Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The en banc court reversed the district court, vacated the award of attorneys' fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), and remanded with instructions to recalculate the attorney fees for the civil rights law firm that represented plaintiff.The en banc court clarified that when a district court awards complete relief on one claim, rendering it unnecessary to reach alternative claims, the alternative claims cannot be deemed unsuccessful for the purpose of calculating a fee award. The en banc court rejected the post hoc "mutual exclusivity" approach to determining whether "unsuccessful" claims are related to succesful claims and reaffirmed that Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983), sets forth the correct standard of "relatedness" for claims under the EAJA. The en banc court reaffirmed that in evaluating whether the government's position is substantially justified, the court looks at whether the government's and the underlying agency's positions were justified as a whole and not at each stage. View "Ibrahim v. DHS" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the state in an action brought by LL Liquor, claiming that Montana's Senate Bill 193 impaired the company's contract to purchase liquor with the Montana Department of Revenue, in violation of the Contracts Clause. Montana's Senate Bill 193 restructured the formula for calculating the rate at which state-approved agency franchise stores could purchase liquor from the state.The panel held that Montana's Senate Bill 193, which applied a uniform commission structure to all franchise stores in the state, did not give rise to a Contracts Clause claim by LL Liquor against the state. In this case, the state did not impair its contractual obligation within the meaning of the Contracts Clause because it did not eliminate LL Liquor's remedy for breach of its contract with the state. View "LL Liquor, Inc. v. Montana" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit certified the following question to the Oregon Supreme Court: Under Oregon law, does a constructive trust arise at the moment of purchase of a property using fraudulently-obtained funds, or does it arise when a court orders that a constructive trust be imposed as a remedy? View "Wadsworth v. Talmage" on Justia Law

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(a) governs how to calculate the Federal Arbitration Act's three-month filing deadline. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a petition to vacate an arbitral award because the petition was filed one day late. The panel clarified how to perform the Rule 6(a) calculation and held that the petition to vacate was untimely. View "Stevens v. Jiffy Lube International" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit filed 1) an order granting a petition for panel rehearing, amending the opinion filed on September 14, 2017, which was previously withdrawn, and denying a petition for rehearing en banc; and 2) an amended opinion denying a petition for review of the BIA's decision.In the amended opinion, the panel held that petitioner's conviction for class one misdemeanor domestic violence assault under Arizona Revised Statutes 13-1203 and 13-3601 was a crime of domestic violence under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(E) that rendered him removable. The panel held that the statute was divisible and, under the modified categorical approach, there was a sufficient factual basis to support that petitioner intentionally or knowingly caused any physical injury to another person. Furthermore, the domestic relationships enumerated under Arizona's domestic violence provision, Arizona Revised Statutes 3-3601(A), were coextensive with the domestic relationships described in section 1227(a)(2)(E)(i). Therefore, petitioner's misdemeanor domestic violence conviction was a crime of domestic violence under section 1227(a)(2)(E), and he was removeable. View "Cornejo-Villagrana v. Whitaker" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of a shareholder derivative suit on behalf of the Walt Disney Company, holding that plaintiff failed to satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1's demand futility requirement. In this case, plaintiff alleged that Disney and its board of directors and several corporate officers participated in a conspiracy to enact illegal anticompetitive agreements between Disney and other animation studios.The panel held that the allegations in plaintiff's amended complaint did not constitute particularized facts demonstrating demand futility. The panel explained that, whether the board's misconduct is characterized as conscious inaction or active connivance, plaintiff needed to demonstrate that a majority of the director defendants knew of the conspiracy, and he failed to do so. View "Towers v. Iger" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for sellers of two Ginkgold nutritional supplements in a consumer class action that alleged false advertising claims under California law. The panel clarified that claims under California's Unfair Competition Law (UCL) and Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA) are to be analyzed in the same manner as any other claim, and the usual summary judgment rules apply.The panel held that plaintiff had the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that a challenged advertisement is false or misleading under the UCL and CLRA. Furthermore, plaintiff need only produce evidence of a genuine dispute of material fact that could satisfy the preponderance of the evidence burden at trial. In this case, plaintiff met her burden by producing expert testimony and other scientific data that the nutritional supplement had no more of an effect on mental sharpness, memory, or concentration than a placebo. The panel held that the district court erred by requiring plaintiff to do more and by elevating the burden of proof well beyond what is usually required to defeat summary judgment. The panel remanded for further proceedings. View "Sonner v. Schwabe North America" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's forfeiture order against defendant after she had pleaded guilty to attempted smuggling of ammunition from the United States into Mexico. Although the ammunition was subject to forfeiture, defendant had caused it to be transferred to a third party. The panel held that the district court properly ordered forfeiture of substitute property under 28 U.S.C. 2461(c) and 21 U.S.C. 853(p). In this case, defendant's acts and omissions caused the ammunition to be transferred to a third party and the forfeiture of $1,235 in the form of a money judgment was proper. View "United States v. Valdez" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state civil rights law, contending that the impoundment of their vehicles by local authorities based on plaintiffs' lack of a driver's license violated the Fourth Amendment. California Vehicle Code 4602.6(a)(1) provides that a peace officer may impound a vehicle for 30 days if the vehicle’s driver has never been issued a driver's license.Applying Brewster v. Beck, 859 F.3d 1194, 1196–97 (9th Cir. 2017), the panel held that 30-day impounds under section 14602.6 are seizures for Fourth Amendment purposes. Therefore, the only issue in this case was whether the impounds were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The panel held that, although the state's interest in keeping unlicensed drivers off the road is governed by the community caretaking exception of the Fourth Amendment, the exception does not categorically permit government officials to impound private property simply because state law does. Furthermore, even if the panel were to balance the state's interest against the driver's interests, the County would still be wrong to rely on a deterrence or administrative penalty rationale to support California's interests. Therefore, the panel affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for plaintiffs on the Fourth Amendment claims.The panel affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on plaintiffs claim that the County and the City were liable for money damages as final policymakers who caused the constitutional violations; affirmed the denial of class certification for lack of commonality and typicality; and affirmed summary judgment for defendants on the California Bane Act claim. View "Sandoval v. County of Sonoma" on Justia Law

Sierra Club filed suit under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), seeking records generated during the EPA's rule-making process concerning cooling water intake structures. The panel affirmed in part the district court's summary judgment order requiring the production of certain documents, holding that the December 2013 draft jeopardy biological opinions and related documents, as well as the March 2014 reasonable and prudent alternative (RPA), were not both predecisional and deliberative.However, the panel reversed in part and held that there was sufficient support to conclude that the December 2013 RPAs and the April 2014 draft jeopardy opinion were pre-decisional and deliberative. Therefore, these records were exempt under FOIA Exemption 5. The panel remanded for a segregability analysis. View "Sierra Club v. United States Fish and Wildlife Service" on Justia Law