Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The City of Oakland filed suit alleging that Wells Fargo engaged in discriminatory lending practices by issuing predatory loans to its Black and Latino residents in violation of the Fair Housing Act of 1968 (FHA). On appeal, Wells Fargo challenged the district court's partial denial of its motion to dismiss the City's complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).In Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami (Miami I), 137 S. Ct. 1296, 1306 (2017), the Supreme Court held that to establish proximate cause under the FHA, a plaintiff must do more than show that its injuries foreseeably flowed from the alleged statutory violation. Rather, some direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged is required. Pursuant to Miami I, the Ninth Circuit held, after reviewing the FHA's text and legislative history, that Congress clearly intended the nature of the statutory cause of action at issue in this case to be broad and inclusive enough to encompass less direct, aggregate, and city-wide injuries. Furthermore, all three of the Holmes factors support the panel's conclusion that it is administratively feasible for the district court to administer the aggregate, city-wide injuries that the City claims it suffered as a result of Wells Fargo's unlawful discriminatory lending practices throughout the City.The panel held that the allegations in the amended complaint are sufficient to plead that Oakland's reduced property-tax revenues, but not its increased municipal expenses, are proximately caused by Wells Fargo's discriminatory lending practices. Therefore, the panel affirmed the district court's denial of Wells Fargo's motion to dismiss as to the City's claims for lost property-tax revenues and the district court's grant of Wells Fargo's motion to dismiss as to Oakland's claims for increased municipal expenses. The panel also held that the FHA's proximate-cause requirement applies to claims for injunctive or declaratory relief. Accordingly, the panel reversed the district court's denial of Wells Fargo's motion to dismiss as to the City's claims seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. The panel remanded for further proceedings. View "City of Oakland v. Wells Fargo & Co." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of an action brought by plaintiffs, customers of the DWP, claiming that DWP overcharged for electric power and then transferred the surplus funds to the City, thereby allowing the City to receive what amounts to an unlawful tax under California law. Plaintiffs alleged claims under the Hobbs Act, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), and 42 U.S.C. 1983, as well as claims under state law.The panel agreed with its sister circuits that the Hobbs Act does not support a private civil right of action; held that municipal entities are not subject to liability under RICO when sued in their official capacities, but the RICO claims in this case were asserted against the defendant City and DWP officials in their personal capacities; held that the RICO claim was nonetheless properly dismissed because it failed as a matter of law because it did not adequately allege a predicate act in extortion under California law or the Hobbs Act, mail and wire fraud, or obstruction of justice; and held that, under the Johnson Act, the district court lacked jurisdiction over the the section 1983 claims. Because plaintiffs have provided no basis for concluding that any of these deficiencies could be cured by an amendment of the complaint, and based upon the panel's own thorough review of the record, the panel held that amendment would be futile. View "Abcarian v. Levine" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's order dismissing an indictment charging defendant with failing to register as a sex offender in violation of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 18 U.S.C. 2250(a). The panel rejected defendant's contention that the Double Jeopardy Clause precludes jurisdiction over this appeal, and held that jeopardy did not attach in this case because the district court never heard evidence for the purpose of deciding the issue of guilt or innocence that could subject the defendant to the risk that he would be found guilty.The panel held that, in light of the plain language and purpose behind the statute, a conviction under section 2250(a) does not require that a defendant's interstate travel not be legally compelled. Because the district court erred in holding to the contrary, the panel remanded with instructions to apply the elements of section 2250 as written. View "United States v. Lusby" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit granted a petition for review of the BIA's denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) to petitioner. Petitioner claims that he is a member of a minority Somali clan who fled Somalia after members of a majority clan forced him to work as a slave for over two years, beat him, and killed his brother.The panel held that the BIA's adverse credibility determination is not supported by substantial evidence. In light of the totality of the circumstances and in the context of the administrative record presented to the panel, the panel held that the evidence in this case compels the conclusion that petitioner's testimony was credible. The panel stated that neither of the two grounds that the BIA relied on supported its adverse credibility determination: first, that petitioner's testimony was nonresponsive or lacking detail, which indicated a lack of candor; and second, petitioner omitted from his asylum application information regarding his sisters' rapes. Rather, the panel explained that the record showed that petitioner gave responsive and detailed answers, and that the omission about his sisters' rapes was not probative of petitioner's credibility and was not inconsistent with petitioner's statements. Accordingly, the panel remanded for further proceedings. View "Iman v. Barr" on Justia Law

Nutrition Distribution filed suit against IronMags, alleging that the company violated the Lanham Act by falsely advertising IronMag's nutritional supplements. After the district court entered judgment, Nutrition Distribution did not file a notice of appeal but, instead, filed a post-judgment motion for attorneys' fees under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) and then filed a notice of appeal 30 days after the district court denied that fees motion.The Ninth Circuit held that, because Nutrition Distribution did not file a notice of appeal within 30 days of the district court's judgment or obtain a Rule 58(e) order extending the time to appeal, the notice of appeal was untimely as to the district court's underlying judgment. The notice of appeal was timely as to the district court's later order denying attorneys' fees.The panel explained that the Federal Rules are clear that ordinarily, the entry of judgment may not be delayed, nor the time for appeal extended, in order to tax costs or award fees. Furthermore, a motion for attorneys' fees does not extend the time to appeal the underlying judgment unless the district court so orders under