Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

This case involves several dialysis providers, a nonprofit organization, and individual patients challenging a California law (AB 290) aimed at regulating relationships between dialysis providers and nonprofits that assist patients with health insurance premiums. The law was enacted due to concerns that providers were donating to nonprofits to help keep patients on private insurance, which led to higher reimbursements for providers compared to public insurance. Key provisions of the law included capping provider reimbursements if they had a financial relationship with a nonprofit offering patient assistance, requiring disclosure of patients receiving such assistance, restricting nonprofits from conditioning assistance on patient treatment choices, mandating disclosure to patients of all insurance options, and a safe harbor for seeking federal advisory opinions.The United States District Court for the Central District of California granted in part and denied in part motions for summary judgment. It upheld the constitutionality of the reimbursement cap, coverage disclosure requirement, and safe harbor provision, but found the anti-steering, patient disclosure, and financial assistance restriction provisions unconstitutional. The district court also ruled that the unconstitutional parts were severable from the remainder of the statute and rejected claims that federal law preempted the state law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the reimbursement cap, patient disclosure requirement, and financial assistance restriction violated the First Amendment because they burdened the rights of expressive association and were not narrowly tailored to serve the state’s interests. The court found the coverage disclosure requirement constitutional under the standard for compelled commercial speech, as it required only factual, uncontroversial information reasonably related to a state interest. However, it concluded that the unconstitutional provisions were not severable from the coverage disclosure requirement. The court also held challenges to the safe harbor provision moot. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and each party was ordered to bear its own costs. View "DOE V. BONTA" on Justia Law

A former employee filed a qui tam action under the False Claims Act against her former employer, alleging that the company falsely certified compliance with federal mortgage program requirements. The Department of Housing and Urban Development would be responsible for defaulted loans under this program. The relator’s attorneys conducted an extensive investigation, including interviewing former employees, after the government declined to intervene and later sought to dismiss the action. Despite these challenges, the relator’s attorneys successfully opposed the motions to dismiss, and the case proceeded. The litigation ultimately resulted in a settlement exceeding $38 million, with the relator and her attorneys receiving a portion of the recovery.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California calculated attorneys’ fees using the lodestar method, finding the hourly rates and hours reasonable, and arrived at a lodestar amount of approximately $4.37 million for the relator’s main counsel. The district court then awarded a 1.75 multiplier, increasing the fee award to over $8.5 million. The court justified the enhancement by citing the “exceptional result” achieved—surviving dismissal against both the government and the employer—and the attorneys’ investigative efforts, but did not provide a detailed rationale for choosing the 1.75 figure.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the district court abused its discretion by awarding a multiplier above the lodestar because the factors cited for the enhancement—exceptional results and investigative work—were already reflected in the lodestar calculation. The Ninth Circuit further found that the district court failed to provide a sufficiently reasoned explanation for selecting a 1.75 multiplier. The court reversed the enhanced fee award and remanded for further proceedings. View "THROWER V. ACADEMY MORTGAGE CORPORATION" on Justia Law

A former mortgage underwriter sued her employer under the False Claims Act, alleging that the company submitted false certifications in a federal mortgage insurance program. The government declined to intervene and unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the case. After years of litigation, the parties reached a settlement: the employer agreed to pay $38.5 million, with a portion going to the plaintiff and the remainder to the United States Treasury. The settlement specifically excluded the plaintiff’s claims for attorneys’ fees, expenses, and costs, leaving them unresolved.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California approved the settlement in January 2023, dismissing the substantive claims but expressly keeping the attorneys’ fees issue pending. Months of disputes ensued over the amount of attorneys’ fees. In May 2024, the district court awarded the plaintiff over $8.5 million in attorneys’ fees and approximately $89,000 in expenses. The plaintiff argued that postjudgment interest on these amounts should accrue from the date of the settlement approval, since her entitlement to fees was established then. The district court disagreed, holding that interest should only begin to accrue from the date the fees were actually awarded.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that postjudgment interest under 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a) accrues only from the entry of a “money judgment,” which requires both identification of the parties and a definite, ascertainable amount owed. Because the district court’s earlier order approving the settlement did not specify the amount of attorneys’ fees, it was not a “money judgment.” Therefore, interest begins accruing only from the order that set the fee amount. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. View "THROWER V. ACADEMY MORTGAGE CORPORATION" on Justia Law

