Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Federal agents discovered that the defendant had engaged in sexually explicit conduct with a female minor, confirmed by photos on her social media. A search warrant was executed at the defendant’s home, and several electronic devices, including an iPhone 12, were seized. Forensic analysis revealed numerous images and videos depicting the minor victim and other unidentified girls in explicit sexual conduct, stored in a vault application and its deleted space, but still accessible. The defendant was arrested and charged with one count of possession of child pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B).The United States District Court for the Southern District of California presided over the trial. Before trial, the government moved in limine to admit thirty-six images and videos as evidence. The defendant did not object, reviewed the material with the government, and agreed to oral descriptions. The district court admitted the evidence and published it to the jury in open court, though not in the jury room. After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted. He later moved for a new trial, arguing his counsel failed to pursue an affirmative defense under § 2252(c), which applies when fewer than three matters are possessed and reasonable steps are taken to destroy or report them. The district court denied this motion, finding no factual support.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court erred by failing to individually review each item of evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 and United States v. Curtin, but found the error harmless as it did not affect the verdict. The court affirmed the denial of a new trial, declined to address ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal, and affirmed the 120-month sentence, applying plain error review. The conviction and sentence were affirmed. View "USA V. DOYLE" on Justia Law

Arizona amended its election laws in 2022, introducing two provisions: one requires county recorders to cancel a voter’s registration in their county if the voter registers in a new county (“Cancellation Provision”), and the other criminalizes knowingly providing a “mechanism for voting” to someone registered in another state (“Felony Provision”). Three organizations engaged in voter registration and education activities claimed these provisions would interfere with their efforts, and sought to enjoin enforcement. They argued that the Cancellation Provision would lead to improper removal of voters and that the Felony Provision was vague and could chill their constitutionally protected activities.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona granted a preliminary injunction, barring enforcement of both provisions. The Arizona Attorney General appealed. A three-judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated the injunction, finding that the organizations lacked standing for the Cancellation Provision and were unlikely to succeed on the merits regarding the Felony Provision. The case was then reheard en banc after the prior panel’s opinion was vacated.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that the organizations lacked standing to challenge the Cancellation Provision because they did not clearly show that it directly affected or interfered with their core activities, as required by FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine. The court further held that the organizations had standing to challenge the Felony Provision due to a credible threat of prosecution, but were unlikely to succeed on the merits, as the statutory context indicated that “mechanism for voting” likely refers only to a ballot or ballot envelope, not to voter registration or education activities. The court vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded the case. View "ARIZONA ALLIANCE FOR RETIRED AMERICANS V. MAYES" on Justia Law

Koi Design LLC retained Marron Lawyers, APC in April 2016 to represent it in a trademark dispute with Strategic Partners, Inc. When SPI sued Koi for trademark infringement, Marron—through its associate, A. Douglas Mastroianni—handled the case. Mastroianni repeatedly missed court deadlines and failed to participate in required discovery meetings, prompting warnings and potential sanctions from the court. Marron did not inform Koi of these mishaps or its internal concerns about Mastroianni’s competence. After repeated lapses, Marron terminated Mastroianni, but again did not disclose the reasons to Koi. Mastroianni continued to represent Koi at a new firm, and Koi ultimately suffered terminating sanctions and a default judgment with trebled damages, leading to bankruptcy.Koi sued Marron, Mastroianni, and another firm for breach of fiduciary duty, legal malpractice, and negligent supervision in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. Bloom Firm settled, and the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Marron on all claims, concluding that Koi had not established that Marron’s conduct caused its injuries. Koi appealed, arguing the district court erred both by granting summary judgment on grounds not adequately noticed and by finding no genuine dispute of material fact.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment. The court held that Marron owed duties to disclose material facts and supervise its employees under California law and professional conduct rules. The Ninth Circuit found genuine disputes of material fact regarding whether Marron breached those duties and whether its conduct was a “but for” cause of Koi’s harm. The court concluded that a reasonable jury could find Marron liable and remanded for further proceedings. View "IN RE: KOI DESIGN LLC V. MARRON LAWYERS, APC" on Justia Law

