolled the first employee in its testing program but failed to do so. The panel also concluded that 14 C.F.R 120.35 and 120.39 are not unconstitutional as applied to the second employee where the employee's concurrent employment, while not addressed in the regulations, unambiguously falls within the regulations' plain text. The panel explained that the FAA chose to promulgate a general rule: if an employee works on an air carrier's planes, the air carrier must enroll the employee in its testing program. The FAA also identified only one narrow exception to this rule, inapplicable here. The panel further concluded that 49 C.F.R. 40.25 is not unconstitutionally vague as to whether Regency Air had to request the second employee's past testing records as an employee. The panel stated that, when an employer hires and becomes obligated to test an employee, it must request past testing records despite the employee's past work on the employer's planes in the scope of other employment. Finally, the panel concluded that the FAA acted within its discretion and established policy in seeking and imposing sanctions against Regency Air. View "Regency Air, LLC v. Dickson" on Justia Law

Joining five circuits, the Ninth Circuit took this opportunity to clarify that a district court must enforce the administrative exhaustion requirement for a motion for compassionate release articulated in 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A) when the government properly invokes the requirement.The panel affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motions for compassionate release under section 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), without prejudice to filing a new motion in the district court after exhausting his administrative remedies with the Bureau of Prisons (BOP). In this case, after defendant exhausted his statutorily prescribed administrative remedies with the BOP, the district court denied his first motion for compassionate release without prejudice on the merits. Defendant did not exhaust his administrative remedies with the BOP before filing a second motion for compassionate release. The district court did not address the government's exhaustion challenge and denied the motion on its merits.Because the government properly objected to defendant's failure to exhaust his administrative remedies, the panel concluded that the district court erred by overlooking the government's objection and addressing his motion on its merits. Nonetheless, the panel concluded that this error was harmless because the district court denied his motion on other grounds. Furthermore, defendant's arguments that he did in fact satisfy the administrative exhaustion requirement are unavailing. In regard to the first, properly exhausted motion, the panel concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factors weighed against defendant's release. The panel noted that, although a district court must perform this sequential inquiry before it grants compassionate release, a district court that properly denies compassionate release need not evaluate each step. View "United States v. Keller" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order denying plaintiff's request for attorney's fees after his successful Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) action seeking to obtain redacted information from the FBI regarding a 2016 search warrant. The search warrant investigated then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's email practices. Although plaintiff was a prevailing party eligible for attorney's fees under FOIA, the district court denied fees after balancing the four factors that inform the entitlement inquiry.The panel applied a deferential standard of review, concluding that the district court reasonably concluded that the FBI reasonably based its nondisclosure on the SDNY sealing order, and the district court also acted within its discretion in balancing the four entitlement factors. The panel explained that, whether obligated or acting out of comity for another branch of government, the FBI was reasonable to think the SDNY sealing order limited its ability to disclose information to plaintiff. Because the FBI's reliance on the SDNY sealing order was reasonable, the panel concluded that the district court's conclusion was reasonable too. The panel also concluded that the district court acted within its discretion in denying fees even though the first three factors favored fees and only the fourth disfavored fees. View "Schoenberg v. Federal Bureau of Investigation" on Justia Law

