Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Ali Bahreman, a flight attendant for Allegiant Air, challenged the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between Allegiant and the Transport Workers Union (Union). The CBA required employees to either pay union dues or agency fees to maintain seniority-based bidding privileges for work schedules. Bahreman chose not to pay any fees and subsequently lost his bidding privileges. He argued that this arrangement violated the Railway Labor Act (RLA) by coercing employees to join the Union, deviating from the employment-termination remedy, and breaching the Union's duty of fair representation.The United States District Court for the District of Nevada granted summary judgment in favor of Allegiant and the Union. The court found that the CBA did not violate the RLA's anti-coercion provision, as it did not induce employees to join the Union. The court also held that the RLA does not prohibit collective bargaining agreements with terms other than those explicitly permitted by the Act. Additionally, the court determined that the Union did not breach its duty of fair representation, as it enforced the CBA equally among all members of the bargaining unit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the RLA does not prohibit a collective bargaining agreement that conditions seniority-based bidding privileges on the payment of union dues or agency fees. The court found that the CBA did not induce union membership, as it treated union members and nonmembers alike regarding payment requirements. The court also concluded that the CBA's terms were permissible under the RLA and that the Union did not act arbitrarily, discriminatorily, or in bad faith in enforcing the agreement. View "Bahreman v. Allegiant Air, LLC" on Justia Law

Karl Hansen sued Tesla, Inc., its CEO Elon Musk, and U.S. Security Associates (USSA), alleging retaliation for reporting misconduct at Tesla. Hansen, initially hired by Tesla, was later employed by USSA. He reported thefts, narcotics trafficking, and improper contracts at Tesla, and filed a report with the SEC. After Musk saw Hansen at the Gigafactory and demanded his removal, USSA reassigned Hansen, which he claimed was retaliatory.The United States District Court for the District of Nevada ordered most of Hansen’s claims to arbitration, except his Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) claim. The arbitrator dismissed Hansen’s non-SOX claims, finding no contractual right to work at the Gigafactory and no reasonable belief of securities law violations. The district court confirmed the arbitration award and dismissed Hansen’s SOX claim, holding that the arbitrator’s findings precluded relitigation of issues essential to the SOX claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The court held that while an arbitrator’s decision cannot preclude a SOX claim, a confirmed arbitral award can preclude relitigation of issues underlying such a claim. The court found that the arbitrator’s decision, which concluded Hansen had no reasonable belief of securities law violations, precluded his SOX claim. The court also held that the arbitrator’s findings on Hansen’s state law claims had a preclusive effect, as they were confirmed by the district court. Thus, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Hansen’s complaint. View "Hansen v. Musk" on Justia Law

Lloyd Gerald Napouk was fatally shot by two Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department officers after they responded to reports of a man behaving suspiciously in a residential neighborhood with what appeared to be a long, bladed weapon. The officers attempted to engage Napouk, who refused to follow their commands and advanced towards them multiple times. When Napouk came within nine feet of one of the officers, both officers fired their weapons, killing him. The weapon turned out to be a plastic toy fashioned to look like a blade.Napouk’s parents and estate sued the officers and the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, alleging excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, deprivation of familial relations in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, municipal liability based on Monell v. Department of Social Services, and Nevada state law claims. The United States District Court for the District of Nevada granted summary judgment for the defendants, determining that the officers’ use of force was reasonable as a matter of law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment. The court held that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity from the Fourth Amendment excessive force claim because Napouk posed an immediate threat to the officers, and no rational jury could find the officers’ mistake of fact regarding the weapon unreasonable. The court also held that the plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment claim failed because there was no evidence that the officers acted with anything other than legitimate law enforcement objectives. Additionally, the plaintiffs’ Monell claims failed due to the absence of a constitutional violation, and the state law claims failed because the officers were entitled to discretionary-function immunity under Nevada law. View "Napouk v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department" on Justia Law

Ahmad Abouammo, a former employee of Twitter, was accused of providing confidential information about dissident Saudi Twitter users to Bader Binasaker, an associate of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. In exchange, Abouammo received a luxury wristwatch and substantial payments. A jury convicted Abouammo of acting as an unregistered agent of a foreign government, conspiracy to commit wire and honest services fraud, wire and honest services fraud, international money laundering, and falsification of records to obstruct a federal investigation.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California presided over the initial trial. Abouammo was found guilty on multiple counts, including acting as an unregistered agent and falsifying records. He was sentenced to 42 months in prison, three years of supervised release, and forfeiture of $242,000. Abouammo appealed his convictions and sentence, arguing insufficient evidence, improper venue, and that some charges were time-barred.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed Abouammo’s convictions, holding that sufficient evidence supported his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 951 for acting as an unregistered agent of a foreign government. The court found that Abouammo acted under the direction and control of the Saudi government, regardless of whether Binasaker was a foreign "official." The court also rejected Abouammo’s statute of limitations argument, holding that the superseding indictment was timely under 18 U.S.C. § 3288. Additionally, the court held that venue for the falsification of records charge was proper in the Northern District of California, where the obstructed federal investigation was taking place.The Ninth Circuit vacated Abouammo’s sentence and remanded for resentencing, but affirmed his convictions on all counts. View "USA V. ABOUAMMO" on Justia Law

