Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

J.B., a student with multiple disabilities, was enrolled in the Kyrene Elementary School District. Due to concerns about the school's handling of J.B.'s behavioral issues, J.B.'s parent, L.B., withdrew J.B. from the District and placed J.B. in a private school, Brightmont Academy. The District attempted to conduct evaluations to update J.B.'s Individualized Education Program (IEP), but L.B. refused to consent to these evaluations, proposing instead that the District use video recordings for assessments.The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that the District did not violate the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and ruled in favor of the District. L.B. appealed to the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona, which affirmed the ALJ's decision. The District Court found that L.B. refused to consent to the District's evaluations and made it clear that she did not intend to re-enroll J.B. in the District.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's judgment. The Ninth Circuit held that the District did not deny a Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE) to J.B. because L.B.'s refusal to consent to evaluations relieved the District of further obligations under IDEA. Additionally, the court found that the District's procedural error in stating that no further IEP meetings would occur because J.B. was not enrolled in the District was harmless, as it did not result in a deprivation of educational opportunity for J.B. Consequently, L.B. was not entitled to reimbursement for private school tuition and related expenses. View "J.B. V. KYRENE ELEMENTARY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 28" on Justia Law

Gail Manney was convicted for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6), which criminalizes making false statements in connection with the acquisition of firearms. On April 21, 2021, Manney visited Hi-Cap Firearms in Reno, Nevada, and selected seven handguns to purchase. She filled out the required ATF Form 4473, certifying she was the actual purchaser. However, after her purchase, a Hi-Cap employee suspected her of being a straw purchaser and contacted the ATF. Upon investigation, ATF Special Agent Joshua Caron found incriminating messages on Manney’s phone indicating she was buying the firearms for her son, Razaaq, a convicted felon prohibited from possessing firearms.The United States District Court for the District of Nevada indicted Manney on May 27, 2021, for making false statements on ATF Form 4473. She was convicted after a jury trial. Manney appealed, arguing that 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6) violated her Second Amendment rights and that her false statement was not material under the statute.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court rejected Manney’s Second Amendment challenge, stating that the Second Amendment does not protect false statements. The court emphasized that § 922(a)(6) regulates false statements made during firearm acquisitions, not the possession of firearms. The court also dismissed Manney’s argument regarding the materiality of her false statement, citing Abramski v. United States, which held that a false statement about the actual purchaser of a firearm is material even if the actual purchaser could legally possess a firearm.The Ninth Circuit affirmed Manney’s conviction, concluding that § 922(a)(6) did not violate her Second Amendment rights and that her false statement was material under the statute. View "USA V. MANNEY" on Justia Law

The case involves a class action lawsuit against the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office (MCSO) for racially profiling Latino drivers and passengers under the guise of immigration enforcement. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief for violations of their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court issued a permanent injunction in 2013, followed by a supplemental injunction appointing an independent monitor to oversee MCSO’s compliance. In 2016, a second supplemental injunction required MCSO to reform its internal misconduct investigation procedures. In 2022, a third supplemental injunction found the Sheriff in contempt for non-compliance and set forth curative measures, including creating a Constitutional Policing Authority (CPA) and assigning its duties to the Monitor.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona initially issued the permanent injunction and subsequent supplemental injunctions. The court found MCSO in contempt for failing to comply with the injunctions and ordered additional remedial measures. The district court relied on its inherent equitable powers rather than Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53 in issuing these orders.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s amended third supplemental permanent injunction. It held that the district court acted within its inherent equitable powers in assigning the CPA’s duties to the Monitor. The court rejected the Sheriff’s contention that this assignment violated Article III of the Constitution and separation of powers principles. It also found that the First Order provided adequate judicial review of the Monitor’s actions and that the Third Order did not contravene Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65’s specificity requirement. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the district court’s actions were appropriate and affirmed the Third Order. View "MELENDRES V. SKINNER" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, representing a class of drivers whose cars were totaled in accidents, alleged that their insurers, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company and State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, failed to pay the actual cash value of their vehicles. They contended that State Farm applied two unlawful discounts: a negotiation discount, which reduced the value based on typical buyer negotiations, and a condition discount, which adjusted for the car's condition compared to similar vehicles.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington initially certified two classes: a negotiation class and a condition class. However, following the Ninth Circuit's decision in Lara v. First National Insurance Company of America, the district court decertified both classes and granted summary judgment in favor of State Farm, concluding that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate injury.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed the district court's decertification of the negotiation class, holding that plaintiffs could prove injury on a class-wide basis by adding back the unlawful negotiation adjustment to determine the value each class member should have received. However, the court affirmed the decertification of the condition class, as determining injury required an individualized comparison of the unlawful condition adjustment and a hypothetical lawful adjustment.The Ninth Circuit also vacated the district court's summary judgment against the named plaintiffs, remanding the case for the district court to reassess whether the plaintiffs provided sufficient evidence of injury. The court clarified that plaintiffs could rely on the Autosource reports, minus the unlawful adjustments, as relevant evidence of injury. The court rejected State Farm's argument that Article III standing was a barrier to the plaintiffs' suit, affirming that the plaintiffs' claim of receiving less than owed under their insurance policies constituted a concrete injury. View "JAMA V. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY" on Justia Law

