Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Ninth Circuit held that the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of attempted Hobbs Act robbery. In this case, the evidence overwhelmingly showed that defendant had the specific intent to commit the robbery and had taken a "substantial step" toward its completion − arming himself with a handgun and driving to within about a block of the planned robbery with his accomplice, turning around only because he got ensnared in the fake crime scene.In light of recent Supreme Court cases, the panel reiterated its previous holding that Hobbs Act armed robbery is a crime of violence for purposes of 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(3)(A). The panel also held that when a substantive offense is a crime of violence under section 924(c)(3)(A), an attempt to commit that offense is also a crime of violence. The panel agreed with the Eleventh Circuit that attempted Hobbs Act armed robbery is a crime of violence for purposes of section 924(c) because its commission requires proof of both the specific intent to complete a crime of violence, and a substantial step actually (not theoretically) taken toward its completion. The panel reversed defendant's conviction of money laundering in Count Four and affirmed the remainder of the judgment. View "United States v. Dominguez" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, representatives of a certified class of aliens with final removal orders who are placed in withholding-only removal proceedings and who are detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1231(a)(6) in the Western District of Washington, filed suit challenging their detention.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment and permanent injunction insofar as they conform to its construction of section 1231(a)(6) in Diouf v. Napolitano. The panel also affirmed insofar as the judgment and permanent injunction require the Government to the satisfy the constitutional burden of proof it identified in Singh v. Holder.However, unlike Aleman Gonzalez v. Barr, decided on the same day, this appeal presented the panel with a different question regarding its construction of section 1231(a)(6). The panel held that the district court erroneously imposed the requirement that the Government provide class members with additional bond hearings as a statutory matter, because the panel did not construe section 1231(a)(6) as requiring this in Diouf II, nor does it find any support for this requirement. Therefore, the panel reversed in part, and vacated the judgment and permanent injunction, remanding for further proceedings. View "Omar Flores v. Godfrey" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, representatives of a certified class of aliens who are subject to final orders of removal and are detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1231(a)(6) within the Ninth Circuit, filed suit challenging their prolonged detention without an individualized bond hearing.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of a preliminary injunction requiring the Government to provide each class member detained for six months or longer with a bond hearing before an immigration judge where the burden is on the Government to justify continued detention. The panel held that plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their section 1231(a)(6) statutory claim. Although the panel recognized some tension between Diouf v. Napolitano and Jennings v. Rodriguez, it cannot conclude that the decisions are so fundamentally inconsistent that it can no longer apply Diouf II without running afoul of Jennings. Therefore, the panel held that it remains bound by Diouff II. The panel also held that the district court did not err in relying on Diouf II's construction of section 1231(a)(6) to require a bond hearing before an IJ after six months of detention for an alien whose release or removal is not imminent.The panel held that, because Jennings did not invalidate its constitutional due process holding in Singh v. Holder, the district court also properly required the Government to bear a clear and convincing burden of proof at such a bond hearing to justify an alien's continued detention. The panel rejected the Government's remaining challenges and held that the preliminary injunction complies with a proper reading of Clark v. Martinez. View "Aleman Gonzalez v. Barr" on Justia Law

An applicant cannot be regarded as personally responsible for failing to maintain lawful status when that failure occurs due to a mistake on her lawyer's part. An applicant who relies on the assistance of counsel to maintain lawful status will usually have no basis to question the soundness of the advice she receives from her lawyer.The Ninth Circuit granted the petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's denial of petitioner's application for adjustment of status on the ground that she is ineligible for relief under 8 U.S.C. 1255(c)(2). The panel held that, although substantial evidence supported the IJ's finding that petitioner's attorney never filed a corrected I-129, petitioner reasonably relied on her attorney's assurances that he had filed the corrected I-129 petition necessary to maintain her lawful immigration status, and she remains eligible for adjustment of status because her failure to maintain lawful status continuously since entering the United States occurred through no fault of her own. The panel remanded for consideration of the IJ's alternative ground for denial of relief. View "Peters v. Barr" on Justia Law

