Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A man with a prosthetic leg and wheelchair mobility visited a 7-Eleven store in California and encountered physical barriers that made access from the parking lot to the store entrance difficult. Specifically, the van-accessible parking was occupied, forcing him to park elsewhere and navigate a curb ramp with an excessive and uneven slope, which caused him difficulty and fatigue. After making a purchase, he filed suit against 7-Eleven under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act, alleging discrimination due to the store’s failure to remove architectural barriers where removal was readily achievable.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California held a bench trial. The court found that, during his visits, the plaintiff personally encountered several violations of the ADA Accessibility Guidelines related to the route from accessible parking to the store entrance. After the lawsuit was filed, 7-Eleven voluntarily remodeled the parking lot and entryway to comply with ADA standards, which mooted the plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief under the ADA. However, the court determined that a violation of the ADA also constituted a violation of the Unruh Act and awarded the plaintiff $4,000 in statutory damages.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that Title III of the ADA requires removal of architectural barriers where such removal is readily achievable, and that the defendant bears the ultimate burden of proving removal is not readily achievable. The court found that 7-Eleven’s voluntary remediation demonstrated that removal was readily achievable. The court also held that a plaintiff who personally encounters an ADA violation while transacting with a business has standing under the Unruh Act, regardless of litigation motive or intent to be a customer. The case was remanded for issues related to the substitution of the plaintiff’s successors. View "GILBERT V. 7-ELEVEN, INC." on Justia Law

A company based in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI), which provides computer and networking services, entered into a contract with a California-based distributor of Microsoft products. The CNMI company sought to purchase Microsoft software to fulfill a government contract. After a series of communications and assurances that the software would meet the CNMI government’s specifications, the CNMI company paid over $800,000 to the distributor, which then delivered the software directly to the CNMI government. The software did not conform to the required specifications, leading the government to cancel its contract with the CNMI company and request a refund. The CNMI company, in turn, sought a refund from the distributor, which offered a partial refund minus a cancellation fee. The CNMI company objected and filed suit alleging fraud, breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and unjust enrichment.The United States District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction over the California distributor. The district court relied on a then-binding Ninth Circuit panel decision, which was later vacated and replaced by an en banc decision. The district court did not address whether the claims arose out of the distributor’s contacts with the CNMI or whether exercising jurisdiction would be reasonable.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that the CNMI company alleged sufficient facts to establish specific personal jurisdiction over the California distributor. The court found that the distributor purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing business in the CNMI and purposefully directed its actions toward the CNMI. The court also concluded that the claims arose out of the distributor’s contacts with the CNMI and that exercising jurisdiction would not be unfair or unjust. View "SUPERTECH, INC. V. MY CHOICE SOFTWARE, LLC" on Justia Law

Isaac Contreras, a criminally committed patient at the Arizona State Hospital, was confined in an isolation cell for 665 days under the hospital’s “Administrative Separation” policy after a series of behavioral incidents. Emmanuel Walker, acting as Contreras’s guardian, filed suit in Arizona Superior Court against the State of Arizona and several officials, alleging that Contreras’s confinement violated his rights under both state and federal law. The complaint included two federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and five state law claims, including one under Arizona Revised Statutes § 36-516, which protects the rights of seriously mentally ill persons.After the case was removed to the United States District Court for the District of Arizona based on federal question jurisdiction, the State moved for judgment on the pleadings on the § 36-516 claim. The district court granted the motion, dismissing that claim, and did not enter partial judgment under Rule 54(b). To expedite appellate review of this dismissal, the parties jointly stipulated to dismiss all remaining claims, both state and federal, with prejudice. The district court then dismissed the entire case, and Walker appealed the dismissal of the state law claim.While the appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v. Wullschleger, which held that if a plaintiff eliminates all federal claims after removal, the federal court loses jurisdiction and must remand the case to state court. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a joint stipulation of dismissal functions the same as an amendment for jurisdictional purposes. The court concluded that the district court lost jurisdiction before entering final judgment and was required to remand the remaining state law claim to the Arizona Superior Court. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court with instructions to reopen and remand the state law claim. View "WALKER V. STATE OF ARIZONA" on Justia Law

