Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Under the ADA Amendments Act (ADAAA), the scope of the ADA's "regarded-as" definition of disability was expanded. The plaintiff must show, under the ADAAA, that he has been subjected to a prohibited action because of an actual or perceived physical or mental impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity.In this case, plaintiff filed suit against HIE, alleging disability discrimination under the ADA and state law claiming that HIE terminated him because of his shoulder injury. The Ninth Circuit held that plaintiff established a genuine issue of material fact as to whether his employer regarded him as having a disability. The panel held that the district court erred in concluding, as a matter of law, that plaintiff was not regarded-as disabled. Furthermore, the district court erred in concluding that plaintiff did not meet the "physical" definition of disability under the ADA. View "Nunies v. HIE Holdings" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit certified the following question to the Washington Supreme Court: Under what circumstances, if any, does obesity qualify as an "impairment" under the Washington Law against Discrimination, Wash. Rev. Code 49.60.040? View "Taylor v. Burlington Northern Railroad Holdings Inc." on Justia Law

The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA) barred a plaintiff class from bringing a covered class action based on state law claims alleging that the defendants made a misrepresentation or omission or employed any manipulative or deceptive device in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security. The panel held, in this case, that SLUSA precluded all of Northstar's claims against Schwab and that the district court correctly dismissed them. However, the panel held that the district court erred in dismissing the claims with prejudice. View "Northstar Financial Advisors v. Schwab Investments" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment for plaintiffs in an action under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). This case involved Teck Metals' liability for dumping several million tons of industrial waste into the Columbia River.Determining that it had jurisdiction, the panel held that the district court properly awarded the Colville Tribes all investigation expenses as costs of removal, even though many of these activities played double duty supporting both cleanup and litigation efforts; the district court properly awarded the Colville Tribes their attorney's fees, and the panel did not disturb the finding that approximately $4.86 million was a reasonable award in this case; and Teck did not make a sufficient showing to establish that liability for environmental harm to the Site was theoretically capable of apportionment. View "Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision affirming the bankruptcy court's summary judgment denying discharge of two individual Chapter 11 debtors' debt arising from a state-court judgment for fraud and misrepresentation. The panel held that the Chapter 11 plan provided for the liquidation of all or substantially all of the property of the bankruptcy estate under 11 U.S.C. 1141(d)(3)(A); debtors did not engage in business after consummation of the Chapter 11 plan, because they were simply employees in businesses owned or operated by others; and, assuming that section 1141(d)(3) does not require that the debtor engage in a pre-petition business, the statute was not satisfied by mere employment in someone else's business after consummation of a Chapter 11 plan. View "Hyun J. Um v. Spokane Rock I, LLC" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review of an IJ's decision affirming an asylum officer's negative reasonable fear determination in reinstatement removal proceedings. Petitioner asserted that he was deprived his due process rights and a fair hearing before the asylum officer, because he was provided a Spanish-language interpreter rather than an interpreter in his native language Chuj. The panel rejected this claim and held that petitioner had indicated he understood "a lot" of Spanish and consented to proceeding in Spanish. Furthermore, petitioner had an opportunity to correct any errors or submit additional evidence on review. The panel also rejected petitioner's due process claims related to his reasonable fear review hearing. However, the panel granted the petition for review of the IJ's decision rejecting for lack of jurisdiction petitioner's motion to reopen reasonable fear proceedings. In this case, the IJ abused its discretion when he failed to recognize that he had at least sua sponte jurisdiction to reopen proceedings. Accordingly, the panel remanded for further proceedings. View "Bartolome v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Washington's accomplice liability statute renders its drug trafficking law broader than generic federal drug trafficking laws under the Armed Career Criminal Act, and thus Washington's drug trafficking law is not categorically a "serious drug offense" under the Act. The Ninth Circuit vacated defendant's sentence for being a felon in possession of a firearm and remanded for resentencing. The panel held that defendant's three convictions under Washington law could not constitute "serious drug offenses," and therefore he was not subject to the Act's fifteen year mandatory minimum sentence. View "United States v. Franklin" on Justia Law

Excessive force under the Eighth Amendment does not require proof that an officer enjoyed or otherwise derived pleasure from his or her use of force. In this case, plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging claims against the Snake River Correctional Institute's officials and corrections officers for, among other things, excessive force and deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendant and remanded for a new trial. The panel held that the district court's instructions that plaintiff had to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his alleged abuser had or derived pleasure from extreme cruelty while beating plaintiff was plainly erroneous. Furthermore, these erroneous instructions prejudiced plaintiff.The panel also vacated the district court's sua sponte grant of summary judgment to defendants on plaintiff's deprivation-of-property claim after determining that plaintiff, who was proceeding pro se at the time, failed to receive sufficient notice that the claim was at issue on summary judgment. View "Hoard v. Hartman" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decertification of two related collective actions brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) by LAPD officers, alleging a pervasive, unwritten policy discouraging the reporting of overtime. The panel held that the officers can appeal a decertification order when they were dismissed from the collective action before final judgment and without prejudice to their individual FLSA claims. The panel held that opt-in plaintiffs are parties to the collective action, and an order of decertification and dismissal disposes of their statutory right to proceed collectively. Therefore, they have standing to appeal and may do so after the interlocutory decertification order to which they are adverse merges with final judgment.The panel also held that the collective actions in this case were properly decertified and the officers properly dismissed for failure to satisfy the "similarly situated" requirement of the FLSA. The panel's de novo review of the record demonstrated that the officers failed, as a matter of law, to create a triable question of fact regarding the existence of a Department-wide policy or practice. View "Campbell v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's preliminary injunction preventing implementation of California Senate Bill 84, which requires railroads to collect fees from customers shipping certain hazardous materials and then to remit those fees to California. The district court held that the railroads were likely to succeed on the merits of their claims. The panel agreed and held that SB 84 was preempted under the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act because it had a direct effect on rail transportation, and it was not protected from preemption by the Hazardous Materials Transportation Uniform Safety Act because the fees authorized by SB 84 were not "fair." The panel also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in evaluating irreparable harm, the balance of the equities, and the public interest. View "BNSF Railway Co. v. California Department of Tax and Fee Administration" on Justia Law