Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Zachary Rosenbaum was arrested by San Jose police officers, during which a police dog allegedly bit him for over twenty seconds after he had surrendered and lay prone on his stomach with his arms outstretched. Rosenbaum sued the City of San Jose and the officers involved under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. He alleged that the prolonged dog bite caused severe lacerations and permanent nerve damage to his arm.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The defendants appealed, arguing that the bodycam video contradicted Rosenbaum's allegations. However, the district court found that the video did not contradict Rosenbaum's claims and that whether the officers acted reasonably was a triable question for the jury.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's denial of qualified immunity. The Ninth Circuit held that the bodycam video generally supported Rosenbaum's allegations and that a reasonable jury could find that the officers used excessive force. The court noted that it was clearly established in the Ninth Circuit that officers violate the Fourth Amendment when they allow a police dog to continue biting a suspect who has fully surrendered and is under officer control. Therefore, the court concluded that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity and affirmed the district court's decision. View "Rosenbaum v. City of San Jose" on Justia Law

Rosa Cuevas was a passenger in a car driven by Quinntin Castro, who led police on a high-speed chase. After getting stuck in mud, Castro continued trying to flee. Police officers surrounded the car, broke the window, and sent a police dog inside. Castro shot and killed the dog and injured an officer. The officers returned fire, aiming at Castro but accidentally hitting Cuevas multiple times. Castro was ultimately killed, and Cuevas survived with severe injuries. Cuevas sued the City of Tulare and the involved officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and California law, alleging excessive force.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court found that Cuevas was not seized for Fourth Amendment purposes and, alternatively, that even if she were seized, the officers were entitled to qualified immunity because it was not clearly established that their use of force was excessive. The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims and the defendants' counterclaims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Cuevas was indeed seized under clearly established Fourth Amendment law. However, it was not clearly established that the force used by the officers was excessive. The court found that none of the cases cited by Cuevas clearly established that officers violated her rights when they shot her while defensively returning fire during an active shooting. The court also noted that in excessive-force cases where police officers face a threat, the obviousness principle will rarely be available as an end-run to the requirement that law must be clearly established. Therefore, the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. View "Cuevas v. City of Tulare" on Justia Law

The case involves a collective action brought by call-center workers against their employer, Customer Connexx LLC, for failing to pay overtime wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The workers claimed they were entitled to overtime pay for the time spent booting up and shutting down their computers each day. Connexx required employees to be ready to take calls at the start of their shifts, necessitating pre-shift computer engagement. The workers were prohibited from clocking in more than seven minutes before their shift, and time was rounded to the nearest quarter-hour, leading to uncompensated work time.The United States District Court for the District of Nevada initially granted summary judgment in favor of Connexx, holding that the time spent on these tasks was not compensable under the FLSA because it was de minimis. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, instructing the district court to determine whether the time was de minimis and whether Connexx had knowledge of the overtime work. On remand, the district court again granted summary judgment to Connexx, maintaining that the time was de minimis and that Connexx had policies allowing employees to request time adjustments.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s summary judgment. The Ninth Circuit held that the de minimis doctrine remains applicable to FLSA claims but found that there were triable issues of material fact regarding whether the time spent booting up and shutting down computers was de minimis. The court also found that there were factual disputes about whether Connexx’s policies allowed employees to be compensated for this time. The case was remanded for further proceedings to resolve these factual disputes. View "Cadena v. Customer Connexx LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves Delaney Marks, who was convicted of murder and sentenced to death in California in 1994. Marks appealed his conviction, arguing that he was incompetent to stand trial and that he is intellectually disabled, making him ineligible for the death penalty. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part the district court’s judgment denying Marks's federal habeas petition.Marks's claim that he was incompetent to stand trial was denied. The court found that although Marks presented substantial evidence of incompetence, there was a reasonable basis in the record for the California Supreme Court to deny this claim.However, the court held that the district court erred by denying relief on Marks's claim that he is intellectually disabled and thus ineligible for the death penalty. Marks had shown that the California Supreme Court’s rejection of this claim was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding.The court also held that the district court properly denied relief on Marks's claim that the judge adjudicating his Atkins claim was biased against him. The California Supreme Court reasonably could have concluded that the judge did not display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.The court affirmed the district court's denial of relief on Marks's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The California Supreme Court reasonably could have concluded that a second competency hearing would have reached the same conclusion as a jury which had already found Marks competent.In sum, the court vacated the district court’s denial of Marks’s Atkins claim and remanded for de novo review of that claim. The court otherwise affirmed the district court's decision. View "Marks v. Davis" on Justia Law

