Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Ninth Circuit withdrew its opinion filed May 16, 2019, in Case Nos. 17-50337 and 17-50387; withdrew the mandate issued in Case No. 17-50337; and filed a new opinion, after the Supreme Court remanded Case No. 17-50387 for reconsideration in light of Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019).Defendant Azano and his co-conspirators sought to influence local politicians during the 2012 San Diego election cycle by providing campaign contributions. Defendants Azano and Singh were convicted of various crimes stemming from the campaign contributions. Azano was also convicted of violating federal firearms law.Although the panel agreed with the Government that there was Rehaif error, the panel held that Azano has not demonstrated that the error seriously affected his substantial rights or the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of his judicial proceedings such that it warrants correction as an exercise of the panel's discretion. In this case, the evidence on the omitted mens rea element—that Azano knew he was "admitted to the United States under a nonimmigrant visa"—was overwhelming and uncontested such that there is no reasonable probability "the jury's verdict would have been different had the jury been properly instructed." However, the panel reversed Azano's and Singh's convictions under count thirty-seven for falsification of campaign records, finding the evidence insufficient to support all material elements. The panel affirmed as to all other convictions, including Azano's conviction for unlawfully possessing a firearm. The panel vacated Azano's and Singh's sentences and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Singh" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against CoreCivil under the Wiretap Act, alleging that CoreCivic unlawfully recorded privileged telephone calls between herself and her clients who were detained in CoreCivic's detention facility in Nevada.The Ninth Circuit held that the only reasonable interpretation based on both the text and context of the Act is that "the violation" refers to each separate interception, whether the interception is a singular event or part of a larger pattern of conduct. Therefore, each interception of plaintiff's privileged telephone calls is a separate violation of the Act, and the statute of limitations is triggered anew for each call that CoreCivic recorded. The panel held that the district court correctly determined that the Act's two-year statute of limitations was first triggered when plaintiff received discovery in June 2016 that contained recordings of her privileged telephone calls. In this case, the undisputed facts establish that plaintiff had such notice of recordings made before June 27, 2016, when she received discovery from the government on that date that included recorded calls. Accordingly, the panel affirmed the district court's holding that plaintiff's claims are untimely to the extent they are based on interceptions that occurred before June 27, 2016. However, to the extent her claims are based on calls that were recorded after this date, the timeliness of such claims depends on when she first had a reasonable opportunity to discover that such calls were recorded. The panel remanded to the district court for further analysis. View "Bliss v. CoreCivic, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment entered in favor of defendants in an action alleging that the individual defendants used excessive force in effecting plaintiff's arrest.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Defendant Leon and held that, even taking plaintiff's version of the facts as true, a reasonable jury would not find a Fourth Amendment violation because Leon's acts were objectively reasonable in the circumstances. In this case, a 12 year old girl called 911 to report that her mother's boyfriend had threatened her and her family with a chainsaw and that she and her family were currently hiding from him in a bedroom that he was trying to enter; Leon faced an immediate threat; plaintiff had a knife in his pocket and had lowered his hands towards the knife when the first shot came from the beanbag shotgun; and plaintiff's hands remained near the knife in his pocket at the time of the second beanbag shot.The panel reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant Rivas-Villegas where there was a genuine issue of fact as to whether the force that Rivas-Villegas used when he kneeled on plaintiff's back when he was lying face down on the ground was excessive. The panel affirmed the district court's summary judgment in favor of Defendant Kensic where Kensic lacked any realistic opportunity to intercede or to stop the excessive force. The panel remanded for the district court to consider plaintiff's Monell claim and state law claims. View "Cortesluna v. Leon" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order denying plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction seeking to force the government to abide by procedural protections before debarring plaintiffs under 22 C.F.R. 127.7 from engaging in their business. Plaintiffs are exporters and resellers of United States armaments. Specifically, plaintiffs claim that they have been completely prohibited from engaging in all International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) and Arms Export Control Act (AECA) activities without being afforded the requisite procedural protections.The panel held that plaintiffs have insufficiently pleaded facts and submitted evidence to support their assertion that they have been de facto debarred. In this case, the entirety of plaintiffs' action, including its request for a preliminary injunction, rests on two presuppositions—that they have been de facto debarred and that the DDTC has improperly imposed a presumption of denial on their license applications. However, plaintiffs have not sufficiently established that either of these things happened. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. View "Thorne v. United States Department of State" on Justia Law

