Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

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The Ninth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for sexually abusing a developmentally delayed 11 year old girl. The panel held that the district court properly exercised its discretion in admitting the testimony of a nurse practitioner and a law enforcement officer about statements the victim made to them during interviews conducted shortly after the abuse occurred. The panel also held that defendant's remaining challenge to the propriety of the prosecutor's closing argument did not merit reversal. View "United States v. Kootswatewa" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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The Ninth Circuit affirmed defendants' convictions for charges related to their misuse of funds belonging to the Wounded Marine Careers Foundation (WMCF). Defendants were convicted, among other things, of violating 18 U.S.C. 666, a statute prohibiting the wrongful taking of property from an organization that receives more than $10,000 in federal "benefits" during a one-year period. The panel held that there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could reasonably conclude that WMCF did receive "benefits" within the meaning of the statute. The panel reasoned that an entity need not be the primary beneficiary of a federal program to qualify as having received "benefits," and that the Vocational Rehabilitation and Employment Program aimed to aid veterans and to ensure the viability and quality of the organizations that served those veterans. View "United States v. Paixao" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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The Ninth Circuit certified the following questions of state law to the California Supreme Court: California Probate Code 249.5 provides that, for probate purposes, "a child of the decedent conceived and born after the death of the decedent shall be deemed to have been born in the lifetime of the decedent if the child or his or her representative proves by clear and convincing evidence that," inter alia, "[t]he decedent, in writing, specifies that his or her genetic material shall be used for the posthumous conception of a child of the decedent." Cal. Prob. Code 249.5(a). Does a writing that specifies that some genetic material of the decedent shall be so used satisfy 249.5(a), regardless whether the genetic material specified in the putative writing includes the genetic material actually used to conceive the claimant child? Or must the genetic material identified in the putative writing include the genetic material actually used to conceive the claimant child? View "Delzer v. Berryhill" on Justia Law

Posted in: Trusts & Estates
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The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of an action under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). In this case, employee benefit trust funds sought unpaid contributions owed under the contracts governing the benefit plans that the trust funds managed for Accuracy Glass & Mirror Company. The panel held that plaintiffs' claims were foreclosed by Bos v. Bd. of Trustees (Bos I), 795 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2015), which held that employers are not fiduciaries under ERISA as to unpaid contributions to ERISA benefit plans. View "Glazing Health & Welfare Fund v. Lamek" on Justia Law

Posted in: ERISA
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These consolidated appeals stemmed from a jury's finding that Pharrell Williams, Robin Thicke, and Clifford Harris, Jr.'s song "Blurred Lines," the world's bestselling single in 2013, infringed Frankie Christian Gaye, Nona Marvisa Gaye, and Marvin Gaye III's copyright in Marvin Gaye's 1977 hit song "Got To Give It Up." The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court's judgment. The panel held that "Got To Give It Up" was entitled to broad copyright protection because musical compositions were not confined to a narrow range of expression; the panel accepted, without deciding, the merits of the district court's ruling that the scope of defendants' copyright was limited, under the Copyright Act of 1909, to the sheet music deposited with the Copyright Office, and did not extend to sound recordings; the district court's order denying summary judgment was not reviewable after a full trial on the merits; the district court did not err in denying a new trial; the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting portions of expert testimony; the verdict was not against the clear weight of the evidence; the awards of actual damages and profits and the district court's running royalty were proper; the district court erred in overturning the jury's general verdict in favor of Harris and the Interscope Parties; the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Gayes' motion for attorney's fees; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in apportioning costs among the parties. View "Williams v. Gaye" on Justia Law

