Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal, based on lack of jurisdiction, of Navajo Nation's breach of trust claim alleging that Federal Appellees failed to consider the Nation's as-yet-undetermined water rights in managing the Colorado River. Several states intervened to protect their interests in the Colorado's waters.The panel concluded that the district court erred in dismissing the complaint because, in contrast to the district court's determination, the amendment was not futile. The panel explained that, although the Supreme Court retained original jurisdiction over water rights claims to the Colorado River in Arizona I, the Nation's complaint does not seek a judicial quantification of rights to the River, so the panel need not decide whether the Supreme Court's retained jurisdiction is exclusive. Furthermore, contrary to the Intervenors' arguments on appeal, the Nation's claim is not barred by res judicata, despite the federal government's representation of the Nation in Arizona I. Finally, the panel concluded that the district court erred in denying the Nation's motion to amend and in dismissing the Nation's complaint. In this case, the complaint properly stated a breach of trust claim premised on the Nation's treaties with the United States and the Nation's federally reserved Winters rights, especially when considered along with the Federal Appellees' pervasive control over the Colorado River. Accordingly, the panel remanded with instructions to permit the Nation to amend its complaint. View "Navajo Nation v. U.S. Department of the Interior" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's order preliminarily enjoining enforcement, against any motor carrier doing business in California, of California's Assembly Bill 5, which codified the judge-made "ABC test" for classifying workers as either employees or independent contractors.After determining that CTA has standing to bring suit, the panel held that application of AB-5 to motor carriers is not preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAA), because AB-5 is a generally applicable labor law that affects a motor carrier's relationship with its workforce and does not bind, compel, or otherwise freeze into place the prices, routes, or services of motor carriers. In this case, because CTA is unlikely to succeed on the merits, the district court erred by enjoining the state from enforcing AB5 against motor carriers operating in California. The panel explained that, by failing to follow precedent regarding labor laws of general applicability, the district court committed a legal error to which the panel cannot defer, even at the preliminary-injunction stage. View "California Trucking Ass'n v. Bonta" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's order granting the motion of 22 sates and the District of Columbia, seeking to enjoin the DOS's Final Rule removing 3D-printed guns and their associated files from the U.S. Munitions List. In 2018, DOS proposed a rule removing 3D-printed-gun files from the Munitions List and regulation under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations, and placing them on the Commerce Control List, regulated by Commerce under the Export Administration Regulations instead. On the same day, Commerce proposed its own rule expressly assuming regulatory jurisdiction over these items. DOS and Commerce, respectively, promulgated Final Rules on January 23, 2020. After plaintiffs' actions challenging both Final Rules, the district court preliminarily enjoined only the DOS Final Rule.The panel held that Congress expressly barred judicial review of designations and undesignations of defense articles under the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (the Control Act) and of any functions exercised under the Export Control Reform Act (the Reform Act). The panel explained that Congress not only barred Administrative Procedure Act (APA) challenges to Commerce's Reform Act functions, it rendered them, in effect, judicially unreviewable. Because the APA's section 702 did not apply to functions exercised under the Reform Act, federal sovereign immunity had not been waived, precluding judicial review of plaintiffs' challenge. In this case, the district court erred by enjoining the DOS Final Rule in part for perceived procedural deficiencies in the Commerce Final Rule. Therefore, because both the DOS and Commerce Final Rules are unreviewable, the States have not demonstrated the requisite likelihood of success on the merits. Accordingly, the panel remanded with instructions to dismiss. View "Washington v. United States Department of State" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Nevada physician who treats patients covered by Medicare, filed suit seeking an injunction compelling the contractor that administers Medicare in his region to change the method of evaluating his claims. The district court granted the injunction.The Ninth Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction, concluding that the Medicare statute permits a court to review only claims that have been presented to the agency. The panel explained that, because this case does not involve a claim that was presented to the agency, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, the panel remanded to the district court with instructions to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. View "Odell v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services" on Justia Law

After plaintiff, who was thirteen years old at the time, confessed to a murder he did not commit, he was convicted in juvenile court and sentenced to 25 years' imprisonment. The California Court of Appeal reversed the conviction, concluding that plaintiff's confession should have been suppressed by the juvenile court because detectives failed to respect his unambiguous request for an attorney. All parties now agree that plaintiff did not commit the murder.Plaintiff subsequently filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the three LAPD Detectives who conducted the interrogation in which plaintiff confessed to killing the victim, alleging violations of his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of qualified immunity on the Fifth Amendment claims that the officers continued to question plaintiff after he invoked his right to silence and that they engaged in unconstitutional coercive questioning tactics. However, the panel reversed the denial of qualified immunity on defendant's Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim because it was not clearly established that the abusive interrogation techniques used by the officers rose to the level of "abuse of power that shocks the conscience." The panel remanded for further proceedings. View "Tobias v. Arteaga" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence for being a deported alien found unlawfully in the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1326. Defendant contends that the district court erred in applying a sixteen-level enhancement pursuant to USSG 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(i) based on his prior state conviction for possession of cocaine. Defendant asserts that his sentence was improperly enhanced because the statute of conviction, Nevada Revised Statutes (NRS) 453.337 did not categorically set forth a drug trafficking offense under Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013), maintaining that section 453.337 criminalizes possession of controlled substances not listed in the federal Controlled Substances Act.In light of the guidance provided by the Nevada Supreme Court, the panel held that section 453.337 is a divisible statute because possession of a specific controlled substance is an element of the crime, and not merely a means of committing the possession-for-sale offense. Therefore, under the modified categorical approach, the panel concluded that, based on the information and judgment, the district court correctly applied the enhancement under section 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) for defendant's Nevada conviction.The panel also held that the district court did not plainly err in its characterization of petitioner's criminal history based on its reasonable inference that prosecution of the controlled substance charge filed on May 13, 2013, was dismissed due to defendant's pending removal from the United States on June 4, 2013. Furthermore, the district court fully considered defendant's personal and criminal history, and the district court did not procedurally nor substantively err in imposing a three year term of supervised release. View "United States v. Figueroa-Beltran" on Justia Law

