Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

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A group of individuals from India, who have been lawfully working in the United States for years and waiting in line for more than a decade for their immigrant visas, sued the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and U.S. Department of State. They sought to compel the USCIS to act on their applications for adjustment of status to become lawful permanent residents. However, the USCIS had not processed their applications because the State Department revised its forecast and concluded that it had hit the visa cap for the year. The plaintiffs argued that the USCIS and the State Department were improperly interpreting the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) by requiring an immigrant visa to be available at the time of adjudication rather than at the time of filing the application.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district courts' denials of injunctive relief. The court concluded that the plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their claims. The court found that the government's interpretation of the INA, requiring an immigrant visa to be available before the government can adjudicate an application for adjustment of status, was consistent with the INA and reasonably filled in a procedural detail left open by Congress. The court also noted that the regulation was not in conflict with the statutory text and was left in the government's discretion by Congress. The court further opined that the plaintiffs' proposed rule could result in inefficiency and further delay. View "JIGAR BABARIA, ET AL V. ANTONY BLINKEN, ET AL" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff employees who opted out of their union and employer-sponsored health plans received a monetary credit, part of which was deducted as a fee that was then used to fund the plans from which plaintiffs had opted out. Plaintiffs argue that this opt-out fee should be treated as part of their “regular rate” of pay for calculating overtime compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment. The panel held that the opt-out fees were not part of the employees’ “regular rate” of pay, but rather were exempted as “contributions irrevocably made by an employer to a trustee or third person pursuant to a bona fide plan for providing” health insurance under 29 U.S.C. Section 207(e)(4). View "ANTHONY SANDERS, ET AL V. COUNTY OF VENTURA" on Justia Law

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Petitioner is a native and citizen of Mexico. He was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 2002. But in 2019, a jury convicted him of possessing methamphetamine, a controlled substance, with intent to deliver, in violation of Idaho Code section 37-2732(a)(1)(A). The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings in 2021, charging that Petitioner is removable (1) under 8 U.S.C. Section 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), for having been convicted of an aggravated felony related to illicit trafficking in a controlled substance, and (2) under 8 U.S.C. Section 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), for having been convicted of violating a state law relating to a controlled substance. Petitioner filed a motion to terminate proceedings, asserting that his conviction is neither for an aggravated felony nor for a crime related to a controlled substance. The immigration judge disagreed and ordered Petitioner’s removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissed Petitioner’s appeal. Petitioner sought review of the final order of removal.   The Ninth Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition. Applying the modified categorical approach, the panel concluded that Petitioner’s conviction record clearly documents that his conviction involved methamphetamine, a controlled substance under federal and Idaho law. The panel next concluded that the required mental state under federal and Idaho law—knowledge—is the same in all relevant respects: the defendant either must know what the substance is (even if the defendant does not know that it is controlled) or must know that the substance is illegal (even if the defendant does not know what the substance is). View "TELLEZ-RAMIREZ V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff is a resident of California. While present in California, Plaintiff used his iPhone’s Safari browser to navigate to the website of California-based retailer IABMFG to purchase fitness apparel. Although Plaintiff claims he did not know it at the time, IABMFG’s website used software and code from Shopify, Inc. to process customer orders and payments. Shopify, Inc. is a Canadian corporation with its headquarters in Ottawa, Canada. Plaintiff filed a putative class action lawsuit in California alleging that Shopify violated various California privacy and unfair competition laws because it deliberately concealed its involvement in consumer transactions. The district court agreed, dismissing the second amended complaint without leave to amend. Plaintiff timely appealed.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed. For specific jurisdiction to exist over Shopify, Plaintiff’s claim must arise out of or relate to Shopify’s forum-related activities. The panel held that there was no causal relationship between Shopify’s broader business contacts in California and Plaintiff’s claims because these contacts did not cause Plaintiff’s harm. Nor did Plaintiff’s claims “relate to” Shopify’s broader business activities in California outside of its extraction and retention of plaintiff’s data. Because there was an insufficient relationship between plaintiff's claims and Shopify’s broader business contacts in California, the activities relevant to the specific jurisdiction analysis were those that caused Plaintiff’s injuries: Shopify’s collection, retention, and use of consumer data obtained from persons who made online purchases while in California. The panel held that Shopify, which provides nationwide web-based payment processing services to online merchants, did not expressly aim its conduct toward California. View "BRANDON BRISKIN V. SHOPIFY, INC., ET AL" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff and other tenants filed suit against the Duringer Law Group, PLC, and Stephen C. Duringer, alleging that Duringer violated the Act by filing a memorandum of costs in state court proceedings concerning an unlawful-detainer judgment. The district court concluded that Tenants’ federal suit constituted an improper appeal of a state-court judgment and thus was barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment. The court explained that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides that, by vesting jurisdiction over state-court appeals in the U.S. Supreme Court, 28 U.S.C. Section 1257 precludes a federal district court from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction in an action asking the court to overturn an injurious state-court judgment. The panel held that the doctrine is limited to cases (1) brought by state-court losers (2) complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments (3) rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and (4) inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments. The panel concluded that the tenants’ action did not challenge a memorandum of costs on which the state court already had rendered judgment, but rather a later memorandum. Because there was no relevant state-court judgment purporting to adjudicate the validity of the costs in the later memorandum, Rooker-Feldman did not apply. View "JANEY BROWN, ET AL V. DURINGER LAW GROUP PLC, ET AL" on Justia Law

