Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Ninth Circuit filed an amended opinion, denied a petition for rehearing, and denied on behalf of the court a petition for rehearing en banc, in appeals arising from the district court's denial of petitioner's habeas corpus petition and his motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) for relief from judgment. Petitioner argues that the state court's admission of his confession violated his due process rights because it was the involuntary product of coercion, and that his Rule 60(b) motion was a proper motion to amend his habeas petition and not a disguised second or successive petition subject to 28 U.S.C. 2244.Considering the petition under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) framework and applying a highly deferential standard, the panel held that the state court's conclusion that petitioner's confession was voluntary was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law. In this case, the state court did not unreasonably conclude that petitioner was sixteen years old and considered his age, experience, and maturity as part of the totality of the circumstances of his confession. Furthermore, the state did not unreasonably conclude that the circumstances of his interview were not coercive. The panel also held that, because petitioner asserted a new claim in his Rule 60(b) motion despite the district court's previously adjudicating his habeas petition on the merits, the district court properly denied that motion as an unauthorized second or successive petition. View "Balbuena v. Sullivan" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to remand the class action to state court because defendant based the claimed amount in controversy on unreasonable assumptions. Plaintiff filed a class action against his former employer, KMI, alleging that KMI violated several provisions of the California Labor Code.The panel held that KMI failed to sufficiently demonstrate that it met the Class Action Fairness Act's requirement that the amount in controversy exceed $5 million. The panel explained that, once plaintiff contested the reasonableness of KMI's assumptions, KMI had the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that its assumptions were reasonable. The court concluded that KMI did not carry its burden because it relied on assumptions regarding the Meal Period and Rest Period subclasses that were unreasonable. In this case, KMI failed to provide any evidence to support its assumption that all 442 Hourly Employee Class members were the same as the members of the Meal Period Sub-Class or the Rest Period Sub-Class or that they all worked shifts long enough to qualify for meal or rest periods. Finally, a remand to the district court for further factfinding is not required. View "Harris v. KM Industrial, Inc." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's determination that Shaun Allahyari's alleged security interest in property owned by his son, Komron Allahyari, a tax delinquent, was not entitled to priority over later-recorded federal tax liens. First, the panel concluded that the district court erred: (1) by holding that the deed of trust between Shaun and Komron recorded on July 26, 2005 was not entitled to priority over the later-recorded federal tax liens under local law; the 2005 Deed of Trust is protected under Washington law; and (2) by failing to consider whether past consideration is sufficient to support an agreement giving rise to a security interest under Washington law.The panel also concluded that the district court applied the incorrect standard of proof to its finding under Washington's Fraudulent Transfer Act. Finally, the panel concluded that, because 26 U.S.C. 7403(a) authorizes the United States to "subject any property, of whatever nature, of the delinquent, or in which [the delinquent] has any right, title, or interest, to the payment of such tax or liability," the United States may assert any affirmative defenses that would be available to the delinquent—including that the statute of limitations has run on payments due to senior liens. Accordingly, the panel reversed and remanded for reconsideration. View "United States v. Allahyari" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit filed: (1) an order granting a request for publication, recalling the mandate, and withdrawing a memorandum disposition and replacing it with an opinion; and (2) an opinion affirming in part the district court's judgment denying NUHS relief from a decision of the Council, and dismissing the appeal in part as moot.In this case, after NUHS's appeal of the Council's probation decision was denied, NUHS filed a complaint in federal court raising common law due process claims and seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. The district court denied relief and NUHS appealed.The panel expressed no opinion on the validity of common law due process claims challenging decisions relating to accreditation. The panel held that, because the Council's accreditation standards contemplate situations in which a program can remain accredited even if it is not fully in compliance with all accreditation standards, the Council did not act arbitrarily and capriciously when it simultaneously reaffirmed NUHS's accreditation and imposed probation. Furthermore, the Council's decision to impose probation was not arbitrary and capricious and did not violate the Council's obligation to apply review procedures consistent with due process under 20 U.S.C. 1099b. Finally, because NUHS has no further reporting obligations with respect to NBCE exams administered before the change in Illinois law, its appeal from the denial of injunctive relief prohibiting the Council from enforcing Policy 56 is moot. View "National University of Health Sciences v. Council on Chiropractic Education, Inc." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit considered whether vacating the indictment against a criminal defendant ab initio following his death during the pendency of a certiorari petition to the Supreme Court requires vacation of an order issued under the Criminal Justice Act (CJA) to make payments to reimburse in part the costs of his defense.After determining that the district court had jurisdiction to determine whether its CJA reimbursement order was within the scope of the abatement doctrine, the panel affirmed the district court's order on remand to enforce continuing obligations under the CJA reimbursement order. The panel held that the CJA reimbursement order is a final order not dependent in any way on defendant's conviction and is beyond the application of the abatement ab initio rule. The panel rejected claims of waiver and availability of funds under the CJA. View "United States v. Robertson" on Justia Law

