Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries
USA V. LIBERATO
Wardy Alfonso Liberato, a Dominican national previously removed from the United States in 2007, was arrested near the U.S.-Mexico border fence in January 2023. He was part of a group of suspected noncitizens. A jury convicted him of entering and being found in the United States after removal, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). Liberato appealed, arguing that the government failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was free from official restraint before his apprehension.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona denied Liberato’s motion for judgment of acquittal and entered a judgment of conviction. Liberato then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.The Ninth Circuit reversed Liberato’s conviction, holding that the government’s evidence was insufficient to establish that Liberato was free from official restraint at any point before his apprehension. The court emphasized that for a conviction under § 1326(a), the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was free from official restraint after physically entering U.S. territory. The court found that there was no evidence that Liberato’s group was ever anywhere other than immediately next to the border fence, and no testimony about where Liberato was or what he was doing when first observed in the United States. The court concluded that no rational jury could have inferred beyond a reasonable doubt that Liberato was at any point free from official restraint. Consequently, the court reversed the conviction and remanded for entry of a judgment of acquittal. View "USA V. LIBERATO" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Criminal Law
HAMPTON V. SHINN
In 2002, Tracy Allen Hampton was convicted of killing Charles Findley, Tanya Ramsdell, and Ramsdell’s unborn child. A jury sentenced him to death. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed Hampton’s convictions and sentences on direct appeal and denied his petition for state post-conviction relief. Hampton then filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which the district court denied.Hampton raised four certified claims on appeal. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that each lacked merit. The court found that the State did not violate Brady v. Maryland or Napue v. Illinois in connection with the testimony of a jailhouse informant, George Ridley. Hampton was not prejudiced by his trial counsel’s alleged failure to obtain evidence that could have been used to impeach Ridley. The court also held that Hampton’s defense counsel were not constitutionally ineffective at the guilt or sentencing phases of his trial. Additionally, the district court acted within its discretion in denying Hampton’s request for evidentiary development on his Brady, Napue, and ineffective assistance of counsel claims. The court declined to expand the certificate of appealability to include Hampton’s uncertified claims.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Hampton’s federal habeas petition. The court found that the state court’s decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, nor was it based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. The court also denied Hampton’s motion for reconsideration as moot. View "HAMPTON V. SHINN" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Rights, Criminal Law
OBRIEN V. BISIGNANO
Christopher Obrien applied for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income, claiming various medical conditions rendered him disabled since August 2010. He reported past work as a telemarketer in 2003 and 2009 and as a door-to-door salesperson in 2013 and 2014. The Social Security Administration (SSA) denied his claim, and an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) upheld this decision, concluding Obrien could perform his past relevant work as a telemarketer and sales representative.Obrien challenged the ALJ's decision in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, arguing his telemarketing work was too old or insubstantial to count as past relevant work. The Commissioner conceded that substantial evidence did not support the ALJ's finding regarding Obrien's ability to perform his past work as a sales representative. However, the district court upheld the denial of benefits, finding Obrien's objections to the ALJ's determination regarding his telemarketing work both forfeited and meritless.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court rejected the Commissioner's argument that Obrien had forfeited his objections by not raising them before the ALJ, noting that SSA ALJ hearings are informal and nonadversarial, and ALJs are required to fully investigate the issues. The court held that substantial evidence did not support the ALJ's determination that Obrien's telemarketing work in 2003 and 2009 counted as past relevant work. The 2003 work was outside the 15-year period required by the regulations, and there were ambiguities regarding the average monthly wages for the 2009 work, necessitating further record development by the ALJ.The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "OBRIEN V. BISIGNANO" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Public Benefits
HARRINGTON V. CRACKER BARREL OLD COUNTRY STORE, INC.
