Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A man named Yoon Suk Chang was injured at the American Memorial Park on Saipan when his foot got caught in a large hole in a grassy area. He suffered severe ankle injuries, which required surgery and led to significant medical expenses and financial losses. Chang filed a negligence claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) against the United States, alleging that the National Park Service (NPS) allowed a dangerous hole to go unrepaired.The District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands dismissed Chang's complaint, citing the discretionary function exception of the FTCA. The court reasoned that the decisions on how to inspect and maintain the grassy areas involved policy considerations, such as safety, public access, and aesthetics. Therefore, the court concluded that the discretionary function exception applied, and the United States was immune from the lawsuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's judgment. The Ninth Circuit held that the discretionary function exception did not apply because the routine maintenance of a grassy lawn did not involve government employees balancing public policy considerations. The court emphasized that the NPS's failure to repair a hole in a regularly maintained grass area was a matter of routine maintenance, which is not protected by the discretionary function exception. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Chang v. United States" on Justia Law

Steven Zinnel was convicted of bankruptcy fraud, money laundering, and other financial crimes. He was sentenced to 152 months in prison and ordered to pay over $2.5 million in restitution and fines. The government sought to garnish funds from Zinnel's TD Ameritrade Individual Retirement Account to satisfy the unpaid restitution and fines. Zinnel objected to the garnishment and requested that the proceedings be transferred to the District of Oregon, where he claimed to reside.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California denied Zinnel's motion to transfer the proceedings, ruling that venue was proper in the Eastern District of California. The court overruled Zinnel's objections to the writ of garnishment and ordered TD Ameritrade to disburse funds to cover the unpaid restitution, fines, and a litigation surcharge. Zinnel appealed the final garnishment order.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and held that the district court erred in denying Zinnel's motion to transfer the garnishment proceedings. The Ninth Circuit agreed with the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits that the plain language of the Federal Debt Collection Procedures Act (FDCPA) imposes a mandatory obligation on the district court to transfer the proceedings upon the debtor's timely request. The court also held that the district court's failure to transfer the proceedings was not subject to harmless error analysis, as it necessarily affected the debtor's substantial rights.The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's final order of garnishment and remanded the case, allowing Zinnel to litigate the proceedings in the district where he now resides. The court concluded that the appeal was not moot, as a partial remedy could still be fashioned by directing the United States to return the funds to TD Ameritrade. View "United States v. Zinnel" on Justia Law

Edward B. Spencer, an indigent and incarcerated individual, filed multiple lawsuits against various California prison officials. He initially proceeded in forma pauperis (IFP) in each case. Spencer had previously filed numerous lawsuits while incarcerated, and he conceded that two of those actions resulted in strikes under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). However, he disputed whether two other actions, which he voluntarily dismissed, should count as strikes.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California revoked Spencer's IFP status in four cases, finding that he had four strikes, including the two voluntary dismissals. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's findings and recommendations, which concluded that the voluntary dismissals counted as strikes under the PLRA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court's revocation of Spencer's IFP status. The Ninth Circuit held that voluntary dismissals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1) do not constitute strikes under the PLRA. The court reasoned that the "on the grounds that" clause in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) requires grounds to be decided by a court, and voluntary dismissals do not have grounds decided by a court. Therefore, Rule 41(a)(1) voluntary dismissals cannot count as strikes because they are never "on the grounds that" the case was frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim.The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's revocation of Spencer's IFP status in each of the four cases on appeal and remanded for further proceedings. The court did not address any other issues urged by the parties. View "Spencer v. Milan" on Justia Law

Richard Mooney sued his former employer, Roller Bearing Company of America (RBC), alleging violations of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and the Washington Family and Medical Leave Act (WFMLA). Mooney claimed his termination was due to his age, depression, and decision to take leave under the FMLA, while RBC argued it was due to a reduction in force in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Mooney filed the lawsuit in King County Superior Court, and RBC removed the case to federal court under federal question and diversity jurisdiction. The jury found RBC liable and awarded Mooney $160,000 in damages.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington calculated prejudgment interest based on a fluctuating federal rate. Mooney appealed, arguing that the higher state rate should have applied. The district court concluded it had discretion to select the appropriate rate and chose the federal rate, finding it the most accurate way to compensate Mooney for the lost use of his wages.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that when a judgment is based equally on both state and federal claims, the district court has discretion to select a proper prejudgment interest rate. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, agreeing that the fluctuating federal rate was appropriate given the circumstances, including Mooney's litigation strategy and the combined nature of the state and federal claims. The court found no error in the district court's application of the federal rate and affirmed the judgment. View "Mooney v. Roller Bearing Company of America" on Justia Law

