Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Ninth Circuit affirmed defendant's convictions for child pornography-related charges, including one count of making a notice offering child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2251(d)(1)(A). In this case, defendant used an online instant messaging platform to exchange child pornography with one other individual.The panel held that one-to-one communications can satisfy the "notice" requirement in section 2251(d)(1), and that a rational fact-finder could find that defendant made a notice offering child pornography when she sent a one-to-one electronic message linking to a Dropbox account that contained child pornography. The panel also held that the district court did not err by admitting a Kik messenger exchange under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) to prove defendant's identity and absence of mistake. View "United States v. Cox" on Justia Law

The Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 2019 does not authorize the Department of Defense (DoD) to make budgetary transfers from funds appropriated by Congress to it for other purposes in order to fund the construction of a wall on the southern border of the United States in California and New Mexico.The Ninth Circuit first held that California and New Mexico have Article III standing to pursue their claims because they have alleged that the actions of the Federal Defendants will cause particularized and concrete injuries in fact to the environment and wildlife of their respective states as well as to their sovereign interests in enforcing their environmental laws; California has alleged environmental and sovereign injuries "fairly traceable" to the Federal Defendants' conduct; and a ruling in California and New Mexico's favor would redress their harms. Furthermore, California and New Mexico easily fall within the zone of interests of Section 8005 of the Act and are suitable challengers to enforce its obligations under the Administrative Procedure Act.The panel held that the district court correctly determined that Section 8005 did not authorize DoD's budgetary transfer to fund construction of the El Paso and El Centro Sectors. The panel explained that the district court correctly determined that the border wall was not an unforeseen military requirement, that funding for the wall had been denied by Congress, and therefore, that the transfer authority granted by Section 8005 was not permissibly invoked. Therefore, the panel affirmed the district court's judgment, declining to reverse the district court’s decision against imposing a permanent injunction, without prejudice to renewal. View "California v. Trump" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit granted a petition for review of the BIA's denial of petitioner's claim under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The panel held that substantial evidence does not support the BIA's determination that petitioner failed to meet her burden of proof under CAT that she would more likely than not be tortured, with the consent or acquiescence of a public official, if returned to Mexico. The panel explained that the BIA reached its determination by misapplying the circuit's precedents regarding acquiescence of a public official and regarding the possibility of safe relocation, as well as by making or affirming factual findings that are directly contradicted by the record.The panel held that the existing record compels the conclusion that petitioner has met her burden under CAT. In this case, the lack of affirmative evidence that there is a general or specific area within Mexico where petitioner can safely relocate, the evidence that Los Zetas operate throughout much of Mexico, and the evidence that LGBTQ individuals are at heightened risk throughout Mexico, together compel a conclusion contrary to the BIA's. The panel remanded for the BIA to grant deferral of removal. View "Xochihua-Jaimes v. Barr" on Justia Law

Section 8005 and Section 9002 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 2019 does not authorize the Department of Defense's budgetary transfers to fund construction of the wall on the southern border of the United States in California, New Mexico, and Arizona.The Ninth Circuit first held that Sierra Club and SBCC have established that their members satisfy the demands of Article III standing to challenge the Federal Defendants' actions. In this case, Sierra Club's thousands of members live near and frequently visit these areas along the U.S.-Mexico border to do a variety of activities; the construction of a border wall and related infrastructure will acutely injure their interests because DHS is proceeding with border wall construction without ensuring compliance with any federal or state environmental regulations designed to protect these interests; and the interests of Sierra Club's members in this lawsuit are germane to the organization's purpose. Furthermore, SBCC has alleged facts that support that it has standing to sue on behalf of itself and its member organizations. Sierra Club and SBCC have also shown that their injuries are fairly traceable to the challenged action of the Federal Defendants, and their injuries are likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.The panel held that neither Section 8005 nor any constitutional provision authorized DoD to transfer the funds at issue. The panel reaffirmed its holding in State of California, et al. v. Trump, et al., Nos. 19-16299 and 19-16336, slip op. at 37 (9th Cir. filed June 26, 2020), holding that Section 8005 did not authorize the transfer of funds at issue here because "the border wall was not an unforeseen military requirement," and "funding for the wall had been denied by Congress." The panel also held that Sierra Club was a proper party to challenge the Section 8005 transfers and that Sierra Club has both a constitutional and an ultra vires cause of action here. The panel explained that the Federal Defendants not only exceeded their delegated authority, but also violated an express constitutional prohibition designed to protect individual liberties. The panel considered the Federal Defendants' additional arguments, holding that the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) is not to be construed as an exclusive remedy, and the APA does not displace all constitutional and equitable causes of action, and Sierra Club falls within the Appropriations Clause's zone of interests. Finally, the panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting Sierra Club a permanent injunction enjoining the federal defendants from spending the funds at issue. View "Sierra Club v. Trump" on Justia Law

