Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Ninth Circuit certified the following question of criminal law to the California Supreme Court: Does a finding of probable cause at a preliminary hearing preclude a false arrest claim? The panel panel withdrew the case from submission and stayed further proceedings pending final action by the state court. View "Patterson v. City of Yuba" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit certified the following question of criminal law to the California Supreme Court: Does a finding of probable cause at a preliminary hearing preclude a false arrest claim? The panel panel withdrew the case from submission and stayed further proceedings pending final action by the state court. View "Patterson v. City of Yuba" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and her minor child filed suit against officers and employees of the Child Protective Services (CPS) division of the Arizona Department of Economic Security (ADES), alleging violations of plaintiff's constitutuional rights to familial association. In this case, CPS removed the child from plaintiff's custody following the child's hospitalization for depression and suicidal ideation. The panel held that the allegations in the complaint were sufficient to state a claim to relief that was plausible on its face. In this case, a reasonable official in defendant's position would know that the available information did not establish reasonable cause to believe that the child was in imminent danger of attempting to commit suicide, or that it was necessary to separate her from her mother, transfer her to another hospital and continue to detain her after medical professionals at the hospital concluded she was a low suicide risk. Therefore, the district court erred in dismissing the familial association claim against defendants Koile and Pender on the basis of qualified immunity. However, the district court did not err in granting the motion to dismiss plaintiff's claim that defendants violated plaintiff and her child's due process right to be free from deliberately false statements during juvenile court proceedings. Finally, the district court did not err in dismissing claims against the remaining defendants. View "Keates v. Koile" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and her minor child filed suit against officers and employees of the Child Protective Services (CPS) division of the Arizona Department of Economic Security (ADES), alleging violations of plaintiff's constitutuional rights to familial association. In this case, CPS removed the child from plaintiff's custody following the child's hospitalization for depression and suicidal ideation. The panel held that the allegations in the complaint were sufficient to state a claim to relief that was plausible on its face. In this case, a reasonable official in defendant's position would know that the available information did not establish reasonable cause to believe that the child was in imminent danger of attempting to commit suicide, or that it was necessary to separate her from her mother, transfer her to another hospital and continue to detain her after medical professionals at the hospital concluded she was a low suicide risk. Therefore, the district court erred in dismissing the familial association claim against defendants Koile and Pender on the basis of qualified immunity. However, the district court did not err in granting the motion to dismiss plaintiff's claim that defendants violated plaintiff and her child's due process right to be free from deliberately false statements during juvenile court proceedings. Finally, the district court did not err in dismissing claims against the remaining defendants. View "Keates v. Koile" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the Department in an action brought by private ambulance companies challenging the reimbursement rate for their transportation of patients covered by Medi-Cal. The panel held that plaintiffs failed to carry their burden of producing evidence upon which a reasonable jury could return a verdict in their favor and thus the district court did not err in entering judgment in the Department's favor on the Takings Clause claim. The panel reasoned that the ambulance companies lacked a constitutionally protected property interest in a particular reimbursement rate, but the mandatory-care provision of Cal. Health & Safety Code 1317(d) implicated a constitutionally protected property right. The panel held that section 1317(d) did not effect a regulatory taking under the Penn Central test. The panel also held that the ambulance companies did not establish a due process claim regarding DHCS's failure to ensure that Medi-Cal reimbursement rates kept pace with their costs because they lacked a constitutionally protected interest in any particular reimbursement rate. View "Sierra Medical Services Alliance v. Kent" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the Department in an action brought by private ambulance companies challenging the reimbursement rate for their transportation of patients covered by Medi-Cal. The panel held that plaintiffs failed to carry their burden of producing evidence upon which a reasonable jury could return a verdict in their favor and thus the district court did not err in entering judgment in the Department's favor on the Takings Clause claim. The panel reasoned that the ambulance companies lacked a constitutionally protected property interest in a particular reimbursement rate, but the mandatory-care provision of Cal. Health & Safety Code 1317(d) implicated a constitutionally protected property right. The panel held that section 1317(d) did not effect a regulatory taking under the Penn Central test. The panel also held that the ambulance companies did not establish a due process claim regarding DHCS's failure to ensure that Medi-Cal reimbursement rates kept pace with their costs because they lacked a constitutionally protected interest in any particular reimbursement rate. View "Sierra Medical Services Alliance v. Kent" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for committing a violent crime in aid of racketeering. The panel held that the district court committed harmless error by instructing the jury on the federal definition of "knowingly," which lacked a self-defense instruction, rather than on the Hawaii definition. The panel also held that defendant's prior burglary and false imprisonment convictions qualified as crimes of violence under USSG 4B1.2's residual clause. View "United States v. Adkins" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to dismiss a count charging him with possession of body armor by a violent felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. 931(a)(1) and 924(a)(7). The panel held that defendant's prior conviction for attempted first degree murder under Washington law was a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 16(a) because it required specific intent and had as an element an intentional, threatened, attempted, or actual use of force. Likewise, attempted first degree murder under Washington law is a crime of violence under USSG 4B1.2(a). Therefore, the panel also affirmed the district court's interpretation and application of the Sentencing Guidelines. View "United States v. Studhorse" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to dismiss a count charging him with possession of body armor by a violent felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. 931(a)(1) and 924(a)(7). The panel held that defendant's prior conviction for attempted first degree murder under Washington law was a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 16(a) because it required specific intent and had as an element an intentional, threatened, attempted, or actual use of force. Likewise, attempted first degree murder under Washington law is a crime of violence under USSG 4B1.2(a). Therefore, the panel also affirmed the district court's interpretation and application of the Sentencing Guidelines. View "United States v. Studhorse" on Justia Law

Although the Dodd-Frank Act significantly altered the regulatory framework governing financial institutions, with respect to National Bank Act (NBA) preemption, it merely codified the existing standard established in Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 (1996). The Ninth Circuit applied that standard and held that the National Bank Act did not preempt California's state escrow interest law. In this case, the panel reversed the district court's dismissal of a putative class action alleging that Bank of America violated both California state law and federal law by failing to pay interest on his escrow account funds. The panel held that plaintiff could proceed with his California Unfair Competition Law and breach of contract claims against Bank of America. View "Lusnak v. Bank of America" on Justia Law