Ohio House, LLC operates a sober-living facility in Costa Mesa, California, within a multiple-family residential (MFR) zone. The City of Costa Mesa notified Ohio House that it was subject to Ordinance 15-11, which mandates that group homes with over six residents in MFR zones obtain a conditional-use permit and meet a separation requirement. Ohio House's application for a permit was denied due to non-compliance with the separation requirement, and its request for a reasonable accommodation was also denied.The United States District Court for the Central District of California granted partial summary judgment to the City on Ohio House's disparate-impact claim and denied Ohio House's post-verdict motions. The jury found in favor of the City on Ohio House's remaining claims, including disparate treatment, discriminatory statements, interference with fair housing rights, and reasonable accommodation. The district court also ruled that Ohio House's claim under California Government Code § 65008 was time-barred.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's rulings. The court held that Ohio House failed to establish facial disparate treatment as a matter of law because the City's group-living regulations facially benefit disabled individuals. The court also affirmed the summary judgment for the City on the disparate-impact claim, agreeing that Ohio House did not prove a significant, adverse, and disproportionate effect on a protected group. The court upheld the jury's verdict on the discriminatory statements claim, finding no unlawful discriminatory statements by the City. The court also affirmed the denial of judgment as a matter of law on the interference claim, concluding that Ohio House failed to prove a causal link between its protected activity and the City's actions. Finally, the court affirmed the denial of judgment as a matter of law on the reasonable accommodation claim, agreeing that the requested accommodation was unreasonable as it would fundamentally alter the City's zoning scheme. The court also upheld the district court's ruling that Ohio House's § 65008 claim was time-barred. View "THE OHIO HOUSE, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA" on Justia Law

The case involves Planned Parenthood and two physicians challenging the Idaho Attorney General's interpretation of Idaho Code § 18-622(1), which criminalizes performing or attempting to perform an abortion and imposes professional licensing penalties on healthcare providers who assist in performing or attempting to perform an abortion. The Attorney General issued an opinion letter stating that the statute prohibits medical providers from referring patients to out-of-state abortion providers. Plaintiffs argued that this interpretation violates their First Amendment rights by preventing them from providing information about abortion services in other states.The United States District Court for the District of Idaho granted a preliminary injunction, preventing the Attorney General from enforcing his interpretation of the statute. The court found that the plaintiffs had standing, the case was ripe and not moot, and the Attorney General was a proper defendant under Ex parte Young. The court held that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their First Amendment claim and would suffer irreparable harm without an injunction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs had established Article III standing, as they demonstrated a credible threat of prosecution under the Attorney General's interpretation. The case was deemed ripe and not moot despite the Attorney General's withdrawal of the opinion letter, as the withdrawal did not disavow the interpretation. The court also held that the Attorney General was a proper defendant under Ex parte Young due to his authority to assist in the enforcement of the statute. The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their First Amendment claim and affirmed the preliminary injunction. The request for reassignment to a different district judge was denied. View "PLANNED PARENTHOOD GREAT NORTHWEST, HAWAII, ALASKA V. LABRADOR" on Justia Law

Barry Ray Knight was convicted of receipt and possession of child pornography. He frequently downloaded child pornography using a peer-to-peer file-sharing network called BitTorrent. In January 2021, undercover officers downloaded files from Knight’s computer that contained child pornography. A search warrant was executed at Knight’s home, revealing over 3,100 videos and 115,000 still images of child pornography on his electronic devices. Knight was convicted after a bench trial and sentenced to 192 months in prison, followed by a lifetime of supervised release.The United States District Court for the District of Nevada imposed several conditions of supervised release, including a special condition prohibiting Knight from viewing or possessing any visual depictions of sexually explicit conduct involving children or adults. Knight did not object to this condition at trial but later argued on appeal that it was overbroad, relying on United States v. Cope. The district court also failed to orally pronounce the standard conditions of supervised release during sentencing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed Knight’s appeal. The court rejected Knight’s argument that the special condition was overbroad, distinguishing it from Cope because it only applied to visual depictions and not to materials describing child pornography. The court found no error in the special condition and concluded that it was not unduly restrictive. However, the Ninth Circuit vacated the standard conditions of supervised release that were not orally pronounced and remanded the case to the district court for reconsideration of those conditions. The court otherwise affirmed Knight’s conviction and sentence. View "U.S. v. Knight" on Justia Law

