Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Ninth Circuit joined its sister circuits in concluding that, when Congress expressly departs from substance-over-form principles, the Commissioner may not invoke those principles in a way that would directly reverse that congressional judgment.The panel reversed the tax court's decision in favor of the Commissioner on a petition for redetermination of federal excise tax deficiency where petitioners established a Foreign Sales Corporation to reduce the tax paid on income that was then distributed as dividends to Roth Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs). The panel concluded that the unusual statutory provisions at issue here expressly elevated form over substance in the relevant respects, and thus the tax court erred by invoking substance-over-form principles to effectively reverse that congressional judgment and to disallow what the statute plainly allowed. View "Mazzei v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's approval of a class action settlement in an appeal brought by a class member objector in a class action alleging that ConAgra used a misleading "100% Natural" label on Wesson Oil.The panel held that, under the newly revised Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e)(2) standard, courts must scrutinize settlement agreements — including post-class certification settlements — for potentially unfair collusion in the distribution of funds between the class and their counsel. The panel explained that courts should apply the heightened scrutiny Bluetooth factors even for post-class certification settlements. In this case, the class action settlement had all the hallmarks of a potentially collusive settlement giving short shrift to the class. The panel stated that the class action settlement raises a squadron of red flags billowing in the wind and begging for further review. The panel also concluded that the district court erred by failing to approximate the value of the injunction. Furthermore, the Erie doctrine does not preclude the application of Rule 23(e)(2). Finally, the panel concluded that the district court did not err by determining that the objector failed to rebut the conclusion that the settlement satisfied Rule 23(e)(2). The panel remanded for further proceedings. View "Briseño v. Henderson" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of the DOI, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, federal officials, and the Spokane Tribe of Indians, in an action brought by the Kalispel Tribe of Indians, challenging the Secretary of DOI's decision determining that the Spokane Tribe of Indians' proposed gaming establishment on newly acquired off-reservation land would not be detrimental to the surrounding community. Kalispel raised challenges pursuant to the the Administrative Procedure Act, the National Environmental Policy Act, and the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act.The panel held that IGRA requires the Secretary to weigh and consider the various interests of those within the surrounding community when deciding whether additional off-reservation gaming would be detrimental to the surrounding community. A showing that additional gaming may be detrimental to some members of the surrounding community, including an Indian tribe, does not dictate the outcome of the Secretary's two-step determination. The panel agreed with the DC Circuit and rejected Kalispel's argument that any detriment to Kalispel precluded the Secretary from issuing a favorable two-part determination. Rather, the panel concluded that the Secretary had the authority to issue a two-step determination, and the Secretary's decision to issue a favorable decision here was neither arbitrary nor capricious. The panel declined to reach the merits of Kalispel's contention, which was not advanced in the district court, that the Secretary previously announced a policy that additional off-reservation gaming would not be approved if a nearby Indian tribe could show that additional gaming would be detrimental to it. Finally, the panel concluded that Kalispel has not shown that the Secretary failed to consider its claimed harms or to comply with the relevant statutes and regulations, and thus it has not shown that the Secretary violated the federal government's trust duty owed to Kalispel. View "Kalispel Tribe of Indians v. U.S. Department of the Interior" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for CoreCivic in an action brought by plaintiff under Nevada state law for torts related to his year-long detention in a private prison without a court hearing. The district court granted CoreCivic's summary judgment motion on the ground that CoreCivic did not cause plaintiff's prolonged detention.The panel concluded that a jury could reasonably find that CoreCivic's actions caused plaintiff's prolonged detention. In this case, a rational jury could find that, in failing to notify the Marshals of plaintiff's detention and in dissuading and preventing him from seeking other help, CoreCivic was a cause of his pre-hearing detention as required to establish claims for false imprisonment, negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The panel also concluded that a jury could find that CoreCivic breached a duty to plaintiff, and thus plaintiff has established triable issues as to his negligence claim. Furthermore, a jury could reasonably find CoreCivic's actions extreme and outrageous, and thus plaintiff has established triable issues as to his claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. View "Rivera v. Corrections Corporation of America" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a class action against Walmart, alleging three violations of California Labor Code's wage-statement and meal-break requirements; first, plaintiff alleged that Walmart did not provide adequate pay rate information on its wage statements, Cal. Lab. Code 226(a)(9); second, he claimed that Walmart failed to furnish the pay-period dates with his last paycheck, section 226(a)(6); and third, he asserted that Walmart did not pay adequate compensation for missed meal breaks, section 226.7(c). Plaintiff sought relief under California's Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA).The Ninth Circuit held that plaintiff lacked standing to bring the meal-break claim because he did not suffer injury himself. The panel explained that PAGA's features diverge from the assignment theory of qui tam injury in Vermont Agency of Nat. Res. V. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765 (2000), and they depart from the traditional criteria of qui tam statutes. In regard to the two wage-statement claims, the panel held that plaintiff had standing but that Walmart did not breach California law. The panel explained that, because Walmart must retroactively calculate the MyShare overtime adjustment based on work from six prior periods, the panel did not consider it an hourly rate "in effect" during the pay period for purposes of section 226(a)(9). Therefore, Walmart complied with the wage statement law here. The panel also held that Walmart's Statements of Final Pay do not violate the wage statement statute. View "Magadia v. Wal-Mart Associates, Inc." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's final order of removal. At issue is whether the government must carry its burden of proving that a returning LPR meets one of the six exceptions under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(13)(C) before it paroles that LPR into the United States under section 1182(d)(5).The panel deferred to a precedential opinion issued by the BIA, Matter of Valenzuela-Felix, 26 I. & N. Dec. 53 (BIA 2012), and held that the government may exercise its discretion to parole a returning LPR into the United States for prosecution without carrying its burden of proving that the LPR falls within one of the six exceptions. The government must, however, carry its burden of proof in subsequent removal proceedings if any ensue. In this case, when petitioner arrived at LAX, the CBP exercised its discretion to parole him into the United States for prosecution; the panel explained that it does not second-guess the CBP's decision to do so; petitioner then pleaded guilty to a crime involving moral turpitude; and, at subsequent removal proceedings, the government properly relied on petitioner's conviction to carry its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that he could be regarded as an alien seeking an admission into the United States under section 1101(a)(13)(C)(v). Therefore, petitioner was properly subjected to a charge of inadmissibility. View "Vazquez Romero v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of social security disability benefits to claimant. At issue is whether knowledge of the Social Security Administration's longstanding interpretation of the term "medium work" as requiring standing or walking for approximately six hours out of an eight-hour workday can be imputed to a qualified vocational expert.The panel held that an expert in this field is presumptively aware of the agency's well-established definition of this term of art. Therefore, when the ALJ asked the expert in this case whether jobs existed for a hypothetical individual who was limited to medium work, that question adequately communicated the term's attendant standing and walking limitations. In this case, it follows that the expert's resulting testimony that a significant number of jobs existed in the national economy for an individual with claimant's limitations constituted substantial evidence in support of the ALJ's determination that he was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. View "Terry v. Saul" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for seven instances of armed robbery and three instances of attempted armed robbery. Defendant raised three alleged trial errors: (1) denial of his motion to suppress body camera footage of him taken during an unrelated police encounter; (2) denial of his motion in limine to exclude video evidence of his flight from police; and (3) denial of his motion to sever the offenses. Furthermore, defendant argued that cumulative errors affected the fairness of his trial; the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment violated the Eighth Amendment; and a Hobbs Act robbery case should be overturned.The panel concluded that the police violated the Fourth Amendment when they opened the door to defendant's residence without a warrant on February 7, 2017, and the fruit of that search should not have been introduced at trial. However, given the strength of the other evidence that defendant committed the ARCO robbery, the panel concluded that the district court's error in admitting the body camera evidence was harmless. The panel rejected the remainder of defendant's challenges to his conviction and his 85-year sentence as meritless. View "United States v. Holiday" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming the denial of deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Petitioner's CAT claim was based on the physical abuse she experienced by her former domestic partner in Jamaica.The panel held that the record does not compel a finding that it is more likely than not that petitioner will suffer future torture if returned to Jamaica. In this case, a Jamaican court issued a protective order and the former partner has left her household. The panel also held that the IJ appropriately considered all of petitioner's evidence, including her country reports and whether she could safely relocate if returned to Jamaica. The panel explained that the circumstances of Jamaican women in general do not vitiate the agency's specific findings as to petitioner's situation with her former partner. While country conditions include generalized domestic violence against women, the panel stated that this does not compel a conclusion that petitioner will more likely than not be subjected to violence from her former partner or his associates. View "Dawson v. Garland" on Justia Law

Lopez, attempting to drive across the border in Otay Mesa, California, was referred to secondary inspection. The inspection of Lopez’s vehicle revealed packages containing methamphetamine. Lopez pleaded guilty under 21 U.S.C. 952 and 21 U.S.C. 960, triggering a mandatory minimum sentence of five years’ imprisonment.The 18 U.S.C. 3553(f) “safety valve” allows a district court to sentence a criminal defendant below the mandatory minimum sentence for certain drug offenses if the defendant meets the criteria in section 3553(f)(1)-(f)(5). A 2018 amendment, the First Step Act, focuses only on the defendant’s prior criminal history as determined under the Sentencing Guidelines and requires a defendant to prove that he does not have: (A) more than 4 criminal history points . . . (B) a prior 3-point offense . . . and (C) a prior 2-point violent offense.” Lopez’s only relevant conviction was for vandalism in 2008. Because of a probation violation, he served 13 months of imprisonment, so that conviction constituted a “3-point offense” under U.S.S.G. 4A1.1(a)The district court concluded that section 3553(f)(1)’s “and” is ambiguous and invoked the rule of lenity to reach a conjunctive interpretation, then sentenced Lopez to four years of imprisonment. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, finding 3553(f)(1)’s “and” unambiguously conjunctive. View "United States v. Lopez" on Justia Law