A woman born in Soviet Armenia immigrated to the United States as a child and was later convicted of grand theft in California. In 2011, she was ordered removed based on this conviction. However, because Armenia did not accept individuals born during the Soviet era, she was considered “stateless” and not deported. She lived in the United States under supervision, checking in annually with immigration authorities. In 2018, she was informed that Armenia had begun accepting such individuals, which placed her at immediate risk of removal. She promptly retained counsel, who identified grounds to vacate her conviction due to a procedural defect, and the conviction was vacated in May 2019.Following the vacatur, she filed a motion to reopen her removal proceedings, but the Immigration Judge denied it, finding she had not explained why she waited over two years after the relevant California statute became effective to seek vacatur. She then filed a second motion to reopen, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel because her counsel in the first motion failed to present facts or arguments about her diligence. The Immigration Judge denied the second motion as number-barred, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed her appeal, finding she had not demonstrated due diligence and thus was not entitled to equitable tolling.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the BIA applied the wrong standard in assessing diligence for stateless individuals. The Ninth Circuit concluded that it is reasonable for someone in her position to begin challenging removability only upon learning they are at risk of removal. The court found she acted with due diligence after learning of her removability and that the BIA abused its discretion in finding otherwise. The court granted her petition for review, vacated the BIA’s decision, and remanded for further proceedings. View "ESKILIAN V. BONDI" on Justia Law

During the summer of 2025, protests erupted in Southern California in response to federal immigration raids. Protesters, legal observers, and journalists alleged that officers of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), including agents from Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the Federal Protective Services, and Customs and Border Protection, used crowd control weapons indiscriminately against them. Multiple individuals, including members of the press and protesters, suffered significant physical injuries during these events, even when they were complying with police orders or were not near disruptive protest activity.Several individual journalists, legal observers, protesters, and two press organizations filed suit in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. They alleged violations of their First Amendment rights, specifically the right to be free from retaliation for engaging in protected activities and the right of public access to protests. The district court issued a preliminary injunction to protect the rights of protesters, journalists, and legal observers, finding that the defendants’ conduct chilled First Amendment activity. The government appealed, arguing that the injunction was overly broad and legally unsound.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their First Amendment retaliation claims, that both individual and organizational plaintiffs had standing, and that the other requirements for a preliminary injunction were met. However, the court found that the scope of the injunction was overbroad because it extended relief to non-parties and included provisions not narrowly tailored to the specific harms alleged. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to issue a preliminary injunction but vacated and remanded the case for the district court to craft a narrower injunction consistent with its opinion. View "LOS ANGELES PRESS CLUB V. NOEM" on Justia Law

Former employees of a travel-nursing agency brought a putative class action against the agency, alleging wage-related violations. Each employee had signed an arbitration agreement with the agency that contained a delegation clause requiring an arbitrator—not a court—to decide on the validity of the agreement. Four initial plaintiffs had their disputes sent to arbitration: two arbitrators found the agreements valid, while two found them invalid due to unconscionable fee and venue provisions.After these initial arbitrations, the United States District Court for the Southern District of California confirmed three out of four arbitral awards. At this stage, an additional 255 employees joined the action as opt-in plaintiffs under the Fair Labor Standards Act. The agency moved to compel arbitration for these additional plaintiffs under their individual agreements. However, a different district judge raised the issue of whether non-mutual offensive collateral estoppel barred the enforcement of the arbitration agreements. After briefing, the district court denied the agency’s motion, concluding that the two arbitral awards finding the agreements invalid precluded arbitration for all 255 employees, effectively rendering their agreements unenforceable.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment. The Ninth Circuit held that the application of non-mutual offensive collateral estoppel to preclude the enforcement of arbitration agreements is incompatible with the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). The court reasoned that such an approach undermined the principle of individualized arbitration and the parties’ consent, which are fundamental to the FAA. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the FAA does not permit using non-mutual offensive collateral estoppel to invalidate arbitration agreements and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "O'DELL V. AYA HEALTHCARE SERVICES, INC." on Justia Law

