Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

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Planned Parenthood filed suit against HHS, alleging that the agency's 2018 Funding Opportunity Announcements (FOAs) for funding programs to combat teen pregnancy were contrary to the law as required in their appropriation, the Teen Pregnancy Prevention Program (TPPP), which is the relevant part of the 2018 Consolidated Appropriations Act.The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of the action, holding that Planned Parenthood had standing under the competitor standing doctrine and that the case is not moot because it satisfies the capable of repetition, yet evading review exception to mootness. The panel explained that Planned Parenthood could reasonably expect to be subject to the same injury again, and the injury was inherently shorter than the normal life of litigation.The panel exercised its discretion to reach two issues in the first instance. First, the panel held that the 2018 Tier 1 FOA was contrary to law, because the 2018 Tier 1 FOA's direction that grant applicants address and replicate each of the elements of the TAC or the SMARTool, contradicts the TPPP's direction that Tier 1 grants go only to applicants whose programs are proven effective. Second, the panel held that the 2018 Tier 2 FOA was not contrary to the TPPP on its face. The panel remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. View "Planned Parenthood of Greater Washington and North Idaho v. United States Department of Health & Human Services" on Justia Law

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The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of a petition challenging USCIS's denial of petitioner's application for naturalization. USCIS and the district court found that petitioner and her first husband were both California domiciliaries at the time they obtained their Korean divorce, meaning that their divorce was of "no force or effect" in California. At issue was whether petitioner was "domiciled" in California at the time of her divorce.The panel held that petitioner, as a B-2 nonimmigrant whose lawful status had lapsed, was precluded from establishing lawful domicile in California by operation of federal law. Therefore, the panel held that petitioner's divorce and subsequent marriage were valid under California law, she was properly admitted for permanent residency based on her marriage to a United States citizen, and she is entitled to naturalization. View "Park v. Barr" on Justia Law

Posted in: Immigration Law
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The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's damages award in a class action brought by long-haul truck drivers in California, alleging that Wal-Mart violated state meal and rest break laws. The panel held that Wal-Mart raised no reversible error.The panel rejected Wal-Mart's claim that the district court erred by failing to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, and held that the district court correctly concluded that this case presented an Article III case or controversy because two lead plaintiffs remained in the action after the stay was lifted. The panel rejected Wal-Mart's claims that plaintiffs should not have been awarded damages for layovers, rest breaks, and inspections. The panel held that the district court correctly concluded that, under California law, time drivers spent on layovers is compensable if Wal-Mart exercised control over the drivers during those breaks; a more comprehensive review of the Wal-Mart pay manual demonstrates that it unambiguously required drivers to obtain preapproval to take a layover at home; the district court correctly determined that Wal-Mart's written policies constituted control as a matter of California law; the district court properly instructed the jury because the initial instruction on layovers and the supplemental instruction in response to a jury question—when viewed as a whole—fairly and accurately covered the issues, correctly stated the law, and were not misleading or prejudicial; the jury's factual finding, that Wal-Mart exercised control over its drivers under California law, is supported by substantial evidence; and the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act does not preempt California meal and break laws.Finally, the panel affirmed the district court's judgment on damages for rest breaks and inspections; held that the district court did not err in certifying a class and allowing representative evidence as proof of classwide damages; and held that the district court did not err in finding that Wal-Mart acted in good faith and with a reasonable belief in the legality of its action. View "Ridgeway v. Walmart Inc." on Justia Law

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The Ninth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for illegal reentry by a previously deported alien in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1326, and the revocation of supervised release. Defendant argued that he should have automatically become a United States citizen as a result of the naturalization of one of his parents prior to the reentry at issue. However, because his parents were married, and the derivative citizenship statute at 8 U.S.C. 1432(a) required married parents to both naturalize to confer citizenship to their child, he did not become a citizen. Defendant claimed that, by making his parents' marital status a factor in the derivative citizenship determination, section 1432(a) violates the Constitution's equal protection guarantee.The panel held that rational basis review applies to section 1432(a) for reasons separate and apart from those relied on in Barthelemy v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2003). Furthermore, Barthelemy's holding that section 1432(a) is rational is not irreconcilable with Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017). Therefore, the panel was still bound by that portion of Barthelemy's reasoning and by its ultimate holding that section 1432(a) is constitutional. Even if the panel were not bound by the holding in Barthelemy, the panel concluded that section 1432(a) is rational because protecting the parental rights of the non-citizen parent is plainly a legitimate legislative purpose. View "United States v. Mayea-Pulido" on Justia Law

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Volkhoff appealed the district court's dismissal of the qui tam complaint filed by relator under the False Claims Act (FCA) and analogous state false claims laws. The Ninth Circuit dismissed Volkhoff's appeal based on lack of appellate jurisdiction, because Volkhoff was not a party to relator's complaint, and it was not clear from Volkhoff's notice of appeal, as required by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c), whether relator also sought to take an appeal. View "United States ex rel. Alexander Volkhoff, LLC v. Janssen Pharmaceutica NV" on Justia Law