A national trade association of online businesses challenged the California Age-Appropriate Design Code Act (CAADCA), which aims to protect children's online privacy and ensure that online products accessed by children are designed with their needs in mind. The association argued that the CAADCA's requirements, particularly those mandating businesses to assess and mitigate risks of exposing children to harmful content, violated the First Amendment.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California granted a preliminary injunction, finding that the association was likely to succeed in its First Amendment challenge. The court held that the CAADCA's requirements compelled businesses to express opinions on controversial issues and act as censors, which constituted a violation of free speech. The court enjoined the entire law, concluding that the unconstitutional provisions were not severable from the rest of the statute.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed in part and vacated in part the district court's preliminary injunction. The Ninth Circuit agreed that the CAADCA's requirement for businesses to create Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) reports, which included assessing and mitigating risks of exposing children to harmful content, likely violated the First Amendment. The court affirmed the injunction against these provisions and those not grammatically severable from them.However, the Ninth Circuit vacated the remainder of the preliminary injunction, finding that it was unclear whether other challenged provisions of the CAADCA facially violated the First Amendment. The court noted that further proceedings were necessary to determine the full scope and impact of these provisions. The case was remanded to the district court for further consideration. View "NETCHOICE, LLC V. BONTA" on Justia Law

Patrick Neiss was convicted in Montana state court of deliberate homicide and evidence tampering, based on circumstantial evidence. He filed a pro se federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, claiming ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. Neiss argued that his trial counsel failed to challenge the particularity of a search warrant, which led to the discovery of silencer-related internet searches on his computer, and that his appellate counsel failed to raise this issue on appeal.The United States District Court for the District of Montana dismissed Neiss’s habeas petition under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, which allows for preliminary screening of habeas petitions. The district court adjudicated the petition on the merits, concluding that Neiss’s trial counsel was not deficient because they had made multiple attempts to suppress the evidence, albeit not on the particularity grounds. The court did not find the petition procedurally defective or frivolous.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that the district court misapplied the Rule 4 standard, which is intended to screen out only those petitions that are procedurally defective or frivolous. The court emphasized that Rule 4 does not permit summary dismissal on the merits. The Ninth Circuit found that Neiss’s petition alleged a cognizable, non-frivolous claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, which should not have been dismissed summarily. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "NEISS V. BLUDWORTH" on Justia Law

The petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, became a lawful permanent resident of the United States in 1990. In 1999, she was convicted of possession for sale of methamphetamine in California. In 2015, upon returning from a trip to Mexico, she was detained and later charged with inadmissibility due to her drug conviction. She sought cancellation of removal and later moved to terminate the removal proceedings.The Immigration Judge (IJ) sustained the charges of removability and denied her relief, ordering her removal to Mexico. The petitioner appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), requesting remand to the IJ to pursue derivative U visa status based on her husband's pending U visa application. She also moved for administrative closure of her removal proceedings. The BIA dismissed her appeal and denied both motions, finding it speculative whether she would receive U visa relief and noting the need for an inadmissibility waiver due to her conviction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the BIA’s denial of the petitioner’s motions for remand and administrative closure due to the criminal jurisdiction bar under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C). The court found that the petitioner’s motions merged with her final order of removal and that judicial review does not extend to factual challenges to the final removal order. The court also noted that the decision did not disturb the result in Alvarez-Santos v. INS, which requires an agency determination of removability based on a covered conviction for the criminal alien bar to apply. The petition for review was dismissed. View "CORIA V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

