Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), of plaintiff's EEO complaint challenging his removal from his job as a power-plant mechanic with the Army Corps of Engineers. 5 U.S.C. 7121(d), a provision of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA), provides that unionized federal employees seeking to bring discrimination claims may "raise the matter" through either (1) their union's negotiated procedure, or (2) their agency's EEO office, "but not both."In light of the wording and legislative history of 5 U.S.C. 7121(d), as well as the persuasive consensus among courts within and outside this circuit, the panel adopted the definition of the term "matter" as set forth in Bonner v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 781 F.2d 202 (Fed. Cir. 1986), and held that the term "matter" in section 7121(d) refers to the "underlying action" in the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) grievance or the EEO complaint. In this case, plaintiff's EEO complaint raised the same matters as previously covered in plaintiff's union grievance. Furthermore, the panel would not impute a hostile-work-environment claim where no such allegation expressly appeared in the EEO complaint. The panel noted that, although plaintiff's EEO complaint was barred, there was a procedure available to him to raise his hostile-work-environment claim in the grievance process. View "Heimrich v. United States Department of the Army" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an inmate at the Montana State Prison (MPS), filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against prison staff members, alleging that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated when he was sexually assaulted during the course of a pat-down search. The district court dismissed all defendants except Sergeant Larry Pasha, the prison guard who conducted the pat down, and a jury subsequently returned a verdict in Pasha's favor. Plaintiff appealed.The Ninth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by failing to continue plaintiff's trial sua sponte. The panel recognized that there was no model jury instruction for Eighth Amendment sexual assault, and took this opportunity to address this circuit's law governing this type of claim.The panel held that a prisoner presents a viable Eighth Amendment claim where he or she proves that a prison staff member, acting under color of law and without legitimate penological justification, touched the prisoner in a sexual manner or otherwise engaged in sexual conduct for the staff member’s own sexual gratification, or for the purpose of humiliating, degrading, or demeaning the prisoner. In this case the model instructions plainly misstated the law applicable to plaintiff's cause. The panel reversed and remanded for a new trial because it was impossible to determine whether the jury would have reached the same result had it been properly instructed. View "Bearchild v. Cobban" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's determination that petitioner committed a crime involving moral turpitude. The panel held that an aggravated assault conviction under Arizona Revised Statutes 13-1203(A)(2) and 13-1204(A)(2) qualifies as a crime involving moral turpitude that made petitioner removable.In this case, the parties have treated both the basic and aggravated assault provisions as divisible, and the panel agreed that such an approach comported with circuit and state precedent. In consideration of the charging document, plea agreement, and plea colloquy together, the panel held that it was clear petitioner was convicted under sections 13-1203(A)(2) and 13-1204(A)(2). The panel was satisfied that under its cases, an aggravated assault conviction under sections 13-1203(A)(2) and 13-1204(A)(2) involving the use of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument qualifies as a crime involving moral turpitude. View "Altayar v. Barr" on Justia Law

A conviction under California Penal Code 114 is not an aggravated felony or a crime involving moral turpitude under the Immigration and Nationality Act. The Ninth Circuit granted a petition for review of the BIA's decision concluding that petitioner was ineligible for cancellation of removal due to her conviction under section 114.The panel used the categorical approach to determine whether the California statute categorically quaifies as an aggravated felony. The necessary elements for conviction under section 114 are: (1) the use; (2) of a false document; (3) to conceal citizenship or alien status; (4) with specific intent. The panel compared these elements with the federal definition of an aggravated felony and held that the California statute cannot be a match to the federal offense because it includes documents, such as fake drivers' licenses, that are not enumerated in the description of the federal crime. Furthermore, the state statute was not divisible. The panel also held that section 114 did not constitute a crime involving moral turpitude because, under the categorical approach, section 114 does not require fraudulent intent. Therefore, the panel held that the BIA erred in holding that petitioner's state conviction precluded her from consideration of cancellation of removal. Accordingly, the panel remanded for further proceedings. View "Jauregui-Cardenas v. Barr" on Justia Law

In the underlying action, plaintiff filed suit against Williams-Sonoma for damages after he allegedly suffered from the company's alleged misrepresentations about thread count on bedding he purchased. Before a class action was certified, the district court concluded that Kentucky law governed plaintiff's claims and that Kentucky consumer law prohibited class actions. The district court then granted plaintiff's request to obtain discovery from the company for the sole purpose of helping counsel's attempt to find a California purchaser of bedding from Williams-Sonoma who might be willing to sue.The Ninth Circuit granted Williams-Sonoma's petition for writ of mandamus and ordered the district court to vacate a pre-class-certification discovery order that directed Williams-Sonoma to produce a list of California customers who had purchased certain bedding products. Applying the Bauman v. U.S. Dist. Court, 557 F.2d 650, 656-661 (9th Cir. 1977), factors, the panel held that the district court clearly erred as a matter of law when it ordered the discovery in question. In this case, the first two Bauman factors weigh in favor of granting the petition, because Williams-Sonoma has no other adequate means to obtain relief at this time. Furthermore, before a direct appeal could be taken and heard, the disclosure and damage to its (and its customers') interests would be complete. The panel held that the balance of factors weighed in favor of granting the writ and vacated the district court's discovery order. View "In re: Williams-Sonoma, Inc." on Justia Law

