Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In the context of asbestos claims, the substantial-factor test requires demonstrating that the injured person had substantial exposure to the relevant asbestos for a substantial period of time. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for Union Pacific in an action brought by plaintiff, alleging that secondary exposure to asbestos exposure caused his mesothelioma. Plaintiff alleged negligence and related claims under Idaho law, stemming from his father's work at a Union Pacific roadhouse where he was exposed to asbestos and then carried the asbestos home to expose plaintiff.The panel held that plaintiff failed to establish that he was regularly exposed to asbestos attributable to Union Pacific, and rejected plaintiff's contentions of error regarding expert testimony. Therefore, plaintiff failed to create a genuine issue of material fact on whether his secondary exposure was a substantial factor in causing his disease, and he could not prevail on his negligence claims. View "Stephens v. Union Pacific Railroad Co." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's order granting the government's motion to seize funds in defendant's inmate trust account under section 3664(n) of the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act. The funds were to be applied to defendant's outstanding restitution debt related to a prior conviction.The panel held that defendant's action was not moot and that de novo review, rather than plain error review, was appropriate in this case. The panel also held that the language and statutory context of section 3664(n) favor Amicus's view that section 3664(n) does not apply to periods of pretrial detention, and that the rule of lenity resolves any remaining ambiguity in defendant's favor. View "United States v. Lillard" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed defendant's felon in possession conviction under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). In United States v. Murillo, 422 F.3d 1152 (9th Cir. 2005), a felony was a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year as defined by the statute of violation. In light of intervening authority not previously available to the district court or the parties, the panel explained that United States v. Valencia-Mendoza, 912 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 2019), now defines "punishable by" as the sentence to which the defendant is actually exposed under Washington's mandatory sentencing scheme, explicitly overruling Murillo. The panel held that it was bound by Valencia-Mendoza and none of defendant's prior convictions actually exposed him to a term of imprisonment exceeding one year. View "United States v. McAdory" on Justia Law

8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) strips the federal courts of jurisdiction to review the denial of a national interest waiver. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's action challenging the denial of his petition for a national interest waiver related to his application for a work visa.Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) provides that no court shall have jurisdiction to review a decision or action of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security the authority for which is specified under this subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security. The panel held that section 1153(b)(2)(B)(i)'s plain language specifies that the authority to grant (or to deny) a national interest waiver is in the discretion of the Attorney General. The panel also held that plaintiff's various claims simply repackaged his core grievance regarding the national interest waiver, and his due process claim failed because he received notice by regular mail to the address given. View "Poursina v. USCIS" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment affirming the bankruptcy court's judgment in favor of the chapter 7 trustee. The trustee claimed that the tax refunds should be considered part of the bankruptcy estate and the bankruptcy court agreed. However, the panel held that the trustee failed to exhaust the administrative claims process as required by the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989. Therefore, the panel held that the bankruptcy court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute because of the failure to exhaust. View "Waldron v. FDIC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against various prison officials, alleging that they used excessive force after an incident where defendant was shot in the knee.The Ninth Circuit reversed and held that a party need not satisfy the good cause or extraordinary circumstances standard provided in 28 U.S.C. 636(c)(4) in order to withdraw magistrate judge consent before all parties have consented. In this case, the magistrate judge erroneously required such a showing by plaintiff and, under the circumstances, his motion to withdraw consent should have been granted. Therefore, the panel held that the magistrate judge did not have jurisdiction over trial proceedings under section 636(c). The panel also reversed the dismissal of Defendant Torres, holding that the 90-day window under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(a) was never triggered, and reversed the dismissal of plaintiff's deliberate indifference claim. View "Gilmore v. Lockard" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's denial of petitioner's application for asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture (CAT) based on his imputed political opinion and whistleblowing activities exposing police corruption.The panel rejected petitioner's broad challenge to Matter of N–M–, arguing that it misconstrues the provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Rather, the panel held that the three factor test in N–M– was consistent with the whistleblowing cases in this circuit and the BIA's interpretation was not unreasonable. In this case, the panel held that petitioner's asylum claim failed because the record did not support his claim that police officers persecuted him on account of his imputed political opinion. Although the BIA erroneously applied the "one central reason" nexus standard rather than the "a reason" standard, the panel need not remand because the BIA adopted the IJ's finding of no nexus between the harm and the alleged protected ground and thus neither the result nor the BIA's basic reasoning would change. View "Singh v. Barr" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit vacated defendant's sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm. The panel held that defendant's prior Nevada conviction for attempted battery with substantial bodily harm in violation of Nev. Rev. Stat. 200.481(2)(b) and 193.330 qualifies as a felony conviction for a crime of violence under USSG 2K2.1. In this case, it was clear that the state treated defendant's conviction as a felony. The panel held that it was not evident that there was a realistic probability that a defendant could be convicted of Nevada attempted battery with substantial bodily harm without the attempted use of violent force. View "United States v. Fitzgerald" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment for the United States in an action under the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994. The Act prohibits any governmental authority from engaging in a pattern or practice of conduct by law enforcement officers or government agents that deprives persons of rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States. The United States filed suit against defendants, alleging that defendants engaged in a pattern or practice of violating the constitutional rights of residents who were not members of the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints .The panel held that the district court correctly interpreted the Act, 34 U.S.C. 12601, when it concluded that the statute does not require an official municipal policy of violating constitutional rights in order for the United States to prevail; defendants' arguments about the district court's factual findings, even if correct, did not entitle it to relief because the district court's judgment was supported on other grounds; and the district court did not err in admitting several statements that defendants challenged as hearsay. View "United States v. Town of Colorado City" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the SEC in a civil complaint filed against defendant and his law firm, alleging securities fraud claims. The panel held that the EB-5 visa program investments in connection to defendant and his law firm constitute securities in the form of investment contracts. In this case, the private placement memoranda's (PPMs) identification of the investments as securities, the form of the investment entity as a limited partnership, and the promise of a fixed rate of return all indicate that the EB-5 transactions were securities. The panel rejected defendant's contention that the promised return was effectively nullified by the administrative fees, and his assertion that his clients nonetheless lacked an expectation of profit.The panel agreed with the district court that the uncontroverted evidence established that defendant was acting as a broker and was required to register with the SEC as a broker; defendant engaged in securities fraud in violation of section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 and section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in entering the disgorgement order. View "SEC v. Feng" on Justia Law