Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

John Russell Howald was convicted for a federal hate crime under 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(2) and discharge of a firearm during a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). Howald had fired shots at a local woman's house in Basin, Montana, with the intent to "rid" the town of "lesbians and gays." The firearms and ammunition used in the offense had traveled across state lines.In the United States District Court for the District of Montana, Howald moved to dismiss both counts of the indictment, arguing that § 249(a)(2) exceeded Congress’s Commerce Clause power and that his § 249(a)(2) hate crime conviction was not a predicate crime of violence for § 924(c)(1)(A). The district court upheld the charges and rejected Howald's arguments.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Howald reiterated his arguments. The appellate court held that the jurisdictional element in § 249(a)(2)(B)(iii) defeated the facial challenge to the statute's constitutionality. The court also rejected the as-applied challenge because the government had proven that the firearms and ammunition used in the offense had traveled across state lines. Furthermore, the court held that § 249(a)(2) is divisible, and that Howald’s offense is categorically a crime of violence because an attempt to kill in violation of § 249(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II) necessarily involves the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another per § 924(c)(3)(A). Therefore, the court affirmed Howald's convictions. View "United States v. Howald" on Justia Law

The case involves two separate actions brought by B&L Productions, Inc., an operator of gun shows in California, against state officeholders tasked with enforcing various California statutes that bar the sale of guns on state property. B&L argued that these statutes violated its rights under the First and Second Amendments. In the first case, B&L challenged a ban on firearm sales at the Del Mar Fairgrounds. In the second case, B&L challenged bans on firearm sales at the Orange County Fairgrounds and on all state property.In the first case, the district court dismissed B&L’s lawsuit, holding that B&L had failed to state a claim that the ban violates its constitutional rights. In the second case, the district court granted B&L’s motion for a preliminary injunction, holding that B&L was likely to succeed on the merits of all its claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of B&L’s claims in the first case and vacated the district court’s order granting B&L’s motion for a preliminary injunction in the second case. The court held that the challenged statutes do not infringe on B&L’s constitutional rights. The court found that the statutes solely restrict nonexpressive conduct—contracting for the sale of firearms—and are not subject to First Amendment scrutiny. Furthermore, the court determined that the plain text of the Second Amendment does not cover B&L’s proposed conduct—namely, contracting for the sale of firearms and ammunition on state property. View "B & L PRODUCTIONS, INC. V. NEWSOM" on Justia Law

The case involves Chad Alan Lee, who was convicted and sentenced to death for three murders. Lee filed a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, arguing that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective at sentencing because he failed to investigate and present mitigating evidence that Lee suffered from Fetal Alcohol Syndrome and Fetal Alcohol Effect. Lee also argued that the Arizona Supreme Court erred by requiring him to establish a causal nexus between his crimes and his mitigating evidence.The district court denied Lee's petition and his motion for leave to amend. The court found that Lee's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was procedurally defaulted because he did not raise it in his postconviction relief petition. The court also found that Lee's proposed claim that the Arizona Supreme Court erred was untimely, procedurally defaulted, and without merit.On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Lee's theories for obtaining a federal evidentiary hearing notwithstanding 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2), which places strict limits on when federal courts can hold evidentiary hearings and consider new evidence, lacked merit. The court also held that even if Lee could demonstrate cause to excuse the procedural default, he could not demonstrate prejudice. The court further held that the district court correctly denied leave to add Lee's proposed claim because it was untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), procedurally defaulted, and lacked merit. View "LEE V. THORNELL" on Justia Law

The Choctaw Nation and several pharmacies it owns and operates entered into agreements with Caremark, LLC, and its affiliates to facilitate insurance reimbursements for the Nation’s costs for pharmacy services for its members. The Nation filed a lawsuit in the Eastern District of Oklahoma, alleging that Caremark unlawfully denied pharmacy reimbursement claims in violation of the Recovery Act. After the matter was stayed in the Eastern District of Oklahoma, Caremark petitioned to compel arbitration of the Nation’s claims in the District of Arizona. The district court granted the petition, concluding that the parties’ agreements included arbitration provisions with delegation clauses and therefore an arbitrator must decide the Nation’s arguments that its claims are not arbitrable.The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that most of the Nation’s arguments challenging the district court’s arbitration order were foreclosed by a previous case, Caremark, LLC v. Chickasaw Nation, which addressed the enforceability of identical arbitration provisions. The court also held that the Nation’s remaining argument that the District of Arizona lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the petition to compel arbitration failed because the Nation contractually agreed to arbitrate its claims against Caremark in Arizona, and in those contracts specifically “agree[d] to such jurisdiction.” Thus, the Nation expressly waived its tribal sovereign immunity as a bar to arbitration in the District of Arizona. View "CAREMARK, LLC V. CHOCTAW NATION" on Justia Law

