Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Beyond a plain statement disclosing "that a consumer report may be obtained for employment purposes," some concise explanation of what that phrase means may be included as part of the "disclosure" required by the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i). The right provided by the FCRA to dispute inaccurate information in a consumer report does not require employers to provide job applicants or employees with an opportunity to discuss their consumer reports directly with the employer. Instead, the FCRA requires that an employer provide, in a pre-adverse action notice to the consumer, a description of the consumer's right to dispute with a consumer reporting agency the completeness or accuracy of any item of information contained in the consumer’s file at the consumer reporting agency.The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part in this putative class action against Fred Meyer, alleging that Fred Meyer willfully violated the FCRA by providing an unclear disclosure form encumbered by extraneous information and failing to notify plaintiff in the pre-adverse action notice that he could discuss the consumer report obtained about him directly with Fred Meyer. In this case, the fourth and fifth paragraphs of the disclosure violated the FCRA's standalone disclosure requirement. The panel remanded for the district court to decide in the first instance whether the remaining language of the disclosure satisfied the separate "clear and conspicuous" requirement. View "Walker v. Fred Meyer, Inc." on Justia Law

The en banc court affirmed the district court's denial of a habeas corpus petition as untimely. Petitioner argued that he was entitled to extend the one-year limitations period set forth in 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1) by equitable tolling for the 66 days between the date his conviction became final in the state appellate court and the date when his attorney informed him of that unsuccessful appeal and provided him with the state appellate record.The en banc court held that petitioner failed to exercise reasonable diligence during the 10 months available after he received his record from his attorney and before the time allowed by the statute of limitations expired.In view of the historic practice of courts of equity and modern Supreme Court precedent governing equitable tolling, the en banc court made two related holdings. First, for a litigant to demonstrate "he has been pursuing his rights diligently," and thus satisfies the first element required for equitable tolling, he must show that he has been reasonably diligent in pursuing his rights not only while an impediment to filing caused by an extraordinary circumstance existed, but before and after as well, up to the time of filing his claim in federal court. Second, and relatedly, it is only when an extraordinary circumstance prevented a petitioner acting with reasonable diligence from making a timely filing that equitable tolling may be the proper remedy. In this case, the en banc court held that petitioner was not entitled to relief. View "Smith v. Davis" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a putative class action alleging that Zumiez failed to pay employees at its California retail stores reporting time pay for "Call-In" shifts. The district court denied Zumiez's motion for judgment on the pleadings. While this appeal was pending, the California Court of Appeal decided Ward v. Tilly's, Inc., 243 Cal. Rptr. 3d 461 (Ct. App. 2019), review denied (May 15, 2019), which held that reporting time pay must be paid in a closely analogous situation, an outcome consistent with the district court's denial of Zumiez's motion for judgment on the pleadings here.The Ninth Circuit followed Ward's controlling interpretation of the law and affirmed the district court's judgment with respect to the reporting time pay claim. The panel also affirmed the district court's judgment as to the failure-to-pay-minimum-wage claim and the related remaining claims. In this case, the allegations were sufficient to defeat Zumiez's motion for judgment on the pleadings. The panel reversed as to plaintiff's claim for indemnification and remanded for the district court to allow plaintiff leave to amend the complaint to include more specific allegations. The panel remanded for further proceedings. View "Herrera v. Zumiez, Inc." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of a 42 U.S.C. 1983 petition raising an as-applied challenge to the Expedited Conversion Program. The Program allows property owners to convert their tenancy-in-common properties into condominium properties on the condition that the owners agree to offer any existing tenants lifetime leases in units within the converted property.The panel held that plaintiffs' takings challenge was unripe, because plaintiffs did not ask the City for an exemption from the lifetime lease requirement, and thus failed to satisfy the separate finality requirement in Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985). The finality requirement survived Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019), and consequently continues to be a requirement for bringing regulatory takings claims such as plaintiffs' in federal court. Furthermore, plaintiffs knowingly waived their right to seek an exemption and their arguments to the contrary were unpersuasive. View "Pakdel v. City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit filed an order granting the government's motion to amend, and an amended opinion granting a petition for review of the BIA's decision and remanding. The panel wrote that the withdrawal sanction in 8 U.S.C. 1003.4 is triggered by an alien's "departure," from this country and that the regulation does not distinguish between volitional and non-volitional departures. The panel noted that the BIA has recognized that an unlawful removal does not a constitute a section 1003.4 departure, but has not addressed whether a lawful removal would withdraw an appeal.In the amended opinion, the panel held that an alien does not withdraw his appeal of a final removal order, including the appeal of the denial of a motion to reopen or reconsider, simply because he was involuntarily removed before the appeal was decided. Rather, the panel held that section 