A group of current and former employees of Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc. alleged that the company violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) regarding wages for tipped workers. They sought preliminary certification for a collective action to include all servers in states where Cracker Barrel attempts to take a tip credit over the last three years. Cracker Barrel objected, arguing that notice should not be sent to employees who are subject to arbitration agreements or to out-of-state employees with no ties to Arizona.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona granted the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary certification and approved notice to the proposed group, including employees who might have entered into arbitration agreements and out-of-state employees. The court decided to reserve judgment on the arbitration issue until the second stage of proceedings and concluded that nationwide notice was permissible based on the participation of one Arizona-based plaintiff.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in following the two-step procedure for preliminary certification. It also held that where the existence and validity of an arbitration agreement are in dispute, the district court is not required to determine the arbitrability of absent employees' claims before authorizing notice. However, the Ninth Circuit joined other circuits in holding that the Supreme Court's decision in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California applies to FLSA collective actions in federal court. This means that for specific personal jurisdiction, the district court must assess whether each opt-in plaintiff's claim is sufficiently connected to the defendant's activities in the forum state. The court vacated the district court's order authorizing nationwide notice and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "HARRINGTON V. CRACKER BARREL OLD COUNTRY STORE, INC." on Justia Law
HUSAYN V. MITCHELL
Zayn Al-Abidin Muhammad Husayn, also known as Abu Zubaydah, was captured in Pakistan in March 2002, suspected of being an Al Qaeda leader. He was transferred to a CIA-operated secret prison where he was subjected to "enhanced interrogation techniques" by James Mitchell and John Jessen, psychologists contracted by the CIA. These techniques included waterboarding, sleep deprivation, and confinement in small boxes, which Zubaydah alleges amounted to torture. He was later transferred to Guantanamo Bay, where he remains detained as an enemy combatant.Zubaydah filed a lawsuit under the Alien Tort Statute seeking damages for the injuries he suffered during his detention and interrogations. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington dismissed the case, citing lack of jurisdiction under the Military Commissions Act (MCA) of 2006, which denies federal courts jurisdiction over certain actions relating to the detention and treatment of enemy combatants by the United States and its agents.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that the MCA deprived the district court of jurisdiction because Zubaydah's claims related to his detention and treatment by the defendants, who were considered agents of the United States. The court found that the CIA had authorized, controlled, and ratified the defendants' actions, thereby establishing an agency relationship. Consequently, the MCA barred the court from hearing Zubaydah's claims. The decision was affirmed. View "HUSAYN V. MITCHELL" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law
United States v. Keller
Thomas Keller, a physician specializing in pain management, was convicted of prescribing controlled substances outside the scope of professional practice. Keller was known for prescribing large quantities of opioids, which led to a federal investigation. During the investigation, agents seized a journal from Keller's residence, which contained patient information and medical notes. Keller was subsequently indicted on federal charges, including unlawfully dispensing controlled substances and health care fraud. He was convicted on four counts of distributing controlled substances outside the scope of professional practice.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California denied Keller's motion to suppress the journal, finding it fell within the scope of the search warrant and was supported by probable cause. The court also declined to hold an evidentiary hearing on the suppression motion, ruling that Keller's allegations did not establish contested issues of fact. Additionally, the court rejected Keller's argument that the charges violated the nondelegation doctrine, holding that the Attorney General's regulations were within the scope of authority delegated by Congress. Keller was sentenced to 30 months in prison and 3 years of supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed Keller's conviction and sentence. The court held that the district court did not err in denying the motion to suppress the journal, as it was properly seized under the search warrant. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision not to hold an evidentiary hearing. The court upheld the constitutionality of the nondelegation doctrine as applied to Keller's charges. Finally, the court ruled that the district court correctly calculated Keller's sentencing range using the drug conversion ratio found in the Sentencing Guidelines commentary, as it was properly incorporated into the Guidelines. View "United States v. Keller" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Criminal Law, Health Law
IDAHO CONSERVATION LEAGUE V. BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION
The Bonneville Power Administration (BPA), a federal agency responsible for marketing power generated at federal hydroelectric facilities in the Columbia River Basin, holds financial reserves to maintain stable rates. When these reserves exceed a certain threshold, BPA is required to spend the excess. In fiscal years 2022 and 2023, BPA decided to allocate only about 10 percent of its excess reserves to fish and wildlife mitigation efforts, prompting environmental groups led by the Idaho Conservation League (ICL) to challenge this decision.The environmental groups argued that BPA's decision violated its obligations under section 4(h)(11)(A) of the Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act (NWPA), which requires BPA to provide equitable treatment for fish and wildlife and to consider the Council's environmental mitigation program to the fullest extent practicable. BPA contended that section 4(h)(11)(A) did not apply to its financial decisions regarding the allocation of excess reserves.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the petitions for review were timely filed within 90 days of BPA's final allocation decisions. The court also determined that the cases were not moot, as the issues raised were capable of repetition while evading review.On the merits, the Ninth Circuit concluded that BPA's allocation of its excess financial reserves was not subject to the requirements of section 4(h)(11)(A) of the NWPA. Instead, the court found that section 4(h)(10)(A) specifically addresses BPA's use of the excess financial reserve fund for fish and wildlife and does not require the same level of prioritization as section 4(h)(11)(A). Consequently, the court denied the petitions for review. View "IDAHO CONSERVATION LEAGUE V. BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law