Several environmental nonprofit organizations challenged a final rule issued by the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) approving California’s State Implementation Plans (SIPs) for air quality in the San Joaquin Valley. The SIPs, developed by the San Joaquin Valley Unified Air Pollution Control District and the California Air Resources Board, were intended to satisfy contingency measure requirements under the Clean Air Act for three particulate matter (PM2.5) standards. The approved measures included stricter wood burning restrictions, enhanced dust control, and expanded vehicle smog checks. However, the groups argued that these measures failed to provide sufficient emissions reductions, particularly for nitrogen oxides (NOx), and contended that the EPA improperly relied on feasibility analyses to justify the shortfall.Prior to reaching the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the SIP submissions underwent notice-and-comment review by the EPA. Despite critical feedback from environmental advocates, the EPA finalized the rule, accepting the agencies’ infeasibility demonstrations and lowering the progress standard for contingency measures from its traditional requirement. This departure from stricter standards allowed approval of the SIPs even though they did not meet the longstanding emissions reduction benchmarks.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the EPA’s approval under the Administrative Procedure Act’s “arbitrary, capricious, or not in accordance with law” standard. The court held that the EPA exceeded its statutory authority by reading a feasibility exemption into Section 172(c)(9) of the Clean Air Act, which does not expressly allow for such consideration. The panel concluded that the statute’s best meaning does not include a feasibility exemption and remanded the rule to the EPA without vacatur, citing the potential disruptive consequences of lacking contingency measures. The court also awarded litigation costs and attorney’s fees to the petitioners. View "COMMITTEE FOR A BETTER ARVIN V. UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Inland Empire Waterkeeper and Orange County Coastkeeper, brought a citizen suit under the Clean Water Act against Corona Clay Company, alleging violations of stormwater-permit requirements at a facility near Temescal Creek in California. The facility discharged stormwater during rainfall, potentially reaching Temescal Creek, a tributary of the Santa Ana River. Plaintiffs claimed Corona failed to implement best management practices, develop a compliant stormwater pollution prevention plan, monitor its facility, and submit accurate reports as required by the permit. Corona defended primarily by arguing it had not discharged pollutants into the creek.The United States District Court for the Central District of California initially granted partial summary judgment for Plaintiffs, but denied it on certain claims. The case proceeded to trial, where the jury found in favor of Corona. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded for a new trial, in part due to an intervening Supreme Court decision, County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund, which expanded the Clean Water Act’s coverage to indirect discharges that are the functional equivalent of direct discharges. After a second trial, Plaintiffs prevailed, and the district court entered judgment and assessed penalties against Corona.Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Sackett v. EPA, which narrowed the definition of “waters of the United States” under the Clean Water Act, Corona moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and alternatively sought a new trial. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the question of whether Temescal Creek is a “water of the United States” is a merits issue, not one of subject-matter jurisdiction, affirming the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss. However, due to the intervening change in law announced in Sackett, the court reversed the denial of the motion for a new trial under Rule 59 and remanded for further proceedings to litigate whether Temescal Creek falls within the Clean Water Act’s scope. View "INLAND EMPIRE WATERKEEPER V. CORONA CLAY COMPANY" on Justia Law

The case involves a defendant diagnosed with autism, Tourette syndrome, OCD, and ADHD, who maintained a romantic relationship with a woman with significant physical disabilities. In September 2019, the defendant and the victim traveled from Pennsylvania to Las Vegas, where the defendant killed the victim in a remote Nevada desert. Prior to the trip, he conducted internet searches related to murder and body disposal. After the murder, he impersonated the victim through her phone and social media, raising suspicions among her friends and family. Eventually, police were alerted, leading to an investigation, the defendant’s arrest, and his confession to the crime.The United States District Court for the District of Nevada presided over the trial, during which the defendant moved to suppress his confession, arguing an invalid Miranda waiver and involuntariness. The district court denied this motion after a magistrate judge held a hearing and issued a report and recommendation. The trial lasted eight days, and the defense presented testimony regarding the defendant’s mental health. After jury deliberations, the defendant moved for a mistrial due to concerns about the interpretation of the “holding” element in the kidnapping statute and alleged jury coercion. The district court denied these motions and the jury returned a guilty verdict. The defendant then filed post-verdict motions for acquittal and a new trial, which were also denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the “holding” element of the federal kidnapping statute under 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) can be satisfied through non-physical means, including deception, and found sufficient evidence to support the conviction. However, the court vacated the conviction and remanded for a new trial because the district court improperly coerced the jury’s verdict, notably by giving an Allen charge while aware of the jury’s numerical division and making coercive comments to a holdout juror. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress, finding that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights and that his confession was voluntary. View "USA V. CHAPMAN" on Justia Law

A company that owns the trademarks and trade dress for a well-known whiskey product objected to a dog toy produced by another company that parodied its bottle and labeling. The toy, named “Bad Spaniels,” mimicked the whiskey’s visual design and replaced references to the whiskey with scatological humor, including phrases like “Old No. 2 On Your Tennessee Carpet.” The whiskey company demanded the toy’s removal from the market, but the toy company instead filed a lawsuit seeking a declaration of non-infringement and non-dilution. The whiskey company responded with counterclaims for trademark infringement and dilution under federal and state law.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona initially found in favor of the whiskey company after a bench trial, concluding the dog toy infringed and diluted its trademarks and trade dress. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed on the dilution claim and vacated the finding of infringement. After further appeals, including a remand from the Supreme Court, the district court again found the toy company liable for dilution by tarnishment and entered a permanent injunction in favor of the whiskey company. The toy company appealed, arguing the whiskey company failed to establish dilution and that the federal dilution law was unconstitutional as applied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the whiskey company did not meet its burden to show dilution by tarnishment under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act. The court found that only “Jack Daniel’s” and its trade dress were proven famous, and the parody toy’s marks and trade dress, though similar, did not facially tarnish the famous marks or portray them in an unsavory context likely to damage their reputation. The court vacated the district court’s injunction and remanded for judgment in favor of the toy company. View "VIP PRODUCTS, LLC V. JACK DANIEL'S PROPERTIES, INC." on Justia Law