HM filed suit alleging infringement of HM's rights in the EAMES and AERON trade dresses under the Lanham Act. The jury found in favor of HM as to the Eames chairs and awarded infringement and dilution damages. As to the Aeron chair, the jury found in favor of OSP.The Ninth Circuit held that for a product's design to be protected under trademark law, the design must be nonfunctional. The panel affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of HM on its causes of action for the infringement of its registered and unregistered EAMES trade dresses and rejected OSP's argument that the utilitarian functionality of the Eames chairs' component parts renders their overall appearances functional as a matter of law; reversed the judgment in favor of OSP regarding the Aeron chair because the functionality jury instruction does not accurately track the panel's functionality caselaw; reversed the judgment in favor of HM on its cause of action for dilution because there was legally insufficient evidence to find that the claimed EAMES trade dresses were famous under 15 U.S.C. 1125(c)(2)(A); and remanded for a new trial. View "Blumenthal Distributing, Inc. v. Herman Miller, Inc." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Freddie Mac and M&T in a quiet title action over a foreclosed property in Nevada. At issue was whether a first deed of trust in favor of Freddie Mac, which had been placed under the conservatorship of the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), survived a non-judicial foreclosure sale of a Nevada residential property to satisfy an HOA superpriority lien. The panel held, and the parties agree, that the Housing and Economic Recovery Act (HERA) statute of limitations, 12 U.S.C. 4617(b)(12)(A), controls.The panel held that, under 12 U.S.C. 4617(b)(12), a quiet title action is a "contract" claim that is subject to a statute of limitations of at least six years; Freddie Mac and M&T Bank timely filed their quiet title action within six years of the foreclosure sale; and Freddie Mac's deed of trust, which had been placed under the conservatorship of FHFA, survived a non-judicial foreclosure sale of a Nevada residential property to satisfy a homeowners association superpriority lien. The panel also held that, although Freddie Mac and the Bank were not assignees of the FHFA, Freddie Mac was under the FHFA conservatorship, and the FHFA thus had all the rights of Freddie Mac with respect to its assets. Furthermore, although there was no contract between the purchaser and plaintiffs, the quiet title claims were entirely "dependent" upon Freddie Mac's lien on the property, an interest created by contract. View "M&T Bank v. SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC" on Justia Law

On remand from the Supreme Court for further consideration in light of Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019), the Ninth Circuit affirmed defendant's convictions for being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1).Because defendant did not raise his sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge in the district court, the panel reviewed that challenge for plain error under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b). The panel held that the district court erred by not requiring the government to prove defendant's knowledge of his status as a convicted felon, and that error is now clear following Rehaif. The panel also assumed without deciding that the error affected defendant's substantial rights. However, in assessing the fourth prong of plain error review, the panel may consider the entire record on appeal, not just the record adduced at trial. In this case, given the overwhelming and uncontroverted nature of that evidence, the panel concluded that defendant cannot show that refusing to correct the district court's error would result in a miscarriage of justice. View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

For standing purposes, a loss of even a small amount of money is ordinarily an injury. The temporary loss of use of one's money constitutes an injury in fact for purposes of Article III.Plaintiff filed a putative class action on behalf of LLR customers in Alaska who were improperly charged sales tax. The complaint alleged claims for conversion and misappropriation and for violation of the Alaska Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act. In this case, plaintiff was refunded $531.25 for sales tax charges, but contends that she is owed at least $3.76 in interest on that sum to account for her lost use of the money. The district court granted LLR's motion to dismiss.The Ninth Circuit held that the district court erred by concluding that $3.76 is "too little to support Article III standing." The panel held that plaintiff suffered a cognizable and concrete injury: the loss of a significant amount of money (over $500) for a substantial amount of time (months with respect to some purchases, over a year with respect to others). Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Van v. LLR, Inc." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress contraband found in the vehicle defendant was driving. The district court held that the evidence was discovered during a valid inventory search.As a preliminary matter, the panel held that defendant has not waived arguments challenging the district court's denial of his motion to suppress. On the merits of the motion, the panel affirmed and held that the officers' failure to precisely comply with police department towing policy by failing to completely fill out the CHP 180 form did not render the search invalid. The panel stated that this case was considerably clearer than United States v. Garay, 938 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2019), which held that the failure to complete the form under the circumstances was not a material deviation from policy and did not make the search invalid. In this case, by creating a list of recovered items and incorporating it into a CHP 180 form, an officer complied substantially with the policy's direction to inventory the property in an impounded vehicle. Furthermore, given the early stage at which an officer decided to impound the vehicle, it is a reasonable view of the evidence that the officer's intent at the time the vehicle was impounded was administrative rather than investigatory.Finally, the panel vacated three conditions of supervised release where the government conceded error or made no argument. The panel remanded for revision, as well as vacated and remanded the notification-of-risk condition. View "United States v. Magdirila" on Justia Law

The Bankruptcy Code does not prevent debtors from proposing and confirming plans with an estimated duration. After determining that it had jurisdiction over debtors' appeal, the Ninth Circuit held on the merits that the text and structure of the Code do not mandate a fixed term requirement for all Chapter 13 plans and that the panel should not add one without clear direction from the statute.The panel also held that none of the reasons given by the bankruptcy appellate panel justify the finding that debtors proposed their initial plans in bad faith. Finally, the panel held that the bankruptcy court did not fail to hold a confirmation hearing within the timeframe prescribed by the Code and properly exercised its discretion by deferring consideration of debtors’ estimated-duration provisions until it could adequately address them. Accordingly, the panel affirmed in part, reversed and vacated in part, and remanded for further consideration. View "In re Nanette Marie Sisk" on Justia Law