Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's summary judgment for defendants and its order denying attorneys' fees in a copyright case alleging infringement of pornographic content. The panel held that the Digital Millennium Copyright Act's safe harbor applied to defendants because the material at issue was stored at the direction of the users and defendants did not have actual or apparent knowledge that the clips were infringing. Furthermore, defendants expeditiously removed the infringing material once they received actual or red flag notice of the infringement, they did not receive financial benefit, and they had a policy to exclude repeat infringers. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in not exercising supplemental jurisdiction over a California state law claim, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying an award of attorneys' fees to defendants. View "Ventura Content, Ltd. v. Motherless, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction in the United States District Court for the District of Guam based on his guilty plea for attempted possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction and rejected defendant's argument that his constitutional right under Article III, Section 2, clause 3 and the Sixth Amendment to be tried in a state or district where the crime was committed was violated because Guam is neither a state nor a district. The panel held that Congress never extended Article III, Section 2, clause 3 to Guam. The panel explained that the Sixth Amendment, which provides for the right to a jury trial in "the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed," did apply to Guam. Congress deemed Guam a "district," defendant's crime occurred in part in the district of Guam, and therefore venue in Guam was proper. View "United States v. Obak" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action alleging that a police officer used excessive force. Plaintiff alleged that excessive force was used when the officer pointed a gun at plaintiff's head in the context of a felony arrest after plaintiff had already been searched, was calm and compliant, and was being watched over by a second armed deputy. The panel held that pointing a loaded gun at the suspect's head in these circumstances constituted excessive force under the Fourth Amendment, but that the officers here were entitled to qualified immunity because the law was not clearly established at the time of the traffic stop. View "Thompson v. Copeland" on Justia Law

California Pacific Bank petitioned for review, challenging the constitutionality of the Banking Secrecy Act (BSA), 31 U.S.C. 5311-5330, and its implementing regulations, and alleged that the FDIC Board of Directors' decision, which found that the Bank violated the BSA and ordered it to implement a plan to bring the Bank into compliance, was not supported by substantial evidence. The Ninth Circuit denied the petition for review, holding that the Bank did not waive its constitutional challenges; the BSA and its implementing regulations were not unconstitutionally vague; neither the FDIC's investigation nor the ALJ was unconstitutionally biased against the Bank; the FDIC acted in accordance with the law by relying on the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council Manual to clarify its four pillars regulation; and the FDIC Board's decisions were supported by substantial evidence. View "California Pacific Bank v. FDIC" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit dismissed defendant's appeal from the district court's judgment on a jury's special verdict in a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action. The panel held that the appeal was time-barred under 28 U.S.C. 2107, Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4, and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58. In this case, the district court never entered a separate judgment and thus Rule 58(c)'s alternative provision for entry of judgment kicked in after 150 days. Because defendant did not file his notice of appeal until more than 30 days later, his appeal was untimely. View "Orr v. Plumb" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit dismissed defendant's appeal from the district court's judgment on a jury's special verdict in a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action. The panel held that the appeal was time-barred under 28 U.S.C. 2107, Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4, and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58. In this case, the district court never entered a separate judgment and thus Rule 58(c)'s alternative provision for entry of judgment kicked in after 150 days. Because defendant did not file his notice of appeal until more than 30 days later, his appeal was untimely. View "Orr v. Plumb" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the conditions of his confinement as a civil detainee while awaiting the adjudication of an involuntary petition under California's Sexually Violent Predator Act violated substantive due process. The Ninth Circuit held that plaintiff's confinement triggered both presumptions under Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 931–35 (9th Cir. 2004), that the conditions of his civil detention amounted to punishment. In this case, sexually violent predator detainees in the Twin Towers Correctional Facility were subject to essentially the same conditions of confinement as their criminal counterparts, and conditions in the sexually violent predator unit in the facility were more restrictive than conditions at Coalinga State Hospital. The panel reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment on plaintiff's claims for damages against the County and against the sheriff in his official capacity; affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment as to plaintiff's claims for damages against the sheriff in his individual capacity; and noted that plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief was moot because he died during the pendency of this appeal. View "King v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit circuit vacated defendant's sentence after the district court denied defendant a minor role reduction under USSG 3B1.2(b). The panel rejected defendant's contention that the district court erred because it did not consider or mention the five factors listed in section 3B1.2 cmt. n.3(C), and failed to mention other factors it did consider when it concluded that defendant did not qualify for a minor-role adjustment. The panel explained that the district court was not obligated to tick off the factors on the record to show that it considered them, and the panel had no trouble determining from the sentencing memoranda and the transcript of the sentencing hearing that the district court was well aware of the factors added by Amendment 794. The panel held, however, that the decision to deny the adjustment rested on incorrect interpretations of section 3B1.2 and Amendment 794. In this case, there was no evidence that defendant had a proprietary interest in the outcome of the operation or otherwise stood to benefit more than minimally, and the government did not account for defendant's limited understanding of the overall scope and structure of the criminal operation. View "United States v. Aguilar Diaz" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for attempting to reenter the United States after a prior removal. Defendant was previously removed for committing an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(B) because he was convicted of felony possession of methamphetamine in violation of California Health & Safety Code section 11378. The panel held that because section 11378 had a trafficking element and required a sufficiently culpable state of mind, section 11378 was a drug trafficking aggravated felony under section 1101(a)(43)(B) where the record of conviction established that the substance involved was federally controlled. Therefore, removal under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) based on such a conviction under section 11378 was not fundamentally unfair. View "United States v. Verduzco-Rangel" on Justia Law

Pipes, ditches, and channels that discharge pollutants from non-concentrated aquatic animal production facilities are point sources within the meaning of 33 U.S.C. 1362(14). The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a motion to dismiss an action under the Clean Water Act, alleging that discharges from Coast Seafoods' hatchery required a National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit. The panel held that, assuming the allegations in the complaint were true, there were discharges of chlorine from the hatchery's pipes, ditches, and channels that required an NPDES permit. View "Olympic Forest Coalition v. Coast Seafoods Co." on Justia Law