Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Ninth Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence imposed after he was convicted of one count of unlawful possession of a firearm. The panel held that defendant's prior Minnesota conviction for aiding and abetting simple robbery qualifies as a predicate violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act's force clause because the minimum force required to sustain a Minnesota simple robbery includes the amount of force necessary to overcome a victim’s resistance. The panel noted that its prior distinction between "substantial" and "minimal" force in the robbery context under the Act could not be reconciled with the Supreme Court's holding in Stokeling v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 544 (2019). View "Ward v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and his children filed suit against the County, the Agency, and others, alleging 42 U.S.C. 1983 and Monell claims stemming from a child welfare investigation undertaken by defendants that allegedly violated plaintiff and his children's First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court dismissed the claims as insufficiently pleaded or barred by qualified immunity.The Ninth Circuit held that plaintiff's first amended complaint (FAC) failed to plausibly allege Fourth Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, and Monell claims. However, the panel held that plaintiff pleaded a plausible First Amendment claim where he alleged that he engaged in protected activity, that the alleged retaliation would objectively have had a chilling effect and that retaliation was the but-for motive for the social worker's actions. Furthermore, the social worker was not entitled to qualified immunity because a reasonable official would know that taking the serious step of threatening to terminate a parent’s custody of his children, when the official would not have taken this step absent her retaliatory intent, violates the First Amendment. Therefore, defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity on the First Amendment claim. The panel affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Capp v. County of San Diego" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for engaging in a monetary transaction of over $10,000 derived from a specified unlawful activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1956. In this case, defendant, a citizen of South Korea employed at a government-funded research institute, solicited and received payments from two seismometer manufacturers in exchange for ensuring that the research institute purchased their products, and gave the companies inside information about their competitors.The panel held that "bribery of a public official" in section 1956 is defined by that phrase's ordinary, contemporary, common meaning and is not constrained by 18 U.S.C. 201, a statute to which section 1956 makes no reference. Because the panel found the crime described in Article 129 of the South Korean Criminal Code fits comfortably within the ordinary meaning of "bribery of a public official" as used in section 1956, the panel held that the indictment was sufficient and that there was no instructional error. View "United States v. Heon-Cheol Chi" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit alleging that the Freedom of Information Act's (FOIA) reading room provision requires APHIS to post all of the documents at issue, because they are "frequently requested." Plaintiffs also alleged that APHIS must affirmatively disclose inspection reports, Letters of Information, official warning letters, and pre-litigation settlement agreements for the additional reason that these records constitute final agency orders. The district court dismissed the complaint based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Determining that plaintiffs have standing, the Ninth Circuit reversed in part.Looking to text, structure, and precedent, the panel held that 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(4)(B) vests in district courts the jurisdiction to enjoin the agency from withholding agency records and to order the production of any agency records improperly withheld from the complainant. The panel held that section 552(a)(4)(B) provided district courts with the authority to order an agency to post records in an online reading room. The panel left it to the district court on remand to decide in the first instance whether plaintiffs have exhausted their reading room claim, or whether such exhaustion would be futile. Finally, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's Administrative Procedure Act claims. View "Animal Legal Defense Fund V. USDA" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sentence imposed for receipt of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(2) and a consecutive prison sentence imposed under 18 U.S.C. 3583(k), upon revocation of his supervised release. The panel held that the district court plainly erred by violating the Constitution's Ex Post Facto Clause when it sentenced defendant under section 3583(k). Therefore, the panel vacated and remanded for complete resentencing.The panel affirmed defendant's 2017 conviction because the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence related to defendant's prior 2007 child pornography conviction under Federal Rules of Evidence 414 and 404(b). The panel explained that because defendant was sentenced for his supervised release violation and his 2017 conviction in the same proceeding, both were based on the same underlying conduct found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, and because it appears the district court was attempting to fashion an appropriate "sentencing package" to account for both transgressions, the panel followed its customary practice and remanded for resentencing on both the supervised release violation and the 2017 conviction. View "United States v. Hanson" on Justia Law

In the context of asbestos claims, the substantial-factor test requires demonstrating that the injured person had substantial exposure to the relevant asbestos for a substantial period of time. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for Union Pacific in an action brought by plaintiff, alleging that secondary exposure to asbestos exposure caused his mesothelioma. Plaintiff alleged negligence and related claims under Idaho law, stemming from his father's work at a Union Pacific roadhouse where he was exposed to asbestos and then carried the asbestos home to expose plaintiff.The panel held that plaintiff failed to establish that he was regularly exposed to asbestos attributable to Union Pacific, and rejected plaintiff's contentions of error regarding expert testimony. Therefore, plaintiff failed to create a genuine issue of material fact on whether his secondary exposure was a substantial factor in causing his disease, and he could not prevail on his negligence claims. View "Stephens v. Union Pacific Railroad Co." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's order granting the government's motion to seize funds in defendant's inmate trust account under section 3664(n) of the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act. The funds were to be applied to defendant's outstanding restitution debt related to a prior conviction.The panel held that defendant's action was not moot and that de novo review, rather than plain error review, was appropriate in this case. The panel also held that the language and statutory context of section 3664(n) favor Amicus's view that section 3664(n) does not apply to periods of pretrial detention, and that the rule of lenity resolves any remaining ambiguity in defendant's favor. View "United States v. Lillard" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed defendant's felon in possession conviction under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). In United States v. Murillo, 422 F.3d 1152 (9th Cir. 2005), a felony was a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year as defined by the statute of violation. In light of intervening authority not previously available to the district court or the parties, the panel explained that United States v. Valencia-Mendoza, 912 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 2019), now defines "punishable by" as the sentence to which the defendant is actually exposed under Washington's mandatory sentencing scheme, explicitly overruling Murillo. The panel held that it was bound by Valencia-Mendoza and none of defendant's prior convictions actually exposed him to a term of imprisonment exceeding one year. View "United States v. McAdory" on Justia Law

8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) strips the federal courts of jurisdiction to review the denial of a national interest waiver. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's action challenging the denial of his petition for a national interest waiver related to his application for a work visa.Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) provides that no court shall have jurisdiction to review a decision or action of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security the authority for which is specified under this subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security. The panel held that section 1153(b)(2)(B)(i)'s plain language specifies that the authority to grant (or to deny) a national interest waiver is in the discretion of the Attorney General. The panel also held that plaintiff's various claims simply repackaged his core grievance regarding the national interest waiver, and his due process claim failed because he received notice by regular mail to the address given. View "Poursina v. USCIS" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment affirming the bankruptcy court's judgment in favor of the chapter 7 trustee. The trustee claimed that the tax refunds should be considered part of the bankruptcy estate and the bankruptcy court agreed. However, the panel held that the trustee failed to exhaust the administrative claims process as required by the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989. Therefore, the panel held that the bankruptcy court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute because of the failure to exhaust. View "Waldron v. FDIC" on Justia Law