Dominic Dorsey was convicted of multiple federal crimes related to a series of robberies committed by two disguised men. The evidence at trial included surveillance video footage of the robberies. A police detective, who had extensively reviewed the surveillance video, testified as a lay witness about details in the video that the jury might have missed. The detective also identified Dorsey and his co-defendant, Reginald Bailey, as the disguised robbers based on his comparison of the video footage and still images.The United States District Court for the Central District of California admitted the detective's testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 701, which allows lay opinion testimony if it is helpful to determining a fact in issue. The jury found Dorsey guilty on all charges, and he was sentenced to 40 years in prison. Dorsey appealed, challenging the admissibility of the detective's identification testimony.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the detective's narrative testimony about the details in the surveillance video was admissible because it helped the jury understand the evidence. However, the court found that the detective's identification of Dorsey and Bailey as the robbers was inadmissible under Rule 701. The court reasoned that the detective's identification opinions were not helpful because they were based on evidence already before the jury, and the detective did not have personal knowledge or experience that would make his identification more reliable than the jury's own assessment.Despite this error, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the admission of the detective's identification testimony was harmless. The court noted that there was overwhelming evidence of Dorsey's guilt, including witness testimony, cell phone records, and other corroborating evidence. Therefore, the court affirmed Dorsey's conviction. View "USA V. DORSEY" on Justia Law

Windy Cove, Inc., HB Fuels, Inc., and Staffing and Management Group, Inc. (collectively “Windy Cove”) are gasoline dealers who own Mobil-branded stations in southern California. In 2012, they entered into a 15-year exclusive fuel supply agreement with Circle K Stores Inc. as required by the agreement under which they purchased their gas stations from ExxonMobil. Windy Cove alleged that Circle K did not set gasoline prices in good faith under this exclusive distributorship contract.The United States District Court for the Southern District of California granted summary judgment in favor of Circle K. The court found that the prices charged by Circle K were within the range of those charged by its competitors, including at least one refiner, and thus were set in good faith under California Commercial Code § 2305(2). Windy Cove failed to provide evidence that Circle K's prices were discriminatory or commercially unreasonable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s summary judgment, holding that Circle K’s prices were presumptively set in good faith because the contract had a “price in effect” term. The court noted that the safe harbor provision under Uniform Commercial Code § 2-305, which is codified as California Commercial Code § 2305(2), presumes good faith if the prices are within the range of those charged by competitors. The court found that Circle K’s prices were lower than at least one refiner, thus falling within the range of prices charged by competitors. Windy Cove’s arguments regarding Circle K’s use of a non-industry-standard pricing formula and higher prices compared to other wholesalers did not rebut the presumption of good faith. The court concluded that summary judgment was appropriate and affirmed the district court’s decision. View "WINDY COVE, INC. V. CIRCLE K STORES INC." on Justia Law

The case involves Idaho's abortion trafficking statute, Idaho Code §18-623, which criminalizes procuring an abortion or obtaining an abortion-inducing drug for an unemancipated minor by recruiting, harboring, or transporting the minor with the intent to conceal the abortion from the minor’s parents or guardian. Plaintiffs, including an Idaho attorney and two advocacy organizations, sought to counsel pregnant minors and provide material support for accessing legal abortions in other states. They challenged the statute, arguing it violated the First Amendment and was void for vagueness.The United States District Court for the District of Idaho granted a preliminary injunction against the statute, finding that the plaintiffs had standing and that the Idaho attorney general was a proper defendant under Ex parte Young. The court concluded that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their First Amendment and void-for-vagueness claims. The district court also partially granted and denied Idaho’s motion to dismiss, dismissing only the claim regarding the right to intrastate travel.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s finding that the plaintiffs had standing and that the Idaho attorney general was a proper defendant. The Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on their claims that the statute was void for vagueness or that it infringed on their rights to expressive association. However, the court found that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their claim that the statute’s “recruiting” prong unconstitutionally infringed on their protected speech. The court determined that the “recruiting” provision was overbroad and could be severed from the rest of the statute. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction against enforcing the “recruiting” prong but reversed the district court’s decision regarding the other claims and remanded for modification of the preliminary injunction. View "Matsumoto v. Labrador" on Justia Law