Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Susan Cox, a resident of Albion, Washington, died from an alleged overdose of medications prescribed by her primary care physician, Dr. Patricia Marciano. Susan’s husband, Mark Cox, and her estate initiated a wrongful-death and survivor action against Dr. Marciano and Gritman Medical Center after Susan’s death. The Coxes had lived in Washington, while Dr. Marciano and Gritman are based in Idaho, with all medical treatment having taken place in Idaho. However, at Susan’s request, her prescriptions were regularly transmitted by Dr. Marciano and Gritman to pharmacies in Washington, and Gritman engaged in marketing and accepted patients from the Washington area.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington dismissed the action for lack of personal jurisdiction over the Idaho-based defendants, holding that Washington’s long-arm statute did not reach them and the exercise of jurisdiction would violate due process. The district court also denied the plaintiffs’ request for jurisdictional discovery relating to general personal jurisdiction over Gritman, and did not address the issue of venue.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that the district court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over Dr. Marciano and Gritman Medical Center was proper under both Washington’s long-arm statute and the Due Process Clause. The court found that the defendants had sufficient minimum contacts with Washington, as they cultivated relationships with Washington residents and regularly transmitted prescriptions to Washington pharmacies in compliance with Washington law. The court also held that venue was proper in the Eastern District of Washington because a substantial part of the events underlying the claims occurred there. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case for further proceedings and affirmed the dismissal only as to one defendant who was conceded to be properly dismissed. View "COX V. GRITMAN MEDICAL CENTER" on Justia Law

A federal land exchange was mandated by the Southeast Arizona Land Exchange and Conservation Act, requiring the United States Forest Service to transfer approximately 2,500 acres of National Forest land, including Oak Flat—a site of religious significance to the Apache—to Resolution Copper Mining, LLC, in exchange for over 5,000 acres of private land. The legislation included requirements for tribal consultation, land appraisal, and the preparation of an environmental impact statement (EIS). Following the issuance of a revised Final EIS in 2025, several environmental and tribal groups, as well as individual Apache plaintiffs, challenged the exchange. Their claims spanned the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), and the Free Exercise Clause, alleging procedural and substantive deficiencies.Previously, the United States District Court for the District of Arizona denied the plaintiffs’ motions for a preliminary injunction, finding that they had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on any claims relating to the appraisal process, NEPA, consultation, or the National Forest Management Act. A separate group of Apache plaintiffs brought similar claims, including religious liberty challenges, which were also denied—particularly in light of circuit precedent established in Apache Stronghold v. United States. All plaintiff groups appealed and sought further injunctive relief pending appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial for abuse of discretion and affirmed. The court held that plaintiffs had standing and their claims were justiciable, but that none of their arguments were likely to succeed on the merits or raised serious questions. The court specifically found the appraisals and environmental review sufficient, the agency’s tribal consultation adequate, and the religious liberty claims foreclosed by circuit precedent. The denial of a preliminary injunction was affirmed, and all related motions for injunctive relief were denied as moot. View "ARIZONA MINING REFORM COALITION V. UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE" on Justia Law

A group composed of individuals, nonprofits, and businesses in Montana challenged the enforcement of a newly enacted state law, H.B. 359, which prohibited “drag story hours” and “sexually oriented performances” in various locations, including state-funded schools, libraries, public property, and certain businesses. The law imposed criminal, civil, and professional penalties, and also created a private right of action against violators. Plaintiffs contended that the statute violated their rights to freedom of speech under the First Amendment and to due process under the Fifth Amendment, both on its face and as applied to their speech.In the United States District Court for the District of Montana, the plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent state officials from enforcing H.B. 359 while their challenge was pending. The district court found that the plaintiffs had standing, as at least one plaintiff demonstrated a credible threat of enforcement and self-censorship for each challenged provision. The district court then applied the Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council standard for preliminary injunctions and concluded that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their First Amendment claims. The court found H.B. 359 to be a content-based and viewpoint-based restriction on expressive activity that failed strict scrutiny, and further determined the statute was unconstitutionally vague. The court granted a preliminary injunction, barring enforcement of H.B. 359 by the state defendants.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the appeal by the Montana Attorney General and Superintendent of Public Instruction. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order, holding that the plaintiffs had standing and that the district court did not abuse its discretion. The appellate court held that both the drag-story-hour and sexually-oriented-performance provisions are content-based restrictions on protected expressive activity and are not narrowly tailored to a compelling governmental interest. Accordingly, the preliminary injunction against enforcement of H.B. 359 was affirmed. View "IMPERIAL SOVEREIGN COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA V. KNUDSEN" on Justia Law

