Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for Catalina in an action brought by plaintiff, a T-10 paraplegic, under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Plaintiff alleged that he was unable to use the restroom aboard the Jet Cat Express, a passenger vessel sailing between Long Beach and Santa Catalina Island, California, because the restroom's door was too narrow to allow his wheelchair to enter.The panel affirmed the district court's conclusion that plaintiff failed to meet his initial burden of plausibly showing that the costs of widening the Jet Cat Express's restroom door do not exceed the benefits such that widening the door was shown to be "readily achievable." The panel adopted a burden-shifting framework whereby plaintiffs have the initial burden at summary judgment of plausibly showing that the cost of removing an architectural barrier does not exceed the benefits under the particular circumstances. The defendant then bears the ultimate burden of persuasion that barrier removal is not readily achievable.Even if widening the Jet Cat Express's restroom door was not readily achievable, plaintiff could still prevail on his Title III discrimination claim if he establishes that Catalina chose not to make the restroom available to him even though it could have done so through alternative methods without much difficulty or expense. In this case, the district court did not evaluate whether Catalina made the restroom available to plaintiff through alternative methods. Therefore, the panel remanded for the district court to determine this issue in the first instance. View "Lopez v. Catalina Channel Express, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellants filed suit alleging that California's winner-take-all (WTA) approach to selecting its presidential electors violates the equal protection and First Amendment rights of California residents who, like appellants, usually do not vote for the State's popular vote winner and thus enjoy no representation among the State's electors.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint, holding that appellants' equal protection challenge is foreclosed by Williams v. Virginia State Board of Elections, a decades-old opinion that was summarily affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court. 288 F. Supp. 622 (E.D. Va. 1968), aff'd, 393 U.S. 320 (1969), reh'g denied, 393 U.S. 1112 (1969). The panel joined three sister circuits to have considered the issue in holding that, under Williams, a State's use of WTA to select its presidential electors is consistent with the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection.The panel also held that appellants have failed to plausibly allege that California's use of WTA to select presidential electors violates the First Amendment. The panel explained that, because appellants can participate fully in California's presidential election, including voting for their preferred candidates, their right to cast an effective vote is not burdened. Furthermore, WTA does not limit appellants' ability to associate with like-minded voters, and appellants do not allege any restrictions on their ability to petition. Even assuming that appellants had plausibly alleged that the State's use of WTA imposed some minimal burden, their claims would still fail. In this case, any burden is—at most—minimal, and California has identified an important interest: maximizing the impact of the State's electors within the Electoral College. View "Rodriguez v. Newsom" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal for failure to join a required party in an action challenging the Jamul Indian Village's efforts to build a casino. The panel held that the distinction JAC urges between historic tribes and other tribal entities organized under the Indian Reorganization Act is without basis in federal law. The panel held that Jamul Indian Village is a federally recognized Indian tribe with the same privileges and immunities, including tribal sovereign immunity, that other federally recognized Indian tribes possess. Therefore, the Village's tribal sovereign immunity extends to its officers in this case. Because the Village is protected by tribal sovereign immunity, the panel agreed with the district court that the Village cannot be joined in this action and that the action cannot proceed in equity and good conscience without it. View "Jamul Action Committee v. Simermeyer" on Justia Law

