Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff  Enigma Software Group USA LLC (“Enigma”), a computer security software provider, sued a competitor, Defendant-Appellee Malwarebytes, Inc. (“Malwarebytes”), for designating its products as “malicious,” “threats,” and “potentially unwanted programs” (“PUPs”). Enigma’s operative complaint alleged a false advertising claim under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 1125(a)(1)(B), and tort claims under New York law. Malwarebytes moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The district court granted the motion, concluding that all of Enigma’s claims were insufficient as a matter of law.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. In the context of this case, the panel concluded that when a company in the computer security business describes a competitor’s software as “malicious” and a “threat” to a customer’s computer, that is more a statement of objective fact than a non-actionable opinion. It is potentially actionable under the Lanham Act, provided Enigma plausibly alleges the other elements of a false advertising claim. The panel disagreed with the district court and concluded that Malwarebytes is subject to personal jurisdiction in New York. As this action was initially filed in New York, the law of that state properly applies.   Because the panel held that the Lanham Act and NYGBL Section 349 claims should not have been dismissed, the panel concluded that the tortious interference with business relations claim should similarly not have been dismissed. The panel agreed with the district court regarding the dismissal of the claim for tortious interference with contractual relations, however, and affirmed the dismissal of that claim. View "ENIGMA SOFTWARE GROUP USA, LLC V. MALWAREBYTES, INC." on Justia Law

Petitioner filed the instant habeas petition in district court. In the amended petition, Petitioner challenges, among other things, the United States Parole Commission’s 2019 decision to issue a three-year “set-off,” the time he must wait until his next parole hearing. The district court for the District of Columbia transferred the case to the District of Arizona, where Petitioner was incarcerated. That court dismissed Petitioner’s petition as an impermissible second or successive petition under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and denied Petitioner’s motion to reconsider.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment. The panel held that Petitioner need not obtain a certificate of appealability (COA) to appeal the denial of the instant petition because Congress did not define or include the District of Columbia Superior Court as a “State court” in 28 U.S.C. Section 2253(c), where it had expressly done so in that and other statutes. The panel held that Section 2253(c)(1)(A)’s language, “in which the detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State court,” does not include the District of Columbia Superior Court. The panel further held that the district court erred in dismissing the petition as an abuse of the writ when Petitioner could not have possibly raised the same claims in prior petitions. Thus, because no court has addressed Petitioner’s three-year set-off claims regarding his 2016 parole denial, he did not abuse the writ by raising the 2019 denial issue in his instant habeas petition. View "CLINTON ELDRIDGE V. CATRICIA HOWARD, ET AL" on Justia Law

At around nine o’clock in the evening, a concerned citizen called 911 to report a Ford Mustang darting erratically in the streets. Behind the wheel was a young white male, along with a blindfolded female in the car. With the aid of the car’s license plate number provided by the caller, Fountain Valley police officers figured out the home address of the driver and raced to that house. But this was not an ongoing kidnapping. In reality, the driver was taking his wife for a “surprise” anniversary dinner. And his parents would soon experience a surprise of their own as the police officers descended upon the home that they shared with their son. Before this mix-up could be cleared, the police officers ordered the Plaintiffs out of their home for obstructing the police and pushed the father to the ground as they handcuffed him. The Hills later sued, alleging (among other things) violations of their Fourth Amendment rights against warrantless arrests and excessive force. The district court granted summary judgment for police officers.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The panel rejected Plaintiffs’ contention that the police officers violated their Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable seizure when the officers ordered them to exit the home or face arrest for obstruction. The officers never seized Plaintiffs, who did not submit to the officers’ demand to leave the home. They, therefore, could not claim that they were unlawfully arrested. The panel next held that while the officers did not have probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for obstruction of justice, they were nevertheless shielded by qualified immunity. View "STEPHEN HILL, ET AL V. CITY OF FOUNTAIN VALLEY, ET AL" on Justia Law

