Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Ninth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for seven instances of armed robbery and three instances of attempted armed robbery. Defendant raised three alleged trial errors: (1) denial of his motion to suppress body camera footage of him taken during an unrelated police encounter; (2) denial of his motion in limine to exclude video evidence of his flight from police; and (3) denial of his motion to sever the offenses. Furthermore, defendant argued that cumulative errors affected the fairness of his trial; the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment violated the Eighth Amendment; and a Hobbs Act robbery case should be overturned.The panel concluded that the police violated the Fourth Amendment when they opened the door to defendant's residence without a warrant on February 7, 2017, and the fruit of that search should not have been introduced at trial. However, given the strength of the other evidence that defendant committed the ARCO robbery, the panel concluded that the district court's error in admitting the body camera evidence was harmless. The panel rejected the remainder of defendant's challenges to his conviction and his 85-year sentence as meritless. View "United States v. Holiday" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming the denial of deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Petitioner's CAT claim was based on the physical abuse she experienced by her former domestic partner in Jamaica.The panel held that the record does not compel a finding that it is more likely than not that petitioner will suffer future torture if returned to Jamaica. In this case, a Jamaican court issued a protective order and the former partner has left her household. The panel also held that the IJ appropriately considered all of petitioner's evidence, including her country reports and whether she could safely relocate if returned to Jamaica. The panel explained that the circumstances of Jamaican women in general do not vitiate the agency's specific findings as to petitioner's situation with her former partner. While country conditions include generalized domestic violence against women, the panel stated that this does not compel a conclusion that petitioner will more likely than not be subjected to violence from her former partner or his associates. View "Dawson v. Garland" on Justia Law

Lopez, attempting to drive across the border in Otay Mesa, California, was referred to secondary inspection. The inspection of Lopez’s vehicle revealed packages containing methamphetamine. Lopez pleaded guilty under 21 U.S.C. 952 and 21 U.S.C. 960, triggering a mandatory minimum sentence of five years’ imprisonment.The 18 U.S.C. 3553(f) “safety valve” allows a district court to sentence a criminal defendant below the mandatory minimum sentence for certain drug offenses if the defendant meets the criteria in section 3553(f)(1)-(f)(5). A 2018 amendment, the First Step Act, focuses only on the defendant’s prior criminal history as determined under the Sentencing Guidelines and requires a defendant to prove that he does not have: (A) more than 4 criminal history points . . . (B) a prior 3-point offense . . . and (C) a prior 2-point violent offense.” Lopez’s only relevant conviction was for vandalism in 2008. Because of a probation violation, he served 13 months of imprisonment, so that conviction constituted a “3-point offense” under U.S.S.G. 4A1.1(a)The district court concluded that section 3553(f)(1)’s “and” is ambiguous and invoked the rule of lenity to reach a conjunctive interpretation, then sentenced Lopez to four years of imprisonment. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, finding 3553(f)(1)’s “and” unambiguously conjunctive. View "United States v. Lopez" on Justia Law

Stafford used his third-party insurance coverage to purchase prescription drugs from Rite Aid’s pharmacies. Rite Aid submits a claim for a prescription drug to an insurance company through a “pharmacy benefits manager” (PBM). The claim form that Rite Aid submits includes the “usual and customary” price of the relevant prescription drug.Stafford brought a class action, alleging that Rite Aid fraudulently inflated the reported prices of prescription drugs, which resulted in class members paying Rite Aid a higher co-payment for the drugs than they would have paid if Rite Aid had reported the correct price. After litigating several motions to dismiss, Rite Aid moved to compel arbitration. Although Rite Aid and Stafford had no contract between them containing an arbitration clause, Rite Aid did have such contracts with the PBMs who coordinated insurance reimbursements and co-payment calculations.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion to compel arbitration. Under California law, Stafford’s claims did not depend on Rite Aid’s contractual obligations to the PBMs. Consequently, equitable estoppel did not apply to bind Stafford to the arbitration agreements in those contracts. View "Stafford v. Rite Aid Corp." on Justia Law

