Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order denying in part Uber's motion to compel arbitration of claims brought by plaintiffs under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Plaintiff alleged that Uber failed to provide a wheelchair-accessible ride-sharing option (uberWAV) in their hometown of New Orleans.The panel held that plaintiffs plausibly alleged sufficient facts to establish Article III standing where they sufficiently alleged an injury in fact under the "deterrent effect doctrine." The doctrine recognizes that when a plaintiff who is disabled within the meaning of the ADA has actual knowledge of illegal barriers at a public accommodation to which he or she desires access, that plaintiff need not engage in the futile gesture of attempting to gain access in order to show actual injury. In this case, plaintiffs have alleged that they are aware that Uber does not offer uberWAV in New Orleans; that they cannot use the Uber App because of its failure to offer uberWAV; that they plan to use the Uber App if it becomes wheelchair-accessible; and that they presently fear that they will encounter the mobility-related barriers which exist within Uber's Application and services. The panel also held that plaintiffs have plausibly alleged causation and redressability where plaintiffs' alleged injuries would not exist absent Uber's actions, and these injuries cannot be redressed without enjoining Uber to comply with the ADA. Finally, the panel held that equitable estoppel does not apply where plaintiffs' ADA claims are fully viable without any reference to Uber's Terms and Conditions. View "Namisnak v. Uber Technologies, Inc." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied a certificate of appealability (COA) allowing petitioner to appeal the district court's denial of his motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255. Petitioner's motion asserted that a report issued on August 12, 2020, by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), which concluded that petitioner's trial and sentence violated his rights under the American Declaration, requires that his death sentence be vacated, that he must be released or given a new trial, and that he cannot be sentenced to death after a new trial.The panel held that reasonable jurists would not find debatable the district court's conclusion that the IACHR's decision is not binding in federal court. In this case, the district court concluded that IACHR rulings do not have binding power within the United States by virtue of the Organization of American States (OAS) Charter because the OAS Charter is not self-executing, and Congress has passed no statute to implement it. Furthermore, the district court rejected petitioner's argument that IACHR decisions are binding because they are derived, through the OAS Charter, from the American Declaration on the ground that the American Declaration is not a treaty and creates no binding set of obligations. View "Mitchell v. United States" on Justia Law

After defendant was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm, he was charged with violating the conditions of his supervised release. Defendant filed a motion to terminate his supervised release on the ground that a change in the law meant that the state offense underlying his felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm conviction was no longer a felony. The district court denied defendant's motion, found that defendant had violated his supervised release, and imposed a fifteen-month term of imprisonment.The Ninth Circuit affirmed and agreed with the district court that the validity of an underlying conviction cannot be challenged in a supervised release revocation proceeding. Rather, the underlying conviction can only be collaterally attacked in a proceeding under 28 U.S.C. 2255. The panel also held that the sentence imposed by the district court was reasonable where it adequately considered defendant's arguments and the requisite statutory factors. View "United States v. Cate" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the City of Portland, alleging that Portland's pre-towing notice was inadequate under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.The Ninth Circuit held that the district court erred in applying Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), rather than Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950), to analyze plaintiff's adequacy of notice claim. The panel first reiterated a settled principle: Due process requires that individualized notice be given before an illegally parked car is towed unless the state has a "strong justification" for not doing so. In this case, the district court did not consider the differences between Mullane and Mathews, but relied on a non-precedential memorandum disposition instead. The panel held that no reason appears why Mullane should not govern the adequacy of pre-towing notice, because it governs the adequacy of notice in other contexts. Therefore, the panel remanded for the district court to apply Mullane's "reasonably calculated" standard and for further proceedings. View "Grimm v. City of Portland" on Justia Law