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This case involves alleged violations of the Clean Water Act (CWA). Plaintiff Cottonwood Environmental Law Center (Cottonwood) filed suit against Defendants Big Sky County Water & Sewer District No. 363 (the District) and Boyne USA, Inc. (Boyne) for their alleged discharge of treated wastewater into the West Fork of the Gallatin River (the West Fork) without a National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit. The district court ruled that Cottonwood could not advance a direct-discharge theory of CWA liability against the District at trial. The district court also dismissed Cottonwood’s claim against Boyne for lack of proper notice.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s judgment. Affirming in part, the panel held that the district court properly ruled, in orders denying summary judgment, that Cottonwood could not advance a direct-discharge theory of liability against the District at trial. The panel held that it had jurisdiction to review the district court’s orders denying summary judgment to Cottonwood because, in those orders, the district court rejected Cottonwood’s direct-discharge theory as a matter of law. The panel affirmed the district court’s holding that the District could not be liable on a direct-discharge theory because an underdrain pipe below but not connected to the District’s holding ponds did not transfer pollutants between meaningfully distinct water bodies and thus was not a “point source” of pollution. Reversing the district court’s dismissal of Cottonwood’s Clean Water Act the panel held that Cottonwood’s letter to Boyne provided sufficient notice of Cottonwood’s indirect-discharge theory of liability. View "COTTONWOOD ENVIRONMENTAL LAW CENTER, ET AL V. RON EDWARDS, ET AL" on Justia Law

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Officers Timothy Wright and Brett Willey responded to a domestic violence call where they shot and killed Robert Anderson. Anderson’s estate and family sued Wright, Willey, and the County of Lyon under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and Nevada law. Defendants moved for summary judgment, and the district court granted qualified immunity to the officers on the Section 1983 claims.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The panel held that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment excessive force claim because Plaintiffs’ rights were not clearly established. First, it was not obvious that defendants were constitutionally precluded from firing given that they were responding to an active domestic violence situation, lacked the benefit of having time to fully assess the circumstances, and needed to make split-second decisions as they were being charged. Second, Plaintiffs failed to show controlling authorities (or a consensus of persuasive ones) that would have put every reasonable officer on notice that defendants’ conduct violated the Fourth Amendment. Distinguishing this case from other cases, the panel noted that Anderson was in a narrow hall and rapidly approaching the officers, with no barrier between them. He could have accessed the officers’ weapons at any time or otherwise harmed them. Further, if the officers took the option to retreat to the house’s entryway, they would have left Jennifer Anderson—for whom they had just called an ambulance—alone with her husband or risked injury themselves if Anderson obtained a weapon from somewhere in his home. View "FREDRICK WAID, ET AL V. COUNTY OF LYON, ET AL" on Justia Law