Peter Schuman and William Coplin, former employees of Atmel Corporation, were terminated without cause after Microchip Technology Inc. acquired Atmel. They were offered severance benefits significantly lower than those promised under Atmel's Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)-governed benefits plan, in exchange for signing a release of all potential claims. Schuman and Coplin signed the releases but later filed a class-action lawsuit on behalf of approximately 200 similarly situated former Atmel employees, alleging ERISA violations, including breach of fiduciary duty and denial of benefits, and challenging the enforceability of the releases.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California granted summary judgment in favor of Microchip against Schuman and Coplin, applying a six-part test to determine that the releases were signed knowingly and voluntarily. The court did not consider evidence of Microchip's alleged breach of fiduciary duties in its analysis. The district court denied summary judgment for the non-named plaintiffs, finding material disputes of fact regarding Microchip's knowledge of the Plan's intended interpretation. The court entered final judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) for Schuman and Coplin, certifying the question of the appropriate legal test for determining the enforceability of the releases.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's summary judgment against Schuman and Coplin, holding that courts must evaluate the enforceability of ERISA releases by considering the totality of the circumstances, including any alleged improper conduct by the fiduciary. The court enumerated nine non-exhaustive factors for this evaluation. The case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The Ninth Circuit dismissed Microchip's cross-appeal for lack of jurisdiction, as the issue raised was not inextricably intertwined with the primary appeal. View "Schuman v. Microchip Technology Inc." on Justia Law

Between 2007 and 2010, the taxpayer transferred millions of dollars between his business entities, characterizing them as loans. On December 31, 2010, he canceled many of these purported loans. On his 2010 income tax return, he reported $145 million of cancellation-of-debt (COD) income but excluded it due to his personal insolvency. He also reported a short-term capital loss of nearly $87 million due to a nonbusiness bad debt write-off, claiming that the discharged debt automatically rendered it worthless. The IRS disagreed and disallowed the deduction.The taxpayer challenged the IRS's decision in the United States Tax Court. The Tax Court found that the taxpayer had not established that the debts were worthless in 2010 and could not be deducted under 26 U.S.C. § 166. The court also found that the taxpayer had not proven the insolvency of the entities involved, which would have allowed the COD income to flow through to him. As a result, the Tax Court determined income tax deficiencies of over $5 million for the taxpayer.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Tax Court did not err in requiring the taxpayer to prove the worthlessness of his discharged debts and in declining to presume worthlessness because COD income arose from that discharge. The Ninth Circuit agreed with the Tax Court's interpretation of the relevant tax statutes and found that the taxpayer had failed to provide sufficient objective evidence to demonstrate the worthlessness of the debts. The court affirmed the Tax Court's decision, resulting in the taxpayer's appeal being denied. View "Kelly v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

Michael Hogan, a death row inmate in Nevada, appealed the denial of his habeas corpus petition. Hogan challenged the district court's denial of relief on two certified issues and sought to expand the certificate of appealability (COA) on five additional issues. The case predates the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.Hogan's first certified claim alleged ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) for failing to investigate his 1971 Iowa manslaughter conviction, which was used as an aggravating factor in his Nevada penalty proceeding. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, finding that Hogan's trial counsel made a reasonable strategic decision to challenge the Iowa conviction in Nevada rather than in Iowa. The court also found that Hogan could not demonstrate prejudice from his counsel's failure to challenge the Iowa conviction as a crime of violence under Nevada law.Hogan's second certified claim argued that the procedural default of his trial-court IAC claims should be excused under Martinez v. Ryan. The Ninth Circuit disagreed with the district court's reasons for concluding that Hogan failed to establish "cause" under Martinez. The court held that Martinez applies to procedural defaults based on state timeliness rules and that Hogan's failure to raise the trial IAC claims in his second petition did not preclude Martinez relief. The court remanded Claims 2(A)-(G) and (I)-(O) to the district court for further proceedings.The Ninth Circuit granted Hogan's motion to expand the COA to include whether the district court erred in dismissing his challenges to the aggravating circumstances (Claims 5(A) and (B)) as procedurally defaulted. The court held that these claims were properly exhausted and that Nevada's procedural rules were not consistently applied as of 1990, allowing federal review of the merits. The court affirmed the district court's judgment on the merits of these claims.The Ninth Circuit declined to expand the COA to cover four other issues, including Hogan's Confrontation Clause claim, jury instructional errors, lethal injection claim, and cumulative errors claim. The court affirmed the district court's judgment on these issues. View "Hogan v. Bean" on Justia Law

