Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff appealed the district court's dismissal of his complaint, alleging various causes of action arising from his termination as a police officer with the Reno-Sparks Indian Colony, a federally recognized Indian Tribe.The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court that, to the extent that plaintiff's claims alleged that the Tribe's decision to fire him was retaliatory, those claims are barred by the discretionary function exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act. The panel applied the two-part Gaubert-Berkovitz test and concluded that the discretionary function test bars plaintiff's two retaliation-based wrongful termination claims. In regard to plaintiff's third cause of action alleging that his termination was wrongful, the panel concluded that the first element of the Gaubert-Berkovitz test was not met and the discretionary function exception did not apply. Therefore, the district court erred in concluding that plaintiff's third cause of action was barred. Finally, the panel concluded that the district court erred in determining that the discretionary exception function barred the two additional claims plaintiff sought to raise in the Third Amended Complaint. Accordingly, the panel affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Miller v. United States" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit concluded that the district court did not err in determining that defendant's 18 U.S.C. 924(c) convictions constitutes a "controlled substance offense," as defined by USSG 4B1.2(b).In this case, defendant pleaded guilty to two drug trafficking crimes: (1) possession with intent to distribute heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C); and (2) possession with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of the same provisions. The panel explained that, either of these crimes could serve as the predicate for defendant's section 924(c) conviction. Therefore, the panel concluded that, under the modified categorical approach, defendant's section 924(c) conviction is a "controlled substance offense" within the meaning of section 4B1.2(b). Accordingly, the panel affirmed the district court's application of the relevant sentencing enhancement because defendant "committed" the section 924(c) "offense subsequent to sustaining one felony conviction of . . . a controlled substance offense[.]" View "United States v. Furaha" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit granted in part and denied in part a petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The petition is based on petitioner's fear that, if returned to El Salvador, he would face persecution or torture on account of his membership in a particular social group, defined based on his intellectual disability.The panel concluded that the agency misunderstood petitioner's proposed social group, and thus granted the petition for review with respect to the claims for asylum and withholding of removal. The panel explained that the BIA and IJ treated the term "intellectual disability" as if it were applied to a layperson. However, that term as used in petitioner's application referred to an explicit medical diagnosis with several specific characteristics. Recognized that way, the panel reasoned that the clinical term "intellectual disability" may satisfy the "particularity" and "social distinction" requirements necessary to qualify for asylum and withholding of removal. However, because the IJ did not recognize the proposed social group before her, the panel must remand to the agency for fact-finding on an open record to determine if the group is cognizable. Finally, the panel concluded that denial of CAT relief by the agency was supported by substantial evidence. View "Acevedo Granados v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment in an action brought by the United States against taxpayer for tax penalties and interest involving her failure to report foreign financial accounts. In this case, taxpayer did not timely file a Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts form (FBAR) disclosing her foreign financial accounts in the United Kingdom. The IRS found that taxpayer violated the reporting requirements of 31 U.S.C. 5314 and imposed multiple penalties under 31 U.S.C. 5321(a)(5)(A) based on her belated submission of a single FBAR.The panel held that section 5321 authorizes the IRS to impose only one non-willful penalty when an untimely, but accurate, FBAR is filed, no matter the number of accounts. In this case, taxpayer was required to file one FBAR for the 2010 calendar year by June 30, 2011 and failed to do so; she committed one violation and the IRS concluded that her violation was non-willful; and thus the maximum penalty for such a violation "shall not exceed $10,000." View "United States v. Boyd" on Justia Law

The en banc court affirmed the district court's dismissal of an action brought by plaintiff, challenging Hawai'i's firearm licensing law, Hawai'i Revised Statutes section 134-9(a). Section 134-9(a) requires that residents seeking a license to openly carry a firearm in public must demonstrate "the urgency or the need" to carry a firearm, must be of good moral character, and must be "engaged in the protection of life and property."Plaintiff applied for a firearm-carry license twice in 2011, but failed to identify "the urgency or the need" to openly carry a firearm in public. Instead, plaintiff relied upon his general desire to carry a firearm for self-defense. After his applications were denied, he challenged Hawai'i's firearm-licensing law under the Second Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.After careful review of the history of early English and American regulation of carrying arms openly in the public square, the en banc court concluded that Hawai'i's restrictions on the open carrying of firearms reflect longstanding prohibitions and that the conduct they regulate is therefore outside the historical scope of the Second Amendment. The panel explained that the Second Amendment does not guarantee an unfettered, general right to openly carry arms in public for individual self-defense. Therefore, the en banc court held that Hawai'i's firearms-carry scheme is lawful. Finally, the en banc court rejected plaintiff's contention that the regulation is invalid as a prior restraint, and rejected as premature plaintiff's due process argument that the regulation does not provide adequate process to challenge the denial of a carry-permit application. View "Young v. Hawai'i" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit certified to the California Supreme Court the following question: Under California's Motor Carriers of Property Permit Act, Cal. Veh. Code 34600 et seq., does a commercial automobile insurance policy continue in full force and effect until the insurer cancels the corresponding Certificate of Insurance on file with the California Department of Motor Vehicles, regardless of the insurance policy's stated expiration date? View "Allied Premier Insurance v. United Financial Casualty Co." on Justia Law

