Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order compelling arbitration of putative class action claims against AT&T by customers who alleged that AT&T falsely advertised their mobile service plans as "unlimited" when in fact it intentionally slowed data at certain usage levels. The panel held that there was no state action in this case, rejecting plaintiffs' claim that there was state action whenever a party asserts a direct constitutional challenge to a permissive law under Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996). The panel held that Denver Area did not broadly rule that the government was the relevant state actor whenever there was a direct constitutional challenge to a "permissive" statute, and did not support finding state action here. The panel also held that the Federal Arbitration Act merely gives AT&T the private choice to arbitrate, and did not encourage arbitration such that AT&T's conduct was attributable to the state. View "Roberts v. AT&T Mobility, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against defendants, challenging on First Amendment grounds, a school uniform policy that required their two minor children to wear shirts or sweatshirts with a logo consisting of the name of the school, a stylized picture of a gopher (the school mascot), and the motto "Tomorrow’s Leaders." Given the failure of the Ninth Circuit's en banc call, the panel held that the uniform policy—both the motto requirement and the exemption—violated the First Amendment. The panel reasoned that there can hardly be interests more compelling than fostering children's educational achievement and providing a safe and supportive educational environment. However, requiring students to display the motto "Tomorrow's Leaders" on their uniforms was not narrowly tailored to serve those interests. The panel held that the Individual Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because the applicable law was not sufficiently clear to put them on notice that the uniform policy would violate the First Amendment. However, because the Institutional Defendants were not individuals, they were not protected by qualified immunity. Accordingly, the panel affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Frudden v. Pilling" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit challenging the County's permitting scheme, which required individuals to obtain a Conditional Use Permit (CUP) to host weddings on their properties. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' First Amendment claim; affirmed the dismissal of plaintiffs' Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc et seq., claim; vacated the denial of a preliminary injunction; and remanded. The panel applied Kaahumanu v. Hawaii, 682 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 2012), and held that plaintiffs functioned as wedding "vendors" because they seek to profit from facilitating and providing a commercial space for weddings; because they are wedding vendors, they may suffer economic injury as a result of the CUP scheme; and an injunction may redress this harm. Therefore, plaintiffs had Article III standing to bring their First Amendment challenge. In regard to the First Amendment claim, the permitting scheme was unconstitutional because it lacked definite and objective standards and lacked a time limit. In regard to the RLUIPA equal treatment claim, the panel held that plaintiffs did not assert that they were a religious institution or assembly. View "Epona, LLC v. County of Ventura" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's conviction of attempted reentry of a removed alien. Defendant argued that his 2009 removal was invalid because his 1997 drug trafficking conviction under Wash. Rev. Code 69.50.401 was incorrectly determined to be an aggravated felony. The panel held that defendant's waiver of the right to seek judicial review was not considered and intelligent, and thus he was deprived of due process. Furthermore, defendant's prior drug trafficiking conviction did not qualify as an aggravated felony under the categorical approach and could not be the basis for defendant's 2009 removal. Therefore, defendant satisfied all three elements of 8 U.S.C. 1326(d), and his collateral attack on the underlying deportation order should have been successful. The panel remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Valdivia-Flores" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in an action filed by a Montana judicial candidate, Mark French, alleging that Montana's campaign-speech rule, which prohibits judicial candidates from seeking, accepting, or using political endorsements in their election campaigns, violated his First Amendment rights. The panel held that Montana has compelling interests in an impartial and independent judiciary; Rule 4.1(A)(7) of the Montana Code of Juridical Conduct was narrowly tailored to those interests because it strikes an appropriate balance between a candidate's speech and Montana's interest in an independent and impartial judiciary; and French's arguments to the contrary were foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s decision in Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015), and the panel's decision in Wolfson v. Concannon, 811 F.3d 1176 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc). View "French v. Jones" on Justia Law

If the terms used by an expert witness do not have a specialized meaning in law and do not represent an attempt to instruct the jury on the law, or how to apply the law to the facts of the case, the testimony is not an impermissible legal conclusion. The Ninth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for distributing controlled prescription drugs in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). In this case, the panel held that an expert's testimony passed muster under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and 704 where he did not substitute his judgment for the jury's. Rather, he provided a professional opinion about whether a course of conduct comported with the standard of care prevalent in the medical community. View "United States v. Diaz" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas corpus petition challenging petitioner's conviction for first degree murder and rape and his capital sentence. The panel held that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) applied to petitioner's federal habeas petition and rejected his claim that AEDPA was inapplicable because he had filed a request for appointment of counsel and a stay of execution before AEDPA's effective date; although trial counsel was deficient for retaining a psychiatrist for the penalty phase only a few days before its start and by failing to prepare him adequately, the California Supreme Court could reasonably conclude that he was not prejudiced; the California Supreme Court reasonably decided that petitioner's counsel's performance was not deficient because his counsel could have made a strategic decision to omit a witness' testimony at the penalty phase and he had not shown prejudice; the prosecutor's statements at penalty phase closing argument did not violate petitioner's constitutional rights; the panel rejected petitioner's conflict claim; and the court declined to expand the certificate of appealability to include an unexhausted claim that systemic delay in the administration of California’s death penalty rendered executions arbitrary in violation of the Eighth Amendment. View "Rowland v. Chappell" on Justia Law

Section 11351 of the California Health and Safety Code (possession or purchase for sale of designated controlled substance) is divisible –as discussed in Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) –as to its controlled substance requirement, such that a conviction under that statute may, applying the modified categorical approach, be held to be a drug trafficking offense under the Sentencing Guidelines. In this case, the Ninth Circuit applied the modified categorical approach and held that the government established that defendant was previously convicted of possessing cocaine for sale, which qualifies as a drug trafficking offense under the Sentencing Guidelines. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Murillo-Alvarado" on Justia Law

The broad waiver of sovereign immunity found in section 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) waived sovereign immunity for all non-monetary claims, and section 704 of the APA's final agency action requirement constrained only actions brought under the APA, 5 U.S.C. 702, 704. The Navajo Nation filed suit challenging Interior's published guidelines clarifying how it would make surplus and shortage determinations for delivery to Western states of the waters of the Colorado River. The panel affirmed the district court's dismissal of the Nation's claims under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., based on lack of standing where the challenged guidelines did not present a reasonable probability of threat to either the Nation's adjudicated water rights or its practical water needs. The panel also held that the Nation's breach of trust claim sought relief other than money damages, and the waiver of sovereign immunity in section 702 applied squarely to the claim. Therefore, the panel reversed and remanded as to this issue. Finally, the district court acted within its discretion in refusing post-judgment leave to amend. View "Navajo Nation v. Department of the Interior" on Justia Law

The government-action bar, 31 U.S.C. 3730(e)(3), applies even when the Government is no longer an active participant in an ongoing qui tam lawsuit. The existence of multiple claims—some of which the Government settles—has no bearing on the Government's relationship to the entire action. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a qui tam action brought under the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3729 et seq., alleging that a medical device supplier, Biotronik, engaged in a series of wrongful acts. The panel held that the Government remained a party to suits that have been settled, and the Government could not be said "partially" to have intervened in a prior qui tam suit. Therefore, relator was barred by section 3730(e)(3). View "United States ex rel. Bennett v. Biotronik, Inc." on Justia Law