Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Ninth Circuit concluded that the IJ failed to evaluate the factors weighing in favor of granting petitioner voluntary departure. In this case, the IJ did not consider any positive factors weighing in support of voluntary departure, such as petitioner's arrival in the United States at a young age and his long-term residency without departure, even though the IJ mentioned these factors elsewhere in its opinion. Nor did the IJ mention petitioner's claims regarding mitigating circumstances with respect to his criminal convictions. Accordingly, the panel granted the petition for review and remanded for further proceedings.The panel concluded that, given the fear of starting a new life in a new country was petitioner's only stated fear, petitioner did not raise a reasonable possibility that he may be eligible for asylum or withholding of removal that would trigger the IJ's duty to inform petitioner of his apparent eligibility to apply for such forms of relief; the IJ did not err under 8 C.F.R. 1240.11(a)(2) by failing to advise him of his apparent eligibility for adjustment of status through U nonimmigrant status because U nonimmigrant status is not a Chapter V benefit; the IJ's failure to address the U nonimmigrant form of relief did not violate section 1240.11(a)(2); and petitioner failed to exhaust his claim regarding the IJ's duty to advise him of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) relief and the panel lacked jurisdiction to consider the procedural challenge. In regard to petitioner's statutory and constitutional claims, the panel held that the IJ did not violate his duty to sufficiently explore for all facts relevant to asylum, withholding of removal, and U nonimmigrant status, and to inform petitioner of what evidence he needed to establish these claims. The panel rejected petitioner's remaining arguments that the agency erred in failing to develop other bases for relief. View "Angeles Zamorano v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the 732 Hardy Way trust, the denial of summary judgment to the Bank, and the dismissal of the Bank's claims against the HOA in a quiet title action brought by the Bank, concerning title to real property in Nevada that was subject to a HOA nonjudicial foreclosure sale. At issue is whether the Bank, as the first deed of trust lienholder, may set aside a completed superpriority lien foreclosure sale on the grounds that the sale occurred in violation of the automatic stay in bankruptcy proceedings.The panel concluded that the Bank may raise the HOA's violation of the automatic stay provision and that the Bank has superior title. The panel explained that the Bank has standing under Nevada's quiet title statute, Nevada Revised Statute 40.010, and established case authority confirms that any HOA foreclosure sale made in violation of the bankruptcy stay—like the foreclosure sale here—is void, not merely voidable, Schwartz v. United States, 954 F.2d 569, 571–72 (9th Cir. 1992). Therefore, the district court erred in holding that the Bank lacked standing to pursue its quiet title claim in federal court. The panel remanded for further proceedings. View "Bank of New York Mellon v. Enchantment at Sunset Bay Condominium Ass'n" on Justia Law

Years after Starline and TMZ launched a joint venture to operate a celebrity bus tour together, TMZ terminated their agreement. TMZ and Starline brought their claims (and counterclaims) to arbitration, and the arbitrator ultimately issued the final award in favor of TMZ. After the Appeal Panel affirmed the majority of the arbitrator's award, Starline moved to vacate the award in district court, and TMZ petitioned to confirm the award. The district court denied Starline's motion and granted TMZ's petition. The Ninth Circuit subsequently issued Monster Energy Co. v. City Beverages, LLC, 940 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2019), interpreting the standard for "evident partiality" to warrant vacatur of an arbitration award under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).The Ninth Circuit concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Starline's Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) motion on the grounds that the arbitrators did not exhibit evident partiality by failing to disclose JAMS's prior business dealings with TMZ or its counsel. The panel also concluded that the district court likewise did not err when it declined to vacate the arbitration award on the grounds that (1) the arbitrator did not produce a form indicating she had no conflicts with the Boies Schiller law firm, (2) the arbitrator improperly granted an anti-SLAPP motion, or (3) based on her interpretation of California partnership law.However, the panel concluded that the district court clearly erred in concluding that JAMS provided a disclosure in accordance with Monster Energy, where JAMS declined to make such disclosure and instead asserted that the arbitrators no longer had jurisdiction over the arbitration. Accordingly, the panel remanded this issue to the district court to consider in the first instance how the parties can obtain from JAMS the information required by Monster Energy. The panel affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded in part. View "EHM Productions, Inc. v. Starline Tours of Hollywood, Inc." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision dismissing petitioner's appeal of the IJ's order of removal and denial of his application for cancellation of removal.The panel held that, in determining whether a conviction satisfies the thirty-gram limit of the personal-use exception to the ground of removability based on drug convictions, the circumstance-specific approach applies to determining the amount of marijuana involved in the conviction. Applying that approach to petitioner's case, the panel concluded that the circumstances specific here clearly establish that petitioner knowingly possessed more than thirty grams of marijuana. In this case, the police report is detailed, is internally consistent, and records observations of fact rather than the officers' conclusions. The report states that the "green leafy material" found in the three bags "tested positive for marijuana," and provides the precise weight of each. Given that petitioner did not specifically contest the measurements of quantity in the report, holding such a report to be insufficient would be essentially the same as holding that no police report is sufficient, standing alone, to demonstrate that a petitioner possessed more than thirty grams of marijuana. The panel declined to adopt such a categorical rule. Therefore, viewing the circumstances together, the evidence clearly establishes that petitioner possessed more than thirty grams of marijuana. View "Bogle v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit vacated defendant's conviction for importing controlled substances into the United States, and remanded for a new trial. At trial, defendant took the stand and testified he did not know the car he was driving contained drugs—what is sometimes referred to as the "blind mule" defense.During closing argument, the government compared the reasonable doubt standard to the confidence one needs to "hav[e] a meal" or "travel to . . .court"—without worrying about the "possib[ility]" that one will get sick or end up in an accident. The panel agreed with defendant that this improper argument, and the district court's failure to cure it, caused him prejudice. The panel explained that the ultimate issue at trial boiled down to whether the government proved that defendant knew about the drugs in his car beyond a reasonable doubt. However, the prosecutor's comments created an unacceptable risk that an honest, fair-minded juror would succumb to the prosecutor's personal—rather than constitutional—view of the government's burden of proof to obtain a conviction and therefore overlook his or her reasonable doubts. In this case, the evidence demonstrating defendant's knowledge was not overwhelming and the district court failed to neutralize the prejudice. Therefore, the panel concluded that it is more probable than not that the misconduct materially affected the verdict. View "United States v. Velazquez" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for PGE and the Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation of Oregon in a citizen suit brought by DRA, alleging that PGE was operating the Pelton Round Butte Hydroelectric Project (the Project) in violation of the Clean Water Act (CWA).The panel agreed with the district court that the Tribe was a required party, but disagreed on the question of the Tribe's sovereign immunity. The panel held that the CWA did not abrogate the Tribe's immunity and that the suit should have been dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19. The panel concluded that the inclusion of "an Indian tribe" in the definition of "municipality" (and, in turn, in the definition of "person") does not indicate—let alone clearly indicate—that Congress intended in the CWA to subject tribes to unconsented suits. The panel agreed with the district court that the Tribe is a required party because it has a legally protected interest in the subject of the suit that may be impaired by proceedings conducted in its absence. Therefore, the Tribe's sovereign immunity requires dismissal of this suit, in which DRA challenges the operation of a large hydroelectric project co-owned and co-operated by the Tribe, and located partly on the Tribe's reservation. The panel did not reach the question of whether PGE and the Tribe violated the CWA. The panel remanded with instructions to vacate the judgment and to dismiss the suit for failure to join the Tribe. View "Deschutes River Alliance v. Portland General Electric Co." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a habeas corpus petition challenging petitioner's Arizona state court conviction for attempted second-degree murder. In this case, the trial court misstated Arizona law in its instructions to the jury by implying that a defendant could be guilty of attempted second-degree murder if he merely intended to cause serious physical injury, not death. Furthermore, trial counsel failed to object to the erroneous instruction. Petitioner petitioned for state post-conviction relief, with the assistance of different counsel, but his counsel did not raise any claims related to the instructional error, and the state trial and appellate courts denied relief. The district court ultimately denied his federal habeas corpus petition, declining to excuse petitioner's procedural default of these claims.The panel declined to excuse petitioner's procedural default under under Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012), so that he could seek habeas relief on the basis of constitutionally ineffective assistance of trial counsel (IATC). The panel concluded that petitioner cannot satisfy Strickland's prejudice requirement for an IATC claim for failure to object to a jury instruction based on the consequent loss of a more favorable