Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A mother, Aurora Regino, filed a complaint against the Chico Unified School District after the district began using her child's new preferred name and pronouns without informing her. Regino claimed that the district's policy, which allows students to be addressed by their preferred names and pronouns without parental notification, violated her substantive and procedural due process rights. She argued that the policy deprived her of her fundamental rights as a parent to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of her children.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California dismissed Regino's complaint, reasoning that she failed to allege the existence of a fundamental right that was clearly established in existing precedent. The court applied a standard similar to that used in qualified immunity cases, requiring that the right be clearly established in existing law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's dismissal, holding that the district court applied erroneous legal standards to the substantive and procedural due process claims. The Ninth Circuit clarified that a plaintiff asserting a substantive due process claim does not need to show that existing precedent clearly establishes the asserted fundamental right. Instead, the critical inquiry is whether the asserted fundamental right is deeply rooted in the nation's history and tradition and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court to conduct the proper analysis, including a careful formulation of the asserted fundamental right and an examination of whether it is deeply rooted in history and tradition.The Ninth Circuit also held that the district court erred in its analysis of Regino's procedural due process claim by requiring her to identify a fundamental right. Procedural due process protects all liberty interests derived from state law or the Due Process Clause itself. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Ninth Circuit's opinion. View "REGINO V. STALEY" on Justia Law

Robert Louis Carver pleaded guilty to charges related to two separate criminal schemes: a biotechnology investment fraud from 2004 to 2008 and a lighting company stock fraud from 2017 to 2018. The government filed indictments in 2011 and 2023, respectively. Carver's plea agreement acknowledged a total offense level of 20 under the Sentencing Guidelines but did not agree on his criminal history category.The United States Probation Office calculated Carver's criminal history score, including two points each for two 1994 California convictions, resulting in a total score of four and a criminal history category of III. Carver objected, arguing that these convictions were expunged under California Penal Code section 1203.4, which should exclude them from his criminal history under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(j). The district court disagreed, ruling that the relief provided by section 1203.4 did not amount to expungement under the Guidelines.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that under United States v. Hayden, convictions set aside under California Penal Code section 1203.4 are not considered expunged for the purposes of U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(j). The court rejected Carver's argument that Hayden was overruled by Kisor v. Wilkie, which modified the standard for deferring to agency interpretations of their regulations. The court found that Hayden's interpretation used traditional tools of construction and did not rely on the Guidelines' commentary, making it consistent with Kisor. The court also found that United States v. Castillo did not apply, as Hayden did not rely on commentary deference. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to include Carver's prior convictions in his criminal history score. View "USA V. CARVER" on Justia Law

Pamela Siino purchased a life insurance policy from Foresters Life Insurance and Annuity Company (FLIAC) in 2010. In 2014, she moved and failed to successfully update her address with FLIAC. Consequently, she did not receive notices about her premium payments and missed her payment due on January 26, 2018. FLIAC sent a notice on February 26, 2018, stating that her policy had lapsed but could be reinstated if she paid the overdue premium by March 28, 2018. Siino did not receive this notice and did not pay the premium. In 2019, she discovered her policy had lapsed and declined to reinstate it, purchasing a new policy from another provider instead.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California granted summary judgment in favor of Siino, declaring that FLIAC wrongfully terminated her policy and that it would remain valid if she tendered all unpaid premiums. The court found that FLIAC violated California Insurance Code sections 10113.71 and 10113.72 by failing to provide proper pretermination and designee notices. Siino's other claims were dismissed with prejudice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's finding that FLIAC violated the statutory notice requirements, agreeing that FLIAC failed to provide the required pretermination and designee notices. However, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's declaration that Siino's policy remained valid, as Siino failed to prove that FLIAC's violations caused her injury. The court noted that even if FLIAC had sent the required notices, they would not have reached Siino due to her failure to update her address. The case was remanded to the district court solely for the purpose of entering final judgment. View "SIINO V. FORESTERS LIFE INSURANCE AND ANNUITY COMPANY" on Justia Law

