Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Ninth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for misdemeanor offenses stemming from his unlawful BASE jump in Yosemite National Park. The panel held that the permit exception in 36 C.F.R. 2.17(a)(3) -- which prohibits delivering a person or object by parachute, helicopter, or other airborne means -- is an affirmative defense for which defendant, not the government, bore the burden of proof. Therefore, the panel rejected defendant's contention that the government failed to establish all elements of section 2.17(a)(3), and held that defendant did not meet the burden of proof at trial. The court also held that the magistrate judge's reference to a news article about the trial, though perhaps imprudent, did not mandate recusal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 455(a). View "United States v. Carey" on Justia Law

Civil Beat filed suit under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), seeking to compel disclosure of two documents related to the University of Hawai'i at Manoa's biolab where researchers study a number of highly dangerous biotoxins.The Ninth Circuit held that the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 (BPRA) is a qualifying statute under Exemption 3 of the Freedom of Information Act. The panel dismissed as moot that part of the appeal pertaining to the disclosure of the specific regulatory violations and vacated those portions of the district court's order; affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment as to the withholding under Exemption 6 of the identity and contact information of CDC employees involved in the UH biolab inspection; and reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the CDC on the BPRA public endangerment exemption, because the CDC did not justify its complete withholding of the information. The panel remanded for further proceedings. View "Civil Beat Law Center for the Public Interest, Inc. v. Centers for Disease Control & Prevention" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment on remand denying a motion by two medical marijuana growers to enjoin their federal prosecutions for violations of the Controlled Substances Act.The panel held that section 538 of the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act authorized defendants to seek to enjoin prosecution, and thus they bear the burden of showing that it is more likely than not that the state's medical marijuana laws "completely authorized" their conduct. Therefore, the district court did not err by placing the burden of proof on defendants. The panel rejected defendants' contention that the government must procure a jury verdict of noncompliance in Washington State Court before it can prosecute them for their federal crimes, and held that Washington's procedural rules should not be imported into section 538. Furthermore, defendants may not resort to common law defenses to show that the Medical Use of Cannabis Act (MUCA) authorizes their conduct, and the district court correctly focused on their compliance with MUCA itself. Finally, the panel held that the district court did not clearly err in finding that defendants were not "qualified patients." View "United States v. Evans" on Justia Law

The en banc court vacated and remanded defendant's sentence of life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for his role in a robbery that resulted in murder. Defendant was 17 years old at the time. The Supreme Court later held that mandatory LWOP sentences for juvenile offenders violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012).The Ninth Circuit held that the district court's analysis during resentencing was inconsistent with the constitutional principles the Supreme Court delineated in Miller and subsequent case law. In this case, based on the district court's articulated reasoning at defendant's resentencing, the panel could not tell whether the district court appropriately considered the relevant evidence of defendant's youth or the evidence of his post-incarceration efforts at rehabilitation. Furthermore, defendant provided evidence related to a number of the Miller factors at the resentencing hearing, including his abusive upbringing, his extensive exposure to drugs and alcohol as a child, his difficulty in high school because of his Native American traditions, and his father's inexplicable insistence that he reject the government's favorable plea offer. Most significantly, defendant offered abundant evidence on the critical issue that he was not irreparably corrupt or irredeemable because he had done what he could to improve himself within the confines of incarceration. View "United States v. Briones" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's order dismissing a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action brought by plaintiff, a state prisoner, for failure to pay the required filing fee. The district court concluded that at least three of plaintiff's prior actions were dismissed based on failure to state a claim or because they were frivolous. Therefore, the district court held that 28 U.S.C. 1915(g) barred plaintiff from bringing this action in forma pauperis.The panel held, however, that one of plaintiff's previous actions was not dismissed for a qualifying reason under section 1915(g). The previous action was dismissed for lack of standing and dismissal for lack of standing is a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, which was not a ground enumerated in section 1915(g). Therefore, the panel remanded for further proceedings. View "Hoffmann v. Pulido" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's dismissal of petitioner's application for cancellation of removal. The panel deferred to the BIA's decision in Matter of Cortes Medina that a conviction for indecent exposure under California Penal Code 314(1) is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT). The panel held that it must defer to Cortes Medina pursuant to the framework outlined in National Cable & Telecommunications Association v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005). Finally, the panel held that Cortes Medina applied retroactively to petitioner's case such that his section 314(1) conviction was a CIMT that made him ineligible for cancellation of removal. View "Cruz Betansos v. Barr" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of a putative class action against Northern Trust, alleging violations of state law involving breaches of fiduciary duty by a trustee. The district court determined that the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA) barred the case from proceeding in federal court.The panel held that SLUSA did not preclude plaintiffs' imprudent investment claims, because these claims did not meet the "in connection with' requirement for SLUSA preclusion. The panel also held that SLUSA did not preclude plaintiffs' fee-related claims, as well as plaintiffs' elder abuse claims and claims against NT Corp. The panel remanded for further proceedings. View "Banks v. Northern Trust Corp." on Justia Law

