Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The broad waiver of sovereign immunity found in section 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) waived sovereign immunity for all non-monetary claims, and section 704 of the APA's final agency action requirement constrained only actions brought under the APA, 5 U.S.C. 702, 704. The Navajo Nation filed suit challenging Interior's published guidelines clarifying how it would make surplus and shortage determinations for delivery to Western states of the waters of the Colorado River. The panel affirmed the district court's dismissal of the Nation's claims under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., based on lack of standing where the challenged guidelines did not present a reasonable probability of threat to either the Nation's adjudicated water rights or its practical water needs. The panel also held that the Nation's breach of trust claim sought relief other than money damages, and the waiver of sovereign immunity in section 702 applied squarely to the claim. Therefore, the panel reversed and remanded as to this issue. Finally, the district court acted within its discretion in refusing post-judgment leave to amend. View "Navajo Nation v. Department of the Interior" on Justia Law

The government-action bar, 31 U.S.C. 3730(e)(3), applies even when the Government is no longer an active participant in an ongoing qui tam lawsuit. The existence of multiple claims—some of which the Government settles—has no bearing on the Government's relationship to the entire action. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a qui tam action brought under the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3729 et seq., alleging that a medical device supplier, Biotronik, engaged in a series of wrongful acts. The panel held that the Government remained a party to suits that have been settled, and the Government could not be said "partially" to have intervened in a prior qui tam suit. Therefore, relator was barred by section 3730(e)(3). View "United States ex rel. Bennett v. Biotronik, Inc." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit held that the Treaty of Point Elliott reserves to the Lummi Nation the right to fish in the waters west of Whidbey Island, Washington. The panel previouslyy concluded that the Treaty secured the Lummi's right to fish in Admiralty Inlet because the Lummi would have used the Inlet as a passage to travel from its home in the San Juan Islands to present-day Seattle. The panel held that the waters at issue are situated directly between the San Juan Islands and Admiralty Inlet and also would have served as a passage to Seattle. In United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974), Judge Boldt developed a framework for determining the usual and accustomed grounds and stations (U&As) for Indian signatories to the Treaty and other similarly worded treaties. At step one of the analysis, all parties agree that Finding of Fact 46 was ambiguous because it did not clearly include or exclude the disputed waters. At step two, the panel held that the district court erred in excluding the waters west of Whidbey Island from the Lummi's U&A. View "Lower Elwha Klallam Indian Tribe v. Lummi Nation" on Justia Law

The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards does not allow nonsignatories or non-parties to compel arbitration. The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) expressly exempted from its scope any contracts of employment of seamen. In this maritime action, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of a motion to compel arbitration arising from the death of a seaman in the sinking of a fishing vessel. Dongwon moved to compel arbitration based on an employment agreement between the seaman and the vessel's owner, Majestic. The panel held that Dongwon was neither a signatory nor a party to the employment agreement. The panel also held that Dongwan could not compel arbitration on grounds other than the Convention Treaty, such as the FAA. View "Yang v. Dongwon Industries, Ltd." on Justia Law

The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards does not allow nonsignatories or non-parties to compel arbitration. The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) expressly exempted from its scope any contracts of employment of seamen. In this maritime action, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of a motion to compel arbitration arising from the death of a seaman in the sinking of a fishing vessel. Dongwon moved to compel arbitration based on an employment agreement between the seaman and the vessel's owner, Majestic. The panel held that Dongwon was neither a signatory nor a party to the employment agreement. The panel also held that Dongwan could not compel arbitration on grounds other than the Convention Treaty, such as the FAA. View "Yang v. Dongwon Industries, Ltd." on Justia Law

Once the government has probable cause to believe that the probationer has actually reoffended by participating in a violent felony, the government's need to locate the probationer and protect the public is heightened. This heightened interest in locating the probationer is sufficient to outweigh a third party's privacy interest in the home that she shares with the probationer. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of police officers and the city in a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action. Plaintiff and her minor granddaughter alleged that their constitutional rights were violated when officers conducted a search of plaintiff's home. The officers were searching for plaintiff's daughter, who was on probation. The terms of the probation allowed warrantless searches of her person and residence. The panel held that the warrantless search of the home over plaintiff's objection was reasonable as a matter of law. View "Smith v. City of Santa Clara" on Justia Law

Once the government has probable cause to believe that the probationer has actually reoffended by participating in a violent felony, the government's need to locate the probationer and protect the public is heightened. This heightened interest in locating the probationer is sufficient to outweigh a third party's privacy interest in the home that she shares with the probationer. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of police officers and the city in a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action. Plaintiff and her minor granddaughter alleged that their constitutional rights were violated when officers conducted a search of plaintiff's home. The officers were searching for plaintiff's daughter, who was on probation. The terms of the probation allowed warrantless searches of her person and residence. The panel held that the warrantless search of the home over plaintiff's objection was reasonable as a matter of law. View "Smith v. City of Santa Clara" on Justia Law

"Personally identifiable information," pursuant to the Video Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 18 U.S.C. 2710(b)(1), means only that information that would readily permit an ordinary person to identify a specific individual's video-watching behavior. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of an action alleging that ESPN disclosed plaintiff's personally identifiable information in violation of the Act. Plaintiff alleged that ESPN violated the Act by giving a third party his Roku device serial number and by giving the identity of the video he watched. The panel held that plaintiff had Article III standing to bring his claim because section 2710(b)(1) was a substantive provision protecting consumers' concrete interest in their privacy. On the merits, the panel held that the information described in plaintiff's complaint did not constitute personally identifiable information under the Act. In this case, the information at issue could not identify an individual unless it was combined with other data in the third party's possession, data that ESPN never disclosed and apparently never even possessed. View "Eichenberger v. ESPN, Inc." on Justia Law

In a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action challenging Butte County Jail's policy prohibiting the delivery of unsolicited commercial mail to inmates, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment for defendants and the denial of plaintiff's motion to reopen discovery and for relief from judgment. Plaintiff, publisher of a magazine aimed at county jail inmates, argued that the jail's mail policy violated the First Amendment. The panel evaluated the mail policy under the test established for reviewing constitutional challenges to prison regulations in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987), and held that the ban was rationally connected to a legitimate government interest; electronic kiosks were an adequate alternative; distributing the magazine itself would have a significant impact on the allocation of jail resources; and paper has created serious problems at the jail, and the jail's mail policy was not an exaggerated response to those problems. Finally, the panel held that plaintiff abandoned its remaining arguments. View "Crime Justice & America, Inc. v. Honea" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's imposition of a sentencing enhancement based on defendant's prior Arizona conviction for attempted armed robbery, which the court treated as a "crime of violence" under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual. The panel reexamined its previous decision in United States v. Taylor, 529 F.3d 1232 (9th Cir. 2008), that Arizona attempted armed robbery should be considered a crime of violence under the relevant Guidelines provision, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010), which construed a similarly worded crime-of-violence provision in the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). The panel held that, although Johnson did not require the panel to depart from some of its analysis in Taylor, Arizona attempted armed robbery nonetheless qualifies as a crime of violence for reasons other than those relied upon in Taylor. The panel held that Arizona robbery (and thus armed robbery) was a categorical match to generic robbery, and that Arizona attempt was equivalent to generic attempt, so defendant's conviction did constitute a crime of violence for purposes of USSG 4B1.2. View "United States v. Sanchez Molinar" on Justia Law