In 2020, the Academy filed suit in state court alleging that Continental breached an insurance policy by denying coverage for a claim asserted against it by a former executive. After removal to the district court, the district court issued a sua sponte order remanding the case to state court.The Ninth Circuit concluded that the district court's transmittal of its sua sponte order remanding this civil action to a state court based solely on the notice of removal does not deprive federal courts of jurisdiction. The panel also concluded that despite the district court's characterization of its order, 28 U.S.C. 1447(d) does not bar the panel's review because jurisdiction could not be determined when the district court issued its sua sponte order. The panel explained that section 1447(d) bars review only of a remand order that is based on a colorable section 1447(c) ground. In this case, the district court's requirement that a notice of removal prove subject matter jurisdiction is contrary to Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 89 (2014), and accordingly, is not a "colorable" ground under section 1447(c). Accordingly, the panel vacated the district court's remand order. View "Academy of Country Music v. Continental Casualty Co." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's grant of costs to Mercy Housing in an action brought by a former tenant under the Fair Housing Act. The panel joined the the First, Second, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits, all of which have applied the Christiansburg standard, and held that a plaintiff bringing suit under the Fair Housing Act should not be assessed fees or costs unless the court determines that his claim is frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless.The panel affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendant in a concurrently-filed memorandum disposition. The panel remanded for further proceedings. View "Green v. Mercy Housing, Inc." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendants in an action brought by plaintiff under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the Americans with Disabilities Act, alleging that officers used excessive force against him, lacked probable cause to arrest him, and prepared deliberately fabricated police reports.The panel concluded that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity where, at the very least, Officer Sanford's use of the reverse reap throw did not violate clearly established law. In this case, officers were called in to a "Code 3" situation involving a "violent" individual; when they arrived, plaintiff was naked and moving quickly on a busy street; and plaintiff resisted the officers' commands to stop, turning to the officers in a threatening manner with his fists clenched.In regard to the ADA claim, the panel concluded that the district court properly granted summary judgment to the City on plaintiff's claim that officers failed to make a reasonable accommodation when retaining him. The panel explained that plaintiff had not shown that a lesser amount of force would have been reasonable under the circumstances, or how personnel with different training would have acted differently given the exigencies of the situation. Furthermore, the panel could not say that the officers violated clearly established law in determining they had probable cause to arrest plaintiff after witnessing him engage in conduct that indisputably violated Nevada law. Nor did any clearly established law require the officers to conclude that probable cause had dissipated once plaintiff was discharged from the hospital. The panel rejected plaintiff's contention that his arrest was unconstitutional. Finally, the panel concluded that there is no clearly established law that would suggest that the officers committed a due process violation when they omitted from their write-ups initial accounts from an arrestee or others that the arrestee had undergone a seizure at some point before the unlawful conduct. View "O'Doan v. Sanford" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the school district in an action brought by plaintiff, a former high school football coach, alleging violation of his rights under the First Amendment and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 when the school district prohibited him from praying at the end of football games while kneeling on the fifty-yard line, surrounded by players and occasionally community members.The panel held that the school district's allowance of plaintiff's conduct would violate the Establishment Clause and thus the school district's efforts to prevent the conduct did not violate plaintiff's constitutional rights nor his rights under Title VII. The panel rejected plaintiff's free speech and free exercise claims, concluding that the record before it and binding Supreme Court precedent compel the conclusion that the school district would have violated the Establishment Clause by allowing plaintiff to pray at the conclusion of football games, in the center of the field, with students who felt pressured to join him. Furthermore, plaintiff's attempts to draw nationwide attention to his challenge to the school district compels the conclusion that he was not engaging in private prayer, but was instead engaging in public speech of an overtly religious nature while performing his job duties. In this case, the school district tried to reach an accommodation for plaintiff, but that was spurned by his insisting that he be allowed to pray immediately after the conclusion of each game, likely surrounded by students who felt pressured to join him.The panel also concluded that plaintiff's Title VII claims alleging failure to rehire, disparate treatment, failure to accommodate and retaliation failed. The panel explained that plaintiff did not show that he was adequately performing his job; plaintiff's conduct is clearly dissimilar to the other personal activities of assistant coaches he cites and thus he cannot make out a prima facie case of disparate treatment; the school district could not reasonably accommodate plaintiff's practice without undue hardship; and the school district had a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its adverse employment actions. View "Kennedy v. Bremerton School District" on Justia Law