Gregory Gliner, a dual citizen of the United Kingdom and the United States, sought to identify the anonymous operator of the PoliticalLore.com website and the pseudonymous author of an allegedly defamatory article published on the website. Gliner intended to use this information for a defamation lawsuit in the United Kingdom. He filed an ex parte application under 28 U.S.C. § 1782 to obtain discovery from Dynadot, Inc., a California-based company that provided domain registration and privacy protection services for the website.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California denied Gliner’s application, citing the First Amendment interests of the website operator and the article author. The court did not make any relevant factual findings and did not address the statutory requirements or the Intel factors for granting discovery under § 1782. Gliner subsequently filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, which the district court also denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and found that the district court abused its discretion. The appellate court held that the First Amendment protections cited by the district court did not apply because there was no evidence that the website operator or the article author were U.S. citizens or present in the United States. Additionally, the court found no indication that the website had a U.S. audience whose First Amendment rights might be implicated. The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded the case for further consideration of the § 1782 statutory factors and the Intel factors. The district court was instructed to allow Dynadot and any affected parties to contest the subpoenas if issued. View "IN RE EX PARTE APPLICATION OF GLINER" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a nonprofit corporation and its founder, applied for a special use permit to conduct church activities on agricultural land they purchased in Maui. The Maui Planning Commission denied their application, citing concerns about traffic, safety, and environmental impacts. Plaintiffs continued using the land for non-agricultural purposes without permits, leading to fines. They applied again, addressing some concerns, but the Commission denied the second application as well.The plaintiffs sued the County of Maui and the Commission, alleging violations of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and other constitutional claims. The United States District Court for the District of Hawaii granted summary judgment to the County on most claims, except for the RLUIPA equal-terms claim, which went to trial. An advisory jury found for the County, and the district court entered judgment accordingly. Plaintiffs appealed, and the Ninth Circuit reversed the summary judgment, remanding the case for further proceedings.On remand, the district court severed an unconstitutional provision from the zoning law and proceeded to trial on the remaining claims. The jury found for the County on all counts. Plaintiffs appealed again, arguing that the substantial-burden inquiry under RLUIPA should have been decided by the court, not the jury.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the substantial-burden inquiry under RLUIPA is a question of law for the court to decide. Although the district court erred in submitting this question to the jury, the error was deemed harmless because the jury's verdict was consistent with the required legal outcome. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of the County of Maui. View "SPIRIT OF ALOHA TEMPLE V. COUNTY OF MAUI" on Justia Law

Bigfoot Ventures Limited brought a shareholder derivative action on behalf of NextEngine, Inc. against Mark S. Knighton, ShapeTools, LLC, and NextEngine. Bigfoot alleged that the agreement between NextEngine and ShapeTools was not intended to benefit NextEngine or its shareholders. Bigfoot had a history of litigation against NextEngine, including disputes over loans and intellectual property (IP) rights.The United States District Court for the Central District of California dismissed Bigfoot’s suit, finding that Bigfoot could not fairly or adequately represent the interests of NextEngine’s shareholders as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1. The court considered the ongoing litigation between Bigfoot and NextEngine, which suggested that the derivative action was being used as leverage in other lawsuits. The court also found that Bigfoot’s personal interest in gaining control of NextEngine’s IP outweighed its interest in asserting rights on behalf of NextEngine.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit clarified that courts are not required to assess each of the eight factors from Larson v. Dumke when determining plaintiff adequacy in a shareholder derivative action. The court held that the district court did not err in considering the ongoing litigation as an outside entanglement and found that the record supported the district court’s conclusion that Bigfoot was an inadequate plaintiff. The Ninth Circuit also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by vacating the trial to hear the motion to dismiss, as it raised significant issues that needed to be resolved before trial. View "BIGFOOT VENTURES LIMITED V. KNIGHTON" on Justia Law