On remand from the Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit filed an amended opinion affirming defendant's convictions for being a felon in possession of a firearm, and an order denying a petition for panel rehearing and denying on behalf of the court a petition for rehearing en banc.The panel reaffirmed its conclusion that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b)'s plain error standard governs here. The panel explained that defendant's argument is best understood not as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, but rather as a claim that the district court applied the wrong legal standard in assessing his guilt—specifically, by omitting the knowledge-of-status element now required under Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019), which was issued after the panel issued its original opinion in this case. Here, the government conceded that the first two prongs of plain error are met: the district court erred by not requiring the government to prove defendant's knowledge of his status as a convicted felon, and the error is clear following Rehaif. The panel also assumed without deciding that the error affected defendant's substantial rights.The panel stated that it is appropriate in this case to review the entire record on appeal—not just the record adduced at trial—in assessing whether defendants have satisfied the fourth prong of plain error review. Given the overwhelming and uncontroverted nature of the evidence, defendant cannot show that refusing to correct the district court's error would result in a miscarriage of justice. View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Alhaggagi spent his childhood going back and forth between Yemen and California. Alhaggagi began chatting online, both in Sunni groups sympathetic to ISIS and anti-ISIS Shia groups, trolling users, and attempting to start fights. In 2016, he expressed interest in purchasing weapons and referred to plans to detonate bombs, set fires, and lace cocaine with strychnine for Halloween distribution. In Alhaggagi’s view, this was “pure bullshit.” His “chat persona” allegedly could get weapons from Mexican cartels. The FBI arranged for Alhaggagi to meet an undercover agent, who was allegedly interested in a suicide mission. Alhaggagi met with the agent several times. After a meeting at a location where the FBI had left barrels of mock explosives, Alhaggagi expressed excitement about the plan but distanced himself from the agent, later stating, “I never took it seriously ... until he was ready to make a bomb … which I wanted no part of!”Alhaggagi pleaded guilty to attempting to provide material support to a terrorist organization 18 U.S.C. 2339B(a)(1). The district court concluded his conduct was “calculated to influence or affect the conduct of government by intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate against the government conduct,” and applied U.S.S.G. 3A1.4's sentencing enhancement. The Ninth Circuit vacated the 188-month sentence. Section 3A1.4 does not automatically apply to all material support offenses. The government must prove that the offense committed involved, or was intended to promote, a “federal crime of terrorism.” The district court failed to determine whether Alhaggagi knew how the accounts he opened were to be used, so it could not find that he specifically intended that they be used to coerce or intimidate the government, and did not find sufficient facts to indicate that his opening of social media accounts was intended to retaliate against government conduct. View "United States v. Alhaggagi" on Justia Law

The U.S. EPA promulgated new landfill emissions guidelines in 2016. Each state was required to submit a plan for implementing the new guidelines. The EPA was to approve or disapprove each state plan. For states that failed to submit a plan, the EPA had to promulgate a federal plan that would govern implementation in those states. The deadline for EPA issue the federal plan was set by regulation for November 2017. The EPA missed the deadline. Several states sued to force EPA to promulgate its federal plan. EPA responded to the suit and also began the rulemaking process to extend its regulatory deadline. While that rulemaking was underway, the district court entered an injunction requiring EPA to promulgate the federal plan within six months (November 2019). Months later, the EPA finalized the rulemaking process, extending its regulatory deadline by two years to August 2021. The district court declined to modify the injunction.The Ninth Circuit reversed. The district court abused its discretion in denying the EPA’s request for relief because the new regulations constituted a change in law, and removed the legal basis for the court’s deadline. A shift in the legal landscape that removed the basis for an order warranted modification of the injunction. The court rejected an argument that courts must look beyond the new regulations and conduct a broad, fact-specific inquiry into whether modification prevented inequity. View "California v. United States Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