The case involves three sets of plaintiffs who filed class-action lawsuits against their healthcare provider, Cedars-Sinai Health System and Cedars-Sinai Medical Center. The plaintiffs alleged that Cedars-Sinai unlawfully disclosed their private medical information to third parties through tracking software on its website. Cedars-Sinai removed the suits to federal court, arguing that it developed its website while acting under a federal officer and at the direction of the federal government.The district court disagreed with Cedars-Sinai's argument. It held that Cedars-Sinai developed its website in compliance with a generally applicable and comprehensive regulatory scheme and that there is therefore no federal jurisdiction under § 1442(a)(1). The court found that although Cedars-Sinai’s website furthers the government’s broad goal of promoting access to digital health records, Cedars-Sinai’s relationship with the federal government does not establish that it acted pursuant to congressionally delegated authority to help accomplish a basic governmental task.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s orders remanding the removed actions to state court. The court agreed with the district court that Cedars-Sinai developed its website in compliance with a generally applicable and comprehensive regulatory scheme under the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act, and that there was therefore no federal jurisdiction under § 1442(a)(1). The court concluded that Cedars-Sinai did not meet § 1442(a)(1)’s “causal nexus” requirement. View "Doe v. Cedars-Sinai Health System" on Justia Law

The case involves Dr. Firdos Sheikh, who brought Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims against former special agents with the Department of Homeland Security Investigations (HSI). Dr. Sheikh alleged that the agents fabricated evidence in a search warrant affidavit and submitted misleading reports to prosecutors, leading to her arrest and criminal prosecution.Previously, the district court dismissed Dr. Sheikh's claims. The court applied the two-step framework from Ziglar v. Abbasi to determine whether implied causes of action existed. The court held that Dr. Sheikh's claims presented a new context as they differed from cases where the Supreme Court implied a damages action. The court also found that several special factors indicated that the Judiciary was arguably less equipped than Congress to weigh the costs and benefits of allowing a damages action to proceed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal. The court agreed that Dr. Sheikh's claims presented a new context under Bivens and that special factors counseled hesitation in extending an implied cause of action. The court noted that the claims risked intrusion into the Executive Branch's prosecutorial decision-making process, were leveled against agents of HSI who investigate immigration and cross-border criminal activity, and alternative remedial structures existed. View "Sheikh v. Department of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

The case involves Keith Atherton, who pleaded guilty to one count of using or attempting to use a minor to produce a visual depiction of sexually explicit conduct. His plea agreement contained an appeal waiver with certain exceptions. Atherton was sentenced to the statutory maximum of 30 years. He appealed, arguing that the district court violated his due process rights during sentencing by relying on false or unreliable information.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the sentence. The court held that a due process challenge to sentencing, like Atherton’s, falls within the appeal waiver limitation set forth in United States v. Wells, for “a challenge that the sentence violates the Constitution.” The court rejected the government’s contention that the Wells exception is limited to constitutional claims targeting the substantive terms of the sentence.Reviewing for plain error, the court held that Atherton’s due process rights were not violated. The court concluded that Atherton did not demonstrate that it is clear or obvious that the challenged information was patently false or unreliable or that the court relied upon the information in imposing sentence. View "United States v. Atherton" on Justia Law

