by
Plaintiffs filed suit challenging Ordinance 124968, which permits independent-contractor drivers, represented by an entity denominated an "exclusive driver representative," and driver coordinators to agree on the "nature and amount of payments to be made by, or withheld from, the driver coordinator to or by the drivers." The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of the Chamber's federal antitrust claims because the ordinance sanctions price-fixing of ride-referral service fees by private cartels of independent-contractor drivers. The panel held that the State-action immunity doctrine did not exempt the ordinance from preemption by the Sherman Act because the State of Washington had not clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed a state policy authorizing private parties to price-fix the fees that for-hire drivers pay to companies like Uber or Lyft in exchange for ride-referral services. Furthermore, the active-supervision requirement for state-action immunity applied, and was not met. The panel affirmed the district court's dismissal of the Chamber's National Labor Relations Act preemption claims. View "U.S. Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Seattle" on Justia Law

by
Plaintiff filed suit against SFPD officials under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that defendants fabricated evidence against him during a murder investigation. The district court granted defendants' motions for summary judgment. The Ninth Circuit held that because Caldwell rebutted any presumption of prosecutorial independence, he established a triable issue as to whether plaintiff fabricated evidence against him. Therefore, the panel reversed and remanded as to Crenshaw. The panel held that Gerrans and Crowly's investigation techniques were not so coercive that they rose to the level of fabricated evidence, and thus affirmed as to these two defendants. View "Caldwell v. City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

by
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of BNSF in an action alleging a failure to accommodate plaintiff under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Applying de novo review, the panel held that it was neither appropriate nor necessary to extend the Barnett and Morton burden-shifting framework to trial. The panel reasoned that the consequences of the denial of summary judgment was not a meaningless gesture, and when weighed against the confusion and complexity likely to arise at trial, burden shifting was best confined to summary judgment. The panel held that the district court properly described plaintiff's burden as a burden of proof and properly refused his requested instruction. Finally, the district court did not err in denying plaintiff's motion for judgment as a matter of law. View "Snapp v. BNSF Railway Co." on Justia Law

by
Plaintiff appealed the district court's dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. 1983 action, alleging that the LADWP terminated his employment in a probationary promotional position without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of defendant's motion to dismiss because plaintiff lacked a constitutionally protected property interest in his probationary position. The panel also denied plaintiff leave to amend his third amended complaint and denied plaintiff's motion for reconsideration. View "Palm v. Los Angeles Department of Water and Power" on Justia Law

by
Skechers challenged the district court's issuance of a preliminary injunction prohibiting it from selling shoes that allegedly infringe and dilute adidas America, Inc.’s Stan Smith trade dress and Three-Stripe trademark. The panel affirmed in part, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the preliminary injunction as to adidas's claim that Skechers's Onix shoe infringes on adidas's unregistered trade dress of its Stan Smith shoe. However, the panel reversed in part, holding that the district court erred in issuing a preliminary injunction as to adidas's claim that Skechers's Cross Court shoe infringes and dilutes its Three-Stripe mark. View "adidas America, Inc. v. Skechers USA, Inc." on Justia Law

by
The Ninth Circuit certified the following questions of state law to the Supreme Court of California: (1) Do California Labor Code 204 and 226 apply to wage payments and wage statements provided by an out-of-state employer to an employee who, in the relevant pay period, works in California only episodically and for less than a day at a time? (2) Does California minimum wage law apply to all work performed in California for an out-of-state employer by an employee who works in California only episodically and for less than a day at a time? (3) Does the Armenta/Gonzalez bar on averaging wages apply to a pay formula that generally awards credit for all hours on duty, but which, in certain situations resulting in higher pay, does not award credit for all hours on duty? View "Oman v. Delta Airlines, Inc." on Justia Law

by
The Ninth Circuit certified the following questions of state law to the Supreme Court of California: (1) Wage Order 9 exempts from its wage statement requirements an employee who has entered into a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) in accordance with the Railway Labor Act (RLA). Does the RLA exemption in Wage Order 9 bar a wage statement claim brought under California Labor Code 226 by an employee who is covered by a CBA? (2) Does California Labor Code 226 apply to wage statements provided by an out-of-state employer to an employee who resides in California, receives pay in California, and pays California income tax on her wages, but who does not work principally in California or any other state? View "Ward v. United Airlines, Inc." on Justia Law

by
The Hostage Taking Act does not require proof of a nexus to international terrorism. The Ninth Circuit affirmed Defendant Mikhel and Kadamovas's convictions and death sentences for several federal crimes, including multiple counts of hostage taking resulting in death under the Hostage Taking Act. Defendants raised numerous issues on appeal. The panel held that the Act was a valid exercise of Congress's power under the Necessary and Proper Clause together with the Treaty Power, and rejected defendants' Tenth Amendment challenge; defendants' motion for recusal of the district judge was untimely and failed on the merits; defendants' Batson challenge failed because defendants did not meet their burden of demonstrating race was a substantial motivating factor; the district court did not err by empaneling an anonymous jury; defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a public trial was not violated; there was no error in the jury instruction; and the panel rejected defendants' remaining guilt phase claims. Furthermore, the panel rejected defendant's penalty phase claims and held that the district court either did not err or any error was harmless. View "United States v. Mikhel" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law

by
The Ninth Circuit granted a petition for review of the BIA's holding that 8 U.S.C. 1231(a)(5) deprived the immigration court of jurisdiction to resolve petitioner's motion to reopen. 8 U.S.C. 1229a(b)(5) authorizes immigration judges to order non-citizens removed from the country in absentia. 8 U.S.C. 1231(a)(5) applies to non-citizens who (1) are ordered removed, (2) leave the United States while under the order of removal, and (3) reenter the country illegally. Determining that it had jurisdiction over the petition, the panel held that section 1231(a)(5) does not bar immigration judges from entertaining a motion to reopen an in absentia removal order under section 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii). The panel also held that an individual placed in reinstatement proceedings under section 1231(a)(5) cannot as a general rule challenge the validity of the prior removal order in the reinstatement proceeding itself, she retains the right, conferred by section 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii), to seek rescission of a removal order entered in absentia, based on lack of notice, by filing a motion to reopen "at any time." Therefore, the panel remanded so that the agency could decide petitioner's motion to reopen on the merits. View "Miller v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Posted in: Immigration Law

by
The Ninth Circuit denied petitioner's application for leave to file a second or successive habeas petition with the district court. The panel held that petitioner's Brady v. Maryland claim was subject to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act's (AEDPA) second or successive gatekeeping requirements because the factual predicate supporting a Brady claim existed at the time of the first habeas petition. The panel applied AEDPA's second or successive bar to petitioner's Brady claim and held that he has failed to make the requisite prima facie showing of actual innocence. View "Brown v. Muniz" on Justia Law