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For several years, Defendant, Shannon Poe, engaged in instream suction dredge mining in Idaho’s South Fork Clearwater River (the South Fork) without a National Pollutant Discharge Eliminating System (NPDES) permit. Plaintiff Idaho Conservation League (ICL) sued Poe, arguing that he violated the CWA each time he operated a suction dredge on the South Fork without an NPDES permit. Poe countered that (1) his suction dredge mining did not add pollutants to the South Fork and therefore did not require an NPDES permit, and (2) even if his suction dredge mining did add pollutants, those pollutants are “dredged” or “fill” material regulated exclusively pursuant to Section 404, not Section 402, of the CWA. The district court granted summary judgment to ICL. Poe appealed the judgment as to liability.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The panel held that to establish a violation of the Clean Water Act’s NPDES requirements, also referred to as Section 402 permitting, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant (1) discharged, i.e., added (2) a pollutant (3) to navigable waters (4) from (5) a point source. As to the first element, the panel held that Poe’s suction dredge mining “added” a pollutant to the South Fork. The panel followed Rybachek v. EPA, 904 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1990), which upheld Environmental Protection Agency regulations interpreting the Clean Water Act. The panel further held that the processed material discharged from Poe’s suction dredge mining was a pollutant, not dredged or fill material, and therefore required an NPDES permit under Section 402 of the Clean Water Act rather than a permit from the Army Corps of Engineers under Section 404. View "IDAHO CONSERVATION LEAGUE V. SHANNON POE" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff first applied for disability insurance benefits on September 3, 2019, alleging a disability onset date of December 1, 2017. His date last insured for the purpose of benefits eligibility was June 30, 2018. The Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denied his application initially and on reconsideration, and he requested an administrative hearing. After the December 14, 2020, hearing, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not disabled. The Social Security Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review. Plaintiff then sought review in the district court, and the district court granted the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment. This appeal followed.   The Ninth Circuit reversed. The panel explained that at step two of the sequential analysis, claimants need only make a de minimis showing for the ALJ’s analysis to proceed past this step and that properly denying a claim at step two requires an unambiguous record showing only minimal limitations. The seven-month period for which Plaintiff seeks disability benefits falls within a two-and-a-half-year gap in his medical treatment records. The panel held that Plaintiff made the requisite showing to meet step two’s low bar, where he submitted evidence that he suffered from multiple chronic medical conditions that both preceded and succeeded the gap in his treatment. The panel concluded that this cumulative evidence was enough to establish that Plaintiff’s claim was nonfrivolous and to require the ALJ to proceed to step three. Therefore, the ALJ’s denial of Plaintiff’s claim at step two was premature. View "BRIAN GLANDEN V. KILOLO KIJAKAZI" on Justia Law

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Complainant, a pro se litigant, has filed a complaint of judicial misconduct against a district judge. Review of this complaint is governed by the Rules for Judicial-Conduct and Judicial-Disability Proceedings (“Judicial-Conduct Rules”), the federal statutes addressing judicial conduct and disability, and relevant prior decisions of the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council.   The Ninth Circuit dismissed the complaint. The court held that complainant provided no objectively verifiable evidence of misconduct in this matter. The court held that a review of the record reveals that the disciplinary proceedings were conducted pursuant to the local rules of the district court, and the district judge explained that the district court did not have appellate jurisdiction over the State Bar’s decisions. View "IN RE COMPLAINT OF JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT" on Justia Law