Domingo Musquiz, a former rail industry employee, petitioned for review of a decision by the U.S. Railroad Retirement Board (RRB). The RRB had adopted a hearing officer's finding that Musquiz was at fault for an overpayment of his reduced-age annuity under the Railroad Retirement Act (RRA) and denied his request for a waiver or reduction of repayment of the overpayment and penalty. Musquiz had failed to report his re-employment and additional income to the RRB, leading to the overpayment.The RRB's decision was based on the fact that Musquiz had received a booklet of regulations, including reporting requirements, when he applied for his annuity. The RRB concluded that Musquiz should have known about his reporting duties and was at fault when he did not report his change in employment and additional outside income.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed with the RRB that Musquiz was at fault for the overpayment that occurred from August 2012 to June 2, 2013. However, the court concluded that Musquiz was without fault for the RRB’s overpayment of his annuity from June 3, 2013, onward. The court reasoned that by then, the RRB had informed Musquiz that they had taken his outside earnings into account and adjusted his annuity payments.The court granted Musquiz's petition, vacated the RRB's decision, and remanded the case to the RRB for further proceedings. The court instructed the RRB to develop a factual record and determine whether recovery of the overpayment from June 3, 2013, onward would be contrary to the purpose of the RRA, against equity, or against good conscience. View "Musquiz V. United States Railroad Retirement Board" on Justia Law

The case involves Sergio Manrique Gutierrez, a lawful permanent resident of the United States, who was convicted of carjacking under California law. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld an Immigration Judge's (IJ) decision that Gutierrez was removable for having been convicted of an aggravated felony crime of violence and for having been convicted of two crimes of moral turpitude.The BIA held that Gutierrez's conviction for carjacking under California law is a categorical crime of violence. The BIA did not address the second ground for removal, concluding that Gutierrez waived his challenge to the moral turpitude removal charge. Gutierrez separately petitioned for review of the BIA’s denial of his motion to reopen his appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that California carjacking under Cal. Penal Code § 215(a) is not a categorical crime of violence. The court also concluded that the BIA erroneously determined that Gutierrez waived his challenge to the moral turpitude removal charge. The court remanded the case to the BIA to decide, in the first instance, whether Gutierrez is removable for having been convicted of two crimes of moral turpitude. The court dismissed Gutierrez’s petition for review of the IJ’s sua sponte reopening of his case to consider a change in the law. The court denied Gutierrez’s petition as to his remaining claims concerning the IJ’s adverse credibility finding, the discretionary denial of his application for waiver of admissibility, the denial of protection under the Convention Against Torture, and the BIA’s denial of his motion to reopen his case to consider new evidence that he was incompetent and to consider his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. View "GUTIERREZ v. GARLAND" on Justia Law

This case involves a trademark infringement dispute between BillFloat Inc., a Delaware corporation using the "SmartBiz" trademark, and Collins Cash Inc., a New York corporation using the "Smart Business Funding" mark. BillFloat alleged that Collins Cash, its former business partner, infringed on its trademark.The case was initially heard in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. The district court admitted Collins Cash's likelihood-of-confusion survey as expert evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. After a jury trial, the court ruled in favor of Collins Cash, finding no likelihood of confusion between the marks. The district court also partially denied Collins Cash's motion for attorneys' fees.The case was then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The appellate court affirmed the district court's judgment. It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Collins Cash's likelihood-of-confusion survey as expert evidence. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to instruct the jury that it should not draw any inferences from BillFloat's lack of a similar survey. On cross-appeal, the appellate court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Collins Cash's motion for attorneys' fees for the trademark infringement claim, either under the parties' partnership agreement or under the Lanham Act. The court concluded that the trademark claim did not relate to the partnership agreement, and the case was not "exceptional" under the Lanham Act. View "BILLFLOAT INC. V. COLLINS CASH INC." on Justia Law