Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress in an action where defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to receipt and distribution of material involving the sexual exploitation of minors. The panel held that, under the warrant and the law established by Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981), the agents had no authority to seize defendant or search his car when they arrived to execute the warrant, because neither was at the residence. In this case, the agents manufactured the authority to seize them by falsely claiming to be police officers responding to a burglary to lure defendant home. Furthermore, by luring defendant home, the agents' successful deceit enabled them to obtain incriminating statements from defendant and evidence from his car and person. The panel held that, under the particular facts of this case, the agents' use of deceit to seize and search Ramirez violated the Fourth Amendment. The panel remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Ramirez" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendants in an action brought by plaintiffs under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law, alleging that her constitutional rights were violated when she was, among other things, subjected to a strip search upon arriving at a prison to visit her boyfriend.The panel held that the defendant who performed the strip search violated plaintiff's rights under the Fourth Amendment where defendant subjected plaintiff to the search without giving her the option of leaving the prison rather than being subjected to the search. However, the panel held that defendant is protected by qualified immunity because there has been no controlling precedent in this circuit, or a sufficiently robust consensus of persuasive authority in other circuits, holding that prior to a strip search a prison visitor—even a visitor as to whom there is reasonable suspicion—must be given an opportunity to leave the prison rather than be subjected to the strip search. Furthermore, because there is little to no likelihood that plaintiff might again be subjected to a strip search under comparable circumstances, prospective declaratory and injunctive relief are unavailable. Finally, plaintiff's other alleged causes of action all fail. View "Cates v. Stroud" on Justia Law

After Sonny Lam was shot and killed inside his home by a police officer, Sonny's father filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law alleging that the officer used excessive deadly force. In this case, a jury specifically found that Sonny had stabbed the officer in the forearm with a pair of scissors prior to the first shot, that the officer had retreated after firing the first shot, and that Sonny did not approach the officer with scissors before the officer fired the fatal second shot.The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and held that the district court properly denied the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law on qualified immunity as to plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim where the law was clearly established at the time of the shooting that an officer could not constitutionally kill a person who did not pose an immediate threat. Furthermore, the law was also clearly established at the time of the incident that firing a second shot at a person who had previously been aggressive, but posed no threat to the officer at the time of the second shot, would violate the victim's rights. Therefore, the facts as found by the jury adequately supported the conclusion that a Fourth Amendment violation had occurred.The panel reversed the district court's denial of the officer’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law on the Fourteenth Amendment claim of loss of a familial relationship with Sonny, because there was insufficient evidence in the record to show that defendant acted with a purpose to harm unrelated to a legitimate law enforcement objective. The panel remanded to the district court for further proceedings. Finally, the panel held that the district court did not commit plain error in its evidentiary rulings. View "Lam v. City of Los Banos" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Service in an action brought by Pacific Choice challenging the agency's rule imposing a quota system for the Pacific non-whiting groundwater fishery. Pacific Choice alleged that the Service's 2.7 percent maximum share and its "control" rule exceeded its authority under the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976 and violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).After determining that Pacific Choice's suit was timely, the panel held that the Service did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in setting the 2.7 percent maximum share. The panel rejected Pacific Choice's contention that the Service failed to consider market power and failed to articulate the methods by which, and the purposes for which, it set the maximum share percent. The panel also rejected Pacific Choice's statutory and APA challenges to the Service's control rule. The panel applied Chevron deference to the Service's interpretation of "hold, acquire, or use" to include "control," as well as to the Service's definition of "control," and held that nothing in the statute unambiguously foreclosed the Service's approach. View "Pacific Choice Seafood Co. v. Ross" on Justia Law

The en banc court overruled Minto v. Sessions, 854 F.3d 619 (9th Cir. 2017), and held that petitioner, who was present in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) when the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) became applicable there, was not removable under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(7)(a)(i). Section 1182(a)(7)(a)(i) applies to noncitizens who do not possess a valid entry document "at the time of application for admission." The en banc court held that the phrase "at the time of application for admission" refers to the particular point in time when a noncitizen submits an application to physically enter into the United States. Therefore, the en banc court granted the petition for review to the extent that the BIA determined that petitioner was removable "as an intending immigrant without a . . . valid entry document" under section 1182(a)(7).The en banc court held that the BIA properly concluded that petitioner is ineligible for relief in the form of cancellation of removal where substantial evidence supports the BIA's determination that petitioner failed to carry her burden of establishing ten years of continuous presence in the United States. Therefore, the en banc court granted in part and denied in part the petition for review, and remanded to the agency for a determination in the first instance as to whether petitioner was removable under the second ground originally charged in the Notice to Appear— removability as "[a]n alien present in the United States without being admitted or paroled" under section 1182(a)(6). View "Torres v. Barr" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former high school student, filed suit alleging disability discrimination by school officials in violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The district court dismissed the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and, in the alternative, as barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations.The panel applied Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch., 137 S. Ct. 743 (2017), and held that the crux of plaintiff's complaint seeks relief for the disability-based discrimination and harassment she faced at school, and not for the denial of a free appropriate public education (FAPE) under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). Therefore, plaintiff need not exhaust the administrative remedies under the IDEA, and the panel reversed the district court's order dismissing her complaint for failure to exhaust. The panel also vacated the district court's order dismissing the complaint as alternatively barred by the statute of limitations and remanded. On remand, the district court should reconsider whether any of plaintiff's claims are barred by the statute of limitations in light of the panel's conclusion that plaintiff does not seek relief for the denial of a FAPE under the IDEA. View "McIntyre v. Eugene School District 4J" on Justia Law