A national trade association representing large online businesses challenged a recently enacted California statute designed to protect minors’ privacy and well-being online. The law imposes specific requirements on businesses whose online services are likely to be accessed by children under eighteen, including obligations regarding data use, age estimation, and restrictions on certain user interface designs known as “dark patterns.” Before the law took effect, the association brought suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, arguing that several provisions were unconstitutional on First Amendment and vagueness grounds, and sought a preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement.The district court initially enjoined the entire statute, finding the association was likely to succeed on its facial First Amendment challenge. On the State’s appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated most of the injunction, affirming only as to a specific requirement regarding Data Protection Impact Assessments and related inseverable provisions, and remanded for the district court to analyze the association’s other facial challenges and the issue of severability under the Supreme Court’s clarified standards in Moody v. NetChoice, LLC. On remand, the district court again enjoined the entire statute and, in the alternative, seven specific provisions.On further appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the association did not meet its burden for a facial challenge to the law’s coverage definition or its age estimation requirement, vacating the injunction as to those. However, the court affirmed the preliminary injunction as to the law’s data use and dark patterns restrictions on vagueness grounds, finding the provisions failed to clearly delineate prohibited conduct. The court vacated the injunction as to the statute’s remainder and remanded for further proceedings on severability. View "NETCHOICE, LLC V. BONTA" on Justia Law

The case concerns a habeas corpus petition filed by an individual convicted and sentenced to death for the willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder of Janine Lee in California in 1993. The petitioner had worked with the victim and, after planning the crime, killed her for financial gain and subsequently attempted to cash her checks. Forensic evidence and the petitioner’s confession corroborated his involvement, including details about the killing, use of martial arts training, and subsequent events. Expert testimony at trial highlighted the petitioner’s mental health issues, drug use, and troubled social history, but the jury found him guilty and sentenced him to death.Following his conviction and sentencing, the California Supreme Court affirmed the judgment on direct appeal and summarily denied habeas relief. The United States District Court for the Central District of California denied the federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, but granted a certificate of appealability for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase. The petitioner sought to expand the certificate to include additional claims related to competency and juror bias.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of habeas relief. Applying AEDPA deference, the Ninth Circuit held that the California Supreme Court could have reasonably determined that the petitioner failed to make a prima facie case for relief on all penalty-phase ineffective assistance subclaims, including alleged failures to investigate, prepare witnesses, and rebut aggravating evidence. The court also rejected cumulative error and competency claims, and denied a certificate of appealability for juror bias. The panel granted a certificate for one penalty-phase competency subclaim but affirmed its denial. The district court’s denial of habeas corpus relief was affirmed. View "COMBS V. BROOMFIELD" on Justia Law

Two blind individuals, after enrolling at a community college in Los Angeles, were approved for disability accommodations, including accessible course materials and technology. Despite these approvals, they faced repeated barriers in accessing required textbooks, online platforms, library resources, and other educational tools. They also experienced difficulties in receiving their approved accommodations, such as accessible test-taking and note-taking support. These obstacles led to their inability to participate fully in their courses and, in one case, being steered away from certain classes due to their disability.After a jury trial in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, the jury found the college district liable on multiple counts and awarded damages for intentional violations of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The district court, however, reduced the damages to only out-of-pocket expenses, concluding that the jury’s award could only be for emotional distress or lost educational opportunities—both of which it believed were not recoverable. The district court also issued injunctive relief. The plaintiffs appealed the reduction of damages.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that, under Supreme Court precedent, emotional distress damages are not available under Title II of the ADA because the statute’s remedies are coextensive with those of the Rehabilitation Act and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, which do not permit such damages. However, the Ninth Circuit concluded that plaintiffs may recover compensatory damages for loss of educational opportunities resulting from ADA violations. The court found that the jury’s award was supported by evidence and the instructions given. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s remittitur, vacated its judgment as to damages, and remanded with instructions to reinstate the original jury awards. View "PAYAN V. LOS ANGELES COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT" on Justia Law

Federal agents investigated a fatal fentanyl overdose in Goleta, California, and traced the source to Isaac Tekola. They discovered that Tekola had been selling drugs for years, primarily from his apartment. A search of his apartment revealed significant quantities of fentanyl, cocaine, methamphetamine, and Alprazolam, along with nearly $13,000 in cash, drug paraphernalia, and evidence that drug sales occurred at his residence. Tekola admitted that the cash came from drug dealing, and that a safe in his closet was used to store drugs and proceeds. His cell phone contained numerous messages confirming that his apartment was the hub of his trafficking operation.A grand jury indicted Tekola on several counts of possession with intent to distribute controlled substances under 21 U.S.C. § 841. He pled guilty to all charges without a plea agreement. At sentencing, the United States District Court for the Central District of California applied a two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12) for maintaining a premises for the purpose of manufacturing or distributing controlled substances. Tekola argued that, because his apartment was his primary residence, drug trafficking was not a primary or principal use of the premises. The district court found overwhelming evidence that the apartment was used as the central location for his drug business and imposed an above-Guidelines sentence of 105 months.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s application of the Sentencing Guidelines for abuse of discretion. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in applying the § 2D1.1(b)(12) enhancement. The Ninth Circuit clarified that maintaining a primary residence as a central hub for substantial drug trafficking activity qualifies for the enhancement, even if the premises also serve as a residence, affirming Tekola’s sentence. View "USA V. TEKOLA" on Justia Law