Andrade, the mother of Omar’s children, called 911 and reported that Omar had hit Andrade and his mother, Ventura, and had smashed Andrade’s vehicle’s window. Officer Rutledge responded to the call, which was classified as a violent domestic disturbance. When Rutledge arrived at the home, Omar was not present. While Rutledge interviewed Andrade, Omar started walking toward the home. Andrade pointed and exclaimed, “that’s him.” Andrade moved behind trash cans in the driveway as Omar approached. Officer Rutledge issued several orders for Omar to “stop.” Omar continued to advance toward Andrade and displayed a knife, asking: “Is this what you wanted?” Rutledge shouted, “[s]top or I’ll shoot.” When Omar did not stop, Rutledge fired two shots, killing Omar. Omar got within 10–15 feet of Andrade before Rutledge fired.In Ventura's suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Rutledge, on the basis of qualified immunity. No controlling precedent clearly established that Omar’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from the excessive use of deadly force by police would be violated when he was shot and killed as he advanced toward an individual he had earlier that day assaulted, while carrying a drawn knife and while defying specific police orders to stop. View "Ventura v. Rutledge" on Justia Law

Washington ballot initiative 1501 prohibits public access to certain government-controlled information, including the personal information of in-home care providers, but permits that information to be disclosed to the providers’ certified exclusive bargaining representatives. The law was challenged under 42 U.S.C. 1983 by in-home providers, required by Washington law to participate in statewide collective bargaining, who are not members of their respective unions and do not pay agency fees. They wanted to inform other individual in-home providers of their right to not pay union agency fees and were unable to obtain the necessary contact information.The Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The First Amendment does not guarantee a general right of access to government-controlled information. Whether to disclose government-controlled information is generally left to the political processes but the First Amendment forbids a state from discriminating invidiously among viewpoints. A state does not engage in viewpoint discrimination by disclosing the personal information of public or quasi-public employees to the employees’ certified bargaining representative while denying equal access to the public. Initiative 1501 does not implicate the plaintiffs’ associational freedom; the plaintiffs lack standing to assert the rights of other in-home care providers. Initiative 1501 does not violate the Equal Protection Clause; the challenged provisions satisfy rational-basis review. The state has a legitimate interest in protecting seniors and other vulnerable individuals from identity theft and other financial crimes. There was no evidence that those who voted in favor of Initiative 1501 were motivated by an irrational prejudice or desire to harm the plaintiffs or their message. View "Boardman v. Inslee" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order compelling arbitration in an action brought by plaintiff, seeking damages and injunctive relief under the Fair Credit Reporting Act and state law. Plaintiff's claims arose from her purchase of the Experian Credit Score subscription service in 2014. Two versions of the Experian terms of use are at issue: the version to which plaintiff expressly agreed in 2014, and the 2018 version, which exempted some types of claims from binding arbitration.The panel held that a mere website visit after the end of a business relationship is not enough to bind parties to changed terms in a contract pursuant to a change-of-terms provision in the original contract. In this case, plaintiff's claims are arbitrable under the 2014 terms of the contract to which she assented. The panel held that, in order to bind parties to new terms pursuant to a change-of-terms provision, consistent with basic principles of contract law, both parties must have notice that the terms have changed and an opportunity to review the changes. Because plaintiff has not alleged that she had such an opportunity, the panel concluded that the 2018 terms did not form a valid contract. Furthermore, the contract permits judicial resolution of claims for public injunctive relief, but plaintiff has not alleged Article III standing for such a claim. Therefore, the panel concluded that the McGill rule does not excuse plaintiff from binding arbitration of her claims against Experian. View "Stover v. Experian Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law