Appellants are agricultural workers hired by strawberry growers (“the Growers”) to pick the fruit that was then turned over to the Appellees Red Blossom Sales, Inc. and Better Produce, Inc. (“the Marketers”) for distribution. Appellants sought to hold the Marketers liable for their wages as “client employers.” The Marketers cooled and sold the berries principally to large retail grocery chains. The Marketers conducted their cooling and distribution operations on premises that were close to but separate from the farms. The Growers stopped paying Appellants and later filed for bankruptcy. Appellants sued the Growers and the Marketers as joint employers under California and federal law. Appellants also sued the Marketers as client employers under California Labor Code Section 2810.3. The district court ruled for the Marketers on all theories. Appellants appeal only with respect to the Marketers’ liability under Section 2810.3.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The panel held that Appellants were not performing labor within the Marketers’ “usual course of business” as defined by the statute. That term is defined as “the regular and customary work of a business, performed within or upon the premises or worksite of the client employer.” Given the particular facts of this case, the court concluded that Appellants’ work took place on the farms where the strawberries were grown, not on the premises or worksites of the Marketers. The Marketers are, therefore, not liable as client employers under California Labor Code Section 2810.3. View "LUIS MORALES-GARCIA, ET AL V. BETTER PRODUCE, INC., ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought an action against The Gap, Inc. and its directors “derivatively on behalf of Gap.” Plaintiff’s action alleged that Gap violated Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Exchange Act) and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule 14a-9 by making false or misleading statements to shareholders about its commitment to diversity. Gap’s bylaws contain a forum-selection clause stating that the Delaware Court of Chancery “shall be the sole and exclusive forum for . . . any derivative action or proceeding brought on behalf of the Corporation.” Lee nevertheless brought her putative derivative action in a California district court. The district court granted Gap’s motion to dismiss Lee’s complaint on forum nonconveniens ground.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The en banc court rejected Plaintiff’s argument that her right to bring a derivative Section 14(a) action is stymied by Gap’s forum-selection clause, which alone amounts to Gap “waiving compliance with a provision of [the Exchange Act] or of any rule or regulation thereunder.” The en banc court explained that the Supreme Court made clear in Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987), that Section 29(a) forbids only the waiver of substantive obligations imposed by the Exchange Act, not the waiver of a particular procedure for enforcing such duties. McMahon also disposes of Plaintiff’s argument that Gap’s forum-selection clause is void under Section 29(a) because it waives compliance with Section 27(a) of the Exchange Act, which gives federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over Section 14(a) claims. View "NOELLE LEE V. ROBERT FISHER, ET AL" on Justia Law

A grand jury indicted Defendant on four counts, including one count of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. Sections 846, 841. Defendant pleaded guilty to the conspiracy count. At sentencing, the district court found the Presentence Report (PSR) prepared by the Probation Officer accurate and correct and so adopted it. For the offense of conviction, the PSR calculated the base offense level at 32 based on the Drug Quantity Table set forth in U.S.S.G. Section 2D1.1(c). The PSR then found that Defendant had two prior convictions under Cal. Health & Safety Code Section 11378 that qualified as controlled substances offenses under U.S.S.G. Sections 4B1.1; 4B1.2(b).   The Ninth Circuit vacated Defendant’s sentence and remanded for resentencing. The panel held that Kisor is an intervening decision and is clearly irreconcilable with the holdings in Vea-Gonzales and Crum. Applying the traditional tools of statutory construction to the text of the guideline, as Kisor instructs, the panel concluded that Section 4B1.2(b) unambiguously identifies a list of crimes that do not include inchoate offenses. Because Section 4B1.2(b)’s definition of “controlled substance offense” is unambiguous, the Supreme Court’s decision in Kisor now makes it impermissible to defer to Application Note 1 to determine whether conspiracy fits into this definition. Because the text of Section 4B1.2(b) unambiguously does not include inchoate offenses, and because the court is no longer permitted to rely on the commentary of an unambiguous guideline after Kisor, the panel held that Defendant’s conspiracy conviction is not a “controlled substance offense” under Section 4B1.1. View "USA V. ROBERTO CASTILLO" on Justia Law