This emergency proceeding arose from a challenge of a decision by President Trump and certain of his cabinet members to "reprogram" funds appropriated by the DoD for Army personnel needs and to redirect those funds toward building a barrier along portions of the United States' southern border. After Congress consistently refused to pass any measures that met the President's desired funding level, he sought to reprogram funds by DoD in response to a request by DHS.Plaintiffs filed suit seeking to enjoin the reprogramming and the funds' expenditure, and the district court enjoined defendants from using the reprogrammed funds to construct a border barrier. Defendants moved for an emergency stay.The Ninth Circuit denied defendants' motion for a stay, holding that defendants failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits of their appeal, because section 8005 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 2019 did not authorize DoD to reprogram the funds and thus the use of those funds violates the constitutional requirement that the Executive Branch not spend money absent an appropriation from Congress. Furthermore, plaintiffs either have an equitable cause of action to enjoin a constitutional violation, or they can proceed on their constitutional claims under the Administrative Procedure Act, or both. Finally, factors such as the degree of hardship that may result from a stay or its denial, and the public interest at stake, did not persuade the panel to enter a stay. View "Sierra Club v. Trump" on Justia Law

18 U.S.C. 3599 permits federal appointment of additional counsel to represent a California death-row prisoner who is seeking state clemency where the State of California also provides for state clemency counsel. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of petitioner's motion for the appointment of additional counsel from the Federal Public Defender Services for the District of Arizona (FPD-AZ). The panel held that the availability of state-appointed clemency counsel does not prevent the district court from appointing additional clemency counsel under section 3599 during post-habeas proceedings. Therefore, the panel remanded for the district court to determine whether appointment of additional counsel to represent petitioner is appropriate under the statute. View "Gonzales Samayoa v. Davis" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's grant of a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the city's Dress Code Ordinance -- which required that the dress of employees, owners, and operators of Quick-Service facilities cover "minimum body areas" -- and the amendments to the Lewd Conduct Ordinances.The panel held that plaintiffs, owners and employees of a bikini barista stand, failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits of their two Fourteenth Amendment void-for-vagueness challenges, nor on their First Amendment free expression claim. The panel held that the activity the Lewd Conduct Amendments prohibit is reasonably ascertainable to a person of ordinary intelligence, and the Amendments were not amenable to unchecked law enforcement discretion.The panel also held that the Dress Code Ordinance is not open to the kind of arbitrary enforcement that triggers due process concerns, and thus the vagueness doctrine does not warrant an injunction prohibiting enforcement of the Dress Code Ordinance. Furthermore, plaintiffs have not demonstrated a "great likelihood" that their intended messages related to empowerment and confidence will be understood by those who view them, and thus the mode of dress at issue in this case is not sufficiently communicative to merit First Amendment protection. Finally, the panel held that the district court's application of intermediate scrutiny under the "secondary effects" line of authority was inapposite because that doctrine applies to regulations that burden speech within the ambit of the First Amendment's sphere of protection. In this case, the Dress Code Ordinance does not burden expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment, and thus the City need only demonstrate that it promotes a substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation. The panel remanded for further proceedings. View "Edge v. City of Everett" on Justia Law