Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Johnnie Fuson, a registered member of the Navajo Tribe, was forced to relocate from his family’s home following the partition of the Joint Use Area (JUA) under the Navajo-Hopi Settlement Act. Fuson applied for relocation assistance benefits, but his application was denied by the Office of Navajo and Hopi Indian Relocation (ONHIR). On appeal, the Independent Hearing Officer (IHO) also deemed Fuson ineligible for benefits, citing adverse credibility findings and determining that Fuson was not a resident of the Hopi Partitioned Lands (HPL) on the relevant date.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona upheld the IHO’s decision, granting summary judgment in favor of ONHIR and denying Fuson’s motion for summary judgment. The district court found that substantial evidence supported the IHO’s adverse credibility findings and that the IHO’s decision was not arbitrary and capricious.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the IHO’s adverse credibility findings were not supported by substantial evidence. The IHO had found every witness not credible due to inconsistencies with other witnesses, creating a circular reasoning that guaranteed adverse credibility findings for all witnesses. The Ninth Circuit also found that the IHO’s finding that Fuson was not a resident of the HPL homesite was arbitrary and capricious. The IHO relied almost exclusively on the Bureau of Indian Affairs enumeration roster without adequately considering contrary testimony about the roster’s reliability.The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "FUSON V. OFFICE OF NAVAJO AND HOPI INDIAN RELOCATION" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs created accounts on justanswer.com and paid to ask questions. According to JustAnswer's Terms of Service, paying for answers automatically enrolled plaintiffs in a recurring monthly subscription. Plaintiffs alleged that JustAnswer violated the Electronic Funds Transfer Act and various state consumer protection laws by enrolling them in the subscription service without their consent and making cancellation difficult. JustAnswer sought to compel arbitration based on a provision in its Terms of Service, asserting that plaintiffs were put on inquiry notice of those terms and agreed to arbitrate any claims arising from their use of the site.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California denied JustAnswer's motion to compel arbitration. The court held that plaintiffs did not receive sufficient notice of JustAnswer's Terms of Service containing the arbitration clause, and thus no contract was formed. The court found that the payment pages and other advisals presented to plaintiffs were not sufficiently conspicuous to put them on inquiry notice of the terms, and the advisals did not explicitly inform users that clicking a button would constitute assent to the terms.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order. The Ninth Circuit concluded that no contracts were formed between plaintiffs and JustAnswer under an inquiry theory of notice. The court held that the website did not provide reasonably conspicuous notice of the terms, and the advisals did not unambiguously manifest the plaintiffs' assent to those terms. Therefore, plaintiffs were not bound by the arbitration provision in JustAnswer's Terms of Service, and the motion to compel arbitration was denied. View "GODUN V. JUSTANSWER LLC" on Justia Law

Cristina Balan, an automotive design engineer, filed a defamation lawsuit against Tesla, Inc. and Elon Musk, alleging that Tesla made defamatory statements about her, including accusations of theft, after an article about her was published in the Huffington Post. Tesla moved to compel arbitration based on an arbitration agreement in Balan's employment contract. The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington partially granted Tesla's motion, compelling arbitration for part of the defamation claim. Balan then amended her arbitration demand to include a defamation claim against Musk.The Western District of Washington initially denied Tesla's motion to compel arbitration in part, but the Ninth Circuit reversed this decision, ruling that the entire defamation claim was subject to arbitration. Consequently, the district court dismissed the case. The arbitrator applied California law and dismissed Balan's defamation claims against Tesla and Musk based on the statute of limitations, issuing an award in favor of Tesla and Musk.Tesla and Musk petitioned the United States District Court for the Northern District of California to confirm the arbitration award. The district court granted the petition, confirming the award. Balan appealed, arguing that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to confirm the award.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and held that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to confirm the arbitration award. The Ninth Circuit cited the Supreme Court's decision in Badgerow v. Walters, which prohibits looking past the face of a petition under 9 U.S.C. § 9 to establish jurisdiction. Since Tesla's petition to confirm a zero-dollar award did not meet the amount in controversy requirement, the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's order and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. View "TESLA MOTORS V. BALAN" on Justia Law

