Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction of an action alleging a claim of legal malpractice. The panel held that what little business Lincoln One conducted was done in Missouri—its state of incorporation—making both Lincoln One and its wholly-owned subsidiary, plaintiff, putative citizens of that state alone. Therefore, there was complete diversity between the parties because defendant was a California citizen. The panel conditionally reversed the district court's jurisdictional dismissal and remanded so that it may consider in the first instance whether Lincoln One and plaintiff were alter egos or there was jurisdictional manipulation that would warrant treating plaintiff as a California citizen. In regard to the issue of classifying the citizenship of a holding company such as Lincoln One that has engaged in no activity other than incorporation, the panel held that a recently-formed holding company's principal place of business is the place where it has its board meetings, regardless of whether such meetings have already occurred, unless evidence shows that the corporation is directed from elsewhere. View "3123 SMB LLC V. Horn" on Justia Law

Section 647(b) of the California Penal Code, which criminalizes the commercial exchange of sexual activity, does not violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of ESP's action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, challenging the constitutionality of Section 647(b). In light of IDK, Inc. v. Clark Cnty., 836 F.2d 1185, 1193 (9th Cir. 1998), rather than Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003), the panel held that laws invalidating prostitution may be justified by rational basis review. The panel held that Section 647(b) is rationally related to several important governmental interests, any of which support a finding of no constitutional violation under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; Section 647(b) does not violate the freedom of intimate or expressive association; and Section 647(b) does not violate the right to earn a living. The panel also held that Section 647(b) does not violate the First Amendment freedom of speech because prostitution did not constitute protected commercial speech and therefore did not warrant such protection. View "Erotic Service Provider Legal Education and Research Project v. Gascon" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit vacated defendant's 60-month sentence for being a felon in possession of a firearm and remanded for resentencing. The panel held that defendant's previous conviction for drug conspiracy under Washington state law did not qualify as a controlled substance offense because the Washington drug conspiracy statute was not a categorical match to conspiracy under federal law. Therefore, the district court erred when calculating defendant's Sentencing Guidelines range and the error was not harmless. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

An arbitration provision in a maritime insurance policy is enforceable despite law in the forum state assertedly precluding its application. This case concerned the scope of insurance coverage Galilea bought for its yacht. The Ninth Circuit held that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 1-16, applied to the insurance policy but not the insurance application. In this case, the insurance application was not a contract, but the insurance policy was a contract subject to the FAA because the FAA constituted established federal maritime law for maritime transactions; federal maritime law was not precluded by Montana law under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. 1012; and federal maritime law was not precluded by Montana law under M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972). The panel also held that the parties have delegated arbitrability issues to an arbitrator. Therefore, the panel affirmed the district court's order finding the policy's arbitration clause enforceable and affirmed the district court's order granting the Underwriters' motion to compel arbitration as to certain causes of action. The panel affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Galilea, LLC v. AGCS Marine Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of an action challenging the constitutionality of California Family Code Section 7962. Section 7962 codified California cases that found gestational surrogacy contracts enforceable. The panel held that this case did not fall within the two limited categories of civil cases that define the scope of Younger abstention. Therefore, the district court erred by abstaining. However, notwithstanding this error, the panel affirmed on issue preclusion grounds the dismissal of the complaint because the California Court of Appeal's decision precluded further litigation of plaintiff's constitutional claims. View "Cook v. Harding" on Justia Law

Because the text of I.R.C. 6630(d)(1) conditions the tax court’s jurisdiction on the timely filing of a petition for review, the thirty-day deadline in I.R.C. 6330(d)(1) is jurisdictional. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the tax court's dismissal of a petition for review of two Internal Revenue Service Notices of Determination based on lack of jurisdiction. In this case, petitioner mistakenly counted the first day after the date of the IRS's notices as day "zero" for purposes of calculating the 30-day period for filing a petition for review. The panel held that petitioner's failure to meet his deadline divested the tax court of the power to hear his case and foreclosed any argument for equitable tolling. View "Duggan v. CIR" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit granted a petition for rehearing, filed an amended opinion reversing the denial of habeas relief challenging petitioner's death sentence, and remanded. The panel held that the Arizona Supreme Court denied petitioner his Eighth Amendment right to individualized sentencing by applying an unconstitutional causal nexus test to his mitigating evidence of a troubled childhood and mental health issues. Such error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the sentence. The panel denied habeas relief on petitioner's claim that the Arizona courts failed to consider his history of substance abuse as a nonstatutory mitigating factor. Finally, the panel agreed with the district court that petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim was procedurally defaulted because it was fundamentally different from the claim he presented in state court. View "Poyson v. Ryan" on Justia Law

A trial judge may excuse a juror at any time for any material problem impeding fair deliberations as long as it was not due to the juror's views of the merits of the case. The Ninth Circuit affirmed defendant's convictions and sentence for fraud and conspiracy in connection with a mortgage fraud scheme. The panel held that Juror No. 9 was removed for reasons other than his views on the merits of the case, but rather, because he was physically unwell and could not serve with his fellow jurors. The panel also held that defendant failed to show that the district court committed plain error when it considered evidence for Guidelines-based sentencing purposes which defendant had made no effort to address. View "United States v. Depue" on Justia Law

A proceeding to revoke supervised release is not a criminal case for purposes of the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment revoking defendant's supervised release based on his admissions during mandatory sex-offender treatment. The panel held that the district court did not violate defendant's right against self-incrimination because that right extended only to prohibit the use of an admission in a criminal case. View "United States v. Hulen" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendants in a class action under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. 227. In this case, plaintiff received a text message from AC Referral, a non-party, that violated the TCPA. Plaintiff claimed that three lenders and two marketing companies ratified the unlawful text messages. The panel held that, although one of the marketing companies, Click Media, had an agency relationship with AC Referral, it was not bound by AC Referral's acts because it lacked knowledge that AC Referral was violating the TCPA and did not have knowledge of facts that would have led a reasonable person to investigate further. Therefore, Click Media could not be deemed to have ratified AC Referral's actions and was not vicariously liable. View "Kristensen v. Credit Payment Services" on Justia Law