In a class action lawsuit regarding faulty Whirlpool dishwashers, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's approval of a class settlement, but vacated and remanded the $14.8 million attorney's fees award. The panel held that the Class Action Fairness Act's (CAFA) attorney's fee provisions apply to all federal class actions; the district court improperly used a lodestar-only method to calculate attorney's fees for the coupon portion of the settlement where that methodology potentially inflates the amount of attorney's fees in proportion to the results achieved for the class because the coupons may end up providing minimal benefit to the class; the district court erred in awarding a 1.68 lodestar multiplier; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in approving the settlement.On remand, the panel instructed the district court to apply a percentage-of-redemption value methodology for the coupon portion of a settlement, and use a lodestar method for the non-coupon part of the relief. In the alternative, the panel stated that the district court may use a lodestar-only methodology, but only if it does not consider the coupon relief or takes into account its redemption value. View "Chambers v. Whirlpool Corp." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendants in an action brought by plaintiff under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), challenging the denial of health care coverage for out-of-state residential treatment for anorexia nervosa.The panel held that defendants' denial of coverage did not violate the Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act or the California Mental Health Parity Act where the denial of coverage was based solely on the Plan's exclusion of coverage for out-of-state treatment, which applies equally to mental and physical illnesses. In this case, plaintiff, aware of this exclusion, sent her daughter to an out-of-state residential treatment program for anorexia nervosa. The panel concluded that plaintiff has not shown that the Plan's requirement of in-state treatment is applied to mental health conditions, but not to other medical conditions. View "Stone v. UnitedHealthcare Insurance, Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, taxi drivers and groups representing them, filed suit challenging SFMTA's new rules favoring recent owners of taxi medallions over those who obtained theirs years ago. Plaintiffs alleged that these new rules violate equal protection, substantive due process, the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), and state anti-age discrimination law.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of the government's motion for judgment on the pleadings, ruling that the taxi drivers failed to state plausible claims. The panel held that the rules are rationally related to the legitimate government interests of aiding beleaguered taxi drivers and easing taxi congestion at the airport. The panel also held that the 2018 Regulations are not a project per CEQA, and plaintiffs' pleadings fail to plausibly claim otherwise. Furthermore, plaintiffs' pleadings failed to plausibly allege that California Government Code section 11135 governs the taxi medallion system. Therefore, the panel affirmed the judgment on the CEQA and age discrimination claims, but remanded for the district court to consider granting leave to amend those claims in the event the taxi drivers can allege additional facts to support them. View "San Francisco Taxi Coalition v. City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

Chapter 7 debtor and his wife (collectively, "appellants") appealed the bankruptcy appellate panel's order affirming the bankruptcy court's judgment in an adversary proceeding brought by the Chapter 7 trustee. At issue is the characterization of two properties acquired by appellants during their marriage but before debtor individually filed for bankruptcy protection.The panel certified to the Supreme Court of California the question whether, in Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings, Cal. Evid. Code 662, which affords a presumption based on the property's form of title, supersedes Cal. Fam. Code 760, which applies a presumption in favor of community property for property purchased during the marriage with community property. The California Supreme Court determined that for joint tenancy property acquired during marriage before 1975, each spouse's interest is presumptively separate in character. For such property acquired with community funds on or after January 1, 1975, the property is presumptively community in character. For property acquired before 1985, the parties can show a transmutation from community property to separate property by oral or written agreement or a common understanding. For joint tenancy property acquired with community funds on or after January 1, 1985, a written declaration is required.In light of the Supreme Court of California's opinion answering the panel's certified question, the panel held that the bankruptcy courts properly applied California law to the characterization of the Redlands Property. In this case, the community property presumption applied because the property was acquired with community funds on or after January 1, 1975. However, the panel held that the bankruptcy courts did not make the necessary factual finding regarding when the San Bernardino Property was purchased to apply the proper presumptions when characterizing that property. Finally, the panel saw no clear error in the bankruptcy courts' finding that appellants failed to meet the requirements for a transmutation of either property. Accordingly, the panel affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part. View "Brace v. Speier" on Justia Law

On remand from the Supreme Court for further consideration in light of Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019), the Ninth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g). The panel applied United States v. Johnson, 2020 WL 6268027 (9th Cir. Oct. 26, 2020), and rejected defendant's Rehaif argument. In this case, as in Johnson, plain-error review applies when the defendant fails to challenge the district court's omission of the knowledge-of-status element now required under Rehaif. Furthermore, defendant's uncontroverted presentence report shows that he pleaded guilty to two felonies and served sentences of greater than one year for each. Therefore, defendant cannot prevail on plain error review. View "United States v. King" on Justia Law