Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The City of Almaty, in Kazakhstan, filed suit against defendant and his family under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), alleging that they engaged in a scheme to defraud the city of millions of dollars. The City claimed that it was forced to spend money and resources in the United States to trace where its money was laundered. The district court dismissed the City's claim on the basis that it failed to state a domestic injury pursuant to the Supreme Court's recent decision in RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community, 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016).The Ninth Circuit held that the City failed to state any cognizable injury other than the foreign theft of its funds, and its voluntary expenditures were not proximately caused by defendants' acts of money laundering. In this case, the City's expenditure of funds to trace its allegedly stolen funds is a consequential damage of the initial theft suffered in Kazakhstan and is not causally connected to the predicate act of money laundering. View "City of Almaty v. Khrapunov" on Justia Law

After defendant pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance, the district court sentenced him to 184 months in prison. The Ninth Circuit held that defendant's prior convictions for carjacking under section 215 of the California Penal Code are not categorical crimes of violence under USSG 4A1.1(e). Therefore, the district court incorrectly calculated defendant's criminal history by improperly including two points for his prior carjacking convictions. However, the panel held that the district court did not err in finding that defendant possessed a firearm under USSG 2D1.1(b)(1). Accordingly, the panel affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Baldon" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction of five counts of money laundering, holding that a reasonable trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the money laundering transactions, in which payment was made via bitcoin, affected interstate commerce in some way or to some degree. In this case, the transfer involved the use of an Internet or cellular network connected Personal Computer Device (PCD) to transfer bitcoin (together with the digital code necessary to unlock the bitcoin) to the digital wallet of another Internet or cellular network connected PCD. View "United States v. Costanzo" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to TRAX in a disability discrimination action brought by plaintiff under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). After TRAX terminated plaintiff from her position as a Technical Writer allegedly due to an inability or unwillingness to accommodate her disability, TRAX discovered during the course of litigation that plaintiff lacked the requisite bachelor's degree for her position.The panel held that, although McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 513 U.S. 352 (1995), held that after-acquired evidence cannot establish a superseding, non-discriminatory justification for an employer's challenged actions, after-acquired evidence remains available for other purposes, including to show that an individual is not qualified under the ADA. Because plaintiff did not satisfy one of the prerequisites for her position, she is not "otherwise qualified," and TRAX was not obligated to engage in the interactive process. View "Anthony v. TRAX International Corp." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision affirming a prior-marriage-fraud finding, and held that the BIA violated due process by relying on undisclosed evidence that petitioners, husband and wife, did not have an opportunity to rebut. In this case, there is no dispute over whether petitioners' current marriage is bona fide. Rather, the government insists that there is substantial and probative evidence that wife's first marriage to an American citizen was a sham. Therefore, the government used this determination of prior marriage fraud to deny husband's I-130 petition that he filed on wife's behalf.The panel held that, in making its initial determination of marriage fraud, the BIA violated due process by applying too low a standard of proof. On remand, the panel instructed the agency to establish marriage fraud by at least a preponderance of the evidence before it can deny any subsequent immigration petition based on such a finding. View "Zerezghi v. United States Citizenship and Immigration Services" on Justia Law