Paul Osheske, a Facebook user, purchased a movie ticket on Landmark Theatres' website. Landmark Theatres, operated by Silver Cinemas Acquisition Co., shared the name of the film, the location of the showing, and Osheske’s unique Facebook identification number with Facebook without his consent. Osheske filed a class action lawsuit against Landmark, alleging that this disclosure violated the Video Privacy Protection Act (VPPA).The United States District Court for the Central District of California dismissed Osheske’s complaint, concluding that Landmark Theatres did not qualify as a “video tape service provider” under the VPPA. The court reasoned that the activities of selling tickets and providing an in-theater movie experience did not fall under the VPPA’s definition of “rental, sale, or delivery of prerecorded video cassette tapes or similar audio visual materials.”The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that the VPPA does not apply to businesses providing a classic in-theater moviegoing experience. The court determined that the statutory text and historical context of the VPPA indicate that the Act was intended to cover the rental, sale, or delivery of video products, not the provision of shared access to film screenings in a theater. Consequently, Landmark Theatres' conduct did not make it a “video tape service provider” under the VPPA. The court also noted that the district court’s dismissal without leave to amend was proper, as the complaint could not be saved by any amendment. View "OSHESKE V. SILVER CINEMAS ACQUISITION COMPANY" on Justia Law

John Holcomb was arrested after his ex-girlfriend, J.J., accused him of sexual assault. During the investigation, officers obtained a search warrant for Holcomb's computer, which led to the discovery of videos depicting child sexual abuse. Holcomb initially consented to the search but later withdrew his consent. A second warrant was issued, allowing a broader search of his computer, which included a provision to search for evidence of "dominion and control" without any temporal limitation. This search uncovered the incriminating videos.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington initially granted Holcomb's motion to suppress the videos, finding the "dominion and control" provision overbroad and insufficiently particular. However, upon reconsideration, the court applied the good-faith exception, citing the lack of clear precedent requiring temporal limitations for such provisions, and denied the motion to suppress. Holcomb then pleaded guilty but reserved the right to appeal the suppression ruling.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the "dominion and control" provision was invalid due to its overbreadth and lack of particularity. The court also determined that the good-faith exception did not apply because the warrant was facially deficient, and the plain view doctrine did not justify the seizure of the videos. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit vacated Holcomb's conviction and sentence and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "USA V. HOLCOMB" on Justia Law

SDVF, LLC registered a default judgment against Cozzia USA LLC in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California to enforce and collect the judgment. This judgment was originally entered by the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware. However, the Delaware Bankruptcy Court later vacated the default judgment.The U.S. District Court for the Central District of California dismissed SDVF's action to enforce the judgment, reasoning that the registered judgment was no longer valid after the underlying judgment had been set aside.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that a registered judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 1963 is not valid if the underlying judgment has been vacated. The court explained that the registered judgment relies on the existence of the original final judgment, and once the original judgment is vacated, the registered judgment cannot be enforced. The court also noted that neither Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure nor the court's inherent equitable power allows SDVF to challenge the Delaware Bankruptcy Court's ruling in the Central District of California. Thus, the district court's dismissal of the case was affirmed. View "SDVF, LLC V. COZZIA USA LLC" on Justia Law

Law enforcement had specific information connecting Robert Hamilton to an unlawful shooting. When officers located him two weeks after the incident, he fled. During the chase, officers observed Hamilton reaching for his waistband, leading them to believe he was armed. After tackling and arresting him, officers found a gun, marijuana, scales, and cash on Hamilton.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California denied Hamilton’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained from his arrest, concluding that the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop him and that his flight and actions during the chase provided probable cause for arrest. The jury convicted Hamilton of being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition but acquitted him of possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime. The district court also applied a sentencing enhancement for possessing a gun in connection with another felony offense.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decisions. The court held that the officers’ initial attempt to stop Hamilton did not constitute a seizure under the Fourth Amendment because he fled before they could do anything other than order him to stop. The court also found that the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop Hamilton and that his flight and reaching for his waistband provided probable cause for arrest. The court further held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in instructing the jury that the evidence was obtained legally and in applying the sentencing enhancement. The court affirmed Hamilton’s conviction and sentence. View "USA V. HAMILTON" on Justia Law