Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of a wage-and-hour action brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) based on res judicata grounds. In this case, plaintiff conceded that she was subject to a state class-action settlement that released all claims arising from the allegations on which her FLSA action was predicated. The panel applied California law and held that the FLSA action was not excepted from the ordinary operation of res judicata because the decision in the prior proceeding was final and on the merits, the present proceeding was on the same cause of action as the prior proceeding, and the parties in the present proceeding were parties to the prior proceeding. View "Rangel v. PLS Check Cashiers of California, Inc." on Justia Law

Washington public school teachers filed a class action to order the Director of DRS to return interest that was allegedly skimmed from their state-managed retirement accounts. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of a stipulated motion to certify a class and dismissal of the action as prudentially unripe. The panel held that the district court erred in dismissing the teachers' takings claim as prudentially unripe because DRS's withholding of the interest accrued on the teachers' accounts constitutes a per se taking to which the prudential ripeness test in Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985), did not apply.In regard to the Director's alternative grounds for summary judgment, the panel held that plaintiffs stated a takings claim for daily interest withheld by the Director; the panel clarified that the core property right recognized in Schneider v. California Department of Corrections, 151 F.3d 1194 (9th Cir. 1988), covered interest earned daily, even if payable less frequently; plaintiffs' takings claim was not barred by issue preclusion or by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine; and the takings claim was not foreclosed by the Eleventh Amendment. The panel also held that the district court erred in denying the motion for class certification. Accordingly, the panel remanded for further proceedings. View "Fowler v. Guerin" on Justia Law

Section 511(a) of the Veterans' Judicial Review Act barred the Community's action against the VA for failing to reimburse the Community for the care it provided to veterans at tribal facilities. In this case, the Community sought review of the VA's determination that two provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act did not require the VA to reimburse the Community absent a sharing agreement. The panel held that such a determination fell under the jurisdictional bar of section 511(a) because it was plainly a question of law that affected the provision of benefits by the Secretary of the VA to veterans, and the relief requested could clearly affect the provision of benefits. The panel also held that the presumption in Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985), did not apply to section 511(a). Finally, the Community's argument that the district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1362 was waived. View "Gila River Indian Community v. US Department of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law

The Director General of a Mexican government-owned corporation, Exportadora de Sal (ESSA), entered into a long-term, multimillion dollar contract with another Mexican corporation, Packsys, to sell the briny residue from its salt production process. Because the Director General did not have actual authority to execute the contract, ESSA invoked sovereign immunity when a suit was filed in the United States.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Packsys's suit based on lack of jurisdiction. The panel declined to create a new rule that would extend the commercial activity exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) to embrace activities of a foreign agent having only apparent authority to engage in them. The panel also did not accept that principles of ratification or waiver improved Packsys's position. Therefore, ESSA properly invoked sovereign immunity under the FSIA. View "Packsys v. Exportadora de Sal" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of an antitrust case based on the act of state doctrine. Plaintiffs alleged an antitrust conspiracy between a Mexican salt production corporation 51 percent owned by the government of Mexico and a Japanese entity that held the remaining ownership interest. The panel held that this case was fundamentally a challenge to the United Mexican States' determination about the exploitation of its own natural resources, made by a corporation owned and controlled by the Mexican government. The panel noted that this decision was not a license for courts to dismiss cases on act of state grounds whenever a foreign state-owned enterprise was involved. Rather, the panel held merely that on the facts of this case, application of the act of state doctrine was appropriate to preclude its consideration of the action. View "Sea Breeze Salt, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a petition for habeas relief challenging a sentencing enhancement for a prior nonjury juvenile conviction and for a gang-related crime. Petitioner argued that the evidence supporting the gang enhancement was constitutionally insufficient under Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), and that the enhancement for his nonjury juvenile conviction violated Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).The panel held that it was objectively unreasonable to conclude that the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find the robbery was committed "in association with" a gang; but it was not objectively unreasonable to conclude that the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find the robbery was committed "for the benefit of" a gang. The panel also held that the juvenile conviction claim was procedurally barred, and the sentencing enhancements based on nonjury juvenile convictions did not violate any clearly established federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court. View "Johnson v. Montgomery" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the parties disputed the maximum term of official detention that can be imposed upon revocation of juvenile delinquent supervision when the juvenile is more than 21 years old at the time of the revocation proceeding. Defendant argued that the duration of previously ordered terms of official detention is always subtracted from the maximum term prescribed by 18 U.S.C. 5037(c)(2).The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's imposition of the 34 month term of official detention following revocation of defendant's juvenile delinquent supervision. The panel held that the text and structure of section 5037(d)(5), its legislative history, and the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act's motivating purpose supported defendant's construction of section 5037(d)(5). In this case, defendant was entitled to credit for "any term of official detention previously ordered," and thus the maximum term of official detention that could have been imposed upon revocation of his juvenile delinquent supervision was 14 months. View "United States v. Juvenile Male" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit certified the following question of state law to the Supreme Court of Washington: Is party A (here the Port of Bellingham) liable as a premises owner for an injury that occurs on part of a leased property used exclusively by party B (here the Alaska Marine Highway System – the "Ferry") at the time of the injury, where the lease has transferred only priority usage, defined as a superior but not exclusive right to use that part of the property, to party B, but reserves the rights of party A to allow third-party use that does not interfere with party B's priority use of that part of the property, and where party A had responsibility for maintenance and repair of that part of the property? View "Adamson v. Port of Bellingham" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit for violation of their First Amendment rights, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief, after they took photographs of activities at U.S. ports of entry on the United States–Mexico border, they were both stopped and searched by officers of the CBP, and their photos were destroyed. The district court dismissed plaintiffs' claims.The Ninth Circuit held that the district court erred by applying the law of the case doctrine on a motion to dismiss an amended complaint. On the merits, the panel held that the First Amendment protected the right to photograph and record matters of public interest, and whether a place was "public" depended on the nature of the location; the district court's holding that the CBP policies were the least restrictive means of serving a compelling government interest were conclusory and insufficient; and it was the government's burden to prove that the specific restrictions were the least restrictive means available. The panel held that plaintiffs have adequately pleaded their claims and that further factual development was required before the district court could determine what restrictions, if any, the government may impose in these public, outdoors areas where the photos were taken. View "Askins v. USDHS" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's order declining to extend a Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), remedy to an immigrant pursuing lawful permanent resident status. In this case, an ICE Assistant Chief Counsel representing the government intentionally forged and submitted an ostensible government document in an immigration proceeding, which had the effect of barring plaintiff from obtaining lawful permanent resident status, a form of relief to which he was otherwise lawfully entitled. The panel held that a Bivens remedy was available on these narrow and egregious facts because none of the special factors outlined in Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1857 (2017), and other Supreme Court precedent applied. The panel also held that the ICE Assistant Chief Counsel was not entitled to qualified immunity because qualified immunity could not shield an officer from suit when he intentionally submits a forged document in an immigration proceeding in clear violation of 8 U.S.C. 1357(b). View "Lanuza v. Love" on Justia Law