Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Ninth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for distribution and possession of material involving the sexual exploitation of minors. Because there was no physical intrusion into defendant's residence when FBI agents used wireless tracking software to detect the signal strength of the address of defendant's wireless device, the panel applied the Katz test in holding that the agents did not engage in a search under the Fourth Amendment. The panel held that defendant lacked any expectation of privacy in the emission of the signal strength of the MAC address emanating from outside his apartment. Furthermore, even if defendant harbored a subjective expectation of privacy, that expectation was not one society was prepared to recognize as reasonable.The panel held that the district court did not err in denying defendant’s request for a Franks hearing, because defendant did not present any evidence that the agent acted knowingly, intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth in preparing the affidavit. The court also held that none of the alleged false statements or omissions materially affected the probable cause determination. View "United States v. Norris" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit dismissed defendant's appeal of the district court's order imposing a probation condition requiring her to register as a sex offender pursuant to the Sex Offender Notification and Registration Act (SORNA). The panel held that the text and structure of SORNA's residual clause make it clear the clause requires the application of a noncategorical approach to determine whether a conviction is for an offense involving "any conduct that by its nature is a sex offense against a minor." In this case, the record supported the district court's determination that defendant committed a "sex offense" as defined by SORNA and thus she was required to register as a sex offender under that law. The panel stated that defendant had adequate notice; the district court did not delegate the Article III judicial power in imposing the sentence; her sentence was legally imposed; and the appellate waiver in her plea agreement was enforceable. View "United States v. Dailey" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for attempted transport of aliens and rejected his claim of prosecutorial misconduct. Specifically, defendant alleged that the prosecution committed misconduct by introducing evidence of, and commenting on, his post-arrest silence at trial. However, the panel held that defendant was not silent in response to an agent's questioning on the topic of his coconspirators, and it was not error for the prosecution to introduce evidence of, and comment on, that part of the interrogation including argument characterizing defendant as being evasive about other people involved in smuggling. Therefore, the prosecution properly relied on admissible evidence to rebut the theory that defendant had always intended to turn aliens he picked up over to border patrol. View "United States v. Garcia-Morales" on Justia Law

A consumer suffers a concrete injury in fact when a third-party obtains her credit report for a purpose not authorized by the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA); a consumer-plaintiff need allege only that her credit report was obtained for a purpose not authorized by the statute to survive a motion to dismiss; and the defendant has the burden of pleading it obtained the report for an authorized purpose.The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claim under the FCRA for lack of standing and failure to state a claim. The panel held that plaintiff pleaded facts sufficient to give rise to a reasonable inference that the Bank obtained her credit report for an unauthorized purpose. In this case, she pleaded that she did not have a credit relationship with the Bank of the kind specified in 15 U.S.C. 1681b(a)(3)(A)–(F), the Bank submitted numerous credit report inquires to Experian, and plaintiff put forth factual assertions which negative each permissible purpose for which Capital One could have obtained her credit report and for which she could possibly have personal knowledge. View "Nayab v. Capital One Bank" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of a preliminary injunction against DOJ's use of the notice and access conditions imposed on recipients of Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant Program formula grants.The panel held that DOJ lacked statutory authority to require recipients of the grant to comply with DHS requests for notice of a detained alien's release date and time and to allow DHS agents access to detained aliens upon request. The panel held that DOJ lacked statutory authority to the notice and access conditions -- which were not special conditions nor were they listed among the statutorily recognized purposes of a Byrne JAG award -- under section 10102(a)(6) of the Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Act of 2005. The panel rejected DOJ's argument that the notice and access conditions were further supported by provisions in the Byrne JAG statute that authorize the Attorney General to obtain certain information and require coordination with agencies. View "Los Angeles v. Barr" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit granted the petition for review of the BIA's denial of two motions to reopen petitioner's removal proceedings. Petitioner sought to reopen her removal proceedings after an IJ issued an in absentia removal order when she failed to appear at an immigration hearing.The panel held that it had jurisdiction over petitioner's case because, absent any prejudice to the Government, a premature petition for review of an immigration order may ripen upon final disposition of the case by the BIA. On the merits, the panel held that the BIA abused its discretion in denying the appeal of a motion to reopen, where the IJ in the underlying removal proceeding ordered petitioner removable in absentia on the basis of an amended notice to appear. In this case, the in absentia removal order was not supported by substantial evidence because the record provided no evidence of proper service of the amended notice to appear, as required by due process, and the IJ ordered petitioner removed based on admissions to the charges for which she did not receive notice. View "Diaz Martinez v. Barr" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit granted the