The case involves the Puget Soundkeeper Alliance (Soundkeeper), an environmental organization, and the Port of Tacoma and SSA Terminals, LLC (collectively, the Port), operators of the West Sitcum Terminal, a marine cargo terminal. The dispute centers on a portion of the terminal known as "the Wharf," where stormwater runoff carries pollutants into Puget Sound. The Soundkeeper alleges that the Port violated the Clean Water Act by not implementing stormwater controls across the entire facility, including the Wharf. The Port argues that the Wharf is not subject to regulation because it does not conduct industrial activities that require a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit.The case was first heard in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, which granted partial summary judgment in favor of the Port. The court concluded that the Industrial Stormwater General Permits (ISGPs) issued by the Washington State Department of Ecology did not extend coverage to the Wharf, as the Wharf did not conduct the industrial activities specified in the permits.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed in part and vacated in part the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the plain text of the 2010 and 2015 ISGPs required a transportation facility conducting industrial activities to implement stormwater controls across the entire facility. Therefore, the Port needed to implement appropriate stormwater controls across the Terminal while the 2010 and 2015 ISGPs were in effect. The court also held that the ISGPs were enforceable in a citizen suit, even if they exceeded the requirements of the federal regulations.However, the court vacated the district court's decision regarding the 2020 ISGP, which was subject to an ongoing state-court challenge, and remanded the case for further consideration. The court instructed the district court to consider the effect of the state proceedings on this case. View "PSA V. PORT OF TACOMA" on Justia Law

In March 2020, Idaho enacted the Fairness in Women’s Sports Act, a law that categorically bans transgender women and girls from participating in women's student athletics. The Act also provides a sex dispute verification process, which allows any individual to dispute the sex of any student athlete participating in female athletics in the State of Idaho and require her to undergo intrusive medical procedures to verify her sex. Lindsay Hecox, a transgender woman who wished to try out for the Boise State University women’s track and cross-country teams, and Jane Doe, a cisgender woman who played on high school varsity teams and feared that her sex would be disputed under the Act due to her masculine presentation, filed a lawsuit against the Act.The United States District Court for the District of Idaho granted a preliminary injunction against the Act, holding that it likely violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court found that the Act subjects only students who wish to participate in female athletic competitions to an intrusive sex verification process and categorically bans transgender girls and women at all levels from competing on female teams. The court also found that the State of Idaho failed to provide any evidence demonstrating that the Act is substantially related to its asserted interests in sex equality and opportunity for women athletes.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that the Act likely violates the Equal Protection Clause. The court found that the Act discriminates on the basis of transgender status and sex, and that it is not substantially related to its stated goals of equal participation and opportunities for women athletes. The court remanded the case to the district court to reconsider the appropriate scope of injunctive relief. View "Hecox v. Little" on Justia Law

Seattle Pacific University (SPU), a religious institution, filed a lawsuit against the Washington Attorney General, alleging First Amendment violations arising from the Attorney General's investigation into the university's employment policies and history under the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD). SPU prohibits employees from engaging in same-sex intercourse and marriage. After receiving complaints, the Attorney General requested documents related to SPU's employment policies, employee complaints, and job descriptions. SPU sought to enjoin the investigation and any future enforcement of WLAD.The district court dismissed the suit, citing lack of redressability and Younger abstention. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court held that SPU failed to allege a cognizable injury for its retrospective claims, as the Attorney General's request for documents carried no penalties for non-compliance. However, the court found that SPU had standing for its prospective pre-enforcement injury claims, as SPU intended to continue employment practices arguably proscribed by WLAD, the Attorney General had not disavowed its intent to investigate and enforce WLAD against SPU, and SPU's injury was redressable. The court also held that Younger abstention was not warranted as there were no ongoing enforcement actions or any court judgment. The case was remanded to the district court to consider prudential ripeness. View "SEATTLE PACIFIC UNIVERSITY V. FERGUSON" on Justia Law

