Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Ninth Circuit granted a petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming an IJ's denial of asylum and withholding of removal. The panel held that substantial evidence did not support the Board's conclusion that the El Salvadoran government was both able and willing to control the Mara-18 gang whose members attacked petitioner and killed his son. In this case, the record before the IJ and BIA compels the conclusion that, despite initial responsiveness to petitioner's complaints, the police were unable, and then unwilling, to protect petitioner and his family from the Mara-18 gang. The panel stated that the undisputed factual record that was before the IJ and BIA reflects actual deadly violence that the government was, during certain periods, unable to control, and threats of additional deadly violence that the government was entirely unwilling to control after petitioner testified. The panel stated that this is enough.The panel remanded for the Board to consider in the first instance questions related to whether petitioner was a member of a particular social group, or whether he suffered harm rising to the level of persecution. View "J.R. v. Barr" on Justia Law

Plaintiff represents three certified classes which are defined to include, in relevant part, all current and future individuals who are subject to an immigration detainer issued by an ICE agent located in the Central District of California, excluding individuals with final orders of removal or who are subject to ongoing removal proceedings. The district court entered a judgment and two permanent injunctions in favor of plaintiff and the Probable Cause Subclass on Fourth Amendment claims. The State Authority Injunction enjoins the Government from issuing detainers from the Central District to law enforcement agencies (LEAs) in states that lack state law permitting state and local LEAs to make civil immigration arrests based on civil immigration detainers. The Database Injunction enjoins the Government from issuing detainers to class members based solely on searches of electronic databases to make probable cause determinations of removability.The Ninth Circuit first held that plaintiff had Article III standing to seek prospective injunctive relief when he commenced suit; second, the panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in certifying the Probable Cause Subclass pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) with plaintiff as the class representative; third, the panel held that 8 U.S.C. 252(f)(1) does not bar injunctive relief for the claims in this case because the only provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) whose text even refers to immigration detainers is not among the provisions that section 1252(f)(1) encompasses; fourth, the panel reversed and vacated the State Authority Injunction because the presence or absence of probable cause determines whether the Government violates the Fourth Amendment when issuing a detainer, not state law restrictions; fifth, the panel reversed and vacated the Database Injunction because it is premised on legal error and lacks critical factual findings; and finally, the panel reversed summary judgment for the Government on plaintiffs' claim pursuant to Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975). View "Gonzalez v. United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement" on Justia Law

Defendant again appealed his conviction for possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. In a prior appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that officers from the Salinas Police Department violated the Fourth Amendment when they entered defendant's home without a warrant, ostensibly to determine whether someone inside posed a threat to their safety or required emergency assistance. At issue in this appeal is whether, under the attenuation doctrine, the discovery of the suspicionless search condition after detaining and handcuffing defendant was an intervening circumstance that broke the causal chain between the initial unlawful entry and the discovery of the evidence supporting defendant's conviction in this case and the revocation of supervised release in the underlying case.The panel held that the evidence found in the search was not sufficiently attenuated from the constitutional violation. The panel balanced the three attenuation factors: 1) the temporal proximity between the unconstitutional conduct and the discovery of evidence; 2) the presence of intervening circumstances; and 3) the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct. The panel held that whatever role the officers' subjective good faith should play in the attenuation analysis, it is not enough to outweigh the other two factors. Under the totality of the circumstances, the panel concluded that even accepting the district court's finding that the officers acted in good faith, this fact alone is not enough to justify admission of the evidence. Therefore, the district court erred in denying defendant's motion to suppress and the panel reversed defendant's conviction. View "United States v. Garcia" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendants in an action brought by plaintiff under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the County and DCFS violated plaintiff's due process and privacy rights by maintaining unfounded child abuse allegations against plaintiff in California's Child Welfare Services Case Management System (CWS/CMS) without providing him notice or a hearing to challenge them.The panel held that the County has a strong interest in maintaining all reports of suspected child abuse in CWS/CMS—even those that result in "unfounded" dispositions—because doing so helps its child welfare and law enforcement agencies protect children from abuse and neglect. In this case, plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of material fact that the records of his "unfounded" allegations in CWS/CMS caused him reputational harm, or that they are used by the County to alter or extinguish his rights to employment, child placement, or child visitation. Therefore, plaintiff failed to show that his inclusion in CWS/CMS implicates his liberty interests so as to require procedural due process. Furthermore, plaintiff has not shown that the County publicly disseminates or misuses his information in a manner that would violate his constitutional right to privacy. View "Endy v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of claimants' motions to enforce a settlement agreement that the district court approved between Volkswagen and owners and lessees of diesel cars that had defeat devices, which altered emissions profiles of the cars.The panel held that the district court had the authority to review claimants' motions to enforce the settlement agreement. Furthermore, the district court did not err in reaching the merits of claimants' motions without resolving their status as third-party beneficiaries. The panel also held that the district court had the authority to, and did, approve the amendment to the settlement agreement. The panel stated that the Framework is now an enforceable part of the settlement agreement. Given the settlement agreement's express modification procedures, the district court did not abuse its discretion by construing the Framework as such a modification and