In 2005-2007, the borrowers obtained residential home mortgages on California properties. California law would normally have entitled them to “at least 2 percent simple interest per annum” on any funds held in escrow, California Civil Code Section 2954.8. The lender, a federal savings association organized and regulated under the Home Owners’ Loan Act of 1933 (HOLA), 12 U.S.C. 1461, did not pay interest because HOLA preempts California law. In a suit against the lender’s successor, Chase, a national bank organized and regulated under the National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. 38, the district court denied the lender’s motion to dismiss; the Ninth Circuit has held that there is no “conflict preemption” between the National Bank Act and the California law.The Ninth Circuit reversed. HOLA field preemption principles applied to the claims against Chase even though its conduct giving rise to the complaint occurred after it acquired the loans in question. Because California’s interest-on-escrow law imposed a requirement regarding escrow accounts; affected the terms of sale, purchase, investment in, and participation in loans originated by savings associations; and had more than an incidental effect on the lending operations of savings associations, it was preempted by 12 C.F.R. 560.2(b)(6) and (b)(10), and 560.2(c). View "McShannock v. JP Morgan Chase Bank NA" on Justia Law

TWA challenged the Navy's decision to relocate troops to Guam and construct training facilities on the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI). The U.S.-Japan Alliance Agreement was entered into by the United States and Japan to adapt their alliance to the changing regional and global security environment, resulting in the determination to move Marine troops from Okinawa to Guam.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Navy and rejected TWA's procedural challenges under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), holding that the Marine relocation and the placing of training facilities on Tinian are not connected for the purposes of an environmental impact statement (EIS). Furthermore, the Navy did not violate NEPA's mandate by deferring consideration of the cumulative impacts to a future EIS. The panel also held that TWA's remaining claim—that the Navy failed to consider stationing alternatives beyond Guam and the CNMI for Marines relocating out of Okinawa—also fails based on lack of standing because TWA's claim is not redressable by the judicial branch. Therefore, the panel affirmed the dismissal of this claim. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying TWA's request for leave to amend. View "Tinian Women Ass'n v. United States Department of the Navy" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of a putative class action against CSSU in favor of arbitration. After plaintiff filed suit alleging that he was owed deferred compensation, CSSU moved to dismiss based on an arbitration clause and general class waiver set forth in an Employee Dispute Resolution Program.The panel rejected plaintiff's argument that FINRA Rule 13204(a)(4) invalidates the Program's class waiver. Because the class waiver survives, the panel held that plaintiff relinquished his right to bring class claims in any forum, and because he is left with only individual claims, Rule 13204(a)(4)'s prohibition on enforcing arbitration agreements directed at putative or certified class claims has no application here. Therefore, the panel held that the district court correctly ordered the parties to arbitrate plaintiff's remaining individual claims, and aligned itself with the Second Circuit's decision in Cohen v. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc., 799 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 2015). View "Laver v. Credit Suisse Securities (USA), LLC" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's order on a motion to compel arbitration of a grievance in which the union asserted that the Hospital placed certain types of patients with nurses who did not have the appropriate training for those patients and that the Hospital was violating nurse-to-patient ratios established by state law. At issue in this appeal is whether the arbitrability of an issue is itself arbitrable, where the relevant agreement includes a broad arbitration clause but is otherwise silent on the question.In First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995), the Supreme Court established that a court, not the arbitrator, must make the determination whether the arbitrability of an issue is itself arbitrable when the relevant agreement is silent on that question. In United Bhd. Of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., Local No. 1780 v. Desert Palace, Inc., 94 F.3d 1308 (9th Cir. 1996), this court stated that labor cases are different, and in those cases, an arbitrator should decide arbitrability as long as the agreement includes a broad arbitration clause.The panel held that the rationale in Desert Palace is clearly irreconcilable with the reasoning or theory of intervening higher authority in Granite Rock Co. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287, 300–01 (2010), where the Supreme Court expressly rejected the notion that labor arbitration disputes should be analyzed differently than commercial arbitration disputes. Therefore, the panel was not bound by Desert Palace and remanded to the district court to consider whether the union's grievance is arbitrable. View "SEIU Local 121RN v. Los Robles Regional Medical Center" on Justia Law