Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Although the Dodd-Frank Act significantly altered the regulatory framework governing financial institutions, with respect to National Bank Act (NBA) preemption, it merely codified the existing standard established in Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 (1996). The Ninth Circuit applied that standard and held that the National Bank Act did not preempt California's state escrow interest law. In this case, the panel reversed the district court's dismissal of a putative class action alleging that Bank of America violated both California state law and federal law by failing to pay interest on his escrow account funds. The panel held that plaintiff could proceed with his California Unfair Competition Law and breach of contract claims against Bank of America. View "Lusnak v. Bank of America" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of a petition challenging the denial of petitioner's naturalization application. The panel held that petitioner's conviction for sodomy where the victim was unable to consent, in violation of California Penal Code 286(i), was an aggravated felony. The panel held that a conviction under CPC 286(i), was an aggravated felony as a rape offense under 8 U.S.C.1101(a)(43)(A). The conduct prohibited by CPC 286(i) fell entirely within the generic definition of "rape" as articulated in Castro-Baez v. Reno, 217 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2000). Therefore, petitioner failed to meet the good moral character requirement for naturalization. View "Elmakhzoumi v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of a petition challenging the denial of petitioner's naturalization application. The panel held that petitioner's conviction for sodomy where the victim was unable to consent, in violation of California Penal Code 286(i), was an aggravated felony. The panel held that a conviction under CPC 286(i), was an aggravated felony as a rape offense under 8 U.S.C.1101(a)(43)(A). The conduct prohibited by CPC 286(i) fell entirely within the generic definition of "rape" as articulated in Castro-Baez v. Reno, 217 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2000). Therefore, petitioner failed to meet the good moral character requirement for naturalization. View "Elmakhzoumi v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decisions in favor of the Service in consolidated cases brought by fishing industry groups challenging the Service's decision to end a 1987 sea otter translocation program. After determining that plaintiffs had standing, the panel held that the Service acted lawfully in terminating the southern sea otter relocation program authorized by Public Law 99-625. The panel explained that, in light of the expressly stated goals of Public Law 99-625, it was reasonable to interpret the "mandatory" language in the statute as conditioned on an ongoing successful translocation program. The panel also held that, in the circumstances here, where the agency has discretion to implement an experimental program, it can reasonably interpret the statute to allow it to terminate that program if the statute's purpose was no longer being served. View "California Sea Urchin Commission v. Bean" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decisions in favor of the Service in consolidated cases brought by fishing industry groups challenging the Service's decision to end a 1987 sea otter translocation program. After determining that plaintiffs had standing, the panel held that the Service acted lawfully in terminating the southern sea otter relocation program authorized by Public Law 99-625. The panel explained that, in light of the expressly stated goals of Public Law 99-625, it was reasonable to interpret the "mandatory" language in the statute as conditioned on an ongoing successful translocation program. The panel also held that, in the circumstances here, where the agency has discretion to implement an experimental program, it can reasonably interpret the statute to allow it to terminate that program if the statute's purpose was no longer being served. View "California Sea Urchin Commission v. Bean" on Justia Law

18 U.S.C. 3583(i), which extends the power to revoke a term of supervised release even after the term has expired, does not empower a district court to base a revocation upon violations which (1) were not alleged prior to the expiration period and (2) are not otherwise factually related to a matter raised in a signed warrant or summons issued before expiration. In this case, the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's order revoking supervised release and remanded for further proceedings. The panel held that the district court erred in adjudicating the perjury allegations because they were submitted by the probation officer after defendant's term of supervision had expired. View "United States v. Campbell" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the sentence imposed because of his conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition and the sentence for violating the conditions of his supervised release in another case. The panel held that the district court did not err in applying an enhancement under USSG 2A2.2(a) and (b)(2)(A) for use of a firearm in the commission of an aggravated assault; the panel remanded for the district court to strike the final sentence in Special Condition 5, which explicitly removed the requirement that the government prove mens rea in a future revocation proceeding; three standard conditions of supervised release were unconstitutionally vague and the panel remanded with instructions; and the panel need not decide whether it should read into Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1 a requirement that a district court in a revocation proceeding resolve factual disputes or determine explicitly that such resolution was unnecessary. Therefore, the panel affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded in part. View "United States v. Evans" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit amended the opinion filed on August 22, 2017, and affirmed the denial of an application for disability insurance benefits.The panel held that the ALJ's residual functional capacity determination was supported by substantial evidence. The panel held that a Social Security claimant who wishes to challenge the factual basis of a vocational expert's estimate of the number of available jobs in the regional and national economies must raise this challenge before administrative proceedings have concluded in order to preserve the challenge on appeal in federal district court. In this case, claimant forfeited his challenge to the vocational expert's job numbers. View "Shaibi v. Berryhill" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit granted the union's petition for review of the Board's order declining to award make-whole relief. This case arose when the now-defunct Hacienda Resort Hotel and Casino and Sahara Hotel and Casino in Las Vegas violated section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(5), by unilaterally terminating the union's dues-checkoff without bargaining to agreement or impasse. The panel held that the Board clearly abused its discretion in declining to award the standard remedy of make-whole relief where it did not provide a valid explanation for departing from its standard remedy in dues-checkoff cases, and where the Board effectively ordered no relief at all by ordering prospective-only relief against defunct entities. The panel vacated the Board's order and remanded for the Board to award standard make-whole relief. View "Local Joint Executive Board of Las Vegas v. NLRB" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit granted the union's petition for review of the Board's order declining to award make-whole relief. This case arose when the now-defunct Hacienda Resort Hotel and Casino and Sahara Hotel and Casino in Las Vegas violated section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(5), by unilaterally terminating the union's dues-checkoff without bargaining to agreement or impasse. The panel held that the Board clearly abused its discretion in declining to award the standard remedy of make-whole relief where it did not provide a valid explanation for departing from its standard remedy in dues-checkoff cases, and where the Board effectively ordered no relief at all by ordering prospective-only relief against defunct entities. The panel vacated the Board's order and remanded for the Board to award standard make-whole relief. View "Local Joint Executive Board of Las Vegas v. NLRB" on Justia Law