approving it in response to claimants' motions. View "In re Volkswagen "Clean Diesel" Marketing, Sales Practices, and Products Liability Litigation" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence for mail fraud stemming from his involvement in a lucrative unemployment-fraud scheme. The panel held that the evidence supported the district court's finding that the losses exceeded $3.5 million and losses exceeding $3.5 million merit an 18-level enhancement under USSG 2B1.1(b)(1)(J). In this case, although the district court cited the correct sentencing provision, it incorrectly stated that it was imposing a 16-level enhancement. However, despite this misstatement, the panel held that it was not error for the district court to apply the 18-level enhancement. The panel also held that the evidence supports the district court's imposition of a leadership-role enhancement under USSG 3B1.1(b) where defendant was a leader within the unemployment-fraud scheme, and he was properly treated as such at sentencing.Finally, the panel held that state government agencies who suffer losses that are included in the actual loss calculation under USSG 2B1.1(b)(1) are properly counted as victims for purposes of the number-of-victims enhancement in USSG 2B1.1(b)(2)(A)(I). Therefore, the panel held that the district court did not err in applying an enhancement for 10 or more victims because there can be no doubt that EDD suffered losses and because EDD is properly considered a victim under section 2B1.1(b)(2)(A)(i). View "United States v. Herrera" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against DCFS and four individual employees under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging sexual harassment in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, retaliation under the First Amendment, and other related constitutional claims.The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's grant of qualified immunity to defendants on defendant's First Amendment retaliation claim because it was clearly established at the time of defendants' conduct that the First Amendment prohibits public officials from threatening to remove a child from an individual's custody to chill protected speech out of retaliatory animus for such speech.However, the panel reluctantly affirmed the district court's grant of qualified immunity to defendants on plaintiff's equal protection claim because the right of private individuals to be free from sexual harassment at the hands of social workers was not clearly established at the time of defendants' conduct in this case. Moving forward, the panel explicitly held that public officials, including social workers, violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when they sexually harass private individuals while providing them social services. View "Sampson v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's summary judgment dismissal of plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims against RII and its current and former employees, alleging that defendants violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by wrongfully detaining him, forcibly injecting him with antipsychotic medications, and misleading a court into extending his period of involuntary commitment for a total of 55 days.The panel held that defendants were acting under color of state law with respect to the actions for which plaintiff attempts to hold them liable. The panel stated that, given the necessity of state imprimatur to continue detention, the affirmative statutory command to render involuntary treatment, the reliance on the State's police and parens patriae powers, the applicable constitutional duties, the extensive involvement of the county prosecutor, and the leasing of their premises from the state hospital, a sufficiently close nexus between the state and the private actor existed here so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself. View "Rawson v. Recovery Innovations, Inc." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order compelling individual arbitration and dismissing a putative class action alleging violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act and Arizona law. Pursuant to agreements entered into by the parties, Artex and Tribeca formed and managed captive insurance companies that plaintiffs owned, and to which plaintiffs paid insurance premiums. Plaintiffs claimed the payments as tax-deductible business expenses without recognizing them as taxable income. After the IRS audited plaintiffs, it issued delinquency notices and sought to impose penalties. Plaintiffs settled with the IRS and then brought this putative class action against defendants.First, the panel held that the agreements are not unenforceable on the grounds that plaintiffs raise. Addressing an issue of first impression concerning the survival of arbitration obligations following contract termination, the panel held that the agreements do not expressly negate the presumption in favor of post-termination arbitration or clearly imply that the parties did not intend for their arbitration obligations to survive termination. Second, the panel held that the Arbitration Clause encompasses all plaintiffs' claims. Third, the panel joined seven of its sister circuits in holding that the availability of class arbitration is a gateway issue that a court must presumptively decide. In this case, the agreements do not clearly and unmistakably delegate that issue to the arbitrator. Because the agreements are silent on class arbitration, the panel held that they do not permit class arbitration. Finally, the panel held that all non-signatory defendants may compel arbitration pursuant to the agreements. View "Shivkov v. Artex Risk Solutions, Inc." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for Catalina in an action brought by plaintiff, a T-10 paraplegic, under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Plaintiff alleged that he was unable to use the restroom aboard the Jet Cat Express, a passenger vessel sailing between Long Beach and Santa Catalina Island, California, because the restroom's door was too narrow to allow his wheelchair to enter.The panel affirmed the district court's conclusion that plaintiff failed to meet his initial burden of plausibly showing that the costs of widening the Jet Cat Express's restroom door do not exceed the benefits such that widening the door was shown to be "readily achievable." The panel adopted a burden-shifting framework whereby plaintiffs have the initial burden at summary judgment of plausibly showing that the cost of removing an architectural barrier does not exceed the benefits under the particular circumstances. The defendant then bears the ultimate burden of persuasion that barrier removal is not readily achievable.Even if widening the Jet Cat Express's restroom door was not readily achievable, plaintiff could still prevail on his Title III discrimination claim if he establishes that Catalina chose not to make the restroom available to him even though it could have done so through alternative methods without much difficulty or expense. In this case, the district court did not evaluate whether Catalina made the restroom available to plaintiff through alternative methods. Therefore, the panel remanded for the district court to determine this issue in the first instance. View "Lopez v. Catalina Channel Express, Inc." on Justia Law