Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Hostage Taking Act does not require proof of a nexus to international terrorism. The Ninth Circuit affirmed Defendant Mikhel and Kadamovas's convictions and death sentences for several federal crimes, including multiple counts of hostage taking resulting in death under the Hostage Taking Act. Defendants raised numerous issues on appeal. The panel held that the Act was a valid exercise of Congress's power under the Necessary and Proper Clause together with the Treaty Power, and rejected defendants' Tenth Amendment challenge; defendants' motion for recusal of the district judge was untimely and failed on the merits; defendants' Batson challenge failed because defendants did not meet their burden of demonstrating race was a substantial motivating factor; the district court did not err by empaneling an anonymous jury; defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a public trial was not violated; there was no error in the jury instruction; and the panel rejected defendants' remaining guilt phase claims. Furthermore, the panel rejected defendant's penalty phase claims and held that the district court either did not err or any error was harmless. View "United States v. Mikhel" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit granted a petition for review of the BIA's holding that 8 U.S.C. 1231(a)(5) deprived the immigration court of jurisdiction to resolve petitioner's motion to reopen. 8 U.S.C. 1229a(b)(5) authorizes immigration judges to order non-citizens removed from the country in absentia. 8 U.S.C. 1231(a)(5) applies to non-citizens who (1) are ordered removed, (2) leave the United States while under the order of removal, and (3) reenter the country illegally. Determining that it had jurisdiction over the petition, the panel held that section 1231(a)(5) does not bar immigration judges from entertaining a motion to reopen an in absentia removal order under section 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii). The panel also held that an individual placed in reinstatement proceedings under section 1231(a)(5) cannot as a general rule challenge the validity of the prior removal order in the reinstatement proceeding itself, she retains the right, conferred by section 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii), to seek rescission of a removal order entered in absentia, based on lack of notice, by filing a motion to reopen "at any time." Therefore, the panel remanded so that the agency could decide petitioner's motion to reopen on the merits. View "Miller v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied petitioner's application for leave to file a second or successive habeas petition with the district court. The panel held that petitioner's Brady v. Maryland claim was subject to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act's (AEDPA) second or successive gatekeeping requirements because the factual predicate supporting a Brady claim existed at the time of the first habeas petition. The panel applied AEDPA's second or successive bar to petitioner's Brady claim and held that he has failed to make the requisite prima facie showing of actual innocence. View "Brown v. Muniz" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's denial of cancellation of removal. The panel held that petitioner's complaints of poor memory, without evidence of an inability to understand the nature and object of the proceedings, were insufficient to show mental incompetency; the standard for mental incompetency as set by the BIA in Matter of M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 474 (BIA 2011), and endorsed by this court in Calderon-Rodriguez v. Sessions, 878 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir. 2018), and Mejia v. Sessions, 868 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2017), was a stringent one; and, in this case, any memory loss petitioner may have experienced did not prejudice his immigration proceedings because his application, not his poor memory, was the basis for the IJ's denial of cancellation of removal. View "Salgado v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied an application for permission to file a second or successive habeas corpus petition in federal district court based on a Brady v. Maryland claim. The panel held that petitioner failed to show that he exercised due diligence in failing to discover the evidence at issue before he filed his habeas petition. Therefore, the application was denied under 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(2)(B)(i). The panel also held that petitioner failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found him guilty had the new evidence been known at trial pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii). View "Solorio, Jr. v. Muniz" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's tort action against the United States for the tragic death of his wife. Plaintiff's wife was a lieutenant in the Navy and she died due to a complication following childbirth. The panel held that plaintiff's medical malpractice claims were barred under the Feres doctrine, which provided governmental immunity from tort claims involving injuries to service members that were incident to military service. View "Daniel v. United States" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed defendant's conviction for conspiracy to import and conspiracy to distribute marijuana. The panel held that, despite the evidence of defendant's presence with two unknown men in a known drug-smuggling corridor close to the Mexican border near what appeared to be a camp for drug trafficking scouts, as well as the seizure of items that were suspicious in this context, there was insufficient evidence for a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant entered into a conspiratorial agreement to import or distribute marijuana. In this case, there was no evidence as to what (if anything) was specifically agreed to, who agreed to it, or what any agreement was intended to accomplish. Furthermore, the panel has long held that drug courier profile evidence such as that admitted here was admissible only for limited purposes. View "United States v. Espinoza-Valdez" on Justia Law

The proper standard for determining which employees have the power to establish an entity's "official policy" under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 34 U.S.C. 12601 is the standard that governs under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the government in an action brought to halt racially discriminatory policing policies concerning traffic stops instituted by Joseph Arpaio, the former Sheriff of Maricopa County, Arizona. The panel held that Arpaio acted as a final policymaker for the County; the County was liable for violations of Title VI and section 12601 stemming from its own official policies; and Arpaio adopted the racially discriminatory traffic-stop policies at issue, he acted as a final policymaker for the County, and the district court correctly held the County liable for the violations of Title VI and section 12601 caused by those policies. The panel also held that the district court properly applied issue preclusion to bar the County from relitigating the lawfulness of Arpaio's traffic-stop policies in light of prior adverse findings in Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2012). View "United States v. County of Maricopa" on Justia Law

The trustee's adversary complaint contesting the basis for debtor's exemptions qualified as an objection to those exemptions under Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 4003. The Ninth Circuit affirmed a bankruptcy court's turnover order denying debtor's claimed exemptions. In this case, before filing a petition in bankruptcy, debtor transferred his interests in two properties into a tenancy-by-the-entirety estate, and subsequently claimed an exemption for those interests under 11 U.S.C. 522(b)(3). The panel rejected debtor's argument that the trustee had failed to make a timely objection to his claimed exemptions, and therefore the exemptions were valid notwithstanding the avoidance of the transfer. View "Lee v. Field" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of class certification in a putative class action alleging employment claims against Corona Medical Center and UHS of Delaware. Plaintiffs moved for certification of seven classes of Registered Nurses, alleging that they were underpaid by Corona. The panel held that the district court's typicality determination was premised on an error of law; Plaintiff Spriggs was not an adequate class representative, but Plaintiff Sali remained as an adequate representative plaintiff; the district court abused its discretion by concluding that attorneys from Bisnar Chase could not serve as adequate class counsel; and the district court erred by denying certification of the proposed rounding-time and wage-statement classes on the basis that they failed Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance requirement. Accordingly, the panel remanded for further proceedings. View "Sali v. Corona Regional Medical Center" on Justia Law