A citizen of Mexico was the beneficiary of an approved family-sponsored immigrant visa petition filed by his mother in 1992, which was approved in 1993. He did not apply for lawful permanent resident status at that time. In 2000, he was deemed inadmissible at the United States-Mexico border, ordered removed, and was actually removed. He reentered the United States without inspection shortly thereafter. In 2017, his wife filed a new immigrant visa petition on his behalf, which was approved, and he applied for adjustment of status. During a 2018 interview regarding that application, he admitted to being illegally present and previously removed, after which he was arrested and DHS began proceedings to reinstate his prior removal order.After the Department of Homeland Security reinstated his prior removal order, the petitioner sought review by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. DHS identified a procedural error in the initial reinstatement (an unsigned section), canceled the order, and began the process again. At the second reinstatement proceeding, the petitioner was advised of his rights but declined to make a statement or sign the acknowledgment form. DHS reinstated the removal order, and he again appealed to the Ninth Circuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied the petition for review. The court held that it was not impermissibly retroactive to apply the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996’s reinstatement provision to the petitioner because he had not taken any affirmative steps to adjust his status before the law took effect. The court further held that, to obtain relief for a due process violation based on denial of a right to counsel in reinstatement proceedings, an alien must show prejudice, and the petitioner failed to establish such prejudice. The petition was denied. View "RUIZ V. BONDI" on Justia Law

The case concerns an individual convicted of two counts of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine and one count of conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance, stemming from a 2018 indictment related to the sale of methamphetamine. At sentencing, the district court classified him as a career offender under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, based on two prior convictions: one federal conviction for distribution of cocaine and one Nevada state conviction for the sale of controlled substances under Nevada Revised Statute § 453.321(1)(a). This classification resulted in a higher sentencing range, and he ultimately received a sentence of 235 months, substantially longer than a similarly situated co-defendant.After his direct appeal was unsuccessful, he filed a pro se motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the United States District Court for the District of Idaho, arguing that his prior Nevada conviction was not a qualifying “controlled substance offense” for the purposes of the career offender enhancement. The district court held that this claim was procedurally barred because it was not raised on direct appeal, and alternatively found that the prior conviction did qualify as a predicate offense.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that there was cause and prejudice to excuse the procedural default, finding that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the career offender enhancement, and that this failure prejudiced the outcome. On the merits, the Ninth Circuit determined that the relevant Nevada statute is indivisible and overbroad, and therefore, his conviction under that statute cannot serve as a predicate offense for career offender status under the Guidelines. The court reversed the district court’s dismissal of the § 2255 motion and remanded for resentencing. View "USA V. CASILDO" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of attempting to kidnap a federal officer and assaulting a family member of a federal official. During sentencing in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, the court heard arguments from counsel for both the defense and the government, but did not ask the defendant if he wished to speak personally before sentencing—a procedural requirement known as allocution, mandated by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.Shortly after imposing concurrent maximum sentences for both counts, the government realized the allocution right had been overlooked and promptly moved to reopen sentencing under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(a), which allows correction of “arithmetical, technical, or other clear error” within 14 days of sentencing. The district court granted the government’s motion over the defendant’s objection, vacated the original sentence, and set a new sentencing hearing. At the subsequent hearing, the defendant was allowed to address the court and allocute. The district court then reimposed the same sentences as before.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered whether the district court had the authority to correct its failure to afford allocution by reopening sentencing under Rule 35(a). The Ninth Circuit held that the failure to allow a defendant the right to allocute under Rule 32 constitutes “other clear error” correctable under Rule 35(a). The court concluded that resentencing after a belated allocution is permissible under Rule 35(a), even if it requires the exercise of judicial discretion. The Ninth Circuit therefore affirmed the sentence imposed by the district court. View "USA V. DEPAPE" on Justia Law

The defendant pleaded guilty in 2024 to being a felon in possession of a firearm. At sentencing, the government sought an increased base offense level under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, which applies if the defendant has at least two prior felony convictions for a crime of violence. The defendant conceded that a previous conviction for third-degree assault in Oregon counted as one predicate crime of violence, but contested whether his 2021 Oregon conviction for attempted first-degree assault qualified as a second predicate.The United States District Court for the District of Oregon concluded that attempted first-degree assault under Oregon law does qualify as a crime of violence and increased the defendant’s base offense level accordingly. The court calculated a Guidelines range of 108 to 135 months and sentenced the defendant to 80 months’ imprisonment. The defendant appealed, arguing that the attempt statute in Oregon is broader than the federal definition of attempt and should not qualify under the “force clause” of the Sentencing Guidelines.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. Applying its precedent, the court held that the “attempted use” of physical force, as required by the force clause in the Sentencing Guidelines, means taking a substantial step toward the use of physical force. Because Oregon law requires a substantial step toward causing serious physical injury for a conviction of attempted first-degree assault, the Ninth Circuit concluded that such a conviction qualifies as a crime of violence. The court rejected the argument that a narrower “probable desistance” test should apply and affirmed the sentence imposed by the district court. View "USA V. CHAVEZ-ECHEVERRIA" on Justia Law