A lawful permanent resident of the United States, who is a Canadian citizen, pleaded guilty in 2003 to one count of health care fraud after participating in a scheme involving fraudulent prescriptions and false Medicaid/Medi-Cal billing. The conviction, which involved a loss exceeding $10,000, rendered him removable from the United States. He claimed that his attorneys gave him incorrect or incomplete advice regarding the immigration consequences of his plea. Despite being informed by both the sentencing judge in 2003 and a U.S. immigration official in 2007 that his conviction could lead to removal, he did not seek to vacate his conviction until many years later.After removal proceedings began in 2008, the defendant waited until 2016 to file his first petition for a writ of coram nobis in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court denied the petition due to unreasonable delay, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed that denial in 2020, finding the delay between 2014 and 2016 unjustified. The first petition focused on the conduct of the attorney who represented him at sentencing.In 2021, the defendant filed a second coram nobis petition in the same district court, this time alleging ineffective assistance by three different attorneys, including the one who handled his first petition. The district court denied the second petition, finding it barred by laches due to prejudicial delay, as key witnesses had died and evidence had been lost. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the government was prejudiced by the delay and that the defendant failed to show reasonable diligence in seeking relief, given that he was on notice of the immigration consequences years earlier. View "USA V. KROYTOR" on Justia Law

A group of building engineers and craftsmen represented by a union worked at several stores operated by a large retail company. After the company and the union failed to reach agreement on a new collective bargaining agreement, the union members voted to reject the company’s final offer and began a strike. The company’s final offer expired, and after three months on strike, the union ended the strike and made an unconditional offer for its members to return to work. The company then locked out the union members who reported for work, stating it would not reinstate them until a new agreement was in place. The union filed a charge with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), alleging that the lockout was an unfair labor practice.An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) held a hearing and found that the company violated Sections 8(a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act by locking out employees without providing a timely, clear, and complete offer setting forth the conditions necessary to avoid the lockout. The ALJ recommended reinstatement and make-whole relief for affected employees. The NLRB adopted the ALJ’s findings, modifying the remedy to include compensation for any direct or foreseeable pecuniary harms resulting from the lockout.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed petitions from both the union and the company, as well as the NLRB’s application for enforcement. The court held that it had jurisdiction, found substantial evidence supporting the NLRB’s conclusion that the lockout was unlawful, and determined that the NLRB did not abuse its discretion in fashioning remedies. The court enforced the NLRB’s order, holding that the company’s lockout violated the Act because employees were not clearly and fully informed of the conditions for reinstatement, and that the NLRB’s make-whole relief, as ordered, was within its authority. The court denied both the union’s and the company’s petitions for review and granted enforcement of the NLRB’s order. View "MACY'S INC. V. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD" on Justia Law

A man with a prior felony conviction used another person’s identity to purchase a firearm and later used fraudulent identification to obtain a U.S. passport, which he used for international travel. He was indicted and ultimately pleaded guilty to making a false statement during a firearms transaction, making a false statement in a passport application, and aggravated identity theft. As part of his plea agreement, he waived his right to appeal his sentence if it was within or below the guideline range calculated by the court.After entering his plea but before sentencing, the defendant requested a psychological evaluation under 18 U.S.C. § 4241 to determine his mental competency, specifically asking that the examiner’s report be filed with the court. The evaluation was conducted by a Bureau of Prisons examiner, who informed the defendant that the results would be shared with the court. The report was included in the presentence report. At sentencing in the United States District Court for the District of Montana, the defendant objected to the use of the evaluation, arguing it violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. The district court overruled his objections, including those to a sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice and to certain supervised release conditions, and imposed a sentence within the guideline range.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the defendant argued that the district court’s consideration of his psychological evaluation at sentencing violated his Fifth Amendment rights. The Ninth Circuit held that the Supreme Court’s decision in Estelle v. Smith does not extend to voluntary psychological evaluations requested by the defendant and that the district court did not violate his right against self-incrimination. The court also held that the defendant’s waiver of appeal barred his remaining challenges to the sentence. The sentence was affirmed. View "USA V. DAVIS" on Justia Law

A prisoner at Kern Valley State Prison was involved in a disputed physical altercation with two correctional officers. The prisoner alleged that the officers used excessive force against him, while the officers claimed the prisoner initiated the altercation. After the incident, the prisoner was found guilty at a prison disciplinary hearing and later filed a pro se lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging Eighth Amendment violations. Over a year after the incident, the state charged the prisoner with battery and resisting an executive officer. The prisoner ultimately entered a nolo contendere plea to the resisting charge, expressing concern that the plea might affect his civil case.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California initially denied the officers’ motion for judgment on the pleadings, finding that the prisoner’s nolo plea was inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 410(a). However, after a change in presiding judge, the court reconsidered and granted the officers’ motion, holding that the nolo plea could be considered and that the prisoner’s civil suit was barred by Heck v. Humphrey, because success in the civil suit would necessarily imply the invalidity of the criminal conviction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that, in a § 1983 action where the Heck bar is at issue, a plaintiff’s nolo contendere plea is inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 410(a) to show that the plaintiff committed the charged crime. The court concluded that neither the plea nor statements made during the plea proceedings should have been admitted against the plaintiff in the civil case. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "KING V. VILLEGAS" on Justia Law