A noncitizen applied to the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) for a U visa, which is available to victims of certain crimes who assist law enforcement. However, he acknowledged being inadmissible to the United States due to prior unlawful entries and removals, and sought a waiver of inadmissibility, which is granted at the discretion of the Secretary of Homeland Security if considered to be in the public or national interest. USCIS denied both his waiver request and his U visa application. He appealed the denials within the agency, but the Administrative Appeals Office dismissed the appeal. After the agency reopened and reconsidered his applications, it again denied both.The plaintiff then filed a suit in the United States District Court for the District of Idaho under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), challenging the denial of his waiver and U visa. He later amended his complaint to add a claim that USCIS violated his Fifth Amendment right to due process by exhibiting bias. The defendants moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court granted the motion, holding that the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) precludes judicial review in district courts of discretionary waiver decisions under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(14).On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s jurisdictional determination de novo. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal, holding that the agency’s denial of a waiver is within the discretionary authority specified in the INA and thus falls under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), which strips district court jurisdiction. The court clarified that the savings clause in § 1252(a)(2)(D) applies only to petitions for review of final orders of removal in courts of appeals, not to APA suits in district court. The court also found no colorable constitutional claim challenging agency procedures and thus lacked jurisdiction over that claim as well. View "CHAIREZ V. MAYORKAS" on Justia Law

The President issued an executive order in January 2025 suspending the entry of all refugees into the United States under the United States Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP), citing concerns about national capacity and security. The Department of State, in response, suspended and later terminated funding for both overseas and domestic refugee resettlement services, including cooperative agreements with resettlement organizations. Plaintiffs, consisting of affected refugees and resettlement agencies, challenged these actions, arguing that the suspension exceeded the President’s statutory authority and that the funding terminations violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the Refugee Act.Upon review, the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington granted two preliminary injunctions. The first prohibited enforcement of the executive order suspending refugee admissions and related funding, and the second required the reinstatement of terminated cooperative agreements with resettlement agencies. The Government immediately appealed and sought stays of these injunctions. The district court also certified three plaintiff classes and further clarified the scope of its injunctions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the President acted within his statutory authority under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) in suspending refugee admissions and in pausing decisions on refugee applications, and it reversed the district court’s injunctions to the extent they blocked these actions. The court also concluded that suspending overseas refugee processing and related funding did not violate the Refugee Act or the APA. However, the court affirmed the injunction as to the termination of domestic resettlement services, holding that the Government was likely acting contrary to law and arbitrarily and capriciously by failing to provide statutorily mandated resettlement services to admitted refugees. The scope of the injunction was upheld as compliant with recent Supreme Court precedent. View "PACITO V. TRUMP" on Justia Law

Two companies that operate app-based delivery platforms challenged a Seattle ordinance enacted in 2023, which aims to protect gig economy workers from unwarranted account deactivations. The law requires “network companies” to provide workers with written deactivation policies and mandates that these policies be “reasonably related” to the companies’ safe and efficient operations. The ordinance also delineates examples of impermissible deactivation grounds, such as those based solely on customer ratings or certain background checks. The companies did not contest the general bar on unwarranted deactivations but argued that the notice and deactivation policy requirements violate the First Amendment and that the ordinance is unconstitutionally vague.In the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, the companies sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the ordinance from taking effect. The district court denied their motion. It found that the ordinance regulates conduct (the act of deactivating accounts) rather than speech, and that any impact on expression is incidental. The court also concluded that the use of “reasonable” in the ordinance was not unconstitutionally vague, pointing to statutory context and specific examples for guidance.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of injunctive relief. The court held that the ordinance regulates nonexpressive conduct, not speech, and thus does not trigger First Amendment scrutiny. Alternatively, if the ordinance were seen as regulating speech, that speech would be commercial in nature, and the law would satisfy the lower level of scrutiny applicable to compelled factual commercial disclosures. The court further held that the ordinance is not unconstitutionally vague, as it provides adequate notice of what is prohibited. The disposition by the Ninth Circuit was to affirm the district court’s denial of injunctive relief. View "MAPLEBEAR INC. V. CITY OF SEATTLE" on Justia Law