Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, current and former Uber drivers, filed putative class actions alleging that Uber violated various federal and state statutes by, among other things, misclassifying drivers as independent contractors rather than employees. The Ninth Circuit previously considered and reversed the district court's orders denying Uber's motions to compel arbitration in Mohamed v. Uber Technologies, Inc., 848 F.3d 1201, 1206 (9th Cir. 2016).In this case, the panel rejected plaintiffs' additional arguments as to why the arbitration agreements were unenforceable. Because the class certification by the district court was premised on the district court's determination that the arbitration agreements were unenforceable, the panel reversed class certification. The panel also held that the Rule 23(d) orders were based on the district court’s denial of the motions to compel arbitration and its granting of class certification. Because these decisions must be reversed, there was no longer a basis for the district court's restrictions on Uber's communication with class and putative class members. Therefore, these orders were moot and the panel reversed. View "O'Connor v. Uber" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's judgment in favor of the Government in his tax refund action. Plaintiff argued that the net income for the subchapter S corporation, of which he was the sole shareholder, was substantially overstated on the corporation's tax return by the bankruptcy trustee who filed the return, resulting in personal income tax payments by plaintiff that were substantially more than he actually owed.The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment and held that the filings by plaintiff satisfied the requirement for a "statement identifying the inconsistency" pursuant to 26 U.S.C. 6037(c)(2)(A)(ii). In this case, the filings sufficiently identified the inconsistencies between plaintiff's tax returns and those of the S corporation. The panel affirmed as to plaintiff's abandoned appeal of his refund claim for tax year 2001 and remanded for further proceedings. View "Rubin v. United States" on Justia Law

Language in a 1993 appropriations act does not require the Corps to continue to use a 1987 guidance manual for delineating wetlands under the Clean Water Act. In an action seeking to set aside the Corps' decision for an excavation permit in Alaska, the Ninth Circuit held that the 1993 Budget Act prohibited the Corps from using the 1987 Manual during fiscal year 1993, and Congress included a second paragraph to explain what it expected the Corps to do instead. Accordingly, the panel affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the Corps. View "Tin Cup, LLC v. US Army Corps of Engineers" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's action alleging that the FBI violated his substantive and procedural due process rights by placing and maintaining him on the No Fly List. While plaintiff's action was pending, defendants removed plaintiff from the list and the district court held that his due process claims were moot.The panel held, however, that the voluntary cessation doctrine applied here and precluded a finding of mootness. In this case, plaintiff's removal from the list was more likely an exercise of discretion than a decision arising from a broad change in agency policy or procedure. Furthermore, the government has not assured plaintiff that he would not be banned from flying for the same reasons that prompted the government to add him to the list in the first place, nor has it verified the implementation of procedural safeguards conditioning its ability to revise plaintiff's status on the receipt of new information. Finally, plaintiff's removal from the list did not completely and irrevocably eradicate the effects of the alleged violations. View "Fikre v. FBI" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit challenging a California statute, Cal. Lab. Code 1720.9, that amended the prevailing wage laws to ensure that delivery drivers of ready-mix concrete are paid a minimum wage. The district court denied IBT's motion to intervene and granted the State's motion to dismiss the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA) claim. The district court granted plaintiffs summary judgment on the equal protection claim.The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for plaintiffs and held that the district court wrongly disregarded as irrelevant certain differences between ready-mix drivers and other drivers that the legislature could have relied on in extending the prevailing wage law. The panel reversed the district court's denial of IBT's motion for leave to intervene and held that IBT had a significantly protectable interest in the case. Finally, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the FAAAA claim, holding that the prevailing wage law was not related to prices, routes, and services within the meaning of the FAAAA's preemption clause. View "Allied Concrete and Supply Co. v. Baker" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment to Crunch Fitness on plaintiff's claim that three text messages he received from Crunch violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA). The panel held, in light of the DC Circuit's recent opinion in ACA International v. Federal Communications Commission, 885 F.3d 687 (D.C. Cir. 2018), and based on the panel's own review of the TCPA, that the statutory definition of automatic text messaging system includes a device that stores telephone numbers (ATDS) to be called, whether or not those numbers have been generated by a random or sequential number generator. Because the district court did not have the benefit of ACA International or the panel's construction of the definition of ATDS, the panel vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Marks v. Crunch San Diego, LLC" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit granted a petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's denial of petitioner's motion to suppress evidence. In this case, petitioner was on a fishing trip with friends when his boat lost power. When Coast Guard officers arrived to tow the boat, they detained petitioner and subsequently placed him in removal proceedings.The panel held that petitioner made a prima facie showing that the Coast Guard officers who detained him violated 8 C.F.R. 287.8(b)(2), which requires that an immigration officer have reasonable suspicion, based on specific articulable facts that a person is, or is attempting to be, engaged in an offense against the United States, or is an alien illegally in the United States, in order for the immigration officer to briefly detain the person for questioning. In this case petitioner was detained solely on the basis of his race and his detention was contrary to the requirements of section 287.8(b)(2). Furthermore, the violation alleged by petitioner was egregious both for its grotesque nature and its patent unlawfulness. View "Sanchez v. Sessions" on Justia Law

A defendant who travels to Nevada and commits an intentional tort there can be sued in that state, absent circumstances that would make such a suit unreasonable. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of an action alleging that John Schmidt made defamatory statements about Freestream Aircraft (Bermuda) Limited at an aviation industry conference in Nevada. The panel held, under the minimum contacts test and the applicable authority, that there was specific jurisdiction in Nevada. In this case, Nevada's exercise of personal jurisdiction over defendants comported with constitutional due process because all three prongs of the minimum contacts test for specific jurisdiction were satisfied. View "Freestream Aircraft (Bermuda) Ltd. v. Aero Law Group" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendants' motion to suppress incriminating statements intercepted by government wiretaps. The panel held that the affidavits submitted by the FBI in support of the wiretap authorization were reasonably detailed, and did not contain a material misstatement or omission. Furthermore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the wiretaps were necessary. In this case, it was not illogical or implausible to conclude that the possibility of using a high-level confidential informant was unlikely to result in the successful prosecution of every member of the conspiracy. View "United States v. Estrada" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit certified the following questions to the Oregon Supreme Court: 1. Is Oregon first-degree robbery, Or. Rev. Stat. 164.415, divisible? 2. Is Oregon second-degree robbery, id. 164.405, divisible? 3. Put another way, is jury unanimity (or concurrence) required as to a particular theory chosen from the listed subparagraphs of each statute? View "United States v. Lawrence" on Justia Law