Following the lead of at least two sister circuits and noting the deference owed to prison officials in light of the special duties that arise in the prison context, the Ninth Circuit held that intermediate scrutiny applies to equal protection challenges of prison regulations which facially discriminate on the basis of gender.In this case, plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that prison officials discriminated against him based on his male gender by not allowing him to purchase certain prison vendor products available only to female inmates. The panel held that plaintiff has sufficiently demonstrated that he has standing to bring his equal protection challenge of the Department's regulation governing inmates' personal property. The panel also held that imprisoned men and women of the same security classification subject to the challenged regulation are similarly situated for the purpose of this case, and that prison regulations such as this one, which facially discriminate on the basis of gender, must receive intermediate scrutiny. Accordingly, the panel vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the prison officials. Because the panel had not yet established intermediate scrutiny as the applicable standard at the time the district court reviewed the regulation at issue, the panel remanded for the district court to determine the issue in the first instance. View "Harrison v. Kernan" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed defendant's convictions for conspiracy in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act and conspiracy in violation of the Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering Activity (VICAR) Act. Defendant's convictions stemmed from her role as "secretary" to a high-ranking member of the Mexican Mafia (La Eme).The panel held that the district court correctly gave a "substantial purpose" rather than "but-for cause" instruction for the VICAR purpose element, and the evidence was sufficient to satisfy VICAR's membership-purpose requirement. The panel also held that there was no basis for reversal on the claimed instructional error for the RICO count; the jury instructions regarding attempt and conspiracy as predicate acts did not broaden the basis for conviction beyond the scope of the RICO statute; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in giving its mid-trial instruction. The panel rejected defendant's challenges to the dual role opinion testimony offered by two law enforcement witnesses for the government. Finally, the panel held that the district court did not err in excluding testimony from a key defense witness. Accordingly, the panel found no cumulative error providing a basis for reversal of defendant's conviction. View "United States v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed defendant's convictions for assaulting his wife with a dangerous weapon and assault of a spouse by strangulation, both of which occurred on federal land. The panel held that the evidence from two other attacks on defendant's wife was proper non-propensity evidence admitted under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(a). The panel stated that other acts of domestic violence involving the same victim are textbook examples of evidence admissible under Rule 404(b). In this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the non-propensity evidence to show that defendant was not joking around or simply trying to frighten his wife, but rather intended to assault and strangle her.The panel also held that there was no error in admitting the evidence under Rule 403 where the evidence of the prior attacks were probative of his intent in this case. Furthermore, the district court on three separate occasions instructed the jury that such acts could only be used for the limited purpose of deciding whether the defendant had the state of mind, knowledge, or intent to commit the crimes charged in the indictment. View "United States v. Berckmann" on Justia Law

Oracle, owner of the proprietary Solaris software operating system, filed suit alleging that HPE improperly accessed, downloaded, copied, and installed Solaris patches on servers not under an Oracle support contract. Oracle asserted direct copyright infringement claims for HPE's direct support customers, and indirect infringement claims for joint HPE-Terix customers. The district court granted summary judgment for HPE.The Ninth Circuit held that the copyright infringement claim is subject to the Copyright Act's three year statute of limitations, which runs separately for each violation. The panel explained that Oracle's constructive knowledge triggered the statute of limitations and Oracle failed to conduct a reasonable investigation into the suspected infringement. The panel also held that the intentional interference with prospective economic advantage claim is barred by California's two year statute of limitations. Therefore, the panel affirmed the district court's partial summary judgment for HPE on the infringement and intentional interference claims. The panel also affirmed in part summary judgment on the indirect infringement claims for patch installations by Terix; reversed summary judgment on all infringement claims for pre-installation conduct and on the direct infringement claims for unauthorized patch installations by HPE; and addressed all other issues in a concurrently filed memorandum opinion. View "Oracle America, Inc. v. Hewlett Packard Enterprise Co." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for 39 counts of distributing controlled substances outside the usual course of professional practice and without a legitimate medical purpose to five of his former patients. Defendant's conviction stemmed from his role as a physician's assistant at a chronic pain-management medical practice.The panel held that uncharged prescriptions of controlled substances in enormous quantities, and in dangerous combinations, support a reasonable inference that the underlying prescriptions were issued outside the usual course of professional practice and without a legitimate medical purpose. In this case, defendant's practice-wide evidence was therefore probative of his unlawful intent, undermining his defense at trial that the charged prescriptions amounted to a "few bad judgments." The panel held that, because the prescription data made the intent element of the 21 U.S.C. 841 charges more probable, the district court properly admitted defendant's uncharged prescriptions under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). Assuming without deciding that the district court abused its discretion under Rule 403 by failing to preview all of the underlying prescription data before admitting it into evidence, the panel held that the error was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt. View "United States v. Lague" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a preliminary injunction in an action challenging Arizona Revised Statute 5-112(U). Section 5-112(U) requires, among other things, that any simulcast of live horseracing into Arizona that originates outside the state "must be offered to each commercial live-racing permittee … and additional wagering facility" in the state.The panel held that the Interstate Horse Racing Act of 1978 (IHA) does not preempt section 5-112(U). The panel also held that Monarch, a simulcast purchaser and sales agent for racetracks, and Laurel Park, a Maryland racetrack whose races Monarch simulcasts, had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits of their claims. The panel explained that the IHA does not address how the states can regulate simulcasts, and the Arizona statute does not address Laurel Park's statutory right to consent before interstate wagering on its races can be conducted. Therefore, it is not facially impossible to comply with both laws. Furthermore, the Arizona statute does not frustrate the intent of the IHA.The panel rejected plaintiffs' contention that section 5-112(U) is an unconstitutional regulation on commercial speech and a forbidden content-based restriction; rejected plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment and Due Process challenges; held that the Arizona statute does not violate the Dormant Commerce Clause; and held that the statute did not give rise to a Contract Clause claim. View "Monarch Content Management LLC v. Arizona Department of Gaming" on Justia Law