This action involves the 1997 settlement agreement (the Flores Agreement) between the United States and a class of minors subject to detention by U.S. immigration authorities. The district court issued two orders enforcing the consent decree incorporating the Flores Agreement. The orders enjoined DHS from detaining certain minors in hotels for more than a few days in the process of expelling them from the United States due to the COVID-19 pandemic (Title 42 Order).As a preliminary matter, the panel concluded that this appeal was not moot. The panel also concluded that the district court's second order (the September 21, 2020 Order) was a final decision for purposes of 28 U.S.C. 1291, and thus the panel has jurisdiction to review it.On the merits, the panel rejected the government's contention that the district court erred in concluding that the Agreement applies to minors held in custody pending their expulsion under the Title 42 Order. The panel concluded that it is clear that DHS, rather than the CDC, both maintains physical control and exercises decision-making authority over the minors held in hotels under Title 42. Therefore, the district court did not modify the Agreement in concluding that minors held under Title 42 are in DHS's custody for purposes of the Agreement or thus by applying the Agreement to those minors. The panel also concluded that nothing in the record establishes that the COVID-19 pandemic impedes or prevents the government from placing minors in licensed programs within three days. The panel need not decide whether the district court correctly applied the Agreement's "safe and sanitary" requirement because the September 21 Order eliminates the practical import of the district court's finding on that issue. Finally, the panel rejected the government's contention that the risk of harm to the United States and the public necessitates reversing the district court's orders. The panel explained that it has already held that the government has not demonstrated that complying with the district court's orders will cause irreparable harm. Accordingly, the panel affirmed the September 21, 2020 Order. View "Flores v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed defendants' convictions for entering the United States at a time or place other than as designated by immigration officers in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1325(a)(1). The panel held that section 1325(a)(1) does not violate the non-delegation doctrine, and is not unconstitutionally vague—facially or as applied. The panel rejected defendants' contention that section 1325(a) unconstitutionally delegates legislative power and that section 1325(a)(1) provides unfair notice or produces arbitrary enforcement. View "United States v. Melgar-Diaz" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of petitioner's habeas corpus petition challenging his Arizona death sentence. The panel applied the appropriate standards pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), and concluded that petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel at sentencing.In regard to Claim 1, the panel agreed with petitioner that his right to counsel was violated when his attorney failed to request a mental health expert in advance of the sentencing hearing. Alternatively, the panel agreed with petitioner that the PCR court used a defective fact-finding process with respect to his first claim when it denied PCR counsel's funding request for a defense neuropsychological expert, effectively preventing the factual development of this claim, and that the state court's failure to hold a hearing on his first claim resulted in an unreasonable determination of the facts. On de novo review, the panel concluded that counsel's errors prejudiced petitioner.In regard to Claim 2, the panel agreed with petitioner that trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective by failing to seek neurological or neuropsychological testing prior to sentencing, and that the failure to do so fell below prevailing professional norms at the time. The panel also agreed with petitioner's alternative argument that the PCR court's decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts under 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(2). On de novo review, the panel concluded that counsel's errors prejudiced petitioner. Accordingly, the panel remanded for further proceedings. View "Jones v. Ryan" on Justia Law

A Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim is precluded by section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) when the right or duty upon which the claim is based is created by a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) or resolution of the claim substantially depends on analysis of a CBA.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Columbia Export's action under RICO against the union and individual union workers. Applying Hubbard v. United Airlines, Inc., 927 F.2d 1094 (9th Cir. 1991), the panel concluded that the district court correctly determined that Columbia Export's RICO claims required interpretation of the CBA under which the workers were employed, that the CBA provided a process for arbitration of disputes, and that the LMRA precluded court adjudication of the RICO claims before the arbitration process had been exhausted. View "Columbia Export Terminal, LLC v. International Longshore and Warehouse Union" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of summary judgment to defendant in a putative securities fraud class action brought by a public pension fund that purchased bonds issued by defendant. This case arose on interlocutory appeal to address the scope of the presumption of reliance in Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972), in "mixed" securities-fraud cases that allege both omissions and affirmative misrepresentations.Because the panel concluded that the allegations in this case cannot be characterized primarily as claims of omission, the panel held that the Affiliated Ute presumption of reliance does not apply. In this case, plaintiff alleges over nine pages of affirmative misrepresentations that it and its investment advisor relied upon when purchasing the bonds from Volkswagen. The panel explained that, while this is a mixed case that alleges both omissions and affirmative misrepresentations, plaintiff's allegations cannot be characterized primarily as claims of omission, so the Affiliated Ute presumption of reliance does not apply. The panel remanded for the district court to further consider whether a triable issue of fact exists. View "Puerto Rico Government Employees and Judiciary Retirement Systems Admin. v. Volkswagen AG" on Justia Law