Franklin, a nurse, was employed by a staffing agency, USSI, and had signed an Arbitration Agreement. USSI assigned Franklin to work at the Hospital. Franklin signed a Travel Nurse Assignment Contract that also includes an arbitration provision. The Hospital is not a signatory to either the Arbitration Agreement or the Assignment Contract. There is no contract between Franklin and the Hospital nor between the Hospital and USSI. The Hospital contracts with RightSourcing, which contracts with USSI to provide the contingent nursing staff. The Hospital retains supervision over the provision of clinical services. RightSourcing bills the Hospital and remits payment to USSI.Franklin brought a class and collective action against the Hospital, alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, the California Labor Code, and the California Business and Professions Code, alleging that the Hospital required Franklin to work during meal breaks and off the clock but failed to pay her for that work and failed to provide accurate itemized wage statements or reimburse travel expenses.The district court granted the Hospital’s motion to compel arbitration. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The Hospital, a nonsignatory, could compel arbitration because Franklin’s claims were intimately founded in and intertwined with her contracts with USSI; under California law, she was equitably estopped from avoiding the arbitration provisions. View "Franklin v. Community Regional Medical Center, FKA" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's imposition of two conditions of supervised release after defendant was convicted of receipt or distribution of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(2). The panel concluded that the place condition, which prohibits defendant from being near any place primarily used by children, is not unconstitutionally vague nor overbroad and is reasonable for the protection of the public. The panel also concluded that the third-party risk notification condition, where a probation officer may require defendant to notify another person of the defendant's risk to that person, was not unconstitutionally vague where the limited discretion vested in the probation officer as to when the condition should be triggered does not render it unconstitutionally vague. View "United States v. Gibson" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal based on lack of jurisdiction of a declaratory judgment action concerning a dispute arising from the withholdings required under the Foreign Investment in Real Property Tax Act (FIRPTA) and the Fixed, Determinable, Annual, or Periodical income (FDAP) rules. Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment that, among other things, withholding money from their agreed purchase price to pay the federal taxes required under FIRPTA and the FDAP rules is not a breach of their real estate contract with Namaca.Under the Declaratory Judgment Act, a federal court may issue a declaration resolving the parties' competing legal rights in a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, except with respect to federal taxes. In this case, plaintiffs argue that because the FIRPTA and FDAP withholdings are made before the IRS assesses tax liability, the taxation exception does not apply because a declaration concerning their withholding obligations will not restrain the ultimate assessment of taxes. However, the panel held that the Declaratory Judgment Act's bar is not conditioned on a determination of ultimate tax liability. Furthermore, it is coextensive with the Anti-Injunction Act despite the broader language of the former. Therefore, the panel upheld the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' request for a declaratory judgment that withholding money from their agreed purchase price to pay the taxes allegedly owed under FIRPTA and the FDAP rules is not a breach of their real estate contract. View "Gilbert v. United States" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of OMB in an action brought by plaintiff and AAET, contending that patent applicants should not have to comply with certain U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (USPTO) rules because the USPTO is violating the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA). Plaintiff and AAET argue that patent applicants need not follow the rules because the USPTO is violating the PRA by failing to obtain OMB approval and a control number each time the USPTO makes a request to an applicant during the back-and-forth communications process concerning a particular patent. The OMB rejected this argument and concluded that the rules are not subject to the PRA.The panel held that the challenged rules do not impose "collections of information" subject to the PRA's procedural requirements. Rather, the PRA and the regulations expressly exclude from coverage individualized communications just like those between a patent examiner and a patent applicant. Furthermore, even if they impose "collections," most of the rules are exempted from the PRA under Exemption 6. View "Hyatt v. Office of Management and Budget" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit amended its opinion, ordered the amended opinion to be filed concurrently with the panel's order, and denied a petition for rehearing en banc.In the amended opinion, the panel held that Bivens remedies were available in the circumstances of this case, where a United States citizen claimed that a border patrol agent violated the Fourth Amendment by using excessive force while carrying out official duties within the United States and violated the First Amendment by engaging in retaliation entirely unconnected to his official duties. Plaintiff owns, operates, and lives in a bed and breakfast near the United States-Canada border in Blaine, Washington. Plaintiff alleged that a border patrol agent entered plaintiff's property to question guests and used excessive force on plaintiff, ultimately retaliating against plaintiff by, among other things, contacting the IRS to seek an investigation into plaintiff's tax status.The panel agreed with the district court's assumption that plaintiff's Fourth Amendment excessive force claim is a "modest extension" of Bivens cases in a new context. The panel did not find that special factors counseled hesitation such that a Bivens action in this new context is foreclosed. In this case, plaintiff, a United States citizen, is bringing a conventional Fourth Amendment excessive force claim arising out of actions by a rank-and-file border patrol agent on plaintiff's own property in the United States. The panel explained that this context is a far cry from the contexts in Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1857 (2017), and Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 743 (2020), where the Supreme Court found that special factors counseled against a Bivens action. In regard to the First Amendment claim, the panel noted that although the Supreme Court wrote in Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250 (2006), that Bivens extends to First Amendment retaliation claims when federal law enforcement officials have no innocent motives for their action, the panel recognized that the Supreme Court has not expressly so held. In this case, plaintiff's First Amendment retaliation claim arose in a new context and the panel found no special factor making it inadvisable to find a cognizable Bivens claim in this new context. Finally, the panel considered the available alternative remedies -- intentional-tort claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act, a trespass claim against Agent Egbert, or injunctive relief -- and concluded that none of these suggested remedies defeats a Bivens action. View "Boule v. Egbert" on Justia Law

After Uber’s founding in 2009, its valuation soared, with some investors assigning a valuation as high as $68 billion by mid-2016. Between June 2014 and May 2016, Kalanick, Uber’s founder, and Uber completed four preferred stock offerings, raising more than $10 billion in additional capital through limited partnerships and other entities. Irving Firemen’s Relief & Retirement Fund acquired Uber securities on February 16, 2016. In 2017, several alleged corporate scandals surfaced. By early 2018, investors estimated a nearly 30% decline in Uber’s valuation. Irving filed a putative class action against Uber and Kalanick alleging securities fraud under California Corporations Code sections 25400(d) and 25500. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint, upholding the use of the federal standard for loss causation rather than the “less-rigid state law standard.” Irving did not state a claim because it did not adequately allege that Uber and Kalanick’s alleged fraudulent misstatements and omissions caused its alleged losses. Even assuming actionable misstatements by Uber and Kalanick and that news articles, a lawsuit, and government investigations revealed the truth to the market, Irving did not adequately and with particularity allege that these revelations caused the resulting drop in Uber’s valuation. View "Irving Firemen’s Relief & Retirement Fund v. Uber Technologies, Inc." on Justia Law