Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After Cerner filed an action in state court against defendants, defendants removed the action to federal district court. Cerner moved to remand to state court, arguing that the removal was improper and that the federal court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the action. The district court denied the motion to remand and held that it could exercise jurisdiction under 9 U.S.C. 205, which authorizes a defendant to remove to federal court an action previously filed in state court that relates to an arbitration agreement or award falling under the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of June 10, 1958.The Ninth Circuit reversed and held that this case was not related to an international arbitration agreement or award, as that term is used in section 205. Therefore, section 205 did not provide a proper basis for removal or for federal subject matter jurisdiction over this action. The panel held that the outcome of this case could not conceivably be affected by the arbitration awarded. Accordingly, the panel remanded with instructions to remand to state court. View "Cerner Middle East Limited v. Belbadi Enterprises" on Justia Law

Cerner filed suit against defendant and iCapital in state court, seeking to enforce an arbitration award against property in Oregon owned by defendants. After removal, the district court dismissed the action. While this appeal was pending, the Court of Appeal of Paris, a court with jurisdiction over defendant, confirmed the arbitration panel's conclusion that defendant was subject to the panel's jurisdiction.The Ninth Circuit held that the French court's decision was entitled to recognition under the principles of international comity and thus the elements of quasi in rem jurisdiction were present. The panel held that Cerner possessed a valid judgment against defendant, who owns property in Oregon, and thus the panel reversed the district court's dismissal of the action for lack of personal jurisdiction. The panel remanded for further proceedings. View "Cerner Middle East Limited v. iCapital, LLC" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order granting motions to remand to state court. AHI contended that it properly removed this case to federal court under 28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(1). Plaintiffs had filed suit in state court against the helicopter owners, the Hecker Defendants, and the manufacturer, AHI, after John Udall died in a helicopter crash while touring the Grand Canyon.The panel held that the district court committed no error in finding that AHI was not "acting under" a federal officer by virtue of becoming an FAA-certified Designation holder with authority to issue Supplemental Certificates. In this case, AHI inspected and certified its aircraft pursuant to FAA regulations and federal law and could not make any structural or design changes without the consent of the FAA. The panel joined the Seventh Circuit in concluding that an aircraft manufacturer does not act under a federal officer when it exercises designated authority to certify compliance with governing federal regulations. View "Riggs v. Airbus Helicopters, Inc." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit certified the following question of state law to the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware: In a Delaware limited partnership, does a general partner's request to a limited partner for a one-time capital contribution constitute a request for "limited-partner action" such that the general partner has a duty of disclosure, and, if the general partner fails to disclose material information in connection with the request, may the limited partner prevail on a breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim without proving reliance and causation? View "Goodman v. Dohmen" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of defendant's 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion and remanded with instructions to grant the motion. The panel held that defendant's first degree armed robbery in violation of Oregon Revised Statutes 164.415 is not a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA).The panel held that United States v. Strickland, 860 F.3d 1224 (9th Cir. 2017), which held that Oregon third degree robbery is not a violent felony under the force clause of the ACCA because it does not require physically violent force, is not clearly irreconcilable with Stokeling v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 544 (2019), which addressed a Florida robbery statute that requires resistance by the victim that is overcome by the physical force of the offender. Finally, even assuming that section 164.415(1) is divisible, the district court erred in finding that defendant had been convicted of armed robbery under subsection (b). View "United States v. Shelby" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Pit River Tribe and environmental organizations in an action under the Geothermal Steam Act, against federal agencies responsible for administering twenty-six unproven geothermal leases located in California's Medicine Lake Highlands. Pit River alleged that the BLM's decision to continue the terms of the unproven leases for up to forty years violated the Act.Determining that it had jurisdiction to hear this appeal, the panel held that the statutory meaning of 30 U.S.C. 1005(a) is clear and unambiguous: it only permits production-based continuations on a lease-by-lease basis, not on a unit-wide basis. In this case, BLM failed to meet its burden of providing a compelling reason for the panel to depart from the plain meaning of section 1005(a). Therefore, the panel rejected BLM's argument that section 1005(a) authorizes forty-year continuations on a unit-wide basis once a single lease in a unit is deemed productive. View "Pit River Tribe v. Bureau of Land Management" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit amended the opinion and concurrence, and affirmed the district court's order denying an IRS agent's motion for summary judgment.Plaintiff alleged that the agent violated plaintiff's Fourth Amendment right to bodily privacy during the lawful execution of a search warrant at plaintiff's home in 2006 when the agent escorted plaintiff to the bathroom and monitored her while she relieved herself. As a preliminary matter, the panel applied the test in Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017), and held that plaintiff could proceed with her Bivens action against the agent. The panel held that the agent's interests in preventing destruction of evidence and promoting officer safety did not justify the scope or manner of the intrusion into plaintiff's most basic subject of privacy. Furthermore, a reasonable officer in the agent's position would have known that such a significant intrusion into bodily privacy, in the absence of legitimate government justification, is unlawful. View "Ioane v. Hodges" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the Association's complaint, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act regarding the Association's provision of diabetes-related care in the U.S. Army's Child, Youth, and School Services (CYSS) programs. When this action began in 2016, the Army had in place United States Army Regulation 608-10 and a 2008 Family and Morale, Welfare and Recreation Command Memorandum (collectively, "Old Policy"), which together prohibited CYSS staff from providing essential medical care for diabetic children. In 2017, defendants revoked the Old Policy and replaced it with a New Policy that provides for possible diabetes-related accommodations.The panel held that the Association's challenge to the Old Policy was moot. In this case, defendants have satisfied their burden of clearly showing that they cannot reasonably be expected to reinstitute the Old Policy's blanket ban. Therefore, because the Association seeks only prospective relief, its challenge to the policy, and the injuries incurred thereunder, were moot. The panel also held that the Association lacked standing to challenge the New Policy, because the Association lacked organizational standing by failing to show an injury in fact, and representational standing where none of its members had standing to sue in their own right. View "American Diabetes Assoc. v. United States Department of the Army" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision denying petitioner's motion to reopen his 1996 in absentia deportation order. Petitioner argued that he did not receive proper notice of the hearing because he was 16 years old in 1996 and no adult was served with the Order to Show Cause and Notice of Hearing (OSC).The panel held that Flores-Chavez v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2004), which required the INS to serve notice to both the juvenile and to the person the juvenile was authorized to be released to, did not extend to situations in which a minor over the age of 14 was never detained or released to an adult by the INS and in which he initiated proceedings by filing an affirmative request for relief. The panel applied the test in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), and held that notice given to petitioner in this case comported with due process. The panel applied the balancing factors and held that the burden on the government of providing notice to a responsible adult living with a juvenile over the age of 14 outweighs the interest of never-detained minors over the age of 14, at least those who have filed an affirmative request for relief. View "Cruz Pleitez v. Barr" on Justia Law

Petitioner and his attorney filed an ex parte application for discovery pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1782, which permits certain domestic discovery for use in foreign proceedings. The district court quashed the subpoenas after concluding that not all the discovery sought was subject to the state secrets privilege.Although the Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court that certain information requested was not privileged because it was not a state secret that would pose an exceptionally grave risk to national security and that the government's assertion of the state secrets privilege was valid over much of the information requested, the panel held that the district court erred in quashing the subpoenas in toto rather than attempting to disentangle nonprivileged from privileged information. In this case, the underlying proceeding was a limited discovery request that could be managed by the district court. Accordingly, the panel remanded for further proceedings. View "Husayn v. United States" on Justia Law