Four Seasons front man Frankie Valli and other defendants associated with Jersey Boys did not infringe Rex Woodard's copyright in the autobiography of Tommy DeVito, now owned by Donna Corbello, Woodard's surviving wife.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, after a jury trial in favor of defendants, on the sole ground that Jersey Boys did not infringe DeVito's biography, and so the panel did not reach the district court's fair use rationale. The panel rests its decision primarily on the unremarkable proposition that facts, in and of themselves, may not form the basis for a copyright claim. In this case, each of the alleged similarities between the Play and the Work are based on historical facts, common phrases and scenes-a-faire, or elements that were treated as facts in the Work and are thus unprotected by copyright, even though now challenged as fictional. The panel explained that neither Valli nor the other defendants violated Corbello's copyright by depicting in the Play events in their own lives that are also documented in the Work. Therefore, because the Play did not copy any protected elements of the Work, there was no copyright infringement. View "Corbello v. Vallli" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a putative class action against Quality, alleging that Quality failed to provide truck drivers with meal breaks, rest periods, overtime wages, minimum wages, and reimbursement for necessary expenditures as required by California law. After Quality removed to federal court, the district court granted plaintiff's motion to remand to state court.The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's remand order and held that plaintiff challenged the form, not the substance, of Quality's showing, and the form of that showing was sufficient under the panel's case law. In this case, because the amount in controversy was not clear from plaintiff's complaint, Quality submitted a declaration to show that more than $5 million was in controversy. The panel explained that Quality only needed to include a plausible allegation that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold. Therefore, the district court erred in treating plaintiff's attack on Quality's presentation as a factual, rather than facial, challenge. View "Salter v. Quality Carriers, Inc." on Justia Law

Pena filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 2012, then owning 30 parcels of real estate. After Pena used cash collateral in an unauthorized manner, the bankruptcy court converted his case to a Chapter 7 bankruptcy and appointed a trustee, who managed Pena’s California rental properties. The trustee tendered the rents as cash collateral to the security holders of the respective security interests. The security holders did not accept the funds. In 2014, the trustee abandoned the rental parcels as part of her administration of the bankruptcy estate; her unsuccessful efforts to distribute the rents ended in 2016. She deposited $52,000 in unclaimed funds in the bankruptcy court registry and closed Pena’s bankruptcy case, listing the unclaimed funds (and their rightful owners) in her final account. Pena did not object to the court’s decree approving the trustee’s actions.In 2018, Pena unsuccessfully sought to recover the funds without reopening the bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court noted that when the bankruptcy closed, Pena still had $411,000 in unpaid, unsecured debt. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, finding that Pena had prudential standing and was a “person aggrieved” and that the absence of an opposing party, due to the trustee’s dismissal did not prevent it from exercising jurisdiction. The trustee did not abandon the rents by abandoning the properties from which they were collected; the funds remained the property of the bankruptcy estate and did not constitute an estate surplus. View "In re: Pena" on Justia Law

In 2017, Asuncion was convicted of possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a) and (b)(1)(A)(viii). His record included three possession convictions in Washington state court in 2000 and 2004 and one distribution conviction in federal court in 2007. Under the federal drug laws, these prior convictions would trigger mandatory minimum sentences if the convictions were for “felony drug offenses,” 21 U.S.C. 802(44) The district court found that all four convictions counted as prior felony drug offenses. The prior federal conviction had resulted in a sentence longer than one year. The prior state convictions had each resulted in sentences of one year or less, but the Washington statute under which Asuncion was convicted set a maximum penalty of five years.The mandatory minimum sentence for defendants who had previously been convicted of two or more felony drug offenses was life in prison, and the district court sentenced Asuncion accordingly. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, agreeing that the state convictions constituted offenses “punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” Section 401 of the First Step Act, 21 U.S.C. 841, which scaled back the mandatory minimum penalties for repeat drug offenders—does not apply to defendants who were sentenced before its enactment. View "United States v. Asuncion" on Justia Law