Posted in: Civil Procedure
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The Association filed suit challenging the National Park Service's authority to prohibit commercial herring fishing in the waters of the Golden Gate National Recreation Area in San Francisco Bay. In a prior appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the Association had failed to allege any final agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and directed the district court to dismiss the case. On remand, the district court allowed the Association to replead, but held that its proposed amendments still failed to allege final agency action.The panel held that the Association's proposed second amended complaint sufficiently alleged final agency action; the Park Service's in-water enforcement orders were final agency action that could be challenged in court; and the Park Service's contrary position that would require fishermen either to violate the law and risk serious punishment or engage in unnecessary further pleas before the agency would leave regulated parties facing stiff penalties without the judicial recourse that the APA enables. The panel held, however, that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to add a Declaratory Judgment Act count that the Association could have brought much earlier. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "San Francisco Herring Assoc. v. U.S. Department of the Interior" on Justia Law

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The Ninth Circuit filed an order withdrawing its prior opinion and replacing the opinion with an amended opinion, denying a petition for panel rehearing, and denying on behalf of the court a petition for rehearing en banc. The panel also filed an amended opinion reserving the district court's dismissal, as barred by section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (DCA), of claims under New York law and the Lanham Act's false advertising provision.Enigma filed suit alleging that Malwarebytes Inc. has configured its software to block users from accessing Enigma's software in order to divert Enigma's customers. The panel distinguished Zango Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d 1169, 1173 (9th Cir. 2009), from this case and held that the parties here were competitors. The panel heeded the warning in Zango against an overly expansive interpretation of section 230 that could lead to anticompetitive results. The panel held that the phrase "otherwise objectionable" does not include software that the provider finds objectionable for anticompetitive reasons. In regard to the state-law claims, the panel held that Enigma's allegations of anticompetitive animus were sufficient to withstand dismissal.In regard to the federal claim, the panel held that section 230's exception for intellectual property claims did not apply because Enigma's false advertising claim did not relate to trademarks or any other type of intellectual property. The panel remanded for further proceedings. View "Enigma Software Group USA, LLC v. Malwarebytes, Inc." on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed suit alleging that CFS and two of its employees fired him from his position as a social services practitioner in retaliation for his whistleblowing activities, in violation of California Labor Code section 1102.5 and 42 U.S.C. 1983. The County's Civil Service Commission upheld the termination and denied plaintiff's appeal, and the district court dismissed the action.The Ninth Circuit held that the Commission's order did not preclude plaintiff's section 1102.5 claim for retaliation in light of Taswell v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 232 Cal. Rptr. 3d 628, 643 (Ct. App. 2018). In Taswell, the California Court of Appeal applied a legislative-intent exception and held that administrative findings by a state agency do not preclude claims for retaliation brought under section 1102.5. However, the panel's conclusion regarding legislative intent did not extend to plaintiff's claim under section 1983, which was precluded by the Commission's order. In this case, plaintiff had a full opportunity to litigate the propriety of his termination before the administrative agency, as evidenced by the comprehensive evidentiary record and the availability of judicial review. Accordingly, the panel affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Bahra v. County of San Bernardino" on Justia Law

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The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's third amended complaint alleging that defendant violated various California consumer-fraud laws by branding Diet Dr Pepper using the word "diet."The panel held that, taken all together, the allegations in the complaint failed to sufficiently allege that reasonable consumers read the word "diet" in a soft drink's brand name to promise weight loss, healthy weight management, or other health benefits. The panel stated that diet soft drinks are common in the marketplace and the prevalent understanding of the term in that context is that the "diet" version of a soft drink has fewer calories than its "regular" counterpart. The panel explained that just because some consumers may unreasonably interpret the term differently does not render the use of "diet" in a soda's brand name false or deceptive. Therefore, the panel held that plaintiff failed to sufficiently allege that Diet Dr. Pepper's labeling was false or misleading and the district court properly dismissed the claim. View "Becerra v. Dr Pepper/Seven Up, Inc." on Justia Law

Posted in: Consumer Law
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CBD filed suit seeking to compel the Department of the Interior to reinstate the Refuges Rule that prevented Alaska from applying certain state hunting regulations on federal wildlife refuges. In 2017, Congress used the Congressional Review Act (CRA) to order Interior to rescind the regulation.The Ninth Circuit held that CBD lacked standing to challenge the Reenactment Provision, because it failed to allege an injury in fact that was more than speculative. Therefore, the panel dismissed CBD's argument that the Reenactment Clause violated the nondelegation doctrine.After determining that the Jurisdiction-Stripping Provision of the CRA did not include any explicit language barring judicial review of constitutional claims, the panel held that the Joint Resolution disapproving the Refuges Rule did not violate the Take Care Clause of the Constitution, and thus CBD's complaint failed to state a claim that was plausible on its face. The panel rejected CBD's argument that the CRA and Joint Resolution violated separation-of-powers principles because they interfere with the Executive Branch's duty under the Take Care Clause. The panel held that, because Congress properly enacted the Joint Resolution, and therefore validly amended Interior's authority to administer national wildlife refuges in Alaska, Congress did not prevent the President from exercising his constitutional duty to faithfully execute the laws.The panel joined other circuits in holding that federal courts do not have jurisdiction over statutory claims that arise under the CRA. In this case, CBD challenged Interior's rescission of the Refuges Rule solely on the ground that Congress did not validly enact the Joint Resolution. Therefore, the panel held that CBD's claim necessarily involved a challenge to a congressional "determination, finding, action or omission" under the CRA, and was therefore subject to the Jurisdiction-Stripping Provision. View "Center for Biological Diversity v. Bernhardt" on Justia Law