VIP filed suit seeking a declaration that its "Bad Spaniels Silly Squeaker" toy did not infringe JDPI's trademark rights or, in the alternative, that Jack Daniel's trade dress and bottle design were not entitled to trademark protection. JDPI counterclaimed and alleged claims of trademark infringement and dilution.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to JDPI on the issues of aesthetic functionality and distinctiveness. The court held that the district court correctly found that Jack Daniel's trade dress and bottle design are distinctive and aesthetically nonfunctional, and thus entitled to trademark protection; VIP also failed to rebut the presumption of nonfunctionality and distinctiveness of the Jack Daniel's bottle design; the district court correctly rejected VIP's nominative fair use defense; and the district court correctly rejected VIP's request for cancellation of the registered mark and rejected VIP's nominative fair use defense.However, the panel held that the dog toy is an expressive work entitled to First Amendment protection. In this case, the district court erred in finding trademark infringement without first requiring JDPI to satisfy at least one of the two Rogers prongs. Therefore, the panel reversed the district court's judgment as to the dilution claim, vacated the judgment on the trademark infringement claim, and remanded for further proceedings. View "VIP Products LLC v. Jack Daniel's Properties, Inc." on Justia Law

After plaintiffs were awarded more than $45 million in a products liability suit brought against EcoSmart, EcoSmart declared bankruptcy and plaintiffs brought a direct action against EcoSmart's insurer, LMIC, for payment on the judgment. LMIC argued that its policy with EcoSmart had a forum-selection clause designating Australian courts as the exclusive forum. The district court granted LMIC's motion to dismiss on grounds of forum non conveniens.The Ninth Circuit held that, because plaintiffs stand in the shoes of EcoSmart, their third-party creditors' rights are derivative of the rights and limitations held by the bankrupt insured, and thus the forum-selection clause applies. The panel also held that plaintiffs have not shown that the clause violates California public policy or that Australia is an inadequate forum for suit. Accordingly, the panel affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Lewis v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied an application under 28 U.S.C. 2244(b) for leave to file a second or successive habeas corpus petition challenging the applicant's 2005 Washington state sentencing judgment.The panel held that the habeas petition applicant seeks to file is a second or successive petition under Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320 (2010), because removal of the victim-restitution condition from applicant's sentencing judgment did not create a new, intervening judgment under Washington law. Therefore, in order to proceed with his habeas petition, applicant must satisfy the requirements for filing a second or successive petition under section 2244(b)(2), which he cannot do. In this case, none of the arguments raise in the petition related to a new constitutional rule. Likewise, each of applicant's arguments raises a procedural error that, even if proven true, has no bearing on his guilt. View "Colbert v. Haynes" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting a preliminary injunction ordering the United States to provide bond hearings to a class of noncitizens who were detained after entering the United States and were found by an asylum officer to have a credible fear of persecution. The panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in applying the Winter factors and concluding that plaintiffs were likely to prevail on the merits of their due process claim regarding the availability of bond hearings; in concluding that plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm absent the grant of a preliminary injunction; and in determining that the balance of the equities and public interest favors plaintiffs with respect to Part B of the preliminary injunction. Therefore, the panel affirmed the district court's order in part.The panel held that the record was insufficient to support Part A of the preliminary injunction order for the required bond hearings, and remanded for further findings and reconsideration with respect to the particular process due to plaintiffs. The panel also held that 8 U.S.C. 1252(f)(1) did not bar the district court from granting preliminary injunctive relief for this class of noncitizens, each of whom is an individual noncitizen against whom removal proceedings have been initiated. Finally, the panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting a preliminary injunction with respect to the nationwide class. View "Padilla v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of a petition for federal habeas relief brought by petitioner, challenging his California state murder conviction and death sentence. Petitioner alleges that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel at the penalty phase because his lawyers failed to present additional evidence of his family history and social background. The panel held that reasonable jurists could conclude that admission of this evidence would not have led to a reasonable probability of a different sentence and thus petitioner was not prejudiced by any deficiency in counsel's performance.The panel granted petitioner's motion to expand the certificate of appealability as to four additional claims. The panel held that the state court reasonably concluded that a mens rea defense theory would not have been reasonably probable to persuade the jury to acquit. Even assuming that counsel rendered deficient performance in failing to conduct further investigation, it was eminently reasonable for the court to conclude that petitioner failed to show that the omission of this argument adversely affected the outcome. Finally, the panel held that petitioner was not prejudiced by his counsel's failure to obtain a transport order and funding authorization for EEG tests and a PET scan during the guilt or penalty phase. View "Berryman v. Wong" on Justia Law

Appellant sought habeas corpus relief, arguing that he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel because the defense lawyer who represented him in his child molestation trial in Arizona state court was ineffective. After the jury reported that it was deadlocked and the judge declared a mistrial, the jury requested permission to resume deliberations. Appellant's counsel did not object and the jury convicted appellant on all grounds.The Ninth Circuit held that appellant's counsel was not ineffective because, on the facts of this case, it was a reasonable prediction that appellant had a better chance of a more favorable verdict from the existing jury on the existing trial record than he would from a retrial. View "May v. Ryan" on Justia Law