Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order quashing the IRS's subpoena to the California Supreme Court that sought documents in connection with a tax audit. The panel held that "reasonable notice in advance" means notice reasonably calculated, under all the relevant circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the possibility that the IRS may contact third parties, and that affords interested parties a meaningful opportunity to resolve issues and volunteer information before third-party contacts are made. Reviewing the totality of the circumstances in this case, the panel held that Publication 1 did not provide taxpayers with the requisite reasonable advance notice. The panel explained that a reasonable notice must provide the taxpayer with a meaningful opportunity to volunteer records on his own, so that third-party contacts may be avoided if the taxpayer complies with the IRS's demand. View "J.B. v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Washington State childcare provider, filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action alleging that Washington's authorization for the Service Employees International Union Local 925 (SEIU) to act as the exclusive collective bargaining representative for Washington's publicly subsidized childcare providers violated plaintiff's First Amendment rights.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the state, holding that the SEIU's authorized position as the childcare providers' exclusive representative is constitutionally permissible. The court held that Minnesota State Board for Community Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271 (1984), was the most appropriate guide in this case. Even if the panel assumed that Knight was not applicable, the panel would reach the same result. View "Miller v. Inslee" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court in this dispute between two insurance companies that arose after the settlement of certain claims brought against their insureds, holding that Cal. Gov’t Code 825.4 did not preclude Westport Insurance Corporation’s lawsuit against California Casualty Management Company and that the district court did not err in its judgment on all the remaining issues raised on appeal.This diversity insurance coverage action concerned claims for $15.8 million brought by three former students against a school district and three of its school administrators. Westport defended and settled the claims for $15.8 million and sought repayment from California Casualty, the administrators’ insurer. The district court found California Casualty liable for $2.6 million plus prejudgment interest. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding (1) section 825.4 did not preclude Westport’s claim; (2) California Casualty’s claim that it was not obligated to contribute to the settlements under its policy was contrary to the plain test of its policy; (3) California Casualty’s challenge to the apportionment of liability with Westport was unavailing; and (4) the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding prejudgment interest at ten percent from the dates Westport paid the settlements. View "Westport Insurance Corp. v. California Casualty Management Co." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision upholding a final order of removal. At issue was whether the BIA permissibly interpreted the phrase "single scheme of criminal misconduct" under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii). In Matter of Adetiba, 20 I. & N. Dec. 506 (BIA 1992), the BIA affirmed its longstanding interpretation of "single scheme of criminal misconduct" under section 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii): "when an alien has performed an act, which, in and of itself, constitutes a complete, individual, and distinct crime, he is deportable when he again commits such an act, even though one may closely follow the other, be similar in character, and even be part of an overall plan of criminal misconduct."The panel upheld the BIA's interpretation under the principles of Chevron deference and held that the BIA properly applied this interpretation here, and that this application was not impermissibly retroactive. The panel explained that, because the phrase in question operates as an exception to a ground for deportation, the BIA's narrower definition of the exception serves to broaden the application of the removal provision, making petitioner subject to removal when he might not have been under the panel's previous definition. The panel also upheld the BIA's denial of discretionary relief, acknowledging the limitations on judicial review of discretionary decisions. View "Szonyi v. Whitaker" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for DHS in an action challenging DHS's authority to expedite construction of border barriers near San Diego and Calexico, California. On January 25, 2017, President Trump issued Executive Order 13,767, directing federal agencies to deploy all lawful means to secure the Nation's southern border. A focal point of the directive was to immediately construct a physical wall.As a threshold matter, the panel held that it had jurisdiction to consider the "predicate legal question" of whether the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) authorizes the contested projects. On the merits, the panel held that IIRIRA section 102(a)'s broad grant of authority, which was not limited by section 102(b), authorized the construction projects. The panel affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to DHS, holding that the projects were statutorily authorized and therefore not ultra vires. The panel also held that DHS has waived the environmental laws California and environmental groups sought to enforce. Furthermore, the panel lacked jurisdiction to consider any argument challenging the Secretary of DHS's August and September 2017 waivers of applicable environmental laws. View "Center for Biological Diversity v. Department of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's forfeiture order in an action where defendant pleaded guilty to one count of attempting to export ammunition from the United States and one count of conspiracy to export firearms and ammunition. The panel held that the district court did not err in ordering forfeiture because 18 U.S.C. 924(d)(1) authorizes forfeiture of firearms and ammunition involved in a federal crime. The panel also held that the district court did not err in ordering the forfeiture of substitute property. Finally, defendant's challenge to the adequacy of the notice of forfeiture in the indictment was not reviewable, but even if it were, the notice was adequate. View "United States v. Soto" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255 in light of Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). Defendant argued that Johnson established that he was ineligible for a sentencing enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act; and, but for alleged misinformation that he was eligible for such an enhancement, he might not have entered a plea agreement.The panel rejected defendant's argument and held that he failed to show that the alleged misinformation about his ACCA eligibility was "demonstrably made the basis for the sentence." In this case, the record established that defendant's potential eligibility for an ACCA enhancement was not before the sentencing court, and defendant's personal concerns and motivation for entering into the plea agreement did not suffice to establish that the district court made an error of constitutional magnitude. View "United States v. Hill" on Justia Law

Three small employers in Montana filed suit against health insurance companies, alleging claims under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), as well as state law claims based on defendants' representations. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' ERISA claims and held that plaintiffs failed to state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty under 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(2) where defendants did not exercise control over plan assets when charging or spending the allegedly excessive premiums.However, the panel reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' state law claims and held that ERISA did not expressly preempt state-law claims against an insurer that did not bear on an ERISA-regulated relationship. Furthermore, the state law claims were not barred by conflict preemption. The panel reversed the district court's dismissal with prejudice of the state-law claims so that plaintiffs may amend their complaint to state the fraud allegations with greater particularity. View "The Depot, Inc. v. Caring for Mountanans, Inc." on Justia Law

The common-law agency test is the most appropriate test for determining whether an entity is a joint employer under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The EEOC brought an enforcement action under Title VII on behalf of Thai workers alleging discrimination charges against Green Acre Farms and Valley Fruit Orchards. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of the EEOC's allegations regarding non-orchard-related matters, which in turn affected each of the other decisions under review.The panel held, under the common-law agency test, that the EEOC plausibly alleged that defendants were also joint employers with respect to non-orchard-related matters; the EEOC's allegations stated a plausible basis for holding Green Acre liable for discrimination relating to non-orchard-related matters; and the district court should have granted the EEOC leave to amend its complaint regarding Valley Fruit's liability with respect to such matters. View "EEOC v. Global Horizons, Inc." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review of a final order of removal following the dismissal of petitioner's appeal by the BIA. Petitioner was convicted of communication with a minor for immoral purposes in violation of Revised Code of Washington 9.68A.090, and an IJ found that petitioner's conviction constituted a crime involving moral turpitude committed within five years of admission to the United States. Therefore, petitioner was removeable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(i).The panel held that, in assessing the constitutional status of the phrase "crime involving moral turpitude," it was bound by the Supreme Court's decision in Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223 (1951), which held that the phrase was not unconstitutionally vague. The panel also held that the Supreme Court's more recent decisions in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), and Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018), did not reopen inquiry into the constitutionality of the phrase. Furthermore, petitioner's alternate claim that communicating with a minor for immoral purposes was not a crime of moral turpitude was foreclosed by the panel's decision in Morales v. Gonzales, 478 F.3d 972 (9th Cir. 2007). View "Islas-Veloz v. Whitaker" on Justia Law