After defendants were charged with attempting to enter the United States illegally, the government prosecuted them on the normal criminal docket. Defendants moved to dismiss the charges, arguing that the government should have prosecuted them through the Central Violations Bureau (CVB) process, but the district court denied the motion.The Ninth Circuit held that the government did not violate defendants' right to equal protection by prosecuting illegal border crossings on the normal criminal docket. The panel explained that the policy does not discriminate against a protected class or infringe a fundamental right. Instead, it distinguishes between defendants based on their criminal conduct—in this case, illegally entering the United States. And since criminal defendants are not a protected class, at most the rational basis test applies. Applying the rational basis test, the panel concluded that the government's decision to prosecute first-time illegal entry separately from other petty offenses passes constitutional muster. In this case, defendants have not carried their burden to negate "every conceivable basis" which might support the government’s decision to prosecute them on the normal criminal docket. Therefore, the government's policy is supported by a rational basis and does not violate equal protection. View "United States v. Ayala-Bello" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of a stay and abeyance pending exhaustion of unexhausted claims under Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005). In this case, petitioner filed a 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition challenging the constitutionality of his conviction and capital sentence. The district court concluded that petitioner lacked good cause under Rhines for his failure to exhaust because his state postconviction counsel's ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) was not sufficiently egregious. However, the panel subsequently held in Blake v. Baker, 745 F.3d 977 (9th Cir. 2014), that IAC by a petitioner's state-court counsel satisfies the good cause standard under Rhines. Therefore, the district court erred in applying the standard the panel later rejected in Blake and the panel remanded for the district court to apply the proper standard. View "Bolin v. Baker" on Justia Law

The United States appeals from the district court's dismissal with prejudice of an indictment against defendant, who was indicted in 2017 on drug-related charges and has since remained on pretrial release, obtaining eight continuances of his trial date. After the Central District of California suspended jury trials due to the COVID-19 pandemic in March 2020, defendant invoked, for the first time, his right to a speedy trial. The government requested a continuance, which the district court denied.The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of the charges against defendant, concluding that the district court erred in its reading of the Speedy Trial Act's "ends of justice" provision under 18 U.S.C. 3161(h)(7)(A). The panel declined to adopt the district court's reading of section 3161(h)(7)(A)—that [c]ontinuances under the 'ends of justice' exception in the Speedy Trial Act are appropriate if without a continuance, holding the trial would be impossible." Rather, the panel concluded that nothing in the plain text of the Act or other precedents support this rigid interpretation.The panel also concluded that the district court's failure to grant the government's motion and subsequent dismissal of defendant's indictment, under the unique facts of defendant's case and the Central District's suspension of jury trials, resulted in a miscarriage of justice under section 3161(h)(7)(B)(i). Furthermore, the district court failed to consider other, non-statutory factors. The panel then listed relevant non-exhaustive factors in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. The panel noted that defendant's reliance on United States v. Clymer, 25 F.3d 824, 829 (9th Cir. 1994), is not helpful. Finally, the panel concluded that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing the case with prejudice. Accordingly, the panel reversed and remanded with instructions to reinstate defendant's indictment, grant an appropriate ends of justice continuance, and set this case for trial. View "United States v. Olsen" on Justia Law

In light of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Ninth Circuit is asked to determine the limits that federal law and the Constitution place on holding an accused person in detention solely for the purpose of awaiting trial. In this case, defendant appealed the district court's denial of his motion for release from pretrial detention. His trial has been delayed and his detention prolonged as a result of the district court's findings that the "ends of justice" served by avoiding the serious public health risks presented by holding a trial during the COVID-19 pandemic outweighed his right to a speedy trial.The panel held that defendant's pretrial detention is consistent with the Speedy Trial Act. First, the panel concluded that because the plain text of the Act, 18 U.S.C. 3161(h)(7), requires consideration of the best interest of the defendant in a speedy trial, an ends-of-justice analysis will necessarily include consideration of whether the defendant is detained. Second, the panel concluded that section 3164(b) unambiguously provides that time properly excluded under section 3161(h) is properly excluded from section 3164. The panel explained that, because the record suggests that the district court considered defendant's detention in granting the ends-of-justice continuances here, his pretrial detention was properly tolled under the Speedy Trial Act. The panel further concluded that due process does not yet require defendant's release, but observed that the length of defendant's pretrial detention is likely approaching the outer bounds of due process. View "United States v. Torres" on Justia Law