1003.4 provides for withdrawal only when the petitioner engaged in conduct that establishes a waiver of the right to appeal. In this case, petitioner did not withdraw his appeal of the denial of his motions to reopen and reconsider when he was involuntarily removed from the United States. View "Lopez-Angel v. Barr" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's action alleging copyright infringement by the Disney movie Inside Out of plaintiffs' characters called The Moodsters. After plaintiff developed The Moodsters, anthropomorphized characters representing human emotions, she pitched to entertainment and toy companies around the country, including The Walt Disney Company.The panel held that, under DC Comics v. Towle, 802 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2015), lightly sketched characters such as The Moodsters, which lack consistent, identifiable character traits and attributes, do not enjoy copyright protection. Furthermore, under Warner Bros. Pictures v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 216 F.2d 945, 950 (9th Cir. 1954), The Moodsters are chessman in the game of telling the story. In this case, the panel applied the alternative "story being told" test and held that The Moodsters as an ensemble are no more copyrightable than the individual characters. Finally, the panel held that the district court did not err in dismissing plaintiff's claim for an implied-in-fact contract where plaintiff was required under California law to do more than plead a boiler-plate allegation, devoid of any relevant details. View "Daniels v. The Walt Disney Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Numi, and its partner CNB, alleging that they violated the Electronic Fund Transfers Act (EFTA), violated the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause, and were liable for conversion and unjust enrichment under Oregon state law. Numi is a for-profit, private company that returns released inmates' money via a prepaid debit card loaded with the balance of their funds. Numi earns revenue by charging fees to the cardholders, rather than the government.The Ninth Circuit held that plaintiff plausibly alleged a claim under section 1693l-1 of the EFTA and the district court erred in dismissing the case for failure to state a claim. The court explained that, because defendants marketed their cards to the general public, section 1693l-1 was applicable. In this case, defendants marketed the card program to municipalities and correctional facilities, and Multnomah County does not give released inmates a choice of whether to accept the cards. Therefore, when defendants marketed the cards to Multnomah County, they indirectly marketed them to these released inmates, and then the inmates reenter the general public.The panel also held that the district court abused its discretion when it denied plaintiff leave to file a third amended complaint; summary judgment was not proper on plaintiff's takings claim; and summary judgment was not proper on plaintiff's state law claims. View "Brown v. Stored Value Cards, Inc." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a habeas corpus petition in which petitioner alleged that the trial judge dismissed the juror for race-related reasons and so ran afoul of the prohibition on racial discrimination in jury selection.As a preliminary matter, the panel held that Haney v. Adams, 641 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2011), did not bar consideration of the merits of petitioner's equal protection claim where he challenged a judge's jury strike for cause, rather than an attorney's peremptory challenge. On the merits, the panel held that the state courts correctly determined that the judge's concerns reflected the juror's own statements of race-related bias, not discriminatory reliance by the judge on the juror's race. Likewise, petitioner's due process and Sixth Amendment claims also failed. View "Rodriguez Infante v. Martel" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against police officers and the City and County of Honolulu, alleging that defendants violated plaintiff's substantive due process right to bodily integrity under the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiff suffered serious, life-threatening injuries after an intoxicated off-duty officer (Officer Kimura) accidentally discharged his gun at the bar plaintiff was working at and shot her.The panel held that Officers Naki and Omoso, the two officers that were with Kimura, did not act or purport to act in the performance of their official duties, and thus they were not acting under color of state law. Therefore, the district court properly dismissed plaintiff's claim against Naki and Omoso. The panel agreed with the district court that plaintiff's Monell claim must be dismissed because she has not plausibly alleged that the County's inaction reflected deliberate indifference to her Fourteenth Amendment right to bodily integrity. In this case, plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that the Chief of Police was aware of prior, similar incidents in which off-duty officers mishandled their firearms while drinking. View "Hyun Ju Park v. City and County of Honolulu" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against 3D Systems for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, among other claims. Plaintiff's claims arose out of a purchase and sale agreement (PSA) documenting 3D Systems' acquisition of 3D printing websites from plaintiff. 3D Systems counterclaimed that plaintiff breached a covenant not to compete (CNTC) contained in the PSA.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's evidentiary rulings regarding the exclusion of a prior arbitration award. The panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding evidence of whether 3D Systems promised to invest substantial resources in the Domains. The panel also held that the district court exercised equitable jurisdiction to award 3D Systems restitution in the form of monetary relief. However, the district court erred in concluding that 3D Systems had a right to an equitable accounting and by relying solely on the text of the parties' contract to grant equitable relief. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and vacated in part. View "Barranco v. 3D Systems Corp." on Justia Law