Two yoga teachers, Steven Hubbard and Amy Baack, challenged the City of San Diego's ordinance prohibiting teaching yoga to four or more persons at the City’s shoreline parks or beaches. They argued that this prohibition violated their First Amendment rights. The ordinance defined teaching yoga as a non-expressive activity and prohibited it without the City’s permission, even if offered for free. Hubbard and Baack, who offered free yoga classes in these parks, were stopped by City park rangers and issued infraction tickets for violating the ordinance.The United States District Court for the Southern District of California denied their motion for a preliminary injunction. The court found that teaching yoga was not protected speech under the First Amendment and that the City’s prohibition was a valid time, place, and manner restriction. The court also concluded that issuing an injunction was not in the public interest, as the City had not banned yoga entirely but had restricted it to non-shoreline parks.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that teaching yoga is protected speech under the First Amendment because it involves communicating and disseminating information about yoga’s philosophy and practice. The court found that the City’s ordinance was content-based, as it specifically targeted yoga, and thus failed strict scrutiny. The City did not demonstrate a compelling interest or narrow tailoring to justify the prohibition. The court concluded that Hubbard and Baack were likely to succeed on the merits of their as-applied First Amendment claim, would suffer irreparable harm without an injunction, and that the balance of equities and public interest favored granting the injunction. The case was remanded with instructions to enter a preliminary injunction in favor of Hubbard and Baack. View "HUBBARD V. CITY OF SAN DIEGO" on Justia Law

Antoine Johnson was convicted of conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, Hobbs Act robbery, and the use and discharge of a firearm causing death during a crime of violence. The charges stemmed from the robbery of an armored truck in which a guard was fatally shot. Johnson argued that his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) was unlawful because intervening Supreme Court case law invalidated § 924(c)’s residual clause, and thus, the jury must have based his conviction on invalid crime-of-violence predicates.The United States District Court for the Central District of California denied Johnson’s motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The district court held that Johnson’s § 924(c) conviction was based on at least one valid predicate pursuant to the elements clause: Hobbs Act robbery. The court also ruled that any error in the jury instructions was harmless because no reasonable juror could have found Johnson guilty of § 924(c) based solely on his participation in the conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery and not the commission of the robbery itself.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling on two alternative grounds. First, the Ninth Circuit held that there was no error in the jury instructions because the district court correctly instructed the jury that it could rely on either of two valid predicate crimes of violence: the direct commission of Hobbs Act robbery or Hobbs Act robbery under a Pinkerton theory of liability. Second, the Ninth Circuit concluded that even if the trial court had instructed the jury that it could rely on one invalid predicate in addition to the valid theories of Hobbs Act robbery, the error would have been harmless on the facts of this case. View "JOHNSON V. USA" on Justia Law

Petitioners Joshua Davis and N.A. were victims of a cryptocurrency theft and extortion scheme. The defendants impersonated Davis to gain control of his cellphone number, hacked his email accounts, and stole both Davis's and N.A.'s Ether. Davis reported the crime to the FBI and filed a petition for remission, while N.A. also reported the theft and filed similar petitions. The government, however, failed to properly calculate the restitution amounts, leading to the district court ordering restitution that significantly understated the value of the stolen Ether.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California sentenced the defendants and ordered restitution of $43,000 to Davis and $40,000 to N.A., based on the government's incorrect calculations. Petitioners later discovered the errors and filed motions to reopen the restitution orders, arguing that the correct value of their stolen Ether was much higher. The district court acknowledged the government's mistakes but denied the motions, concluding that Petitioners did not "discover further losses subsequent to sentencing" under 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(5).The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and granted the petitions for writs of mandamus. The court held that Petitioners were entitled to seek mandamus relief under the Crime Victims' Rights Act (CVRA), 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3), and that the limitations on motions to reopen a sentence set forth in § 3771(d)(5) do not apply to petitions to reopen restitution brought under § 3664(d)(5). The court concluded that the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA), 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(5), allows crime victims to petition to reopen restitution when they "subsequently discover" that a district court's restitution order failed to include recoverable losses. The case was remanded to the district court to consider whether Petitioners met the additional good cause and timing requirements set forth in the MVRA. View "A. V. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA" on Justia Law