Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that CFS and two of its employees fired him from his position as a social services practitioner in retaliation for his whistleblowing activities, in violation of California Labor Code section 1102.5 and 42 U.S.C. 1983. The County's Civil Service Commission upheld the termination and denied plaintiff's appeal, and the district court dismissed the action.The Ninth Circuit held that the Commission's order did not preclude plaintiff's section 1102.5 claim for retaliation in light of Taswell v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 232 Cal. Rptr. 3d 628, 643 (Ct. App. 2018). In Taswell, the California Court of Appeal applied a legislative-intent exception and held that administrative findings by a state agency do not preclude claims for retaliation brought under section 1102.5. However, the panel's conclusion regarding legislative intent did not extend to plaintiff's claim under section 1983, which was precluded by the Commission's order. In this case, plaintiff had a full opportunity to litigate the propriety of his termination before the administrative agency, as evidenced by the comprehensive evidentiary record and the availability of judicial review. Accordingly, the panel affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Bahra v. County of San Bernardino" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's third amended complaint alleging that defendant violated various California consumer-fraud laws by branding Diet Dr Pepper using the word "diet."The panel held that, taken all together, the allegations in the complaint failed to sufficiently allege that reasonable consumers read the word "diet" in a soft drink's brand name to promise weight loss, healthy weight management, or other health benefits. The panel stated that diet soft drinks are common in the marketplace and the prevalent understanding of the term in that context is that the "diet" version of a soft drink has fewer calories than its "regular" counterpart. The panel explained that just because some consumers may unreasonably interpret the term differently does not render the use of "diet" in a soda's brand name false or deceptive. Therefore, the panel held that plaintiff failed to sufficiently allege that Diet Dr. Pepper's labeling was false or misleading and the district court properly dismissed the claim. View "Becerra v. Dr Pepper/Seven Up, Inc." on Justia Law

CBD filed suit seeking to compel the Department of the Interior to reinstate the Refuges Rule that prevented Alaska from applying certain state hunting regulations on federal wildlife refuges. In 2017, Congress used the Congressional Review Act (CRA) to order Interior to rescind the regulation.The Ninth Circuit held that CBD lacked standing to challenge the Reenactment Provision, because it failed to allege an injury in fact that was more than speculative. Therefore, the panel dismissed CBD's argument that the Reenactment Clause violated the nondelegation doctrine.After determining that the Jurisdiction-Stripping Provision of the CRA did not include any explicit language barring judicial review of constitutional claims, the panel held that the Joint Resolution disapproving the Refuges Rule did not violate the Take Care Clause of the Constitution, and thus CBD's complaint failed to state a claim that was plausible on its face. The panel rejected CBD's argument that the CRA and Joint Resolution violated separation-of-powers principles because they interfere with the Executive Branch's duty under the Take Care Clause. The panel held that, because Congress properly enacted the Joint Resolution, and therefore validly amended Interior's authority to administer national wildlife refuges in Alaska, Congress did not prevent the President from exercising his constitutional duty to faithfully execute the laws.The panel joined other circuits in holding that federal courts do not have jurisdiction over statutory claims that arise under the CRA. In this case, CBD challenged Interior's rescission of the Refuges Rule solely on the ground that Congress did not validly enact the Joint Resolution. Therefore, the panel held that CBD's claim necessarily involved a challenge to a congressional "determination, finding, action or omission" under the CRA, and was therefore subject to the Jurisdiction-Stripping Provision. View "Center for Biological Diversity v. Bernhardt" on Justia Law

VVV appealed the district court's dismiss of its trademark claims based on three marks and the denial of leave to amend its complaint. The Ninth Circuit assumed, without deciding, that the district court correctly applied the elements of claim preclusion to this case, but found that an exception to claim preclusion applied.The panel explained that an interparty proceeding before the TTAB is a limited proceeding involving registration of a trademark, and the TTAB has no authority to determine the right to use, or the broader questions of infringement, unfair competition, damages or injunctive relief. In this case, TTAB had no power to decide VVV's claims of infringement, dilution, and unfair competition or to grant either injunctive relief or damages. Therefore, the panel held that it would be unfair to preclude VVV from litigating these claims and seeking relief when barriers existed that prevented it from doing so in the first action. The panel reversed and remanded for the district court to consider, in the first instance, whether issue preclusion applied. The panel also reversed the denial of leave to amend the complaint, and affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's claims as to the second and third marks. View "V.V.V. & Sons Edible Oils v. Meenakshi Overseas" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order allowing defendant to withdraw her guilty plea to illegal reentry under 8 U.S.C. 1326, vacated the dismissal of the information, and remanded for the district court to resolve the factual issue of whether geometric isomers of methamphetamine exist.In Lorenzo v. Sessions, 902 F.3d 930 (9th Cir. 2018)(Lorenzo I), the panel held that the definition of methamphetamine applicable to convictions under 8 U.S.C. 11378 is broader than the definition of methamphetamine under the federal Controlled Substances Act. In this case, the panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing defendant to withdraw her guilty plea after Lorenzo I, because that decision effectively invalidated defendant's underlying removal. Lorenzo I was subsequently withdrawn and replaced with a non-precedential memorandum disposition, Lorenzo v. Whitaker, 752 F. App'x 482 (9th Cir. 2019) (Lorenzo II). Lorenzo II stated that the government is not foreclosed from raising in other cases the argument that any difference between California and federal law about the definition of methamphetamine is illusory.The government contended that both California law and federal law prohibit the possession for sale of methamphetamine and its isomers, and thus they are identical. The panel declined the government's invitation to rewrite California law and noted that the government's argument required the panel to look beyond the statutory language to matters of organic chemistry. Rather, the panel reasoned that resolution of the factual issue of whether geometric isomers of methamphetamine exist has the potential to inform its disposition in this appeal and future cases. View "United States v. Rodriguez-Gamboa" on Justia Law