A Nigerian citizen sought relief from removal in the United States, claiming he faced persecution in Nigeria due to his ethnicity and membership in a separatist political organization. He described several violent incidents involving Nigerian police, including arrests, assaults, and threats to his life. After leaving Nigeria, he entered the United States on a visitor visa and subsequently married a U.S. citizen, later applying for adjustment of status based on that marriage. However, both he and his spouse admitted to immigration authorities that the marriage was fraudulent and entered into for immigration purposes, with the petitioner paying his spouse for the arrangement.The U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services denied his adjustment application and a subsequent petition under the Violence Against Women Act, finding insufficient evidence of a bona fide marriage. The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings, charging him with overstaying his visa and committing marriage fraud. During removal proceedings before an Immigration Judge, the petitioner denied the marriage was fraudulent and claimed his prior admission was coerced. The Immigration Judge found him not credible, primarily due to the marriage fraud and his inconsistent statements, and denied his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the adverse credibility finding and denial of relief, remanding only for further analysis of his fear of future persecution, which was again rejected after additional evidence was submitted.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and denied the petition for review. The court held that substantial evidence supported the adverse credibility determination based on the petitioner’s deliberate deception of immigration authorities, even though the fraud was not directly related to his persecution claim. The court clarified that such intentional deception can, by itself, support an adverse credibility finding under the totality of the circumstances, and the record did not compel a contrary conclusion. The denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and the motion to remand was affirmed. View "ANI V. BONDI" on Justia Law

A debtor filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Arizona, initially claiming exemptions for real property and a recreational vehicle under Arizona’s homestead law. The trustee objected, and the debtor amended his schedule to claim the same exemptions under Washington law. After the trustee objected again and the bankruptcy court sustained both objections, the debtor amended his schedule a second time, this time electing federal exemptions under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d), specifically claiming a homestead exemption for the real property and a wildcard exemption for the recreational vehicle.The bankruptcy court granted the debtor’s federal homestead exemption for the real property and the wildcard exemption for the recreational vehicle, even though the debtor had listed the RV under the homestead exemption rather than the wildcard exemption. The trustee appealed to the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, which reversed the bankruptcy court’s decision. The district court held that claim preclusion barred the debtor from asserting federal exemptions after his state law exemptions were denied and that the bankruptcy court lacked authority to grant the wildcard exemption for the RV because the debtor had not specifically claimed it.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment. The Ninth Circuit held that claim preclusion did not bar the debtor from amending his schedule to claim federal exemptions after the bankruptcy court ruled that state exemptions were unavailable, because bankruptcy procedure prohibits simultaneous claims of state and federal exemptions. The court also held that the bankruptcy court did not exceed its authority by granting the wildcard exemption for the RV, as the debtor’s claim was sufficient under the federal statutory scheme. The case was remanded to the district court with instructions to vacate its decision and remand to the bankruptcy court. View "WARFIELD V. NANCE" on Justia Law

Ajay Thakore, a resident of La Jolla, California, and owner of Gopher Media LLC, a digital marketing agency, became involved in a dispute with Andrew Melone and American Pizza Manufacturing (APM), a local “take-n-bake” restaurant. The conflict began after the City of San Diego converted parking spaces outside APM to 15-minute zones. Thakore, who frequented nearby businesses and allegedly had a financial stake in a competitor, was accused of parking for extended periods and initiating contentious exchanges. Thakore and Gopher Media sued Melone and APM in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, alleging harassment, discrimination, and unfair competition. Melone and APM counterclaimed, alleging defamation, trade libel, and unfair business practices, including claims that Thakore and Gopher Media orchestrated negative online reviews and made false statements on social media.In response to the countercomplaint, Thakore and Gopher Media filed a motion to strike under California’s anti-SLAPP statute (Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16), arguing that the alleged conduct constituted protected speech on a public issue. The United States District Court for the Southern District of California denied the anti-SLAPP motion. Thakore and Gopher Media then sought an interlocutory appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, challenging the denial.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, reviewed whether it had jurisdiction to hear an interlocutory appeal from the denial of an anti-SLAPP motion under the collateral order doctrine. The court held that such denials do not resolve issues completely separate from the merits and are not effectively unreviewable after final judgment. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit overruled its prior decision in Batzel v. Smith, dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, and remanded the case. View "GOPHER MEDIA LLC V. MELONE" on Justia Law