The Estate of a man who was shot and killed by police brought claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and state law alleging that police officers used excessive force. The Estate claimed that the decedent was known to the officers to be homeless and mentally ill. The district court dismissed for failure to state a claim.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The panel held that, under the totality of the circumstances, it was objectively reasonable for the officers to believe that the man posed an immediate threat. Construing the facts in the light most favorable to the man, he was carrying a replica gun, disregarded multiple warnings to drop it, and pointed it at the officers. While the misidentification of the replica gun added to the tragedy of this situation, it did not render the officers’ use of force objectively unreasonable. The panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Estate leave to amend the complaint. The complaint established that the man pointed the replica gun’s barrel at the officers, so it was objectively reasonable for the officers to respond with lethal force. Under these pleaded facts, it would be futile to allow leave to amend. View "ESTATE OF GABRIEL STRICKLAND, ET AL V. NEVADA COUNTY, ET AL" on Justia Law

Petitioner was sentenced to death in 1991 after a California state jury convicted him of robbery, burglary, and felony murder. He appealed the district court’s denial of his federal habeas corpus petition filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 2254. Petitioner raised several certified claims, including claims that the prosecutor knowingly used false and misleading testimony in violation of Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959), and failed to disclose favorable material evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).   The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded to the district court with instructions to grant a conditional writ of habeas corpus as to the special-circumstances findings and the imposition of the death penalty and affirmed the district court’s holding as to Petitioner’s certified guilt-phase claims. The panel wrote that this is an exceptional case in which the prosecutor deliberately elicited, and then failed to correct, false and misleading testimony from the State’s star witness. The prosecutor went on to exploit the witness’s false testimony in his closing argument. He also failed to produce evidence to the defense team that would have seriously impeached the witness’s testimony. The panel wrote that the record makes clear that the State’s special-circumstances evidence depended on the witness’s testimony. Reviewing under the deferential standard afforded to state-court decisions by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), the panel concluded it was objectively unreasonable for the state court to decide that the prosecutor’s misconduct was immaterial to the jury’s special circumstances findings. View "COLIN DICKEY V. RON DAVIS" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted by a jury of sixteen counts of attempted sexual exploitation of a minor under 18 U.S.C. Section 2251(a) and one count of possession of child pornography under 18 U.S.C. Section 2252A(a)(5)(B). At trial, the jury heard extensive evidence that Defendant placed a hidden camera in his bathroom with the purpose of secretly recording and amassing a collection of nude videos of his then fourteen-year-old stepdaughter. Defendant asserts there was insufficient evidence to sustain his convictions, arguing on appeal (1) that he did not “use” his stepdaughter in a way that violates Section 2251(a) and (2) that the videos did not depict “sexually explicit conduct,” as defined by 18 U.S.C. Section 2256(2)(A)(v), which applies to both Sections 2251(a) and 2252A.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The panel concluded that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the videos reasonably fell within the definition of sexually explicit conduct. The panel wrote that the district court did not clearly err in determining that a reasonable jury could find (1) that the focal point of the videos was on T.A.’s genitals or pubic area, (2) that T.A. is fully nude in the videos, and (3) that the videos were intended or designed to elicit a sexual response in the viewer. The panel reached the same result under a de novo review of the sufficiency of the evidence. View "USA V. TEL BOAM" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for panel rehearing and denied on behalf of the court a petition for rehearing en banc in a case in which the panel held that federal courts lack jurisdiction to review the discretionary determination that a particular noncitizen in immigration detention poses a danger to the community, and so is not entitled to release on bond. Judge Berzon, joined by Chief Judge Murguia and Judges Wardlaw, W. Fletcher, Paez, Christen, Hurwitz, Koh, Sung, Mendoza, and Desai, disagreed with the Court’s refusal to reconsider the panel opinion en banc. View "JAVIER MARTINEZ V. LOWELL CLARK, ET AL" on Justia Law