Plaintiff AirDoctor, LLC, sells air purifiers and replacement air filters, while Defendant Xiamen Qichuang Trade Co., Ltd., sells replacement air filters primarily through Amazon.com. Plaintiff alleged that Defendant falsely advertised its air filters as compatible with Plaintiff’s air purifiers and offering equivalent filtration, which diverted sales from Plaintiff and harmed its reputation. Plaintiff filed a Complaint alleging violations of the Lanham Act, California’s Unfair Competition Law, and California’s False Advertising Law, seeking various forms of relief, including actual damages to be determined at trial, attorney’s fees, and an injunction.The United States District Court for the Central District of California entered default judgment in favor of Plaintiff after Defendant failed to appear or respond. However, the district court denied Plaintiff’s request for actual damages, reasoning that awarding damages would exceed what was demanded in the pleadings under Rule 54(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as the Complaint did not specify an amount of damages sought. The district court also denied attorney’s fees based on its local rules, which tied fees to the amount of damages awarded.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and held that Rule 54(c) does not prohibit awarding actual damages in a default judgment when the pleadings sought such damages in an amount to be determined at trial. The court referenced its decision in Henry v. Sneiders, which allowed for damages to be awarded even if the exact amount was not specified in the complaint. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of damages and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "AirDoctor, LLC v. Xiamen Qichuang Trade Co., Ltd" on Justia Law

A mother, Aurora Regino, filed a complaint against the Chico Unified School District after the district began using her child's new preferred name and pronouns without informing her. Regino claimed that the district's policy, which allows students to be addressed by their preferred names and pronouns without parental notification, violated her substantive and procedural due process rights. She argued that the policy deprived her of her fundamental rights as a parent to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of her children.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California dismissed Regino's complaint, reasoning that she failed to allege the existence of a fundamental right that was clearly established in existing precedent. The court applied a standard similar to that used in qualified immunity cases, requiring that the right be clearly established in existing law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's dismissal, holding that the district court applied erroneous legal standards to the substantive and procedural due process claims. The Ninth Circuit clarified that a plaintiff asserting a substantive due process claim does not need to show that existing precedent clearly establishes the asserted fundamental right. Instead, the critical inquiry is whether the asserted fundamental right is deeply rooted in the nation's history and tradition and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court to conduct the proper analysis, including a careful formulation of the asserted fundamental right and an examination of whether it is deeply rooted in history and tradition.The Ninth Circuit also held that the district court erred in its analysis of Regino's procedural due process claim by requiring her to identify a fundamental right. Procedural due process protects all liberty interests derived from state law or the Due Process Clause itself. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Ninth Circuit's opinion. View "REGINO V. STALEY" on Justia Law

Robert Louis Carver pleaded guilty to charges related to two separate criminal schemes: a biotechnology investment fraud from 2004 to 2008 and a lighting company stock fraud from 2017 to 2018. The government filed indictments in 2011 and 2023, respectively. Carver's plea agreement acknowledged a total offense level of 20 under the Sentencing Guidelines but did not agree on his criminal history category.The United States Probation Office calculated Carver's criminal history score, including two points each for two 1994 California convictions, resulting in a total score of four and a criminal history category of III. Carver objected, arguing that these convictions were expunged under California Penal Code section 1203.4, which should exclude them from his criminal history under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(j). The district court disagreed, ruling that the relief provided by section 1203.4 did not amount to expungement under the Guidelines.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that under United States v. Hayden, convictions set aside under California Penal Code section 1203.4 are not considered expunged for the purposes of U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(j). The court rejected Carver's argument that Hayden was overruled by Kisor v. Wilkie, which modified the standard for deferring to agency interpretations of their regulations. The court found that Hayden's interpretation used traditional tools of construction and did not rely on the Guidelines' commentary, making it consistent with Kisor. The court also found that United States v. Castillo did not apply, as Hayden did not rely on commentary deference. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to include Carver's prior convictions in his criminal history score. View "USA V. CARVER" on Justia Law

Pamela Siino purchased a life insurance policy from Foresters Life Insurance and Annuity Company (FLIAC) in 2010. In 2014, she moved and failed to successfully update her address with FLIAC. Consequently, she did not receive notices about her premium payments and missed her payment due on January 26, 2018. FLIAC sent a notice on February 26, 2018, stating that her policy had lapsed but could be reinstated if she paid the overdue premium by March 28, 2018. Siino did not receive this notice and did not pay the premium. In 2019, she discovered her policy had lapsed and declined to reinstate it, purchasing a new policy from another provider instead.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California granted summary judgment in favor of Siino, declaring that FLIAC wrongfully terminated her policy and that it would remain valid if she tendered all unpaid premiums. The court found that FLIAC violated California Insurance Code sections 10113.71 and 10113.72 by failing to provide proper pretermination and designee notices. Siino's other claims were dismissed with prejudice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's finding that FLIAC violated the statutory notice requirements, agreeing that FLIAC failed to provide the required pretermination and designee notices. However, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's declaration that Siino's policy remained valid, as Siino failed to prove that FLIAC's violations caused her injury. The court noted that even if FLIAC had sent the required notices, they would not have reached Siino due to her failure to update her address. The case was remanded to the district court solely for the purpose of entering final judgment. View "SIINO V. FORESTERS LIFE INSURANCE AND ANNUITY COMPANY" on Justia Law