Uber’s smartphone application connects riders needing transportation with available local drivers. Rideshare fares are charged automatically via the Uber App, with Uber withholding a percentage as a “service fee.” Grice, an Alabama Uber driver, has used the Uber App since 2016 to provide rideshare services to and from Huntsville International Airport and Birmingham-Shuttlesworth International Airport. Uber had agreements with these airports to allow Uber drivers to pick up arriving passengers. Grice, in the course of his work, never crosses state lines. Grice filed a putative class action lawsuit, alleging that Uber failed to safeguard drivers’ and riders’ personal information and mishandled a data security breach in which that information was stolen by online hackers. Uber moved to compel arbitration, citing the Technology Services Agreement that Grice and other drivers signed, requiring arbitration of “any disputes . . . arising out of or related to [the driver’s] relationship” with Uber and prohibiting arbitration “on a class, collective action, or representative basis.” Grice responded that he drives passengers who are engaged in interstate travel to and from airports and qualified for the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 1 exemption for workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.The district court compelled arbitration. The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for a writ of mandamus seeking to vacate the order The district court’s decision was not clearly erroneous as a matter of law, as required for granting a writ of mandamus. View "Grice v. United States District Court for the Central District of California" on Justia Law

Nanouk uses her 160-acre Alaska Native allotment for traditional subsistence activities. In the 1980s, Nanouk built a small cabin, which she and her family reached by using a trail that runs from the main road through the U.S. Air Force North River Radio Relay Station, which closed in 1978. In 1981, the General Accounting Office criticized the Air Force’s failure to maintain shuttered sites, including North River, which contained hazardous chemicals. The Air Force and the Army Corps of Engineers began remediation, removing 500 gallons of transformer oil containing PCBs and PCB-contaminated soil. Surveys taken in 1987 and 1989 revealed that 6,700 cubic yards of contaminated soil remained. The Air Force and the Corps released a new plan in 2001; clean-up resumed. The trail that Nanouk used ran through a “hot spot” where PCB-contaminated soil was picked up by her vehicles. Nanouk did not learn about the PCBs on her property until 2003 when she reported a strong chemical odor. The Air Force then undertook extensive environmental remediation at the Station and Nanouk’s allotment. Nanouk sued, alleging trespass and nuisance. She and several family members have experienced serious health problems.The Ninth Circuit vacated the dismissal of her suit. The Federal Tort Claims Act's discretionary exception barred claims predicated on two of the acts she challenged as negligent--the government’s alleged failure to supervise contractors during the Station’s operation, and its abandonment of the property between the 1978 closure and 1990. The government did not establish that the exception barred the claims relating to the failure to identify and remediate the hot spot in a timely manner after 1990. View "Nanouk v. United States" on Justia Law

Individual parents of Hindu children in the California public schools and CAPEEM filed suit against the State Department of Education and State Board of Education, claiming discrimination against the Hindu religion in the content of the History-Social Science Standards and Framework for sixth and seventh graders.The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court that the challenged content of the Standards and Framework, and process leading up to the Framework's adoption, did not disparage or otherwise express hostility to Hinduism in violation of the Constitution. The panel held that the district court properly dismissed the Equal Protection claims where the district court correctly characterized plaintiffs' claims as an indirect attack on curricula; Monteiro v. Tempe Union School District, 158 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 1998), bars plaintiffs' claims; and plaintiffs' dislike of challenged content does not constitute a violation of Equal Protection, absent a plausible allegation of discriminatory policy or intent.In regard to plaintiffs' claims under the Free Exercise clause, the panel held that the complaint did not allege interference with plaintiffs' exercise of their religion under the Constitution as required for a viable Free Exercise claim under Trinity Lutheran Church v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017), and Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2252 (2020). Furthermore, there are no expressions of hostility here as there was in Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 138 S.Ct. 1719 (2018).In regard to the Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim, the panel held that parents have the right to choose the educational forum, but not what takes place inside the school. The panel stated that parents do not have a due process right to interfere with the curriculum, discipline, hours of instruction, or the nature of any other curricular or extracurricular activities. Finally, in regard to the First Amendment Establishment clause claims, the panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to consider plaintiffs' expert report in its analysis; the Standards and Framework do not call for the teaching of biblical events or figures as historical fact, thereby implicitly endorsing Judaism, Christianity, and Islam; and none of plaintiffs' characterizations of the Hinduism materials as disparaging was supported by an objective reading of those materials. View "California Parents for the Equalization of Educational Materials v. Torlakson" on Justia Law