Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Ninth Circuit certified to the Oregon Supreme Court the following question: Does Oregon Revised Statutes 31.710(1) cap the noneconomic damages awarded on an employment discrimination claim under Oregon Revised Statutes 659A.030? View "Zweizig v. Rote" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's denial of petitioner's application for asylum and withholding of removal. The panel held that "wealthy landowners" in Colombia do not constitute a cognizable particular social group for purposes of asylum and withholding of removal because the group lacks particularity and social distinction. Applying the particular social group analysis, the panel held that the agency correctly concluded that petitioner's arguments, and the majority of the evidence he submitted, pertain to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia's perception of wealthy landowners rather than to Colombian society's perception of the purported group. View "Cordoba v. Barr" on Justia Law

The First Step Act of 2018 does not permit a plenary resentencing proceeding in which a defendant's career offender status can be reconsidered. The Act permits the court to sentence "as if" parts of the Act had been in place at the time the offense occurred, not "as if" every subsequent judicial opinion had been rendered or every subsequent statute had been enacted.The Ninth Circuit held that the district court properly exercised its discretion when it acknowledged that the Act did not authorize it to conduct a plenary resentencing and instead recalculated defendant's Guidelines range to be 188-235. The panel held that the district court correctly applied the applicable laws existing when defendant's covered offense was committed, "as if" the Act was also in existence. The district court then proceeded to the second step of the resentencing and exercised its discretion to impose a reduced term of imprisonment of 180 months. The panel found no error in the district court's approach. View "United States v. Kelley" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed, although on different grounds, the district court's dismissal of appellant's challenge to an exculpation clause approved by the bankruptcy court as part of a settlement and confirmation plan in Chapter 11 proceedings. As a preliminary matter, the panel declined to dismiss the appeal because of appellant's failure to reply to the show cause order. The panel remained bound by its earlier decision that appellant's challenge to the exculpation clause is not equitably moot. On the merits, the panel held that 11 U.S.C. 524(e) does not prohibit the exculpation clause at issue, because the clause covers only liabilities arising from the bankruptcy proceedings and not the discharged debt. View "Blixseth v. Credit Suisse" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the convictions of Defendants Eduardo Hernandez, Leonidas Iraheta, and Vladimir Iraheta; affirmed in part and reversed in part the convictions of Javier Perez; vacated Perez's sentence; and remanded for resentencing. Defendants' convictions and sentences stemmed from their involvement in the Columbia Lil Cycos clique of the 18th Street gang.The panel held that the post-verdict filing made in camera by a third party did not contain Brady material and there was no abuse of discretion in not allowing Leonidas and Hernandez's attorneys to view it; in the few instances in which admission of the witnesses' testimony was error, Leonidas and Hernandez suffered no prejudice; the Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering (VICAR) statute may reach a crime committed abroad with sufficient nexus to the conduct of an enterprise's affairs; but VICAR does not reach all crimes committed in other countries; because California requires the formulation of criminal intent—and a non-de-minimis act in furtherance of the crime’s commission—in California, the district court's instruction on Perez's count one, sixteen, seventeen, and eighteen was in error; the error as to count eighteen was not harmless and required reversal; and the evidence was sufficient to support defendants' underlying convictions.The panel also held that, although the district court improperly applied the firearm enhancement to Hernandez, the error was harmless, and all of Hernandez and Leonidas's other sentencing-related challenges failed; there was no error in the district court's decision to give both Hernandez and Leonidas life sentences; and remand of Perez's sentence was necessary in light of the error on his count eighteen conviction. View "United States v. Perez" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit certified to the New York Court of Appeals the following questions: 1) Whether a litigation financing agreement may qualify as a “loan” or a “cover for usury” where the obligation of repayment arises not only upon and from the client’s recovery of proceeds from such litigation but also upon and from the attorney’s fees the client’s lawyer may recover in unrelated litigation? 2) If so, what are the appropriate consequences, if any, for the obligor to the party who financed the litigation, under agreements that are so qualified? View "Fast Trak Investment Co., LLC v. Sax" on Justia Law

After the State Bar of California suspended one of its members for misconduct, it conditioned her reinstatement of the payment of court-ordered discovery sanctions and costs associated with its disciplinary proceedings. The suspended attorney sought to discharge the payment in bankruptcy.The Ninth Circuit held that, while a debtor may not discharge the costs of the State Bar's attorney disciplinary proceedings imposed under California Business and Professions Code 6086.10, the discovery sanctions under California Procedure Code 2023.030 were dischargeable. Under the plain text of 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(7), they were not payable to and for the benefit of a governmental unit and were compensation for actual pecuniary losses. Finally, the panel rejected the attorney's claim that the State Bar violated 11 U.S.C. 525(a) by failing to reinstate her law license because of her nonpayment of dischargeable debts. Accordingly, the panel affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Albert-Sheridan v. State Bar of California" on Justia Law

Plaintiff raised a First Amendment challenge to part of California's Private Postsecondary Education Act of 2009, which prohibit plaintiff, Esteban Narez, from enrolling in plaintiff Bob Smith's horseshoeing class unless he first passes an examination prescribed by the U.S. Department of Education. However, if Smith were running a flight school or teaching golf, dancing, or contract bridge, Narez could enroll without restriction. The district court held that the Act does not burden plaintiffs' free speech and dismissed the complaint based on failure to state a claim.The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that plaintiffs have stated a claim that the Act burdens their rights under the First Amendment. The panel held that the statutory scheme here not only implicates speech, but also engages in content discrimination; because content discrimination is apparent, the district court should have applied some form of heightened scrutiny; and thus the panel remanded for the district court to determine whether this case involves commercial or non-commercial speech, whether California must satisfy strict or intermediate scrutiny, and whether it could carry its burden under either standard. View "Pacific Coast Horseshoeing School, Inc. v. Kirchmeyer" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of a putative securities class action under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 10b-5. Plaintiff alleged that a medical device company misled the investing public about whether the FDA would approve the company's new aneurysm sealing product.The panel held that allegations that are implausible do not create a strong inference of scienter under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act. In this case, plaintiff failed sufficiently to plead facts giving rise to a strong inference that defendants made false or misleading statements either intentionally or with deliberate recklessness. The panel explained that, under the facts alleged, plaintiff's core theory—that the company invested in a U.S. clinical trial and made promising statements about FDA approval, yet knew from its experience in Europe that the FDA would eventually reject the product—has no basis in logic or common experience. Rather, the more plausible inference is that the company made optimistic statements about its prospects for FDA approval. View "Nguyen v. Endologix, Inc." on Justia Law

A conviction for being under the influence of a controlled substance, in violation of California Health and Safety Code 11550(a), is divisible with respect to controlled substance such that the modified categorical approach applies to determining whether a conviction under the statute is a controlled-substance offense as defined by federal law.The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's dismissal of petitioner's appeal from the IJ's decision finding him removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) for having been convicted of a controlled-substance offense as defined by federal law. The panel explained that, where, as here, the controlled-substance requirement of a state statute is divisible and where, as here, the relevant substance is shown by application of the modified categorical approach to be federally controlled, then there is "a direct link between an alien's crime of conviction and a particular federally controlled drug" such that section 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) is satisfied. Furthermore, the divisibility of the actus reus element of Section 11550(a) is irrelevant, because under the modified categorical approach a conviction for using or being under the influence of amphetamine relates to a federally controlled substance. View "Tejeda v. Barr" on Justia Law