Claude Stephen Bent, a lawful permanent resident from Jamaica, pleaded no contest to two felony charges in California in 2006. The judge did not inform him of the immigration consequences of his plea. After serving his sentence, Bent was detained by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2016 and charged with removability based on his felony conviction. Bent applied for asylum and other relief, but an immigration judge (IJ) denied his application and ordered his removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision. Bent appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which remanded the case to the BIA. The BIA again dismissed his appeal, and Bent petitioned for review.Bent moved to vacate his 2006 conviction in California state court, which was granted in 2022 on the grounds that his plea was involuntary and violated his Fifth Amendment rights. Bent then moved to reopen his removal proceedings before the BIA, arguing that his vacated conviction invalidated the basis for his removal. The BIA denied the motion, stating it was untimely and not subject to equitable tolling, and mischaracterized the California statute as allowing vacatur solely to mitigate immigration consequences.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the BIA erred in its interpretation of California Penal Code § 1473.7(a)(1) and the state court's order, which vacated Bent's conviction due to a constitutional defect, not to alleviate immigration consequences. The Ninth Circuit also held that the BIA misapplied equitable tolling precedent by not properly assessing whether Bent diligently pursued his rights. The court granted Bent's petition for review in part and remanded the case to the BIA to adjudicate his motion to reopen under the correct legal standards. View "BENT V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

Tahawwur Hussain Rana, a Pakistani national, was tried in a U.S. district court for his involvement in supporting a terrorist organization responsible for the 2008 Mumbai attacks. He was convicted of providing material support to a foreign terrorist organization and conspiring to support a foiled plot in Denmark but was acquitted of conspiring to support the Mumbai attacks. After serving seven years in prison and being granted compassionate release, India requested his extradition to face charges related to the Mumbai attacks.The magistrate judge certified Rana as extraditable, rejecting his arguments that the U.S.-India extradition treaty's Non Bis in Idem (double jeopardy) provision protected him from extradition and that India failed to provide sufficient evidence of probable cause. Rana then filed a habeas corpus petition in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, which upheld the magistrate judge's decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's denial of Rana's habeas corpus petition. The court held that the term "offense" in the extradition treaty refers to a charged crime defined by its elements, not the underlying acts. Therefore, the Non Bis in Idem exception did not apply because the Indian charges contained distinct elements from the crimes for which Rana was acquitted in the U.S. The court also found that India provided sufficient competent evidence to support the magistrate judge's finding of probable cause that Rana committed the charged crimes. View "RANA V. JENKINS" on Justia Law

In December 2017, the U.S. Coast Guard intercepted Victor Gaspar Chichande and his co-defendants on a small boat near the Galapagos Islands, carrying approximately 1,230 kilograms of cocaine. The defendants attempted to evade capture by throwing items overboard and fleeing, but the Coast Guard disabled their boat. The discarded packages were later found to contain cocaine. Chichande was convicted by a jury of conspiring to distribute cocaine on a vessel, possession with intent to distribute, and aiding and abetting.The United States District Court for the Southern District of California initially sentenced Chichande to 180 months in prison. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed his conviction but vacated the sentence, remanding for resentencing due to an error in the district court's analysis of whether Chichande was entitled to a minor role reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b). The district court had incorrectly compared Chichande to a single average participant rather than the average of all participants in the crime.Upon remand, the district court again denied the minor role reduction, finding that Chichande was not substantially less culpable than the average participant. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, clarifying that the district court correctly identified all participants, calculated a rough average level of culpability using the five factors from the Mitigating Role Guideline, and compared Chichande’s culpability to that average. The court also declined to remand for resentencing based on a retroactive amendment for zero criminal history points, noting that Chichande could seek relief through the established protocol in the Southern District of California. The court held that the district court did not err in denying the minor role reduction and affirmed the 180-month sentence. View "USA V. CHICHANDE" on Justia Law