Planned Parenthood filed suit against HHS, alleging that the agency's 2018 Funding Opportunity Announcements (FOAs) for funding programs to combat teen pregnancy were contrary to the law as required in their appropriation, the Teen Pregnancy Prevention Program (TPPP), which is the relevant part of the 2018 Consolidated Appropriations Act.The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of the action, holding that Planned Parenthood had standing under the competitor standing doctrine and that the case is not moot because it satisfies the capable of repetition, yet evading review exception to mootness. The panel explained that Planned Parenthood could reasonably expect to be subject to the same injury again, and the injury was inherently shorter than the normal life of litigation.The panel exercised its discretion to reach two issues in the first instance. First, the panel held that the 2018 Tier 1 FOA was contrary to law, because the 2018 Tier 1 FOA's direction that grant applicants address and replicate each of the elements of the TAC or the SMARTool, contradicts the TPPP's direction that Tier 1 grants go only to applicants whose programs are proven effective. Second, the panel held that the 2018 Tier 2 FOA was not contrary to the TPPP on its face. The panel remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. View "Planned Parenthood of Greater Washington and North Idaho v. United States Department of Health & Human Services" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of a petition challenging USCIS's denial of petitioner's application for naturalization. USCIS and the district court found that petitioner and her first husband were both California domiciliaries at the time they obtained their Korean divorce, meaning that their divorce was of "no force or effect" in California. At issue was whether petitioner was "domiciled" in California at the time of her divorce.The panel held that petitioner, as a B-2 nonimmigrant whose lawful status had lapsed, was precluded from establishing lawful domicile in California by operation of federal law. Therefore, the panel held that petitioner's divorce and subsequent marriage were valid under California law, she was properly admitted for permanent residency based on her marriage to a United States citizen, and she is entitled to naturalization. View "Park v. Barr" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's damages award in a class action brought by long-haul truck drivers in California, alleging that Wal-Mart violated state meal and rest break laws. The panel held that Wal-Mart raised no reversible error.The panel rejected Wal-Mart's claim that the district court erred by failing to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, and held that the district court correctly concluded that this case presented an Article III case or controversy because two lead plaintiffs remained in the action after the stay was lifted. The panel rejected Wal-Mart's claims that plaintiffs should not have been awarded damages for layovers, rest breaks, and inspections. The panel held that the district court correctly concluded that, under California law, time drivers spent on layovers is compensable if Wal-Mart exercised control over the drivers during those breaks; a more comprehensive review of the Wal-Mart pay manual demonstrates that it unambiguously required drivers to obtain preapproval to take a layover at home; the district court correctly determined that Wal-Mart's written policies constituted control as a matter of California law; the district court properly instructed the jury because the initial instruction on layovers and the supplemental instruction in response to a jury question—when viewed as a whole—fairly and accurately covered the issues, correctly stated the law, and were not misleading or prejudicial; the jury's factual finding, that Wal-Mart exercised control over its drivers under California law, is supported by substantial evidence; and the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act does not preempt California meal and break laws.Finally, the panel affirmed the district court's judgment on damages for rest breaks and inspections; held that the district court did not err in certifying a class and allowing representative evidence as proof of classwide damages; and held that the district court did not err in finding that Wal-Mart acted in good faith and with a reasonable belief in the legality of its action. View "Ridgeway v. Walmart Inc." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for illegal reentry by a previously deported alien in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1326, and the revocation of supervised release. Defendant argued that he should have automatically become a United States citizen as a result of the naturalization of one of his parents prior to the reentry at issue. However, because his parents were married, and the derivative citizenship statute at 8 U.S.C. 1432(a) required married parents to both naturalize to confer citizenship to their child, he did not become a citizen. Defendant claimed that, by making his parents' marital status a factor in the derivative citizenship determination, section 1432(a) violates the Constitution's equal protection guarantee.The panel held that rational basis review applies to section 1432(a) for reasons separate and apart from those relied on in Barthelemy v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2003). Furthermore, Barthelemy's holding that section 1432(a) is rational is not irreconcilable with Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017). Therefore, the panel was still bound by that portion of Barthelemy's reasoning and by its ultimate holding that section 1432(a) is constitutional. Even if the panel were not bound by the holding in Barthelemy, the panel concluded that section 1432(a) is rational because protecting the parental rights of the non-citizen parent is plainly a legitimate legislative purpose. View "United States v. Mayea-Pulido" on Justia Law

Volkhoff appealed the district court's dismissal of the qui tam complaint filed by relator under the False Claims Act (FCA) and analogous state false claims laws. The Ninth Circuit dismissed Volkhoff's appeal based on lack of appellate jurisdiction, because Volkhoff was not a party to relator's complaint, and it was not clear from Volkhoff's notice of appeal, as required by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c), whether relator also sought to take an appeal. View "United States ex rel. Alexander Volkhoff, LLC v. Janssen Pharmaceutica NV" on Justia Law