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Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37's general discovery enforcement provisions, a court can order a party to produce its nonparty expert witness at a deposition, and if the party makes no effort to ensure that its witness attends the deposition, sanction the party's counsel when the witness fails to appear unless the failure to produce the expert "was substantially justified or other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust." The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's contempt judgment stemming from the failure of plaintiffs' counsel to pay sanctions when they did not produce their expert at a deposition as ordered. In this case, the panel held that Rule 37 sanctions were reasonable where there was no justification for plaintiffs' failure to attempt to comply with a court order. The court held that the award of defendants' deposition-related costs was not unjust, but was rather the mildest of the possible Rule 37 sanctions. View "Sali v. Corona Regional Medical Center" on Justia Law

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The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's sua sponte dismissal of a complaint seeking damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for alleged violations of plaintiff's constitutional rights by police officers during a traffic stop. The panel disagreed with the district court that plaintiff's allegation that the officers "beat the crap out of" him was too vague and conclusory to support a legally cognizable claim. The panel explained that plaintiff's use of a colloquial, shorthand phrase makes plain that plaintiff was alleging that the officers' use of force was unreasonably excessive. The panel also held that Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), did not bar plaintiff's other claims. View "Byrd v. Phoenix Police Department" on Justia Law

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The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's sua sponte dismissal of a complaint seeking damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for alleged violations of plaintiff's constitutional rights by police officers during a traffic stop. The panel disagreed with the district court that plaintiff's allegation that the officers "beat the crap out of" him was too vague and conclusory to support a legally cognizable claim. The panel explained that plaintiff's use of a colloquial, shorthand phrase makes plain that plaintiff was alleging that the officers' use of force was unreasonably excessive. The panel also held that Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), did not bar plaintiff's other claims. View "Byrd v. Phoenix Police Department" on Justia Law

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Heryford, Trinity County, California's District Attorney, sued American Bankers and others, on behalf of the people under California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL), alleging they had “engaged in deceptive marketing and sales practices.” Private parties may seek injunctive relief and restitution under the UCL; only a public prosecutor may pursue civil penalties. The complaint listed private law firms as “Special Assistant District Attorneys.” An agreement required the Firms to “provide all legal services that are reasonably necessary,” and to “conduct negotiations and provide representations at all hearings, depositions, trials, appeals, and other appearances” with authority to control the performance of their work “under the direction of the District Attorney,” stating that Heryford’s office did “not relinquish its constitutional or statutory authority or responsibility” and retained “sole and final authority to initiate and settle.” Heryford retained the Firms on a contingency-fee basis. American Bankers challenged the contingency-fee agreement as a violation of its federal due process rights that gave the Firms “a direct and substantial financial stake in the imposition of civil penalties and restitution,” which “compromise[d] the integrity and fairness of the prosecutorial motive and the public’s faith in the judicial process.” The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. Heryford’s retention of private counsel to pursue civil penalties cannot be meaningfully distinguished from a private relator’s pursuit of civil penalties under the qui tam provisions of the False Claim Act, an arrangement that does not violate due process. View "American Bankers Management Co. v. Heryford" on Justia Law

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Solis alleged that his former employers violated the federal False Claims Act (FCA) by promoting dangerous off-label uses of a cardiovascular drug, Integrilin, and by paying physicians kickbacks to prescribe Integrilin and an antibiotic drug, Avelox. The district court found that Solis’s FCA claims were foreclosed by the public disclosure bar, which deprives federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction over FCA suits when the alleged fraud has already been publicly disclosed unless the relator is deemed an original source. The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part, holding that Solis’s Integrilin claims were substantially similar to those in prior public disclosures, and were close enough in kind and degree to have put the government on notice to investigate the alleged fraud before Solis filed his complaint. The court vacated the dismissal of Solis’s Integrilin claims and remanded for a determination of whether Solis qualified for the “original source” exception, 31 U.S.C. 3730(e)(4). Concerning Solis’s Avelox claims, the court held that the district court clearly erred in finding that the Avelox claims were publicly disclosed based on court complaints that never mentioned Avelox but affirmed the dismissal of Solis’s Avelox claims on the alternative ground of failure to plead with particularity as required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b). View "Solis v. Millenium Pharmaceuticals, Inc." on Justia Law