Cervantes-Torres v. United States
Hector Cervantes-Torres was convicted in 2014 of being a felon in possession of a firearm, possessing a firearm as an alien unlawfully present in the United States, and being an alien found unlawfully present in the United States following deportation. Five years later, the Supreme Court ruled in Rehaif v. United States that a defendant’s knowledge of their status as a person barred from possessing a firearm is a necessary element of a § 922(g) conviction. Cervantes-Torres filed a coram nobis petition in 2021 to vacate his § 922(g)(1) and § 922(g)(5) convictions due to the lack of a Rehaif instruction at his trial.The district court granted the petition for the § 922(g)(1) conviction but denied it for the § 922(g)(5) conviction. The court found that there was a reasonable probability that the jury could have reached a different verdict regarding the § 922(g)(1) conviction due to the expungement of Cervantes-Torres’s felony drug conviction. However, for the § 922(g)(5) conviction, the court concluded that no reasonable jury could find that Cervantes-Torres was unaware of his unlawful status, given his deportation, false statements on his green card application, and a letter from USCIS informing him of his lack of lawful status.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s partial denial of Cervantes-Torres’s petition. The panel held that even under the standard of review for a direct appeal, Cervantes-Torres could not prevail. The court found that there was no reasonable probability that the jury would have reached a different result even if a Rehaif instruction had been given, due to the overwhelming evidence that Cervantes-Torres was aware of his unlawful status. Therefore, any error from the lack of a Rehaif instruction was not of the most fundamental character, and the district court’s decision was affirmed. View "Cervantes-Torres v. United States" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Criminal Law
SCHEIBE V. PROSUPPS USA, LLC
A plaintiff filed a putative class action against a dietary supplement company, alleging that the supplement Hydro BCAA was mislabeled. The plaintiff claimed that preliminary testing showed the supplement contained more carbohydrates and calories than listed on its FDA-prescribed label. The plaintiff tested the supplement using FDA methods but did not follow the FDA’s twelve-sample sampling process.The United States District Court for the Southern District of California dismissed the complaint, holding that the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act preempted the claims because the plaintiff did not plead that he tested the supplement according to the FDA’s sampling process. The district court noted a divide among district courts on whether plaintiffs must plead compliance with the FDA’s testing methods and sampling processes to avoid preemption.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the plaintiff’s complaint allowed a reasonable inference that the supplement was misbranded under the Act, even without allegations of compliance with the FDA’s sampling process. The court found that the plaintiff’s preliminary testing of one sample, which showed significant discrepancies in carbohydrate and calorie content, was sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. The court emphasized that plaintiffs are not required to perform the FDA’s sampling process at the pleading stage to avoid preemption.The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal, allowing the plaintiff’s state-law claims to proceed. The court concluded that the plaintiff’s allegations were sufficient to avoid preemption and stated a plausible claim that the supplement was mislabeled under the Act. View "SCHEIBE V. PROSUPPS USA, LLC" on Justia Law
COSTAR GROUP, INC. V. COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE EXCHANGE, INC.
CoStar Group, Inc. and CoStar Realty Information, Inc. (collectively, “CoStar”) and Commercial Real Estate Exchange, Inc. (“CREXi”) are online platforms competing in the commercial real estate listing, information, and auction markets. CoStar sued CREXi for copyright infringement, alleging that CREXi listed images and information hosted by CoStar without permission. CREXi counterclaimed on antitrust grounds, asserting that CoStar engaged in monopolistic practices to exclude competition.The United States District Court for the Central District of California dismissed CREXi’s antitrust counterclaims and directed entry of final judgment on those claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). The district court held that CREXi failed to show CoStar had monopoly power and that the agreements at issue were not exclusive. CREXi appealed the dismissal of its antitrust counterclaims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s dismissal of the antitrust counterclaims. The Ninth Circuit held that CREXi successfully stated claims under §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, California’s Cartwright Act, and the Unfair Competition Law. The court found that CREXi plausibly alleged CoStar had monopoly power in the relevant markets and engaged in anticompetitive conduct by entering into de facto exclusive deals with brokers and imposing technological barriers to entry. The court concluded that a monopolist using its power to exclude competitors and maintain monopoly power violates § 2 of the Sherman Act, and using exclusive deals to do so violates § 1 of the Sherman Act and the Cartwright Act. The court also held that CREXi stated claims under the “unfair” and “unlawful” prongs of the Unfair Competition Law. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of CREXi’s tortious interference claims as they were improperly raised. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "COSTAR GROUP, INC. V. COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE EXCHANGE, INC." on Justia Law