Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, who have hearing loss severe enough to qualify them as disabled, filed suit claiming that Kaiser's health insurance plan's categorical exclusion of most hearing loss treatment discriminates against hearing disabled people in violation of Section 1557 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA). The district court ruled that Kaiser's plans do not exclude benefits based on disability because the plans treat individuals with hearing loss alike, regardless of whether their hearing loss is disabling.The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court that plaintiffs have failed to state a plausible discrimination claim. The panel explained that the ACA specifically prohibits discrimination in plan benefit design, and a categorical exclusion of treatment for hearing loss would raise an inference of discrimination against hearing disabled people notwithstanding that it would also adversely affect individuals with non-disabling hearing loss. However, the exclusion in this case is not categorical. The panel stated that, while Kaiser's coverage of cochlear implants is inadequate to serve plaintiffs' health needs, it may adequately serve the needs of hearing disabled people as a group. Therefore, the panel affirmed the district court's dismissal of the second amended complaint. The panel reversed the district court's dismissal without leave to amend and remanded. View "Schmitt v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan of Washington" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's order granting plaintiff's motion to remand to state court because it effectively required Harley-Davison to provide evidence that the proffered punitive damages amount is probable or likely. The question presented on appeal is if the defendant relies on potential punitive damages to meet the amount-in-controversy requirement for removal under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), what is the defendant’s burden in establishing that amount?The panel held that the defendant must show that the punitive damages amount is reasonably possible. In this case, Harley-Davidson met its burden of showing that the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million under CAFA by establishing that the proffered punitive/compensatory damages ratio is reasonably possible. View "Greene v. Harley-Davidson, Inc." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part, and vacated in part, the district court's grant of summary judgment entering declaratory relief for plaintiffs and permanently enjoining the DOJ on a nationwide basis from imposing certain conditions for providing funding for state and local criminal justice programs through Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grants. Plaintiffs, so-called sanctuary jurisdictions, which have enacted laws that limit their employees' authority to assist in the enforcement of federal immigration laws, filed suit to prevent DOJ from denying funding of Byrne grants for failure to comply with new Access, Notice, and Certification Conditions.Consistent with its discussion in City of Los Angeles v. Barr, 941 F.3d 931 (9th Cir. 2019), the panel affirmed the injunction barring DOJ from using the Access and Notice Conditions as Byrne funding requirements for any California state entity or political subdivision. In City of Los Angeles, the panel held that DOJ lacked statutory authority to impose the Access and Notice Conditions on Byrne funds in reviewing a preliminary injunction obtained by the City of Los Angeles. The panel also upheld the injunction barring DOJ from denying or withholding Byrne funds on account of the Certification Condition based on plaintiffs' alleged non-compliance with 8 U.S.C. 1373. With regard to the geographical reach of the relief granted by the district court, the panel held that the district court abused its discretion in issuing an injunction that extended nationwide. View "City and County of San Francisco v. Barr" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's pre-sentencing order enjoining the government from spending additional funds on the prosecution of defendants, who pleaded guilty to federal conspiracy to manufacture and possess with intent to distribute marijuana.The panel held that the appropriations rider that prohibited the Department of Justice from using congressionally-allocated funding to prevent states from implementing their medical marijuana laws does not bar the government from spending funds on this appeal. The panel also held that the district court did not err in concluding that defendants met their burden to show that they were strictly compliant with the Medical Marijuana Program Act at the time of their arrest. In this case, the district court properly focused the McIntosh hearing on the conduct underlying the charge, and the district court's analysis of state law was not in error and its factual findings were not clearly erroneous. View "United States v. Pisarski" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied the petition for review of the BIA's December 2015 order of removal, holding that the BIA did not err in relying on binding precedent to conclude that petitioner was removable on the ground that he was convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude. The panel discussed that, if it were writing on a clean slate, what categorical analysis it would use. However, because the panel was not writing on a clean slate, the panel held, according to binding precedent, that petty theft under section 484(a) of the California Penal Code is a crime involving moral turpitude.The panel also denied the petition for review of the BIA's denial of petitioner's motion to reopen, holding that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case for asylum or withholding of removal. Finally, the panel held that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case for protection under the Convention Against Torture. View "Silva v. Barr" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for federal agencies and officials and ConocoPhillips in an action brought under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) challenging the BLM's 2017 offer and sale of oil and gas leases in the National Petroleum Reserve-Alaska.The panel first held that plaintiffs' actions are not entirely time barred by the Naval Petroleum Reserves Production Act (NPRPA). To the extent plaintiffs argued that the 2017 lease sale was a distinct federal action requiring a tiered or stand-alone NEPA analysis, the panel found that their challenge is justiciable. Because the panel can reasonably construe the defined scope of the 2012 environmental impact statement (EIS) to include the 2017 lease sale, the panel deferred to BLM's position that the 2012 EIS was the EIS for the 2017 lease sale. Therefore, the panel found that the BLM met the NEPA requirement for the 2017 lease sale of preparing at least an initial EIS, any challenge to the adequacy of which is now time barred. Furthermore, although plaintiffs alleged significant new information and circumstances known to BLM before the 2017 lease sale, the panel stated that the appropriate rubric for considering these allegations—given the existence of an initial EIS—is supplementation, and plaintiffs have waived any supplementation claim. View "Northern Alaska Environmental Center v. Department of the Interior" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a class action in state court alleging that Costco violated California Labor Code 1198 by failing to provide her and other employees suitable seating. After Costco removed the case to federal court under 28 U.S.C. 1332(a) and the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), the district court ultimately granted summary judgment to plaintiff.The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment with instructions to remand to state court, holding that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction at the time the action was removed to federal court. The panel first held that the district court lacked diversity jurisdiction under section 1332(a). The panel explained that, because plaintiff's pro-rata share of civil penalties, including attorney's fees, totaled $6,600 at the time of removal, and the claims of other member service employees may not be aggregated under Urbino v. Orkin Services of California, Inc., 726 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2013), the $75,000 jurisdictional threshold was not met. The panel also held that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under CAFA because plaintiff's stand-alone Private Attorney General Act lawsuit was not, and could not have been, filed under a state rule similar to a Rule 23 class action. Therefore, the district court erred by not remanding the case to state court. View "Canela v. Costco Wholesale Corp." on Justia Law

In 2007, the FWS first issued a rule declaring the Yellowstone grizzly population a "distinct population segment" within the meaning of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) and removing it from the protections of the ESA. The Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's determination that further agency consideration was required and remanded, which resulted in a second delisting rule, Rule 2017, which the district court again vacated and remanded. In the remand order, the district court found three important deficiencies in the FWS's analysis.As a preliminary matter, the panel held that a remand of an agency's rulemaking is a final order as to the government and thus appealable. Furthermore, the panel has jurisdiction to consider the intervenors' appeals regarding recalibration. On the merits, the panel affirmed the district court in all respects, with the exception of the order requiring the FWS to conduct a "comprehensive review" of the remnant grizzly population. As to that order, the panel remanded for the district court to order further examination of the delisting's effect on the remnant grizzly population. View "Crow Indian Tribe v. United States" on Justia Law

BNSF filed suit under the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 (4-R Act), alleging that the tax on its intangible personal property is "another tax that discriminates against a rail carrier" under 49 U.S.C. 11501(b)(4).The Ninth Circuit joined the Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits and held that challenges to discriminatory property taxes may proceed under 49 U.S.C. 11501(b)(4). The court rejected the Department's claims to the contrary and explained that this is not a challenge to exemption-based discrimination. The panel agreed with the district court that the proper comparison class for BNSF was Oregon's commercial and industrial taxpayers, and that the intangible personal property tax assessment discriminated against BNSF in violation of the 4-R Act. View "BNSF Railway Co. v. Oregon Department of Revenue" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted by a jury of six counts of assault on a federal officer with a deadly or dangerous weapon, six counts of discharging a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, and one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Defendant argued that the five assault counts based on four shots he fired toward the door of his motel room are multiplicitous in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause.The Ninth Circuit held that defendant failed to show that the district court erred, let alone plainly erred, in entering judgment on the four assault convictions based on the four shots he fired toward the door. However, the panel reversed one assault conviction. Furthermore, because each assault conviction served as a predicate offense for each firearm conviction, the panel also reversed one firearm conviction. The panel rejected defendant's remaining arguments and remanded with instructions. View "United States v. Voris" on Justia Law