Amazon.com Services, LLC filed suit against Perplexity AI, Inc., an artificial intelligence company, asserting that Perplexity’s web browser tool, Comet, unlawfully accessed Amazon’s website in violation of the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) and California’s Comprehensive Computer Data Access and Fraud Act (CDAFA). Perplexity’s Comet browser includes an AI “Assistant” that, when activated by a user, navigates Amazon.com on the user’s behalf, sending browser screenshots to Perplexity’s servers for further instruction. Amazon claimed that this use of the Assistant, despite their explicit prohibition, amounted to unauthorized access to its servers.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California granted Amazon a preliminary injunction, finding that Amazon was likely to succeed on its claims under both the CFAA and CDAFA. The district court concluded that Perplexity, through its Assistant, accessed Amazon’s password-protected accounts without authorization, obtained private information, and caused Amazon to incur significant costs responding to this activity. The court also determined that the equitable factors supported granting the injunction, citing irreparable harm and the public interest.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded for further proceedings. The Ninth Circuit held that Amazon was unlikely to succeed on the merits of its claims because Perplexity did not “access” Amazon’s computers within the meaning of the CFAA or CDAFA; instead, the access was performed by the user employing the Assistant as a tool. The court found that the district court erred in its analysis of the equitable factors, which favored Perplexity, and concluded that an injunction was not warranted under these circumstances. The disposition was to vacate the injunction and remand. View "AMAZON.COM SERVICES, LLC V. PERPLEXITY AI, INC." on Justia Law

Benjamin Hoskins and his wife, Leanne Rodgers, participated in a telemarketing operation that defrauded consumers of more than $130 million by selling worthless “business coaching” services. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) obtained a judgment against Hoskins for over $130 million and against Rodgers for approximately $1.5 million, reflecting the proceeds they received from the scam. Hoskins and Rodgers took steps to hinder collection by transferring assets through trusts and shell entities, including a residence in Las Vegas held via a trust in which they were both trustees and beneficiaries.The United States District Court for the District of Nevada initially blocked the FTC’s attempts to enforce the judgment, concluding that Nevada’s six-year statute of limitations for enforcement of judgments barred the FTC’s action against Rodgers. The court also quashed a writ of execution the FTC obtained under the Federal Debt Collection Procedure Act (FDCPA), reasoning that Nevada law required a separate action to prove the trust holding the property was Rodgers’s alter ego before the property could be levied.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed both of the district court’s rulings. The Ninth Circuit held that the FDCPA preempts inconsistent state statutes of limitations and has no time limit for collecting debts owed to the federal government by writ of execution. The court also determined that the judgment against Rodgers, which is payable to the FTC, qualifies as a “debt” under the FDCPA, regardless of whether the proceeds are ultimately distributed to victims. Additionally, the Ninth Circuit held that the FTC was not required to file a separate alter ego action under state law to levy property held in trust; under the FDCPA, the FTC may levy any property in which the judgment debtors have a substantial nonexempt interest. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these holdings. View "FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION V. HOSKINS" on Justia Law

In 2017, an investment entity loaned approximately 160 million Chinese yuan to an individual, who failed to repay the loan. The lender obtained an arbitral award against the borrower from the Beijing Arbitration Commission for around 150 million yuan. A Singaporean court later ordered the borrower to pay the award, but he still did not comply. The lender, knowing the borrower had been living in California for about two years, sought to enforce the foreign arbitral award in the United States under the Federal Arbitration Act by filing a petition in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California. Attempts to serve process directly on the borrower at his California residence were unsuccessful. Eventually, the petition was left with another adult at the residence, mailed, and emailed to the borrower, who later acknowledged receiving notice.The borrower moved to dismiss the case in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California, arguing under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) that the court lacked personal jurisdiction because his domicile was China and the underlying dispute had no connection to California. He did not raise a defense under Rule 12(b)(5) for insufficient service of process. The district court found that it had general personal jurisdiction over the borrower based on his physical presence in California and confirmed the arbitral award.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require that presence-based personal jurisdiction be conditioned on service of process on the defendant’s person; other means of service are sufficient if the defendant is physically present in the forum state. The court declined to address the sufficiency of service of process because the borrower had waived this argument by not raising it in district court. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment. View "SHENZHEN ZEHUIJIN INVESTMENT CENTER V. YINGKUI" on Justia Law