Borrower filed suit under federal and state regulations for consumer credit transactions against the lenders, alleging that the lender's loan disclosures were materially inconsistent with the terms of the loan. At issue in this appeal was whether the loan the borrower obtained to make repairs to a personal residence occupied by her niece should be considered a consumer credit transaction. The district court held that, because the borrower did not intend to live in the house, this was not a consumer credit transaction.The Ninth Circuit held that, under applicable statutes and regulations, a trust created by an individual for tax and estate planning purposes, like the one in this case, does not lose all state and federal consumer disclosure protections when it seeks to finance repairs to a personal residence for the trust beneficiary, rather than for the trustee herself. Therefore, the transaction remains a consumer credit transaction. Because the district court erred in construing the statutes in this case too narrowly, the panel reversed the district court's dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. View "Gilliam v. Levine" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit filed an order amending its prior opinion and an amended opinion denying petitioner's petition for review.The panel joined the Fifth and Seventh Circuit in concluding that 8 U.S.C. 1231(a)(5) bars reopening a removal order that has been reinstated following an alien’s unlawful reentry into the United States. In this case, petitioner's 2008 removal order had been reinstated and thus the BIA properly concluded that section 1231(a)(5) deprived it of jurisdiction to entertain petitioner's motion to reopen. Accordingly, the panel denied the petition for review. View "Padilla Cuenca v. Barr" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a consolidated complaint on behalf of themselves and a putative class of people, alleging that internal Facebook communications revealed that company executives were aware of the tracking of logged-out users and recognized that these practices posed various user-privacy issues.The Ninth Circuit held that plaintiffs have standing to pursue their privacy claims under the Wiretap Act, the Stored Communications Act (SCA), and the California Invasion of Privacy Act (CIPA), as well as their claims for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. In this case, plaintiffs have adequately alleged that Facebook's tracking and collection practices would cause harm or a material risk of harm to their interest in controlling their personal information. Therefore, plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged a clear invasion of the historically recognized right to privacy. Furthermore, plaintiffs sufficiently alleged a state law interest whose violation constitutes an injury sufficient to establish standing to bring their claims for Computer Data Access and Fraud Act (CDAFA) violations and California common law trespass to chattels, fraud, and statutory larceny.On the merits, the panel held that plaintiffs adequately stated claims for relief for intrusion upon seclusion and invasion of privacy under California law. Plaintiffs have also sufficiently alleged that Facebook's tracking and collection practices violated the Wiretap Act and CIPA. The panel held that the district court properly dismissed plaintiffs' SCA claims, because the allegations do not show that the communications were even in "storage," much less that the alleged "storage" within a URL toolbar falls within the SCA's intended scope. The district court also properly dismissed plaintiffs' breach of contract claim, because plaintiffs failed to adequately allege the existence of a contract. Finally, plaintiffs' claims for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing were rejected. View "Davis v. Facebook, Inc." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order denying plaintiff's motion to remand his case to state court, where he wants to pursue his claim that a JAG colleague, defendant, is engaged in the unauthorized practice of law because defendant is licensed only in states outside of California.The panel held that defendant was "acting under" a federal officer within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(2). The panel rejected plaintiff's contention that this was not a "civil action or criminal prosecution" under section 1442(a)(1), and held that defendant was a "person" within the meaning of the statute; there was a causal connection between plaintiff's claims and defendant's actions taken pursuant to a federal officer's directions; and defendant raised a colorable federal defense under the Supremacy Clause. In this case, defendant was appointed by and reports to a federal officer and is permitted by federal regulation to practice law, in a specific and limited capacity, without becoming a member of the California Bar. Therefore, defendant has a colorable defense that this federal regulatory scheme preempts a claim by a private individual that would have the effect of invalidating those federal regulations in states, like California, that do not require all JAG Trial Defense Service attorneys to become members of the California Bar. View "Stirling v. Minasian" on Justia Law

When a party that has suffered an adverse partial judgment subsequently dismisses any remaining claims without prejudice, and does so without the approval and meaningful participation of the district court, this court lacks jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291.The Ninth Circuit dismissed plaintiff's appeal of the district court's dismissal of her Rehabilitation Act claim. The panel dismissed the appeal based on lack of jurisdiction, because plaintiff voluntarily dismissed what she thought were her sole remaining claims without prejudice after the district court dismissed her Rehabilitation Act claim, and because the district court did not meaningfully participate in the dismissal of those claims and did not formally dismiss an additional remaining claim. The panel explained that the procedural posture indicates that the district court did not intend to enter a final judgment and that the retaliation claim is still before the district court. View "Galaza v. Wolf" on Justia Law