An alien does not withdraw his appeal of a final removal order, including the appeal of the denial of a motion to reopen or reconsider, simply because he was involuntarily removed before the appeal was decided.The Ninth Circuit held that petitioner's removal from the country while his appeal was pending before the BIA did not withdraw his appeal under 8 C.F.R. 1003.4. The panel explained that the withdrawal sanction in section 1003.4 is triggered by an alien's departure from this country; section 1003.1 does not distinguish between volitional and non-volitional departures; but the BIA has already recognized that the regulation does not apply every time a petitioner leaves this country. For example, an unlawful removal does not constitute a section 1003.4 departure. The panel agreed with the Sixth Circuit's holding in Madrigal v. Holder, 572 F.3d 239 (6th Cir. 2009), that section 1003.4 applies only when the right to appeal is relinquished by the alien's own volitional conduct, not solely that of the government. The panel held that the Sixth Circuit's holding in Madrigal was consistent with its interpretation of a similar regulation. Finally, the panel held that petitioner did not otherwise waive his right to appeal. Accordingly, the panel granted the petition for review and remanded. View "Lopez-Angel v. Barr" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal, for failure to state a claim, of an action brought by Great Minds, publisher of math curriculum Eureka Math. The complaint alleged a claim of copyright infringement against Office Depot.The panel held that Office Depot did not itself become a licensee of the "Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International Public License" or otherwise infringe Great Minds' copyright by making copies of Eureka Math materials for a profit on behalf of school and school district licensees. In this case, there was no dispute that, if Office Depot were itself a licensee, commercial copying of Great Minds' material would fall outside the scope of the license and infringe Great Minds' copyright; under California law, the school and school district licensees' exercise of their rights under the license through the services provided by Office Depot did not result in Office Depot becoming a licensee; and the district court not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend the complaint. View "Great Minds v. Office Depot, Inc." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of a Truth in Lending Act (TILA) claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on the jurisdiction-stripping provisions of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA). In this case, plaintiff sought rescission of a mortgage loan under TILA, claiming that the lender provided him with defective notice of the right to cancel when the loan was signed.The panel held that FIRREA's administrative exhaustion requirement applied, and plaintiff had a claim under FIRREA because his cause of action gave right to an equitable remedy of rescission and was susceptible of resolution by FIRREA's claims process. The panel agreed with the Fourth Circuit and concluded that there was no requirement that the loan have passed through an FDIC receivership. The panel also held that plaintiff's claim related to an act or omission, the lender failed to comply with TILA, and the FDIC was appointed as receiver.However, the panel held that plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with the FDIC because his complaint included no allegations that he presented his TILA claim to the FDIC before filing suit. Furthermore, because subject matter jurisdiction was lacking when this action was filed, plaintiff's later communications with the FDIC did not prevent dismissal of his TILA claim. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff’s request for further discovery. View "Shaw v. Bank of America Corp." on Justia Law

In appeal No. 13-99003, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the Central District and denied petitioner's motion to expand the certificate of appealability (COA) as to all claims except claim 6, regarding ineffective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase. The panel held that the conclusion that an irreconcilable conflict did not exist based on the disagreement between petitioner and counsel was reasonable; even if petitioner were successfully able to demonstrate a complete breakdown in communication or prove that an irreconcilable conflict existed under the Moore factors, his irreconcilable-conflict claim would still fail, because the Supreme Court has never held that an irreconcilable conflict with one's attorney constitutes a per se denial of the right to effective counsel; and thus the state court's decision did not unreasonably apply clearly established Federal law as pronounced by the Supreme Court. The panel also held that the state court reasonably determined that counsel did not perform deficiently by refusing to let petitioner testify, and even if counsel was deficient in doing so, petitioner was not prejudiced.In appeal No. 13-99007, the panel affirmed the judgment of the Southern District and denied petitioner's motion to expand the COA. The panel held that petitioner was not deprived of constitutionally adequate representation during the penalty phase and petitioner was not deprived of his right to the competent assistance of a psychiatric expert. View "Carter v. Davis" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of a claim for monetary relief under 42 U.S.C. 1983 brought by public sector employees against their union after the Supreme Court's decision in Janus v. American Federation of State, County, & Municipal Employees, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018). Janus held that the compulsory collection of agency fees by unions violates the First Amendment.The panel joined the Seventh Circuit and held that private parties may invoke an affirmative defense of good faith to retrospective monetary liability under 42 U.S.C. 1983, where they acted in direct reliance on then-binding Supreme Court precedent and presumptively-valid state law. The panel also held that the good faith affirmative defense applies as a matter of law, and the district court was right to dismiss plaintiffs' claim for monetary relief. View "Danielson v. Inslee" on Justia Law