The case involves Rosalina Calonge, who sued Officer Edward Carboni and the City of San Jose under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Officer Carboni used excessive deadly force when he shot and killed her son, Francis Calonge. The incident occurred when police officers responded to 911 calls reporting a man with a gun. They located Francis Calonge, who had what appeared to be a gun in his waistband. Officer Carboni shot and killed Calonge after following him for about a minute as he walked down a street.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California granted summary judgment in favor of Officer Carboni, ruling that he was entitled to qualified immunity because the plaintiff had failed to identify specific caselaw clearly establishing that Officer Carboni’s conduct violated the Fourth Amendment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court found that, construing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a reasonable jury could decide that Officer Carboni violated Calonge’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force. The court also concluded that the relevant law was clearly established at the time, so Officer Carboni was not entitled to qualified immunity. The court resolved three disputed facts in the plaintiff’s favor for purposes of the appeal: Calonge was not drawing his gun or making a threatening gesture when Officer Carboni shot him; there were no bystanders in Calonge’s vicinity when he was shot; and officers did not instruct Calonge to get on the ground or otherwise stop. The court held that the totality of the circumstances did not justify deadly force. View "CALONGE V. CITY OF SAN JOSE" on Justia Law

The case involves a group of plaintiffs, including the Health Freedom Defense Fund, Inc. and California Educators for Medical Freedom, who challenged the COVID-19 vaccination policy of the Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD). The policy, which was in effect for over two years, required employees to get the COVID-19 vaccination or lose their jobs. The plaintiffs argued that the policy interfered with their fundamental right to refuse medical treatment.The case was initially dismissed by the United States District Court for the Central District of California, which applied a rational basis review under Jacobson v. Massachusetts, concluding that the policy served a legitimate government purpose. The court held that even if the vaccine did not prevent transmission or contraction of COVID-19, it furthered the purpose of protecting LAUSD students and employees from COVID-19.The plaintiffs appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. During the appeal, LAUSD rescinded its vaccination policy. LAUSD then asked the court to dismiss the appeal, arguing that the case was now moot. The plaintiffs objected, arguing that LAUSD withdrew the policy because they feared an adverse ruling.The Ninth Circuit held that the case was not moot, applying the voluntary cessation exception to mootness. The court found that LAUSD's pattern of withdrawing and then reinstating its vaccination policies, particularly in response to litigation risk, was enough to keep the case alive.On the merits, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court misapplied the Supreme Court’s decision in Jacobson v. Massachusetts. The court found that Jacobson did not apply because the plaintiffs had plausibly alleged that the COVID-19 vaccine does not effectively prevent the spread of COVID-19. The court vacated the district court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings under the correct legal standard. View "HEALTH FREEDOM DEFENSE FUND, INC. V. ALBERTO CARVALHO" on Justia Law

The case involves plaintiffs Christopher Calise and Anastasia Groschen, who alleged that they were harmed by fraudulent third-party advertisements posted on Meta Platforms, Inc.'s (commonly known as Facebook) website, in violation of Meta's terms of service. Meta claimed immunity from liability under § 230(c)(1) of the Communications Decency Act (CDA), which applies to a provider or user of an interactive computer service that a plaintiff seeks to treat, under a state law cause of action, as a publisher or speaker of information provided by another information content provider.The district court dismissed the plaintiffs' non-contract claims, ruling that they were barred by § 230(c)(1) of the CDA. The court also dismissed the plaintiffs' contract-related claims, holding that Meta's duty arising from its promise to moderate third-party advertisements was related to Meta's status as a "publisher or speaker" of third-party advertisements, and therefore § 230(c)(1) barred the plaintiffs' contract claims.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' non-contract claims, agreeing that these claims derived from Meta's status as a "publisher or speaker" of third-party advertisements. However, the appellate court vacated the dismissal of the plaintiffs' contract-related claims, holding that Meta's duty arising from its promise to moderate third-party advertisements was unrelated to Meta's status as a "publisher or speaker" of third-party advertisements, and therefore § 230(c)(1) did not bar the plaintiffs' contract claims. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Calise v. Meta Platforms, Inc." on Justia Law