Rule 58(e). In this case, Nutrition Distribution did not seek such an order, nor did the district court enter one. The panel also held that Nutrition Distribution's attempt to now save its untimely appeal of the underlying judgment by recasting its fees motion as a Rule 59 motion to alter or amend the judgment likewise fails. The panel stated that the 1993 amendments to the Federal Rules and the Supreme Court precedent that gave rise to them make clear that attorneys' fees motions cannot be recharacterized as Rule 59 motions to extend the time to appeal an underlying judgment. Accordingly, the panel affirmed the denial of fees, and otherwise dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Nutrition Distribution LLC v. IronMag Labs, LLC" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of defendants in an action under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), alleging that a fiduciary breached its duty to make accurate representations to a beneficiary.The panel first held that defendants did not waive their statute of limitations affirmative defense. The panel applied Intel Corp. Inv. Policy Committee v. Sulyma, 140 S. Ct. 768 (2020), which held that "actual knowledge" requires more than merely a possible inference from ambiguous circumstances, but rather knowledge that is actual. The panel held that the record establishes that the beneficiary had actual knowledge of the alleged breach and failed to bring suit within the three-year statute of limitations prescribed under ERISA. In this case, the district court correctly determined that the beneficiary had actual knowledge of the alleged misrepresentation when he received a letter from defendants regarding the bridging of service under the retirement plan. Therefore, the beneficiary's claim is time-barred. Furthermore, there is no exception for fraudulent concealment that triggers the six-year statute of limitations here. Finally, the panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the beneficiary's post-judgment motion for reconsideration. View "Guenther v. Lockheed Martin Corp." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit held that the BIA reasonably interpreted "perjury," as used in 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(S), to mean an offense where "an offender make[s] a material false statement knowingly or willfully while under oath or affirmation [or penalty of perjury] where an oath is authorized or required by law." Given this definition, the panel held that perjury under section 118(a) of the California Penal Code is an "aggravated felony" because it is "an offense relating to . . . perjury."Petitioners, in three separate petitions for review, were convicted of perjury under section 118(a) and then suffered adverse immigration consequences on the ground that each had committed an "aggravated felony," namely, an "an offense relating to . . . perjury" under section 1101(a)(43)(S). The panel applied the categorical approach and held that section 118(a) is a categorical match with the BIA's generic definition of perjury, meaning that they cover the same amount of conduct. The panel rejected petitioners' claims to the contrary and held that section 118(a) is an "offense" relating to . . . perjury" under section 1101(a)(43)(S). The panel disposed of the petitions and any remaining arguments in concurrently filed memorandum dispositions. View "Ho Sang Yim v. Barr" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order denying claimant's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and for lack of proper venue a civil forfeiture case. This case arose from claimant's shares of stock in Palantir Technologies, a corporation with its principal place of business in California. Petitioner is a citizen of Saudi Arabia who wired $2 million from his account in Switzerland to a bank in California to purchase 2,500,000 shares of Series D preferred stock in Palantir. In this case, the government filed an in rem civil forfeiture action against claimant's Palantir shares, alleging that the shares were forfeitable because they were derived from proceeds traceable to a wire fraud and money laundering scheme.The panel held that the Supreme Court's decision in Tennessee Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440 (2004), supports the panel's conclusion that the district court did not err when it determined that the constitutional due process requirements set forth in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), were inapplicable to this in rem action. The Supreme Court's decision in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), addressed quasi-in-rem actions rather than in rem actions directed solely toward a res instead of property seized as a substitute for the defendant. The panel explained that in an in rem action, the focus for the jurisdictional inquiry is the res, in this case claimant's Palantir shares, rather than claimant's personal contacts with the forum. The panel also held that venue was proper because sufficient acts giving rise to the civil forfeiture occurred in the Central District. View "United States v. Obaid" on Justia Law

Plaintiff challenged the denial of her application for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. The ALJ found that plaintiff was not disabled because she could perform two occupations that existed in significant numbers in the economy.The Ninth Circuit held that the ALJ's identification of two occupations is insufficient to satisfy the "significant range of work" requirement of the Medical-Vocation Guidelines. The panel explained that, because plaintiff's skills were readily transferrable to only two occupations, the ALJ erred in concluding that she was not disabled. The panel reversed in part and remanded with instructions for calculation and payment of benefits for the period after plaintiff reached 55 years of age. Finally, the panel affirmed the district court's disability determination as to the time period before plaintiff reached the age of 55. View "Maxwell v. Saul" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit granted a petition for review of the BIA's decision denying petitioner's second motion to reopen asylum proceedings based on changed country conditions. The panel held that the BIA abused its discretion by determining that a non-citizen who seeks to reopen an earlier application for relief and attaches that application to the motion has failed to attach the "appropriate application for relief" as required by 8 C.F.R. 1003.2(c)(1).In this case, petitioner sought only to reopen his prior asylum application because he believed that changed conditions in Azerbaijan revived his previously denied claim for asylum, and he sought asylum on precisely the same ground, political opinion, as he had in his 2004 application. Furthermore, petitioner attached to his motion to reopen his prior asylum application. The panel held that the prior asylum application that petitioner sought to reopen is the "suitable or proper" application to attach, and that it makes no sense to require someone in petitioner's shoes to submit a new asylum application that is identical to the earlier application. View "Aliyev v. Barr" on Justia Law