Gregory Gliner, a dual citizen of the United Kingdom and the United States, sought to identify the anonymous operator of the PoliticalLore.com website and the pseudonymous author of an allegedly defamatory article published on the website. Gliner intended to use this information for a defamation lawsuit in the United Kingdom. He filed an ex parte application under 28 U.S.C. § 1782 to obtain discovery from Dynadot, Inc., a California-based company that provided domain registration and privacy protection services for the website.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California denied Gliner’s application, citing the First Amendment interests of the website operator and the article author. The court did not make any relevant factual findings and did not address the statutory requirements or the Intel factors for granting discovery under § 1782. Gliner subsequently filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, which the district court also denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and found that the district court abused its discretion. The appellate court held that the First Amendment protections cited by the district court did not apply because there was no evidence that the website operator or the article author were U.S. citizens or present in the United States. Additionally, the court found no indication that the website had a U.S. audience whose First Amendment rights might be implicated. The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded the case for further consideration of the § 1782 statutory factors and the Intel factors. The district court was instructed to allow Dynadot and any affected parties to contest the subpoenas if issued. View "IN RE EX PARTE APPLICATION OF GLINER" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a nonprofit corporation and its founder, applied for a special use permit to conduct church activities on agricultural land they purchased in Maui. The Maui Planning Commission denied their application, citing concerns about traffic, safety, and environmental impacts. Plaintiffs continued using the land for non-agricultural purposes without permits, leading to fines. They applied again, addressing some concerns, but the Commission denied the second application as well.The plaintiffs sued the County of Maui and the Commission, alleging violations of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and other constitutional claims. The United States District Court for the District of Hawaii granted summary judgment to the County on most claims, except for the RLUIPA equal-terms claim, which went to trial. An advisory jury found for the County, and the district court entered judgment accordingly. Plaintiffs appealed, and the Ninth Circuit reversed the summary judgment, remanding the case for further proceedings.On remand, the district court severed an unconstitutional provision from the zoning law and proceeded to trial on the remaining claims. The jury found for the County on all counts. Plaintiffs appealed again, arguing that the substantial-burden inquiry under RLUIPA should have been decided by the court, not the jury.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the substantial-burden inquiry under RLUIPA is a question of law for the court to decide. Although the district court erred in submitting this question to the jury, the error was deemed harmless because the jury's verdict was consistent with the required legal outcome. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of the County of Maui. View "SPIRIT OF ALOHA TEMPLE V. COUNTY OF MAUI" on Justia Law

Bigfoot Ventures Limited brought a shareholder derivative action on behalf of NextEngine, Inc. against Mark S. Knighton, ShapeTools, LLC, and NextEngine. Bigfoot alleged that the agreement between NextEngine and ShapeTools was not intended to benefit NextEngine or its shareholders. Bigfoot had a history of litigation against NextEngine, including disputes over loans and intellectual property (IP) rights.The United States District Court for the Central District of California dismissed Bigfoot’s suit, finding that Bigfoot could not fairly or adequately represent the interests of NextEngine’s shareholders as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1. The court considered the ongoing litigation between Bigfoot and NextEngine, which suggested that the derivative action was being used as leverage in other lawsuits. The court also found that Bigfoot’s personal interest in gaining control of NextEngine’s IP outweighed its interest in asserting rights on behalf of NextEngine.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit clarified that courts are not required to assess each of the eight factors from Larson v. Dumke when determining plaintiff adequacy in a shareholder derivative action. The court held that the district court did not err in considering the ongoing litigation as an outside entanglement and found that the record supported the district court’s conclusion that Bigfoot was an inadequate plaintiff. The Ninth Circuit also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by vacating the trial to hear the motion to dismiss, as it raised significant issues that needed to be resolved before trial. View "BIGFOOT VENTURES LIMITED V. KNIGHTON" on Justia Law