standard of appellate review. The panel also concluded that petitioner failed to demonstrate a substantial IATC claim, and accordingly, his procedural default of that claim is not excused under Martinez. View "Dickinson v. Shinn" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs challenge the district court's dismissal of three actions seeking damages under the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) against Google, Twitter, and Facebook on the basis that defendants' social media platforms allowed ISIS to post videos and other content to communicate the terrorist group's message, to radicalize new recruits, and to generally further its mission. Plaintiffs also claim that Google placed paid advertisements in proximity to ISIS-created content and shared the resulting ad revenue with ISIS. The Gonzalez Plaintiffs' appeal concerns claims for both direct and secondary liability against Google. The Taamneh and Clayborn Plaintiffs' appeals concern claims for secondary liability against Google, Twitter, and Facebook.In Gonzalez, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the presumption against the extraterritorial application of federal statutes did not prevent section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA) from applying to plaintiffs' claims because the relevant conduct took place in the United States. Furthermore, the Justice Against Sponsors of International Terrorism Act of 2016 (JASTA) did not impliedly repeal section 230. The panel joined the First and Second Circuits in holding that section 230(e)(1) is limited to criminal prosecutions. Therefore, plaintiffs' claims were not categorically excluded from the reach of section 230 immunity. The panel affirmed the district court's ruling that section 230 immunity bars plaintiffs' non-revenue sharing claims. The panel also affirmed the district court's dismissal of the direct liability revenue-sharing claims for failure to adequately allege proximate cause. Separately, the panel concluded that the TAC's direct liability revenue-sharing claims did not plausibly allege that Google's actions qualified as acts of international terrorism within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. 2331(1), and that the secondary liability revenue-sharing claims failed to plausibly allege either conspiracy or aiding-and-abetting liability under the ATA.In Taamneh, the panel reversed the district court's judgment that the FAC failed to adequately state a claim for secondary liability under the ATA, concluding that the district court erred by ruling that plaintiffs failed to state a claim for aiding-and-abetting liability under the ATA. The district court did not reach section 230 immunity in Taamneh. In Clayburn, the panel affirmed the district court's judgment and concluded that the district court correctly held that plaintiffs failed to plausibly plead their claim for aiding-and-abetting liability. Accordingly, the panel affirmed the judgments in Gonzalez and Clayborn, and reversed and remanded for further proceedings in Taamneh. View "Gonzalez v. Google, LLC" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit certified the following questions to the Montana Supreme Court: 1. Under Montana law, for a claim that accrued prior to the effective date of Mont. Code Ann. 27-1-308 (2021), may a plaintiff in a survival action recover the reasonable value of medical care and related services when the costs of such care or services are written-off under the provider's charitable care program? 2. For a claim that accrued prior to the effective date of Mont. Code Ann. 27-1-308 (2021), does a charitable care write-off qualify as a collateral source within the meaning of section 27-1-307? If so, does a charitable care write-off qualify for the "gifts or gratuitous contributions" exception under section 27-1-307(1)(c)? View "Gibson v. United States" on Justia Law

After selling two guns to a confidential informant and an undercover agent during a controlled buy, Parlor was indicted for unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Agents searched Parlor’s residence and found 21.63 grams of marijuana, $5,000 in cash, dozens of small plastic baggies, digital scales, and another gun. Parlor’s storage unit contained a semiautomatic rifle, a handgun, and ammunition. The handgun had been reported stolen. Parlor entered a guilty plea.The PSR noted two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense, recommended a three-level decrease for acceptance of responsibility, and recommended a two-level enhancement (U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(1)(A)) because the “offense involved” three-to-seven firearms, a two-level enhancement (2K2.1(b)(4)(A)) because one firearm had been reported stolen, and a four-level enhancement (2K2.1(b)(6)(B)) for possessing firearms in connection with another felony, drug trafficking. The Guidelines range of 121-151 months was reduced to the statutory maximum of 120 months. Absent the three enhancements, Parlor’s range would have been 57-71 months. Defense counsel did not object to the multiple-firearms enhancement. The court noted evidence that a gun was found in Parlor’s home, close to drugs and drug paraphernalia and that Parlor had “exchanged guns for drugs” in the past with the informant.The Ninth Circuit upheld Parlor’s 120-month sentence. The district court connected the various firearms to each other and connected Parlor’s possession of an uncharged firearm with another felony offense, drug trafficking. View "United States v. Parlor" on Justia Law