Board's petition for enforcement of its order enjoining the union from committing violations of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). The panel held that substantial evidence supported the ALJ's finding that the union violated Section 8(b)(4)(i)(B) of the NLRA by inducing or encouraging Commercial Metals Company's neutral employees to strike or stop work for the unlawful secondary purpose of furthering the union's primary labor dispute with Western Concrete Pumping.The panel declined to extend Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015), to conclude that the Board's application of section Section 8(b)(4)(i)(B) violates the First Amendment. Addressing the union's alternative contention, the panel held that the Board reasonably rejected the union's claim that Section 8(c) of the NLRA protects its communications. Rather, the panel held that the Supreme Court has concluded that Section 8(c) does not immunize activities that violate Section 8(b)(4). Finally, the panel held that the Board properly rejected the union's challenges under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and the Thirteenth Amendment, and that the language of the Board's order adequately apprised the union of its notice obligations. View "NLRB v. International Association of Bridge, Structural, Ornamental, and Reinforcing Iron Workers" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied petitions for review of the BIA's orders dismissing petitioner's appeal of the IJ's denial of his application for adjustment of status under section 245(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and denial of petitioner's requests to reopen his removal proceedings so that he could seek a waiver of inadmissibility to obtain a U visa.The panel noted that petitioner acknowledged that his petition with respect to adjustment of status is controlled by Roman-Suaste v. Holder, which held that convictions under California Health and Safety Code section 11359 categorically constitute drug trafficking aggravated felonies under the INA. Therefore, petitioner was not statutorily eligible for adjustment of status.In removal proceedings commenced against a non-citizen after the non-citizen has already entered the country, the panel held, in light of Matter of Khan, that an IJ does not have the authority to grant the non-citizen a U visa waiver of inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. 1182(d)(3)(A)(ii). The panel agreed with the district court that immigration judges lack the authority to consider a request by a petitioner for U nonimmigrant status for a waiver under section 212(d)(3)(A)(ii) of the Act. The panel explained that Matter of Khan was entitled to deference where, as here, the relevant statutory provisions were ambiguous and the holding was reasonable. View "Man v. Barr" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of a preliminary injunction barring enforcement in several states of final federal agency rules that exempt employers with religious and moral objections from the Affordable Care Act's (ACA) requirement that group health plans cover contraceptive care without cost sharing. As a preliminary matter, the panel held that the plaintiff states had Article III standing to sue and that the appeal was not moot.The panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that the plaintiff states were likely to succeed on the merits of their Administrative Procedure Act (APA) claim or, at the very least, raised serious questions going to the merits. At the preliminary injunction stage, the panel held that the evidence was sufficient to hold that providing free contraceptive services was a core purpose of the Women's Health Amendment and that nothing in the statute permitted the agencies to determine exemptions from the requirement. Therefore, given the text, purpose, and history of the Women's Health Amendment, the district court did not err in concluding that the agencies likely lacked statutory authority under the ACA to issue the final rules.The panel also held that, regardless of the question of the agencies' authority under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the accommodation process likely did not substantially burden the exercise of religion. Furthermore, because appellants likely failed to demonstrate a substantial burden on religious exercise, there was no need to address whether the government had shown a compelling interest or whether it has adopted the least restrictive means of advancing that interest. Finally, the panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that the states were likely to suffer irreparable harm absent an injunction, and that the balance of equities tipped sharply in favor of the plaintiff states and that the public interest tipped in favor of granting the preliminary injunction. View "California v. The Little Sisters of the Poor" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and the Privacy Act of 1974, seeking FAA records related to the Biographical Assessment, a screening tool introduced by the FAA in 2014 as part of the air traffic controller hiring process.The panel affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the FAA based on Exemption 2 of FOIA and Exemption (k)(6) of the Privacy Act, which allowed the FAA to withhold from plaintiff the minimum passing score and plaintiff's own score on the Biographical Assessment. Where FAA employees used personal email addresses to receive information relating to the FAA's change in selecting air traffic controllers, the panel held that plaintiff has carried his burden of showing that the FAA employees' privacy interest in their personal email addresses was outweighed by the robust interest of citizens' right to know what their government was up to in making the changes it did. The court also held that there was no genuine issue of material fact that Exemption 6 does not apply to the personal email addresses of the recipients of the Barrier Analysis document containing FAA information relating to the selection of air traffic controllers. The panel reasoned that the FAA could satisfy its obligation under FOIA by identifying the email recipients by name, instead of revealing the recipients' personal email addresses. In regard to 202 emails withheld by the FAA as agency records, the panel vacated the district court's order and remanded to the district court to apply the second prong of the test set forth in Tax Analysts v. U.S. Dep't of Justice. View "Rojas v. FAA" on Justia Law